



Open Crisis, Hidden Opportunity: 
Europeanization, the Euro Crisis, and 
the Case of Social Policy 
 
Hailey Purdue, B.A. (Hons), M.A 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of 







I declare that the thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in 









Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... vii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. xi 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. xii 
 .................................................................................................................................... 1 
 Motivation and Contribution ..................................................................................... 1 
 Why Britain and Ireland, and Why Two Different Areas of Social Policy? ................. 4 
 Thesis Aims ................................................................................................................. 5 
 Methodology .............................................................................................................. 9 
1.4.1 The Comparative Method: The ‘Few-N’ Approach .......................................... 10 
1.4.2 MSSD Method .................................................................................................. 13 
1.4.3 Case Study Approach ....................................................................................... 14 
1.4.4 Interviews ......................................................................................................... 16 
1.4.5 Newspapers ...................................................................................................... 18 
 Definitions ................................................................................................................ 21 
 Clarification on the Euro Crisis ................................................................................. 26 
 Thesis Structure ....................................................................................................... 27 
1.7.1 Events Beyond the Thesis: The ‘Brexit’ Crisis ................................................... 38 
 .................................................................................................................................. 39 
 Academics on ‘Europeanization’ and the Definitional Contest ............................... 40 
2.1.1 ‘Top-down’ Approach....................................................................................... 43 
2.1.2 ‘Bottom-up’ Approach ..................................................................................... 48 
2.1.3 ‘Bi-Directional’ Approach ................................................................................. 51 
2.1.4 ‘Circular’ Approach: Europeanization and Crises ............................................. 54 
2.1.5 Concept and Debate: The Controversy of Usefulness ..................................... 55 
 Europeanization Theory: Going Beyond the Traditional Integration Theories? ...... 59 
2.2.1 Neo-functionalism vs. Europeanization ........................................................... 59 
2.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism/Intergovernmentalism vs. Europeanization ... 60 
2.2.3 Multi-level Governance (MLG) vs. Europeanization ........................................ 61 
 The ‘Crisis Spectrum’ and Integration Theories: The Impact of Crises .................... 62 
 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 68 
iv 
 
 .................................................................................................................................. 70 
 Economic Crisis Literature: ‘Crisis Progression’ vs. ‘Crisis Diversity’........................ 71 
3.1.1 The ‘Dominant’ Economic ‘Crisis Progressionists’ ........................................... 71 
3.1.2 The Economic Perspective of the EU’s Hidden Opportunities ......................... 73 
 Political Crisis Literature: ‘Crisis Progression’ vs. ‘Crisis Diversity’ .......................... 77 
3.2.1 The Political ‘Crisis Progressionists’ ................................................................. 77 
3.2.2 The Political ‘Crisis Diversifiers’ ........................................................................ 82 
 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 92 
 .................................................................................................................................. 94 
PART I: Europe and the Euro Crisis ...................................................................................... 96 
 Story of the Crisis: The Collapse of the European Edifice ........................................ 96 
4.1.1 The Greek Tragedy ........................................................................................... 96 
4.1.2 The Portuguese Problem.................................................................................. 98 
4.1.3 Spain and Italy: ECB Rescue as PIG becomes PIIGS .......................................... 99 
4.1.4 Cyprus: The Crisis Island ................................................................................. 100 
4.1.5 The Response to the Crisis: The German “Master of Europe” ....................... 101 
4.1.6 Fiscal Compact (March 2012): Towards “One Voice” .................................... 102 
4.1.7 The Banking Union (June 2012) ..................................................................... 103 
4.1.8 The Latest Crisis News .................................................................................... 104 
PART II: Member States and the Euro Crisis ...................................................................... 105 
 The Taming of the Celtic Tiger ............................................................................... 105 
4.2.1 Story of the Crisis: The Collapse of the Celtic Tiger ....................................... 105 
4.2.2 The Irish Response to the Crisis ..................................................................... 107 
4.2.3 The EU’s Response to the Irish Crisis: EU/IMF and ECB ................................. 109 
 The British Dilemma: “No Banking System is an Island” ........................................ 111 
4.3.1 British Bailout to Ireland: A “Friend in Need” ................................................ 111 
4.3.2 Britain’s Bank Rescue: The ‘Brown Plan’ ........................................................ 113 
4.3.3 EU Budget and Britain: “The Fall Guy for Failure” ......................................... 114 
 Conclusion: ‘Crisis Progression’ and ‘Crisis Diversity’ in Action I ........................... 116 
 ................................................................................................................................ 120 
PART I: European Social Policy, the ‘Good’ Crises and the Absent Crisis........................... 124 
 Phase 1: Initial Inactivity (1950s-1970s) ................................................................ 124 
 Phase 2: A Period of Crisis Integration (1970s-early 1990s) .................................. 126 
 Phase 3: Consolidation (Mid 1990s-2007) ............................................................. 129 
v 
 
 Phase 4: Crisis and Consolidation (2008-Present Day) .......................................... 134 
PART II: National Social Policy and the History of Revitalisation ....................................... 137 
Britain ................................................................................................................................. 137 
 Phase 1: Initial Activity (1940s-1970s) ................................................................... 137 
 Phase 2: Recession and Resistance (1970s-Early 1990s) ....................................... 138 
 Phase 3: Revitalisation and Innovation (Mid-1990s -2007) ................................... 140 
 Phase 4: Crisis and National Resistance (2008 – Present Day) .............................. 142 
Ireland ................................................................................................................................ 146 
 Phase 1: Inactivity of the Free State (1930s-1970s) .............................................. 146 
 Phase 2: “The False Dawn” (1970s-Early 1990s) .................................................... 147 
 Phase 3: Reciprocal Revitalisation (Mid 1990s-2007) ............................................ 151 
 Phase 4: The “Sick Man of Europe” as the Poster Child for Austerity (2008- Present 
Day)……………………. ............................................................................................................. 153 
 Conclusion: ‘Crisis Progression’ and ‘Crisis Diversity’ in Action II .......................... 157 
 ................................................................................................................................ 163 
 Phase 1: The Mismanagement of Managed Migration (2010-2011) ..................... 166 
6.1.1 Pre-Crisis Concerns: The Dawn of Britain’s Anti-Free Movement ................. 166 
6.1.2 New Crisis, Old Concerns, New Policy Response ........................................... 169 
6.1.3 The Beginning of the End: British Welfare State vs. EU Citizenship .............. 170 
 Phase 2: The Crisis Response (2012-2014) ............................................................ 173 
6.2.1 The Stable Crisis: Right to Reside and the Inflexible Positions of Britain and the 
EU………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………173 
6.2.2 British Policy Innovation over Non-Intervention: The Battle over ‘Benefit 
Tourism’………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….... 176 
6.2.3 British Innovation from the Impasse over Immigration ................................. 180 
 Phase 3: The British Negotiation (2015-2016) ....................................................... 183 
6.3.1 EU Policy Stability ........................................................................................... 183 
6.3.2 The Dawn of a New Crisis ............................................................................... 184 
 Conclusion: ‘Crisis Progression’ vs. ‘Crisis Diversity’ .............................................. 185 
 ................................................................................................................................ 191 
 Phase 1: The Activation of Activation Policy (2009-2011) ..................................... 195 
7.1.1 Pre-Crisis Activation Thinking......................................................................... 195 
7.1.2 The Grubb Report: The “Grandfather” of Activation ..................................... 198 
7.1.3 Crisis Activated Activation: The Takeover of the Troika ................................ 199 
 Phase 2: The Activation of the Irish System (2012-2014) ...................................... 202 
vi 
 
7.2.1 The Catalytic Crisis: Implementation, Resistance and Reform ...................... 202 
7.2.2 An Irish Guarantee for the Young Unemployed............................................. 209 
 Phase 3: The Rise of the ‘Celtic Phoenix’ and Resurrection of Irish Employment 
(2015-2017) ........................................................................................................................ 211 
 Conclusion: ‘Crisis Progression’ vs. ‘Crisis Diversity’ .............................................. 213 
 ................................................................................................................................ 218 
 Conclusions: “Crisis Proversity” ............................................................................. 220 
 Implications: National Impact and Response to the Euro Crisis ............................ 223 
 Implications: EU Impact and Response to the Euro Crisis ..................................... 227 
8.3.1 Theoretical Implications: Europeanization in Crisis Times............................. 227 
8.3.2 Crisis Implications: The EU System in Crisis Times ......................................... 228 
 Future Research ..................................................................................................... 229 
Postscript ............................................................................................................................... 231 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 234 
Media News Articles .......................................................................................................... 281 
Interviews ........................................................................................................................... 300 












Hailey Purdue, BA (Hons), M.A. 
Open Crisis, Hidden Opportunity: Europeanization, the Euro Crisis , and the Case 
of Social Policy. 




For many the euro crisis has been a complete disaster for the European Union (EU) with a 
cascade of crisis from one policy area to another with collapse both imminent and inevitable. 
This conception of crisis relies on a progressive vision. As Angela Merkel epitomised in 2010, 
"If the euro fails, it's not only the currency that fails…it's Europe that fails and with it the idea 
of the European Union”. However, what really constitutes a crisis? Can a crisis act as an 
‘engine’ rather than an obstruction for EU policy development?  
Crises are not uncommon to the EU nor are they necessarily a hindrance. As the history of the 
EU demonstrates, responding to crisis is normal. A crisis does not present the end of 
something or a binary option between a negative or positive eventuality. Rather, this thesis 
purports that a crisis creates a range of possibilities. To demonstrate this, theories of 
Europeanization are combined with a novel ‘crisis spectrum’ concept comprising of three crisis 
logics; ‘crisis progression’, ‘crisis diversity’ and ‘crisis stability’ and applied to particular areas 
of British and Irish social policy. 
While these crisis logics can be applied to any policy area, this research focuses on the case of 
social policy. In particular, the British social policy response from welfare policy to the free 
movement of EU nationals due to the national immigration debate induced by the euro crisis, 
and the Irish social policy response from activation policy to the unprecedented 
unemployment crisis due to the euro crisis. Semi-structured interviews combined with an 
analysis of primary documents reveal which of these crisis logics is occurring, whether 
independently or simultaneously within the same period. Both the British and Irish case 
demonstrate how a crisis does not always occur in a progressive, mechanical fashion, 
uniformly arresting policy development and policy responses, but that it can lead to a range 
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Introduction: Crippling Crisis or Crisis 
Integration? The Euro Crisis as a Threat or an 
Opportunity for Social Policy? 
 
"The euro is in danger… if the euro fails, then Europe fails." (Angela Merkel, 20101) 
"The euro is the heart of Europe. If the euro is destroyed, it's the whole of Europe that goes 
up in smoke. If Europe goes up in smoke it's the peace of our continent that will be one day or 
another be called into question." (Nicolas Sarkozy, French President, January 20122) 
“The European Union is an historically unique achievement. It has always been built gradually 
and it has emerged stronger from every crisis. There is no reason that this time would be 
different.” (Herman Van Rompuy, Brussels, 29th June 20113) 
 
 Motivation and Contribution 
In 2007, a global economic crisis ensued after the American housing bubble burst. The bubble 
had been instigated by the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage industry in the US. The 
interconnectedness of the global system meant the crisis swiftly became a global issue. The 
problem was that Europe itself had participated in the boom-time lending practices, handing 
out easy loans. Europe unavoidably followed suit in 2009 with Greece, Ireland and eventually 
even Italy and Spain falling victim to the economic crisis. Many commentators and academics 
claimed this was the end of not only the euro/Eurozone, but of the European Union (EU) itself.  
The quotes above epitomise the two contrasting views of the ongoing European 
economic crisis. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy represent the dominant, classical view that 
the crisis is the potential death of the EU while Herman Van Rompuy symbolises the growing 
                                                          
1 (The Guardian, May 2010) 
2 (The Telegraph, January 2012) 
3 (EC Press Release, 2011a) 
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counter argument that the crisis will see the continuing development of the EU and possibly, 
a stronger EU from a crippling crisis. It is these two perspectives which this thesis explores.  
Crises are not uncommon to the EU nor are they necessarily a hindrance to the EU’s 
development. Traditionally there has always been a debate over the role of crises in the EU, 
as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3. Some have viewed crises as the beginning of the end for 
policy development and, ultimately, the death of the EU. Contrastingly, others have viewed 
crises as ‘engines’ of progress facilitating the development of the EU. This thesis is focused on 
this long-standing, lively debate. Intrigued by the most recent crisis in the EU (at the time the 
research commenced, the euro crisis) I was compelled to explore the most unprecedented, 
protracted crisis in the EU’s history to decipher whether crises really are the death of the EU 
as many claim or whether we are in fact seeing a ‘crisis spectrum’ at play. 
Accordingly, this research is stimulated to identify the dangerous or expediting effect 
the crisis had on the integration process and the resultant impact on the process of 
Europeanization at the national level. In doing so, there are three key contributions this thesis 
makes to the field of Europeanization theory, EU crisis literature and euro crisis literature 
respectively. Firstly, the thesis applies Europeanization theory and examines the 
Europeanization process in a time of crisis. Europeanization theory emerged in a benign 
context and has primarily been considered in non-crisis times. The euro crisis has initiated a 
movement in Europeanization research to explore the effect of a crisis on the Europeanization 
process (see Saurugger, 2014; Triandafyllidou, 2014; Christou and Kyris, 2017; González, 2017; 
Windwehr, 2017). This thesis is contributing to this new theoretical discussion, taking 
Europeanization theory further than it has currently been applied by analysing new countries 
and new policy areas.  
Secondly, the thesis explores the impact of the euro crisis through the application of 
a novel ‘crisis spectrum’ comprising of three crisis logics ‘crisis progression’, ‘crisis diversity’ 
and ‘crisis stability’. These three novel crisis logics employ Europeanization theory to identify 
the type of crisis pattern occurring, to decipher whether policy is developing because of the 
euro crisis or is being inhibited by the euro crisis. Furthermore, to identify if and what type of 
Europeanization is occurring in the euro crisis. The thesis develops these logics on the premise 
that the EU is flexible and needs to be flexible to survive. Consequently, the thesis provides a 
new framework with which to examine: the EU system in a crisis; the Europeanization process 
in crisis times; and Europeanization theory in crisis times. This contributes to examining and 
conceiving the impact of crises on the EU in a way which has not been done before. 
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Thirdly, the thesis contributes to widening the euro crisis debate by looking at the 
crisis from a new and different perspective, namely from the perspective of social policy. Social 
policy is the instrument which is used to explore the impact of the euro crisis on the 
Europeanization process. This is a surrounding policy area which has been overlooked by 
academics due to the scholarly focus on the core crisis area of economic policy, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. While the crisis literature on economic policy is important, the 
other side of the coin to economic policy is social policy. The economic literature is highly 
significant on account of the nature of the crisis, however it omits this interconnection and 
interdependence between the two policy areas. Yet, in practice underpinning social policy is 
monetary policy. As one interviewee stated in relation to the economic and social issues 
perpetuating in Ireland at the time, “the two are intertwined. It is a false dichotomy 
conceptualising them as either/or, they are flip sides of the one coin” (Interview 14, November 
2015). Accordingly, this research is complimentary to the research already conducted within 
economics by providing an analysis of the impact of the euro crisis on the other side of the 
coin. 
Hence, it is equally important to look at the surrounding policy areas both for how the 
crisis has impacted on the rest of the EU system and for what it has demonstrated with regards 
to European Integration (EI) and European crises overall. After all, even during normal times 
“European integration has unintended and unanticipated consequences” (Dyson and Goetz, 
2003: 7). This is a scholarly opportunity that has been underdeveloped. Thus, the thesis is 
looking at the euro crisis from a different perspective to the majority, with the euro crisis 
literature having examined the impact of the euro crisis on the European Social Model and 
national welfare states as a collective. This is where the thesis fills the gap in the current 
literature, bridging the literature on EU crises and the euro crisis in particular, with literature 
on social policy.  
There were an array of (European) policy areas that could have been explored. Social 
policy was chosen due to two key features. Firstly, within crisis countries austerity 
programmes it was social policy which was being adjusted and regulated, acting as an 
important shock absorber in the crisis, as had consistently occurred at times of economic crisis. 
Secondly, in comparison to other policies, the jurisdiction over social policy had been highly 
contentious between member states and the EU. Thus, social policy is an excellent litmus 
paper for testing the impact of crises on European policy responses as well as EU and member 
state policy interactions. Social policy’s treatment within the current crisis is telling for how 
the EU operates in ‘crisis mode’ and for how member states use Europeanization and/or de-
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Europeanization as either an opportunity or a defensive strategy against its debilitating 
effects. This focus on social policy leads to the two main research questions of this thesis: 
• What is the impact of crises within the EU on member states’ social policy 
responses?  
• How flexible and adaptable are member states?  
 Why Britain and Ireland, and Why Two Different Areas of Social Policy?  
Britain and Ireland are the member states under comparative examination. In using 
two this thesis avoids the pitfalls of studying a single-country and the problems of many-
country analysis where there are too many variables and not enough countries when using the 
qualitative rather than the quantitative approach. Ultimately, this is the most appropriate way 
to “maximize comparability” (Lijphart, 1971: 689) within the comparative method. On a 
practical level both countries are English speaking countries. The analyses within the case 
studies use both primary and secondary sources in the form of semi-structured interviews, 
primary resources such as government reports, academic literature and newspaper reports.   
The cases are also interesting for their contrasting features. Britain is outside of the 
Eurozone, on the periphery of the current crisis and the ‘awkward partner’ of Europe. 
Contrastingly, Ireland being inside the Eurozone, was one of the countries at the centre of the 
crisis and is the ‘faithful son of Europe’. Their historical, financial, and geographical closeness 
provides another interesting dimension to this comparison. Hence, the nexus between these 
two EU member states provides an optimum window with which to view the effects of, and 
responses to, the euro crisis. 
Similar to the choice of policy area and member states to be examined, the umbrella 
of social policy has a wide range of policy areas. This thesis cannot possibly cover them all. The 
specific social policy areas placed under examination are, firstly, welfare policy in Britain, 
examining the topical and controversial interplay of the social impact of EU free movement 
with the British welfare state. This explores how welfare policy mechanisms in control of the 
state were used to manage welfare entitlement of EU nationals. This was in the context of EU 
free movement where national immigration policy is invalid and a highly divisive national 
immigration debate. Secondly, activation policy in Ireland, which examines the interplay of the 
EU’s bailout conditions with Ireland’s assistance to their unemployed in response to the 
unprecedented unemployment crisis. This explores how activation policy was reformed, using 
pre-crisis national policy proposals, and Europeanized at an accelerated pace due to the euro 
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crisis. There are two different areas of social policy under analysis as the thesis has followed 
the crisis trajectory for where the EU has impacted the greatest at the national level.  
Respectively, there were no two identical policy areas in Britain and Ireland that were 
equally influenced by the EU. The British dispute with the EU over the social impact of EU free 
movement was a topical event at the time of research and the area of British social policy 
where the EU was impacting and interacting the greatest. Ireland was experiencing 
unprecedented levels of (youth) unemployment and yet, notably there was no (negative) 
impact from EU free movement in Ireland. Rather, activation policy was identified as having 
undergone the biggest change within Irish social policy during the euro crisis, which was not 
without controversy. From the interviews conducted, it was clear that the positive or negative 
predisposition with free movement was a matter of conception. One Irish interviewee stated 
the British questioning of EU free movement was “a terribly un-European question to raise” 
(Interview 17, January 2016). Ireland’s highly positive indubitable attitude towards the EU 
combined with the contrasting “cultural reality of emigration in Ireland” when compared to 
Britain (Interview 14, November 2015) meant the impact of EU mobility did not and could not 
become a political issue as it had in Britain. Hence, there was little to gain by exploring free 
movement in the Irish context. 
Nonetheless, while there were no two identical policy areas in Britain and Ireland that 
were equally influenced by the EU, the euro crisis has similarly translated into welfare issues 
within these two separate social policy areas. These policies were also chosen because they 
are the crossover areas where politics and economics interact the most. Political, economic 
logic and social dimensions have always interplayed and been interwoven within the multi-
layered composition of the EU and European policy field. There has always existed a political 
dimension to economic policy, and an economic dimension to social policy. Understanding this 
interplay of politics and economics is key to this thesis.   
 Thesis Aims 
The thesis will incrementally analyse the EU system and the case of social policy within 
the euro crisis, exploring whether there is a threatening or expediting impact from the euro 
crisis. By implication, this thesis aims to identify the specific crisis patterns at the European, 
national and social policy levels as well as within specific areas of national social policy. 
Respectively, motivated by the two research questions above, the focus of this thesis is on the 
following three core aims; 
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1. To explore if ‘crisis diversity’ is occurring in the euro crisis, demonstrating the presence 
of a ‘crisis spectrum’ which is currently being overlooked; 
2. To explore the role of crises in Europeanization and the resulting impact on national 
social policy; 
3. To explore the role of member states in the current euro crisis and by proxy, their role 
within the EI process. 
In order to fulfil these aims this thesis is underpinned by Europeanization theory. 
Crises within the EI process take two forms, a “crisis of” and “crisis in” integration (Kühnhardt, 
2009: 1-2). The former is more substantial in its consequences, by means of contesting the 
nature and rationale of the integration process. The latter is spoken in relation to difficulties 
in implementing certain policy objectives without any significant adverse effect to the 
integration process. Similar to other analysts of EI this thesis conceives three logics regarding 
the impact of crises (Kühnhardt, 2009: Gehler, 2009; Elvert, 2009) which together comprise 
the ‘crisis spectrum’ (see figure 1). This thesis develops the logics of ‘crisis progression’, ‘crisis 
diversity’ and ‘crisis stability’ on the premise that the EU is flexible and needs to be flexible to 
survive (see figure 2). These logics are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The three novel logics 
will be used and explicitly applied within each chapter to identify the crisis pattern within the 
pre-crisis (Chapter 5), crisis (Chapters 4, 6-7) and post-crisis (Chapters 6-7) periods for 
purposes of comparison. This will facilitate deciphering the impact of the euro crisis on 
peripheral policy areas, which is indicative of the impact of crises on the EU. 
From the perspective of ‘crisis progression’, major crises in core policy areas should 
spread to other connected policy areas. Hence, the euro crisis should lead to an economic 
crisis, then a social crisis and continue to spread to other policy areas until the potential 
collapse of the EU. The protagonists of ‘crisis progression’ would expect to see events 
occurring in economic policy mirrored within social policy on account of monetary policy 
underpinning social policy. For ‘crisis progressionists’ social policy is so expensive that the crisis 
in economic policy, in theory, should be undermining social policy. However, do crises occur 
in such a mechanical fashion? From the perspective of ‘crisis diversity’, major crises in core 
policy areas should create policy responses and lead to policy development. By implication, 
the euro crisis should create a policy response and policy adjustment to the crisis in peripheral 
areas, leading to policy development within areas such as social policy.    
It is important to note at the outset that the thesis acknowledges the clear 















The ‘crisis spectrum’ demonstrates how a crisis cannot be perceived as 
solely a threat or an opportunity, rather there is a spectrum of 
possibilities. The logics of ‘crisis progression’ and ‘crisis diversity’ 
demonstrate the respective ends of the spectrum; two crisis ideals. At 
present the crisis is being viewed from the ‘crisis progression’ end of the 
spectrum without recognition of the continuum it is a part of. At different 
times in the crisis it will be at different places along this spectrum, its 
position on the spectrum will be dependent on the dynamics of the time. 
‘Crisis progression’ and ‘crisis diversity’ are in tension with each other, not 
opposites of one another, whereby they are mutually dependent. 




















 Figure 2 
‘Crisis Stability’ involves some policy areas responding to the crisis but not adapting while other 
policy areas to adapt and innovate in response to the crisis. This in-adaptation is a response 
rather than an inability to respond to the crisis. This in-adaptation allows the rest of the system 
to remain flexible. 
‘Crisis Progression’: ‘Domino’ Effect as all the blocks fall as they fail to adapt 
in response to the crisis. 
‘Crisis Diversity’ all the policy areas innovate and 
adapt in different ways in response to the crisis.  
The ‘Crisis Logics’ 
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State (1992). Milward argued that the EU was built to ‘rescue’ the nation states and 
states perceived integration as the only path to national reassertion after the destruction of 
two world wars. The findings from this thesis provide evidence to suggest that Britain and 
Ireland’s disparate responses to the euro crisis helped to save the EU from disintegration. 
Furthermore, that member states drive social policy’s development equally as much as the EU. 
However, it is not an aim of this thesis to explore the impact of the euro crisis on member 
states social policy responses in relation to Milward’s thesis for two reasons. Firstly, the focus 
of this thesis is on the impact of the euro crisis on Britain and Ireland’s social policy responses 
to the euro crisis, not on whether the EU or the member states themselves were driving social 
policy’s development. Hence, the thesis is unable to accommodate such a significant 
exploration of Milward’s work. Secondly, by implication of the former, these findings are not 
extensive enough to provide conclusive evidence for a reversal of Milward’s thesis. As such, 
the implications of these findings for Milward’s work will be discussed within the conclusion 
of this chapter as an area which merits further study.    
 Methodology 
This thesis uses a qualitative, comparative, case-study and policy analysis approach, 
using the ‘Method of Difference’ or what is also known as the ‘Most Similar Systems Design’ 
(MSSD). It is the aim of this thesis to be a “conscious thinker” (Lijphart, 1971: 685) and limit 
the weaknesses of the comparative method but exploit the advantages in creating a rigorous 
methodological comparative study. This thesis will primarily use a ‘bi-directional’ and ‘circular’ 
perspective of Europeanization, albeit more closely aligned to the former, based on an 
epistemology of Constructivism.  
A qualitative approach will be employed due to the complex and disorderly nature of 
the Europeanization debate which makes quantitative research inappropriate, impractical, 
and cumbersome. On account of the economics background to this thesis, a quantitative 
approach will be used to provide supplementary background information to the qualitative 
analysis in the form of relevant statistics. Furthermore, in order for this thesis to answer its 
research question, in-depth knowledge is a necessity in unravelling the key interactions and 
causation of policy development. As such, with qualitative methods being “data enhancers” 
(Ragin, 1994: 92) these are the most appropriate methods to employ. Mason prescribes a 




The qualitative approach will also facilitate in this thesis taking Europeanization theory 
further than it has currently been applied, as Peters emphasises, particularly in regard to 
comparative politics, “theory is a powerful source for ideas that add to the comparative 
storehouse of knowledge” (Peters, 2011: 39)4. In accordance, Ragin argues qualitative 
research has the power to advance theory through three avenues (1994: 84-85). Firstly, theory 
is advanced through in-depth knowledge which provides new information that stimulates new 
thinking. This new thinking facilitates the development of concepts and direct analysis of 
connections between phenomena. In turn, this helps to develop concepts further. Secondly, 
theory is advanced through identifying features of greatest significance. This culminates in the 
elaboration and refinement of original concepts, as well as the creation of new ones. Thirdly, 
theory is also advanced through an emphasis on commonalities across cases in unexpected 
contexts which provide the necessary new insights. 
1.4.1 The Comparative Method: The ‘Few-N’ Approach 
The comparative method, also known as ‘few-N’ studies, has been chosen above other 
methodology due to the focus of this thesis on comparing two case studies and two areas of 
social policy. The case studies under analysis are Britain and Ireland; meanwhile the policy 
areas under exploration are welfare policy and activation policy respectively. For many 
academics, social science research is comparative research, hence to undertake social 
research without comparison is impossible (Swanson, 1971; Liberson, 1985; Landman, 2008).  
Landman in particular identifies four strengths of country comparisons namely, 
contextual description; classifications or ‘cognitive simplification’; the ability to conduct 
hypothesis-testing; and the ability to make predictions in other countries not included in the 
comparison under analysis, which are based on the initial generalisations made from 
hypothesis-testing (Landman, 2008: 4-11). All of these co-evolve and are mutually reinforcing, 
moreover, all are necessary for systemic research as “predictions cannot be made without 
well-founded theories; theories cannot be made without proper classification; and 
classification cannot be made without good description.” (Landman, 2008: 21). The logic of 
inference, through comparing countries, is the key underlying principle in comparative politics 
                                                          
4 Peters (2011) argues the primary focus on the individual has lost comparative politics role of being at 
the centre of theory-building in comparative politics, “comparative politics should be at the centre of 
theory-building in political science, but that central position has been lost through the emphasis on 
individual-level behaviour” (48). This thesis aims to contribute to the repositioning of comparative 
politics back to the centre of the theory-building within political science by building on Europeanization 
theory, which is also an area researchers are tentative of using within their research.  
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for Landman, “using facts we know to learn something about facts we do not know” (Landman, 
2008: 11-13).  
This method is also fitting with this thesis exploration of the euro crisis, a significant 
contemporary event, as Ragin argues, “the interpretation of important historical events and 
outcomes…is one of the defining features of comparative social science – one of its special 
missions” (Ragin, 1989: 23). The method focuses on differences and the differentiation of 
types which facilitates historical interpretation (Ragin, 1994: 110). In addition, there are a 
number of significant advantages in using the comparative method (Ragin 1994; Lijphart, 
1975; Landman, 2008; Lijphart, 1971; Ragin and Zaret, 1983). In particular, Lijphart argues 
there are numerous “intrinsic advantages” (Lijphart, 1971: 165) with the comparative method. 
Firstly, it requires careful selection of cases5 that fit the research problem which makes the 
method highly conducive to subnational cases which allows more similarities of control 
(Lijphart, 1975: 167-168).  
 The issues of reliability and validity are smaller in the comparative method because 
with a smaller number of cases it is possible to analyse thoroughly and there is a greater 
degree of reliability from data of cases which are intentionally selected (Lijphart, 1975: 171). 
The familiarity with the cases allows the researcher to know when cases are not truly 
independent so conclusions are more robust (ibid). Ragin concurs maintaining this is an 
essential interest of the comparative method (Ragin, 1994: 105). Similarly, Landman claims 
that by comparing only a few countries allows for a lower level of abstraction which allows 
concepts to be founded within the specific national contexts of the case studies (Landman, 
2008: 25), hence increasing internal validity. In methods where more cases are analysed it is 
not possible to attain this level of detail or to be familiar with the cases which are being 
studied. 
While ‘case-stretching’ can be as much of a problem as concept-stretching or data-
stretching, by using fewer cases and being familiar with these cases there is less chance of 
these problems arising (Lijphart, 1975: 172). Accordingly, Lijphart contends that the features 
identified within the comparative method would be overlooked within the so-called respected 
quantitative methods, such as the statistical method (ibid). Hence, Lijphart concludes that 
these “are enormous advantages which may well offset the relative weaknesses of the 
comparative method in handling the problem of control” (ibid). Ultimately, the advantage of 
the comparative method is the quality of its “descriptive holism” (Landman, 2008: 21), 
                                                          
5 Hans Keman refers to cases as ‘the carriers of relevant information’ (Keman, 2011: 54).  
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providing a focused comparative analysis of a few countries subsequently overcoming the 
issue of ‘too many variables and too few countries’ which is frequently found within many-
country comparisons. Methodological quality is desired over quantity.  
There are a number of recognised weaknesses with the comparative method 
(Landman, 2008: 29-48; Keman6, 2011: 50-61; Lijphart, 1971: 685-691; Lijphart, 1975: 172-
173). Those that are of relevance to this thesis and will be minimised include; the issue of too 
many variables and too few countries (Landman, 2008: 30-33; Lijphart, 1971; see Lijphart 
(1975: 686-690) for a discussion on solutions to this problem). However, as Lijphart claims, 
comparative politics is usually an analysis of political systems, an analysis of the macro-level, 
which by their very nature limit the availability of cases for analysis (Lijphart, 1971: 685). The 
findings of the comparative method have also been criticised for only culminating in partial 
generalisations when arguably valid, universal generalisations are required (Lijphart, 1975: 
172).  
Interpretative issues with the comparative method relate to Galton’s problem7, which 
is commonly highlighted when discussing the weaknesses of the comparative method (Keman, 
2011: 61; Lijphart, 1975: 171-172; for a detailed discussion see Moses and Kuntsen, 2007). The 
application of equivalent concepts is also problematic, both theoretical and operational, for 
creating reliability problems. Specifically, problems arise if there is doubt over the stability and 
applicability of the meaning within different cases which makes meaningful comparison across 
different cases problematic (Landman, 2008: 33-36; Keman 2011: 57). This, in turn, leads to 
concept-stretching (Keman, 2011: 60). Overall, there is a continual cyclical trade-off within 
comparative politics between the range of countries under analysis, the level of abstraction 
which effects validity and so the strength of the inferences from the countries compared. 
 In parallel, the issue of individual and ecological fallacies has also been discussed 
(Keman, 2011 61; Landman, 2008: 41-45). Despite these issues Keman still concludes that the 
“comparative method is the best way to go forward” (Keman, 2011: 62) given discussions 
surrounding the comparative method are focused on solutions to its weaknesses rather than 
an incessant debate over its weaknesses. Contrastingly, Lijphart concludes that rather than 
the comparative method having more disadvantages than advantages or vice versa, “their 
suitability as research methods depends on the research problem” (Lijphart, 1975: 173). 
                                                          
6 Keman categorises these weaknesses into research design and interpretation of comparative data. 
7 The problem that observed differences and similarities may well be caused by an exogenous factor 
that is common to all cases selected for comparison. 
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1.4.2 MSSD Method 
This thesis will apply John Stuart Mill’s ‘Method of Difference’ (1843), what is also 
termed as the ‘Most Similar Systems Design’ (MSSD) (Landman, 2008: 70-76; Pzeworski and 
Teune, 1970; Keman, 2011: 57-59), which aims to compare political and/or social systems that 
share commonalities. This method is favoured due to neutralising differences while 
simultaneously highlighting others (Landman, 2008: 70) and being experimental without being 
statistical in nature (Faure, 1994: 317). MSSD has been chosen over its counterpart ‘Most 
Different Systems Design’ (MDSD) because the latter does not provide a framework where 
negative cases can be incorporated into the analysis (for a discussion on negative cases see 
Landman, 2008: 77-78). Additionally, nor do the conclusions infer anything more than 
confirmation and identification of the necessary conditions for a specific outcome (Landman, 
2008: 82). Hence, MDSD would not facilitate in answering the research question proposed 
here.  
While Ireland and Britain may not have “every circumstance in common save one” 
(Moses and Knutsen, 2007: 99) they are similar in the most significant features under analysis. 
Equivalent to area studies8 this thesis justifies the selection of these countries for the MSSD 
approach by arguing there is something inherently and significantly similar between the two 
countries given they are both composing the same geographical region of the world and the 
historical relationship between them before the conception of the EU. As Lijphart 
acknowledges, comparability is not inevitable within a given area, however it is more likely to 
be possible and fruitful within the same geographical area than in a randomly selected set of 
countries (Lijphart, 1971: 689)9. 
Lijphart argues area studies can be a beneficial contribution to the comparative 
method if applied in two distinctive ways. Firstly, if it is to facilitate the comparative method 
and not an objective in itself. Secondly, where it offers the possibility of establishing control 
within a comparison. Within this thesis using this similarity assumption does both of these, 
thus proving beneficial to the approach. Furthermore, the more similarities between cases the 
more straightforward it is to infer the cause. Through choosing states which are relatively 
similar it is possible to control for contextual variables.  
                                                          
8 There are criticisms of area studies and the assumptions used within this research field, see Lijphart, 
1971: 688. 
9 Lijphart argues, “it is not true that areas reflect merely geographical proximity; they tend to be similar 
in many other basic respects” (Lijphart, 1971: 688). 
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There are numerous strengths of the comparative method within the MSSD approach 
(Landman, 2008: 70-76). MSSD uniquely holds similarities constant or ‘controlled’. This helps 
to increase conceptual validity of the comparative method whereby “failing to specify 
important ‘control’ or other relevant variables can lead to overestimation of relationships” 
(Landman, 2008: 46). However, Landman highlights two counter criticisms; firstly, that MSSD 
leads to “overdetermined outcomes”; and secondly, that “similarities of one researcher may 
be different for another, effectively lending little value to the approach” (Landman, 2008: 32).  
MSSD’s strength is also in focusing on those factors which are different that explain 
the outcome within that country (Landman, 2008: 70). In conjunction with controlling the 
similarities, this reasonably excludes, or at the very least reduces, the number of possible rival 
explanations. In addition, it is possible to compare across the presence and absence of a 
variable which is important for identifying explanatory variables (ibid). As Lijphart concurs, 
“one cannot be sure that a relationship is a true one unless the influence of other variables is 
controlled” (Lijphart, 1971: 683). A particular strength of the MSSD, relevant to this thesis, is 
its ability to generate theory on account of its “specialist knowledge of a few cases” (Landman, 
2008: 46).  
Moses and Knutsen (2007) criticise the application of Mill’s MSSD, claiming that many 
applications of MSSD are less inductive than what Mill had intended. However, deductive and 
inductive methods will be used simultaneously within this analysis. Moses and Knutsen argue 
that this is the comparative method at its most efficient as “…good comparative studies 
combine deductive and inductive approaches to test hypotheses concerning causal 
arguments, even when the number of observations is relatively small” (2007: 114). 
Contrastingly, Ragin argues the comparative method is at its most efficient when it is used 
within research which is examining diversity. This primary focus on diversity allows for 
examining patterns of both similarities and differences. It is these patterns which infer 
causation and highlights the contrasting effects of a phenomenon. Within this thesis there is 
an equal emphasis on discovering the similarities and differences. 
1.4.3 Case Study Approach 
The comparative method encompasses a broad-range of approaches consisting of 
both quantitative and qualitative methods, these are; the statistical approach; the 
experimental approach and the case-study approach (Lijphart, 1971: 682).  The case-study 
approach is a classic comparative method which will be utilised within this research. This thesis 
will use a ‘cross-section’ approach whereby several similar cases of the same time period, will 
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be simultaneously compared. The fundamental features in each context of each case are 
considered to be constant. This method is being used as it reduces the likelihood of 
immeasurable variables affecting the analysis, thus increasing the internal validity of the 
comparative results. The case study approach is closely connected to the comparative method 
(Lijphart, 1971: 691); hence the aforementioned weaknesses of the comparative method 
equally apply here.  
Additionally, a significant criticism of the comparative case study method10 is selection 
bias which Landman (2008: 36-40) claims originates from the intentional choice of countries 
(contrastingly, some academics have argued for the benefits of choosing cases based on the 
dependent variable, see Geddes 1990) as well as the use of historical accounts and sources 
which favour the theoretical position of the researcher. In turn, a researcher’s preference for 
a method and accessibility to similar cases can dictate the research hypothesis and research 
aims (Lijphart, 1975: 173). Interrelated to this is the issue of ‘omitted variable bias’, whereby 
the choice of cases overlooks an underlying factor which accounts for an outcome (Landman, 
2008: 40-41; see discussion under MSSD for Keman, 2011). Over determination (Lijphart, 
1975: 172; Keman, 2011: 61) is another significant criticism, with too much significance placed 
upon negative findings (Lijphart, 1971: 686). 
There are two significant strengths in using a case-orientated method which are 
relevant to this thesis. Firstly, it reinforces the comparative method by making the 
comparative method more experiment-like (Ragin, 1989: 31). Case selection allows for an 
element of control within the method, similar to that within an experimental approach 
subsequently echoing that of the scientific logic (Mosses and Knutsen, 2007: 114). However, 
there is much debate over the degree to which the comparative method is scientific (see 
Charles Ragin, 1989: 1-18). Landman advocates that the comparative method is scientific, if it 
adheres to making inferences from available evidence and uses coherent rules of inquiry 
(Landman 2007: 21).  
Secondly, this method will facilitate in advancing Europeanization theory and (new) 
understandings of the crisis, as well as enhancing future enquiry into both this economic crisis 
and future EU crises. Ragin maintains that case-orientated comparison allows for a 
combination of causal and interpretive analysis which affords it with a naturally occurring 
‘theory-generative’ nature and allows for concept formation (Ragin, 1989: 44). The 
                                                          
10 For a detailed discussion of the case study approach and selection of cases see Keman (2011: 54-59) 
and Geddes (1990) respectively. 
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comparative ‘few-N’ or ‘few countries’ method is unique in allowing for case selection rather 
than a random selection of cases. The cases within this research have been consciously 
selected due to their contrasting relationships with the EU. The case study comparison will 
elucidate whether Ireland as a Eurozone member state has responded to the crisis in a 
different manner to Britain who is a non-Eurozone EU member state (the ‘negative’ case).  
Alternatively, if there is no difference this is equally as interesting and important in 
answering the research question. Hence, within this thesis similarities will be equally as 
important as differences. Landman maintains that it is “only by comparing across the presence 
and outcomes can the importance of explanatory factors be determined” (Landman, 2008: 
39). Thus, this method corresponds with Mills Method of Difference (Landman, 2008: 29). In 
identifying patterns of similarities (also known as ‘universals’ or invariant properties) and 
differences in different states and policy areas, pre-existing claims and concepts will be refined 
and elaborated on; hence, a process of reciprocal clarification11 will ensue.  
1.4.4 Interviews 
 “Qualitative interviewing” (Mason, 1996: 38) provided the primary data to compare 
British and Irish social policy responses. Interviews were chosen due to the in-depth 
exploration of understanding and meanings that they access (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 32). 24 
interviews were conducted with relevant actors from non-governmental organisations (NGO), 
government departments, and other relevant experts in the social policy field in Britain and 
Ireland. Participants were recruited through a combination of email and telephone. There 
were difficulties in accessing higher level participants, such as ministers and members of 
parliament (MP), as at the time of conducting interviews a general election was imminent. 
Prior to the general election in Britain a number of MP’s agreed to participate in interviews 
however after the general election they were unavailable to partake in the research. Irish MP’s 
were simply unattainable due to their electoral commitments. A semi-structured interview 
was employed due to its “versatility” (Galletta, 2013: 46) and accommodating both “open-
ended and more theoretically driven questions, eliciting data grounded in the experience of 
the participant” (Galletta, 2013: 45). The questions posed were not easily categorizable 
questions nor were they simple yes or no questions hence interviews were chosen over other 
                                                          
11 A process involving the researcher’s image of the research subject, on the one hand, and the concepts 
that frame the investigation, on the other. Images are built up from cases, sometimes by looking for 
similarities among several examples of the phenomenon that seem to be in the same general category. 
These images in turn are related to the relevant concepts. This process is on-going and culminates in 
the researcher’s conclusion of the study (Ragin, 1994: 82-83). 
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methods, such as a survey12. The questions posed were thematic so to more easily compare 
participants’ responses across the two case studies.  
The interviews were conducted one-to-one through telephone interviews and Skype 
due to both financial and time constraints. There is a burgeoning interest in the 
methodological implications for using modern technology rather than in-person face-to-face 
interviews (Chen and Hinton, 1999; Bampton and Cowton, 2002; Denscombe, 2010; Stephens, 
2007; Evans et al: 2010; Holt: 2010; Sullivan, 2012; Deakin and Wakefield; 2014; Hanna, 2012; 
Oates, 2015; Iacono et al., 2016). The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the benefits of 
using Skype and telephone interviews. These include, the “much richer text” produced as a 
result of needing to articulate their answer fully within telephone interviews (Holt, 2010: 116); 
more responsive interviewees and quicker rapport when using Skype (Deakin and Wakefield, 
2014: 610); additionally, the flexibility of time, location and re-scheduling for both 
interviewers and interviewees (Evans et al., 2010: 10; Holt, 2010: 116-117; Deakin and 
Wakefield, 2014: 613). There was also greater control over ensuring confidentiality for the 
interviewee with many of the participants choosing to conduct the interview at home rather 
than at their location of employment.   
Respectively, this method is cost-effective in terms of both time and money (Chen and 
Hinton, 1999; Bampton and Cowton, 2002; Hanna, 2012, Deakin and Wakefield, 2014). The 
advancement of technology combining real time visual with audio has eradicated those early 
concerns over limited communication online (Denscombe, 2010; Evans et al, 2010). The 
principal negative of this method is an increase in the likelihood of interviewees not attending 
the interview (Deakin and Wakefield, 2014: 612). However, this challenge did not arise as a 
problem within the interviews conducted for this research. Interviewees provided positive 
feedback in conducting the interviews by Skype and telephone highlighting the convenience 
of them in fitting with their work schedule. There were only two instances where actors 
approached were unwilling to conduct the interview remotely. Ultimately, it is possible to 
conclude that the benefits of interviewing over Skype “definitely outweigh the drawbacks” 
(Sullivan, 2012: 59), substantiated by more recent research conducted by Iacono et al. (2016), 
and telephone interviewing is certainly not considered “a ‘second-best’ option” (Holt, 2010: 
120).  
                                                          
12 Survey’s do not provide in-depth information and provide more quantitative results rather than 
qualitative results in quantifying how many of the population asked provided a certain response to a 
certain question. This was not in fitting with eliciting the information required for the qualitative 
exploration of British and Irish social policy responses to the euro crisis that this thesis conducts. 
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The data attained from these interviews supplemented and verified observations from 
secondary data analysis. It is acknowledged that the information attained contained only the 
information the participants wanted to share, as is the case with all interviews. Nevertheless, 
this was the most suitable method for achieving a fair and comprehensive representation of 
their perception of the role of the euro crisis in national social policy developments. 
Furthermore, this was information which could not be attained through any other form of 
analysis or from any other resource. As Landman argues, in-depth interviews “strive to 
uncover a deeper level of information in order to capture meaning, process, and context, 
where explanation involves describing and understanding people as conscious and social 
human beings” (Landman, 2008: 21). 
1.4.5 Newspapers 
There are methodological challenges when using newspaper reports as data in 
qualitative analysis, as Oritz et al. (2005) states “newspaper content is not created for the 
purpose of conducting social scientific research” (2005: 397). As a result, issues of reliability 
and validity are common place, as Franzosi stated in the earliest research on using newspaper 
reports as data “the problem with using the press as a source of event data is that the validity 
of newspaper information is questionable” (Franzosi, 1987: 6). Ultimately, there is a principal 
issue of selection bias within media data (Oritz et al. 2005; Barranco and Wisler, 1999; 
Woolley, 2000; Earl et al., 2004; Myers and Caniglia, 2004; Mueller, 1997; Oliver and Myers, 
1999; Snyder and Kelly, 1977; Danzger, 1975; Franzosi, 1987). 
The thesis has acknowledged and considered this methodological weakness and 
countered it through three strategies. Firstly, newspaper reports were carefully selected from 
reputable sources focusing on the primary national news sources namely in the case of Britain: 
BBC News; The Telegraph; The Guardian; The Independent; The Daily Mail; The Daily Express; 
The Financial Times; The Spectator; and The Economist. In the case of Ireland: The Irish Times; 
The Journal.ie; The Irish Examiner; and The Irish Independent. As Barranco and Wisler (1999) 
claim, “a careful selection of newspapers will minimize the validity problems associated with 
using media data” (1999: 319). Similarly, Franzosi (1987) advocates that using multiple 
newspaper sources “helps the researcher be less subject to idiosyncrasies of any individual 
source” (Franzosi, 1987: 11). 
Secondly, there was no single source that was relied upon to analyse the euro crisis or 
its constituent events, as the list above attests to, there were a number of resources utilised 
within the research, providing a comparison between newspaper reports on the same events 
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in the euro crisis and of the euro crisis itself. This therefore counteracts any bias including 
political persuasion within the newspaper reports. As Woolley (2000) claims, this comparison 
between sources reporting on the same event facilitates in identifying “some of the sources 
of bias and error” (2000: 157). Thus, increasing the reliability and validity of those newspaper 
reports employed within this thesis. Similarly, Danzger (1975) provides evidence showing that 
inaccurate reports become more accurate as events are observed by others within the 
American context. The same principle can be applied to the context of the United Kingdom. 
While the quantity of reports and newspaper articles has been highlighted as another 
methodological issue with using newspaper data (Franzosi, 1975; Deacon, 2007), this 
extensive reporting is on the other hand a benefit with newspapers acting as a check on each 
other. Danzger claims, “errors of fact appearing in a given news report will be contradicted by 
other reports in the network. Such differences are likely to be re-examined so that these errors 
will be corrected in subsequent reports. Utilizing a sequence of reports, one is likely to have 
accurate facts” (1975: 582). He calls this “a network of careful evaluators of fact” (ibid).   
Thirdly, all information from newspaper reports was cross-referenced and corroborated 
with non-media sources namely primary sources including government reports and interview 
data within the case study analysis, as Barranco and Wisler (1999) advocate in order to 
neutralise validity problems (1999: 319-320). Academic scholarship was used to cross-
reference events as and when it was published. This ensured that all events and the details of 
the events discussed within newspaper reports were authentic.  
Fourthly, it is important to note that the methodological issues highlighted within social 
sciences research are discussed in research fields where media resources are used in a 
significantly different manner to this research. The majority of literature discusses the 
challenges and solutions to these challenges of utilising newspaper reports from the 
perspective of (protest) event analysis within social movement research and collective action 
research on account of the prolific use of this data source within these fields. The majority of 
this research has been conducted in America where protest events are more prevalent. There 
has been a lesser number of publications within the field of history (Nicholson, 201313) as well 
as comparative and international politics (Hazlewood and West, 1974). Within these fields 
content analysis is performed and media data is analysed in-depth to identify for example, 
                                                          
13 Notably, Nicholson’s account is highly positive of the use of newspapers in historical research, 
focusing on newspaper databases he views the ‘digital turn’ as an opportunity with significant but 
currently undefined benefits and claims “it is crucial that researchers – and media historians in 
particular – start to unpack these methodological possibilities” (2013: 72). 
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relationships between the nature of protest events and media coverage of the protest and 
which protest events received or were excluded from media coverage to name a few, largely 
comprising of quantitative analysis. 
Consequently, issues of reliability and validity will be more prominent and more of a 
concern within these fields of research than in comparison to the research conducted within 
this thesis. Contrastingly, this thesis has used newspaper data and only utilised, what is 
referred to in the literature as, the ‘hard facts’. This means methodological issues of reliability 
and validity are still prominent but not to the extent that they would disproportionately impact 
the findings of this research. As Franzosi (1987) argues, the “hard facts” are significantly 
unlikely to be open to interpretation and bias such as the action involved, location and general 
identity of the participants of the events in comparison to where reasons are stated or 
responsibility is assigned to actors’ actions (1987: 7). It is these ‘hard facts’, including 
statements and interviews with actors, which this thesis draws from newspaper reports rather 
than where responsibility has been assigned to particular states or officials or reasons for 
actions. Although it is noted that some statements given by officials or politicians can be 
manipulated by the media, this is counteracted by the use of multiple media sources to verify 
the exact comment or statement made. As Franzosi states “the type of bias likely to occur in 
mass media consists more of silence and emphasis rather than outright false information” 
(1987: 7).   
Similarly, Danzger (1975) discusses such ‘hard facts’ as being “indisputable data” (1975: 
577) seen as they are “observable facts” (ibid), such as if a case is brought to a court. Such a 
‘hard fact’ is discussed in Chapter 6 with the European Commission taking Britain to court over 
the Right to Reside test. As he claims, “there is no evidence that “hard” facts are affected by 
bias, i.e., are distorted…bias affects placement and display, but does not produce distortion” 
(ibid). Accordingly, it is these elements of a newspaper report which are most reliable for 
Danzger hence it is important for a researcher to “avoid dealing with bias and to accept only 
the facts” (ibid), namely identifying information which is not “open to question” (ibid). For him 
they are distinct as he claims, “researchers may use specific facts or hard facts in contrast to 
interpretations of the facts. The two are distinguishable” (ibid). 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that all sources have varying degrees of reliability 
and validity issues, as Franzosi concurs, “no data source is without error, including officially 
collected statistics. In the absence of systematic and comparative validation, there is no a 
priori reason to believe that data collected from newspapers would be less valid than other 
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commonly used sources” (Franzosi, 1987: 7). This thesis uses newspaper reports in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 6 for two key reasons. Firstly, it is possible to access what was happening at the 
time the euro crisis broke and during its initial evolution, enabling this analysis to capture the 
sense of ‘crisis progression’ and urgency which characterised the initial period of the euro crisis 
and to identify other events that were occurring at the time. The reflectiveness of academic 
scholarship would prohibit such a current examination of emergent crisis events.  
Secondly, due to the rapid development of the euro crisis this early period is best 
captured by media reports with academic scholarship unable to keep abreast of events. This 
is one of the benefits of using newspaper data, as Franzosi advocates, “despite the limitations 
of newspapers as a source of historical data, they often constitute the only available source of 
information…exclusion of newspaper data would prevent research in fields where no 
alternative data are available” (Franzosi, 1987: 6). Ultimately, while there are challenges in 
using newspaper data if these are recognised and addressed there are significant benefits to 
be drawn from its use. As Woolley concludes, “there is every reason to seek to use media data” 
(2000: 171). Earl et al. (2004) concur claiming “researchers can effectively use such 
data…newspaper data does not deviate markedly from accepted standards of 
quality…although not without its flaws, it remains a useful data source” (2004: 77).   
 Definitions 
A number of definitions need to be specified from the beginning of the thesis, starting 
with the definition of the term ‘crisis’. Despite the high frequency of its use, as Henderson 
claims “crisis seems to be everywhere” (Henderson, 2014), the term ‘crisis’ is notable for the 
absence of a shared interpretation (Boin, 2004: 166). There is even disagreement “over 
whether or not such a consensus should be a goal” (Dayton et al., 2004: 165). Arguably, this 
array of definitions is due to the “ill-defined” nature of the research field which exists as “a 
hodgepodge quilt of specialist academics that are scattered over many disciplines” (Boin, 
2004: 167). There is crisis literature involved in the fields of sociology (Hay, 1996; Jessop, 2010; 
2015; 2017), management in relation to crisis management (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1990; 
Hermann, 1963; Weick, 1988; Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer, 1998; Pearson and Clair, 1998; 
Pearson and Mitroff, 201714), public relations relating to crisis communication research and 
crisis management in organizations (Coombs and Holladay, 1996; 2010; Coombs, 2007; Kent, 
2010; Murphy, 1996), health (Estes, 1983; Beck and Worthen, 1972), law (Henderson, 2014), 
                                                          
14 Of note, Hermann (1963); Pearson and Clair (1998); Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (1998); and, Weick 
(1988) all discuss crises within the sub-field of organizational crisis research.  
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and politics (Boin, 2004; Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997; ‘t Hart and Boin, 2001; Henderson, 
2014; González, 2008; Offe, 1976) to name merely a few.  
All of these fields define a crisis differently. Some define a ‘crisis’ in purely negative 
terms relating to a significant threat such as Pauchant and Mitroff who define a ‘crisis’ as “a 
disruption that either affects or has the potential to affect a whole system, thus threatening 
the very core of its social identity” (Pauchant and Mitroff: 121). Others define a ‘crisis’ in more 
positive terms such as “devices of change” (Hermann, 1963: 63) and “occasions for decision” 
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997: 279). In relation to organizational crises Seeger, Sellnow and 
Ulmer define a ‘crisis’ as “part of the natural organizational process, purging elements of the 
system that are outdated and inappropriate and creating new, unexpected opportunities for 
growth and change” (Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer, 1998: 233).  
Hence, this positive conception of crises views their occurrence in processual terms 
rather than as a static, external shock which induces processes; in other words, the crisis itself 
is a process. As epitomised by ‘t Hart and Boin’s definition which conceives crises as “episodes 
during which essential features of the institutional status quo in society are 
delegitimized…They [crises] are dynamic forces in ongoing processes of legitimization, 
delegitimization, and relegitimization of the social order, in particular the prevailing patterns 
of political and administrative authority” (‘t Hart and Boin, 2001: 28). 
 Contrastingly, there are those that view a ‘crisis’ as a social construct rather than an 
objective, observable phenomena such as Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort who claim, “crises are 
culturally and politically defined events that contain levels of conflict and arouse strong 
emotional responses. They are, at least partially, the outcome of organizational or societal 
sensemaking” (2001: 8). Similarly, Hay maintains that a ‘crisis’ “is subjectively perceived and 
hence brought into existence through narrative and discourse” (Hay, 1996: 255). Estes concurs 
stating, “crises are socially constructed as a consequence of social perception and definition: 
that is, a crisis may be said to exist if it is perceived to exist. Conversely, a crisis does not exist 
if people do not act as though it exists” (Estes, 1983: 445).  
There are also specific definitions for ‘organizational crises’ within the field of 
management (see, Hermann, 1963; Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer, 1998; Murphy, 1996; Weick, 
1988; Coombs and Holladay, 1996). Meanwhile, there are more general definitions of ‘crisis’ 
which view a crisis as, “a period of discontinuity, marking the breaking point in a patterned 
process of linearity” (Boin, 2004: 167) or as disrupting “regularities, rendering normal 
conceptual anchors and rules of thumb quite useless, if not counterproductive” (Rosenthal, 
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Boin and Comfort, 2001: 7). These are not applicable to the EU system as it is not linear, as will 
be discussed further in Chapter 5, and crises are a regular occurrence within the union. 
Accordingly, the term ‘crisis’ has an array of meanings. Respectively, there is a 
challenge for this thesis to identify a single definition of ‘crisis’ to apply for the purposes of 
this research. There is an additional layer of difficulty when settling upon a definition due to a 
‘crisis’ being a continually evolving event, ultimately no one (economic, political or social) crisis 
is the same. Hence, the target for conception is continually a moving one as Rosenthal, Boin 
and Comfort concur, “the changing nature of crisis poses conceptual and theoretical problems 
to the crisis researcher” (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort, 2001: 6).  
The thesis will thus adopt the frequently cited definition of a ‘crisis’ by Rosenthal, ‘t 
Hart and Charles (1989) for three key reasons. Firstly, due to, arguably, its generalizability 
across different contexts. Secondly, on account of the definition reflecting the novel ‘crisis 
spectrum’ within this thesis, namely conceiving a ‘crisis’ as comprising both a threat and 
response. Thirdly, the authors treat a ‘crisis’ as an objective phenomenon thus simplifying its 
application within this thesis by removing the necessity to discuss how the euro crisis is socially 
constructed which would not facilitate the thesis in answering the two central research 
questions. Consequently, the definition of ‘crisis’ by Rosenthal, ‘t Hart and Charles which will 
be used within this thesis specifies a crisis as, 
“a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a 
social system, which – under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances – 
necessitates making critical decisions” (from Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and Charles 1989: 10 
in Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1997: 280). 
Intriguingly, the term ‘crisis’ has changed over time. The original meaning of a ‘crisis’ 
specified a bifurcation in the course of an illness, signalling either recovery or death. The 
source of the term is from the Greek krisis which means ‘a decision’ taken from krinein ‘to 
decide, judge’, or kpiois ‘judgement’ (Bauman and Bordoni, 2014: 1). Its more general sense 
means a ‘decisive point’. As Koselleck and Richter15 states, “in classical Greek, the term was 
central to politics” meaning ‘decision’ “in the sense of reaching a crucial point that would tip 
the scales” (2006: 358).  
                                                          
15 See Koselleck and Richter (2006) for a comprehensive, historical discussion on the meaning and usage 
of ‘crisis’. Also see Koselleck (1988).  
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Thus, in contrast to modern day, the Greeks meaning of ‘crisis’ provided “relatively 
clear demarcated meanings in the spheres of law, medicine and theology” (Koselleck, 2006: 
358) with the concept commanding “choices between stark alternatives” (ibid). Over time the 
term has lost its original meaning, attaining a solely economic connotation. Nonetheless, it is 
today used in numerous contexts, subsequently replacing the term ‘conjecture’ which was 
typically used to mean a “painful but necessary transition in order to reach a new phase of 
prosperity” (Bauman and Bordoni, 2014: 2).  
This ‘conjecture’ was a short period of adjustment where strategies would be 
redefined and recharged so to “regain strength and security and negotiate bargain deals as 
soon as things stabilized” (ibid). Bauman and Bordoni maintain,  
“crisis, in its proper sense, expresses something positive, creative and optimistic, 
because it involves a change, and may be a rebirth after a break-up. It indicates 
separation, certainly, but also choice, decision and therefore the opportunity to 
express an opinion…In short, it is the predisposing factor to chance that prepares for 
future adjustments on a new basis, which is by no means depressing.” (2014: 3). 
Respectively the term ‘crisis’ does hold positive connotations historically, however as 
Bauman claims “I get the impression that the idea of ‘crisis’ tends to drift nowadays back to 
its medical origins” (Bauman and Bordoni, 2014: 7). In reviewing the European crisis literature 
in Chapter 3, it became apparent that there was a transfer of crisis management terminology 
from crisis diplomacy literature where a ‘crisis’ is defined as “a brief phase in which the 
breakdown or transformation of a system (a pattern of relationships) is threatened” 
(Richardson, 1994: 10).  
A second important definition to specify from the outset is that of Europeanization. 
Europeanization here is not a synonym for EI theory; it is a theory in its own right. Rather, 
Europeanization is the consequence of EI, referring to the transformation of the domestic level 
in response to EU membership (i.e. the integration process). This thesis will be using the term 
‘Europeanization’ instead of ‘EU-ization’ (Bulmer and Burch, 2005: 863) because the latter 
presumes the continual presence of EU involvement. Bulmer and Burch (2005) understand 
Europeanization to be an additional pressure(s) deriving from the EU level, prompting 
domestic adjustment. In contrast, within this thesis the EU is not a permanent feature in the 
Europeanization process with Europeanization occurring in the presence and absence of 
adaptational pressures and/or EU involvement, rather than it being a pressure in itself. 
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Accordingly, Radaelli’s (2003) definition of Europeanization, the most commonly used 
definition within Europeanization literature, will be used throughout this thesis due to its 
conceptualisation of Europeanization as an “interactive process, and not a simple process of 
uni-directional reaction to ‘Europe’” (Radaelli, 2004: 4). His definition emphasises the 
transformation of domestic politics as EU policies and politics becomes incorporated into the 
nation state but without an EU bias incorporating: individuals and organisations; ‘hard’ EU law 
and ‘soft’ EU regulations; and, is applicable to (non) member states alike (Radaelli, 2003: 30-
31). Radaelli defines Europeanization as, 
“Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared 
beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public 
policy and politics and then in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures, and public policies” (2003: 30). 
   In anticipation of the discussion on the historical development of EU and national 
social policy in Chapter 5 it is important to set out at the onset what is meant by ‘policy 
progress’ and ‘policy innovation’, the implications of either occurring, and their relation to one 
another. By ‘progress’, this encompasses new policy developments and a new set of core 
parameters. The outcome would be radically new social measures within new policy areas, a 
new focus and composition to social measures, and a potential change in which governance 
level the jurisdiction lies. By ‘policy innovation’, this refers to a transformation of pre-existing 
policy areas and pre-existing policy measures attaining legal deepening and broadening. 
Respectively, new methods such as Qualified Majority Voting or the Open Method of Co-
ordination rather than non-binding, informal measures. ‘Policy innovation’ ensures that ‘policy 
progress’ continues and ‘policy stagnation’ or ‘eurosclerosis’ does not become embedded 
within the policy process, hindering ‘policy progress’ and brining EI to a halt. 
Another important definition for the purposes of Chapter 5 is EU social policy. In 
contrast to national social policy, EU social policy has an extensive remit, permitting a free 
choice of subject matter. However, Grahl and Teague’s (2013) definition will be adopted within 
this chapter in order to confine the area under analysis, which consists of; 
“a wide definition of social policy, including not only social security but also 
employment and labour market regulation together with labour market interventions, 
when these are intended to counter unemployment or to improve the welfare of 
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workers rather than promote purely economic objectives, such as wage flexibility” 
(2013: 679). 
For the purposes of analysing the Irish case study of activation policy in Chapter 7, it 
is important to define what activation policy is as “the notion of activation refers not to one 
thing, but to many” (Pascual, 2004: 227). Activation policy started with a focus on active labour 
market programmes and individuals. This incrementally evolved to encompass the politics of 
activating social protection systems and an increasing number of policy areas within these 
systems, in addition to the activation of individual(s) target groups (Barbier, 2004b: 236; 
Bassanini and Duval, 2006 and 2009; OECD, 2013). Respectively, the term is innately elastic, 
capable of being utilised within both a narrow and broad conception (Clasen and Clegg, 2006; 
Barbier, 2005). Hence, in light of such a contested concept and multiple attempts at a 
definition (Jørgensen, 2004; Barbier, 2004a and 2005; Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; 
Classen and Clegg, 2006; Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2008; OECD, 2013) this chapter will be 
adopting Barbier’s (2004b) broad definition which comprises of; 
“an increased and explicit dynamic linkage introduced between (i) on the one hand, 
social, welfare, assistance etc. programmes (including pensions – particularly early 
retirement programmes – family benefits etc.) and on the other hand (ii) 
employment/labour market programmes/policies” (2004b: 236). 
 Clarification on the Euro Crisis 
One feature of this thesis also needs to be clarified from the beginning, namely the 
timeframe of the euro crisis. The main aspects of the euro crisis have subsided since 
2013/2014. However, there are still crisis elements persisting and ongoing concerns over the 
Eurozone. Consequently, this thesis will discuss the euro crisis as the living crisis that it is, 
except for when examining past events where the crisis will rightfully be discussed in past 
tense. It is not possible to discuss the crisis as a historical event for three reasons. Firstly, the 
impact of the crisis is continuing to be felt in Italy and Greece with debt remaining high and 
weak growth. Significant economic divergences also remain within the Eurozone (IMF, July 
2017). In 2017 the Eurozone crisis was reignited with Italy once again taking centre stage, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
Secondly, the recent political crisis in Spain is a source of renewed economic concern 
along with ongoing political instability across Europe with right-wing political parties 
remaining resilient and the significant uncertainty over the consequences of ‘Brexit’ are 
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creating both political and economic pressures. Thirdly, there are ongoing concerns over the 
Eurozone with the signs of an economic recovery presenting an opportunity for further 
reforms rather than signalling the end of the crisis (ibid). The European Central Bank warned 
the Eurozone area continued to be in a “fragile” state with government debts remaining out 
of control and the banking sector “not yet in good health” (The Telegraph, May 2017).  
Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund warned in their latest World Economic 
Outlook report that the recovery was not complete and could be short lived (IMF, October 
2017). Thus, it is not implausible that the Eurozone crisis could become headline news once 
again. Accordingly, it would be premature to treat the crisis as over with such significant 
uncertainty persisting. As De Grauwe concurs, arguing the future of the Eurozone “remains in 
doubt. The euro crisis is not over” (2016: 155). Ultimately, there are no neat endings to crises 
and no one announces the end of a crisis rather, as ‘t Hart and Boin concur, “crises are fuzzy 
and indeterminate…[hence] deciding when they are over is not a self-evident, unproblematic 
act” (2001: 29). Kent concurs claiming, “an event that is a crisis for one public is not necessarily 
a crisis for another” (2010: 709). Hence, there is an ongoing debate over whether the crisis has 
reached a conclusion or not.      
 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will conduct a theoretical review of the 
literature on Europeanization theory which underpins the discussion throughout this thesis 
and within which the novel ‘crisis spectrum’ is positioned. The purpose of the chapter is to 
provide an outline of the different approaches to Europeanization theory and critically analyse 
the Europeanization debate. Furthermore, to introduce the novel ‘crisis spectrum’ and 
delineate how Europeanization theory is employed through this new crisis framework. The 
chapter will begin by critically analysing the debate over the meaning and definition of 
Europeanization.  
This is followed by an analysis of the taxonomy of Europeanization theory which 
discusses the different approaches to examining the process of Europeanization, illustrating 
their differing analytical functions and purposes, while also highlighting the scholarly debates 
over their use. Within this section the chapter identifies the gap where the thesis is making an 
original contribution to Europeanization theory literature. Specifically, the chapter states how 
the thesis is novel for contributing to the new theoretical discussion of the Europeanization 
process in crisis times by analysing new member states, Britain and Ireland, and new policy 
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areas, examining British welfare policy and Irish activation policy. Hence, the thesis is 
contributing to constructing a holistic picture of how a crisis impacts the EU system. 
The debate over the usefulness of Europeanization theory is critically analysed, followed 
by a comparison between Europeanization theory and traditional integration theories to 
explore whether the theory goes further than these earlier theories as its protagonists’ claim. 
Before concluding, the chapter introduces the novel ‘crisis spectrum’ discussing each crisis 
logic respectively and positions the traditional integration theories on the ‘crisis spectrum’ to 
elucidate how they conceive the impact of EU crises in comparison to Europeanization theory. 
The chapter argues that Europeanization theory does matter and those academics deeming 
Europeanization theory as being useless have been too hasty to discount its utility, with this 
analysis showing the theory is useful. Thus, supporting the consensus amongst academics. This 
is substantiated by the theoretical literature reviewed and the fact Europeanization theory is 
shown to surpass EI theory as it claims.       
Chapter 3 will conduct a literature review of the European crisis debate on EU crises. 
The chapter applies the two extremes of the novel ‘crisis spectrum’ to explore where scholars 
from the field of economics and politics lay on the ‘crisis spectrum’ in relation to these 
extremities. Positive comments surrounding the conclusion of the euro crisis are difficult to 
locate, thus portraying the image that sceptics are dominating the crisis debate. The chapter 
aims to identify whether the sceptics are dominating the crisis debate, with EU crises and the 
euro crisis in particular viewed as a threat to EU policy development and the EU system, 
aligned to ‘crisis progression’. Alternatively, the review explores whether this image is a falsity 
and of equal significance in the crisis debate are those viewing EU crises and the euro crisis as 
a catalyst, accelerating EU policy development and providing an opportunity for the EU system 
to strengthen, aligned to ‘crisis diversity’. While the economic literature on the euro crisis is 
included within this literature review due to the dominance of the discussion on economic 
policy which makes this literature important to include, the chapter provides an explanation 
for why the economic field is disregarded for the purposes of this research. 
Accordingly, the chapter initially conducts a brief review of the economic literature on 
the euro crisis in relation to the two crisis extremes identifying economic ‘crisis 
progressionists’ and economic ‘crisis diversifiers’. This is followed by a review of the political 
literature in relation to the two crisis extremes, identifying political ‘crisis progressionists’ and 
political ‘crisis diversifiers’. It is within this analysis that the chapter identifies the gap this 
thesis is filling and identifies the literature most closely aligned to this thesis. In particular, 
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economic and political literature scarcely focuses on social policy instead focusing on the 
European Social Model and national welfare states as a collective. Subsequently, the thesis 
aims to fill this gap and bridge the literature on EU crises and the euro crisis in particular with 
literature on social policy, namely exploring the implications of the euro crisis for the EU 
through an examination of two distinctive areas of social policy in Britain and Ireland 
respectively.  
The thesis will provide an in-depth analysis exploring whether the crisis is providing 
opportunities for national social policy responses or inhibiting such policy development. The 
analyses by Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2015) and Kühnhardt (2009) are identified as being most 
closely aligned to this thesis, and thus are built upon by this research. The chapter concludes 
that over time there has been an increasing number of academics in the crisis debate who are 
‘crisis diversifiers’ rather than ‘crisis progressonists’. Hence, despite appearances, the 
traditional view of crises is not dominating the crisis debate.             
Chapter 4 analyses the peak of the euro crisis from its inception in 2010 to 2013, 
identifying the crisis pattern at the EU and national levels. The purpose of the chapter is to 
explore, with the benefit of hindsight, whether the ‘crisis progression’ narrative within the 
national press at the time was an accurate portrayal of the euro crisis or whether ‘crisis 
diversity’ was being overlooked, and by proxy the presence of a ‘crisis spectrum’, due to the 
prevalence of the traditional, mechanical vision of crises. The chapter is divided into two 
sections to mirror the separate European and national governance levels.  
The European section identifies a crisis pattern of ‘crisis progression’ through charting 
the course of the euro crisis from the collapse of Greece to the fall of Cyprus and an analysis 
of the subsequent German-dominated European crisis response. This is followed by a special 
analytical focus on the Fiscal Compact and Banking Union as these measures are the most 
significant developed in response to the euro crisis in this early period, entailing significant 
Europeanization of national policies. To conclude, this section is brought up-to-date with a 
brief overview of the latest crisis events since 2013 accounting for the economic and political 
issues persisting in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy, illustrating how ‘crisis progression’ has 
continued to prevail after the crisis reached its peak. 
The national section analyses the Irish variant of the euro crisis and Britain’s role in 
the crisis as a non-Eurozone member state, conversely identifying a crisis pattern of ‘crisis 
diversity’. This section of the chapter highlights how flexible and adaptable member states 
were, and their imperative role within crises and the wider EI process. Additionally, it 
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highlights the inherent interconnection and interaction between European economics and 
national politics which motivates this thesis. The examination of the Irish crisis charts the 
collapse of the Celtic Tiger and analyses the national and European crisis responses. The 
national response details the Irish resistance to an economic bailout, the national attempts to 
gain control through fiscal policy and the inevitable political crisis which ensued as Ireland 
finally assented to a bailout which was perceived as poorly negotiated by the state’s public.  
The European response accounts for interstate disagreement over Ireland’s low 
corporation tax and the politics around Ireland’s bailout package as the EU attempted to stop 
contagion of the euro crisis. The analysis of Britain’s role in the euro crisis follows, examining 
the political controversy around the state providing aid to its neighbouring member state 
Ireland; the states’ prominent role within the Eurozone policy response to the economic 
problems of the euro crisis through the enactment of the ‘Brown Plan’, despite being a non-
Eurozone member; and, an examination of the political tensions surrounding the negotiations 
for the EU budget which led Britain to become the scapegoat for a lack of European cohesion 
as the euro crisis started to shape the wider political affairs of the EU.  
The chapter finds a ‘crisis spectrum’ was in operation during the peak of the euro crisis 
which has been overlooked as evidence by a pattern of ‘crisis diversity’ at the national level 
and the two differing crisis patterns, hence different crisis responses, occurring at the 
European and national levels respectively. The chapter regards the media perception of the 
euro crisis as a simple story of ‘crisis progression’ a media creation due to an EU-centric focus 
overlooking national activity. The chapter argues that these two different crisis responses 
facilitated a role reversal between the member states and the EU as a ‘crisis cushion’ formed 
whereby national responses resolved national issues, unconsciously, in conjunction with the 
EU structure. These national responses allowed the EU to continue to operate and exist thus 
helping to save the EU from the euro crisis by prohibiting the perpetuation of ‘crisis 
progression’. Respectively, a ‘bi-directional’ process of Europeanization is argued to be 
occurring in the EU system at this time with the processes of ‘top-down’ Europeanization and 
‘bottom-up’ Europeanization being indistinguishable.  
Chapter 5 will analyse the development and interaction of EU and national social 
policy in Britain and Ireland. The aim of the chapter is to identify the crisis pattern within the 
historical development of EU and national social policy in Britain and Ireland. The chapter 
identifies whether social policy has traditionally followed a pattern of ‘crisis diversity’, with 
social policy developing because of EU crises. On the other hand, if a pattern of ‘crisis 
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progression’ has typically transpired, where periods of crisis have faltered the development of 
social policy. Alternatively, whether a combination of these scenarios has occurred, thereby 
moving up and down the ‘crisis spectrum’ in different phases of social policy’s development 
and demonstrating the historical presence of a ‘crisis spectrum’.  
Furthermore, this analysis provides the foundations upon which it will be possible to 
analyse the British and Irish social policy responses to the euro crisis. The crisis pattern and 
interaction between EU and national social policy identified within this chapter will serve as a 
comparison to the crisis pattern and interaction between the EU and national social policy 
during the euro crisis period within individual areas of British and Irish social policy. The 
chapter is, identical to Chapter 4, divided into two sections to mirror the separate European 
and national governance levels under analysis.  
The chapter will begin with an analysis of the EU level, identifying a crisis pattern of 
‘crisis diversity’ which is conceptualised within four developmental phases from the 1950s to 
1970s through to the euro crisis in present-day. The first phase from the 1950s to 1970s 
examines the establishment of the core parameters of EU social policy and the notable 
inactivity which characterises this phase. Thus, demonstrating the necessity of a political or 
economic challenge for EU social policy progress to occur. This is followed by the second phase 
from the 1970s to early 1990s which will chart the significant positive impact EU crises had on 
EU social policy’s development. This phase illustrates how periods of ‘crisis progression’ were 
followed by ‘crisis diversity’ as successive economic crises brought national social policy issues 
to the fore, leading to a strengthening of social policy. It is within this phase that EU social 
policy becomes established as the ‘step child’ of EU policy due to the persistence of British 
opposition. 
The subsequent phase from the 1990s to 2007s will chart the peak of EU social policy 
development under the Amsterdam, Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties as an environment of high 
unemployment, declining economic growth and economic crisis acted as a catalyst, further 
consolidating the development of EU social policy. The final phase from 2008 to the present-
day context of the euro crisis will account for the absent crisis in EU social policy, 
demonstrating how EU social policy operated unaffected by the euro crisis due to EU social 
policy’s structure being vastly different to economic policy. The national section will then 
follow, examining British and Irish social policy development, identifying an identical crisis 
pattern of ‘crisis diversity’. This section will highlight the significant difference between EU and 
national social policy whereby national social policy is dependent upon economic policy for 
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providing significant funding; ultimately, national economic policy underpins national social 
policy. 
The chapter subsequently analyses Britain, illustrating the highly political environment 
in which national social policy developed. This section will begin with documenting the 
development of a comprehensive welfare state and an extensive role for the state from the 
1940s to 1970s, in the context of unprecedented crisis, which renders EU social policy a 
supporting role. This supporting role varies depending on the political party in government. 
The following phase from the 1970s to 1990s will document the beginning of the tug of war 
between Britain and the EU over the jurisdiction of social policy, examining the successive 
rejections of EU social policy. Conversely, it will demonstrate how national social policy 
continued to be revitalised through concepts ‘downloaded’ from the EU level despite this 
confrontational relationship. The third phase from the 1990s to 2007s will account for the 
significant shift in Britain’s interaction with EU social policy as the election of Tony Blair’s New 
Labour creates a non-threatening conception of EU social policy, leading to Britain reversing 
roles with the EU. For the first time Britain drives EU and national social policy’s development 
from within the EU.  
The final phase from 2008 to the present-day returns to a familiar tug of war over 
social policy. This phase will explore how Britain views the euro crisis as an opportunity to 
radically reform the national welfare state and increase the dependency of EU social policy on 
the national level as once again EU social policy developments become conceived as a threat. 
At the national level, social policy becomes the fall guy for the economic crisis. The 
revitalisation of the EU and national levels is found to be opposed in both directions. 
Thereafter, the chapter conducts an analysis of Ireland which depicts a very different, 
contrastingly unpolitical, story of national social policy. The initial phase from the 1930s to 
1970s illustrates the lack of national demand for social policy which is exacerbated by the 
minimal role for the state. The following phase from the 1970s to 1990s will account for how 
EU social policy takes up this role and becomes the driving force for Irish social policy.    
This expansion of social policy’s development is shown to be initially hindered by the 
1980s national economic crisis which leaves Ireland financially challenged to implement EU 
social policy, highlighting the difference between EU and national social policy. Nonetheless, 
this phase will discuss how ‘crisis diversity’ is borne out of this ‘crisis progression’ as EU social 
policy developments combine with the economic crisis to accelerate the modernisation and 
Europeanization of the Irish state. The 1990s to pre-crisis 2007 phase will explore the reversal 
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of roles between Ireland and the EU within the non-crisis period of the Celtic Tiger. For 
example, Ireland’s National Anti-Poverty Strategy provided a template for the EU’s approach 
to social exclusion. This revitalisation is found to be a two-way process as the European 
Employment Strategy reinforced the national trajectory of employment policy leading to 
significant national social policy development.  
The final phase from 2008 to the euro crisis will demonstrate the interdependency 
between national economic and social policy as the economic crisis mechanically spills over 
into national social policy, with social partnership bearing the cost of the economic crisis. This 
phase will analyse how ‘crisis diversity’ emerges from significant ‘crisis progression’ as welfare 
benefits were reformed and Ireland drove EU social policy through its presidency of the 
European Council, thus filling the policy void at the national level. The chapter finds, in contrast 
to the present euro crisis (Chapter 4), the two governance levels are exhibiting the same crisis 
pattern and this has facilitated the development of EU and national social policy. Specifically, 
at different times out of ‘crisis progression’, ‘crisis diversity’ has been borne, demonstrating 
the historical and continual presence of a ‘crisis spectrum’, which is currently being overlooked 
within the euro crisis debate.  
The chapter also finds, due to the identical crisis patterns, Britain and Ireland 
recurrently reversing roles with the EU and becoming the ‘pace-setter’ for the development 
of EU and national social policy, as in Chapter 4, at times when EU social policy is stifled, thus 
ensuring policy progress for both governance levels. Additionally, the chapter finds that while 
Britain and Ireland share the same crisis pattern they have interacted with and been impacted 
by EU social policy developments differently. Respectively, the chapter argues that the euro 
crisis is unable to be an existential crisis (‘crisis progression’) as there is no uniform structure 
at either the EU or national level.    
 Chapter 6 will analyse the first of the two case studies within this thesis, starting with 
Britain and the British response to the free movement of EU nationals during the euro crisis 
within the state dispute with the EU. This chapter accounts for the path which led to ‘Brexit’. 
The chapter will, filling the current gap in the literature identified in Chapter 3, examine the 
social debates and social policy developments which emerged from the immigration debate in 
response to the significant rigidity at the EU level. The purpose of the chapter is to identify the 
crisis pattern within British welfare policy, deciphering whether a ‘crisis spectrum’ is at play or 
whether the EU in ‘crisis mode’ does mean the end of the EU as the classical view of crises 
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contends. The crisis pattern identified in this chapter serves as a point of comparison for the 
analysis of the second case study in Chapter 7 on Irish activation policy.  
Immigration policy is referred to within the chapter but it is not the focus of the analysis. 
Immigration policy is purely of contextual importance within the chapter. The references to 
immigration policy merely serve to provide the important context in which the social policy 
responses were operating. Furthermore, to facilitate exploring the focus of this chapter. 
Specifically, how Britain used those social policy mechanisms which were in control of the 
state to manage welfare entitlement of EU nationals in the context of EU free movement 
where national immigration policy is invalid. 
The analysis will examine how the euro crisis had notably no effect on the process of 
Europeanization with British attempts to de-Europeanize, so to keep EU social policy out of 
the British welfare model, ultimately failing due to the EU’s rigid defence of the principle of 
free movement. It will be shown how this defence of free movement created an equal defence 
over the process of Europeanization with both the policy area and the process left untouched 
by the euro crisis. The chapter achieves this through an examination of three-time periods, 
documenting how Britain used its national welfare state to counter the social impact of the 
EU’s principle of free movement. 
The first period from 2010 to 2011 will identify how the immigration debate has its 
origins outside of the euro crisis and how the social tensions over EU nationals’ access to 
British welfare benefits were borne. This section will account for the introduction of the Right 
to Reside test, designed to counter the broad definition of a ‘worker’ at the EU level and thus 
control EU nationals’ access to national welfare benefits. This test was to become a significant 
source of conflict between the EU and Britain, acting as a significant strain on political 
relations.  
The second period will chart the height of the free movement debate between 2012 
and 2014 accounting for the significant development of British social policy to exclude EU 
nationals from the British welfare state with the introduction of a new single welfare payment 
Universal Credit and other welfare initiatives. This section will also document how the dispute 
over the Right to Reside test reached its peak with the EU referring the case to the European 
Court of Justice, despite the Supreme Court supporting Britain’s contention that free 
movement was connected to an EU national’s employment status and financial independence.  
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Accordingly, it is within this period the chapter will document how ‘crisis stability’ 
played out at the EU level and how the path was created for ‘Brexit’ as both Britain and the 
EU remained immovable over their respective policy stances as the British welfare model 
clashed with the conception of EU citizenship. The third period from 2015 to 2016, up to when 
the British EU referendum campaign begun, will document the triggering of ‘Brexit’ as ‘crisis 
stability’ continued within the EU’s first and only response to Britain’s concerns within the 
renegotiation package, with only minimal policy reforms pledged in relation to the EU’s 
regulation on social security co-ordination.  
The chapter finds that ‘crisis diversity’ at the national level was met with significant 
‘crisis stability’ at the EU level, substantiating the findings so far within the thesis for a ‘crisis 
spectrum’ at play. The chapter will also substantiate the claim made hitherto, building upon 
those findings from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, that the euro crisis is not an existential crisis as 
evidenced by free movement remaining untouched. Hence, the crisis pattern of ‘crisis 
diversity’ in British welfare policy is found to mirror national social policy’s historical 
development (Chapter 5) and the national level within the euro crisis (Chapter 4). Similarly, 
the chapter finds Britain’s crisis interaction with EU social policy accords with its negative 
historical interaction (Chapter 5). It also finds, in contrast to Britain’s interaction with the EU 
historically (Chapter 5), that Britain is unsuccessful in reversing roles with the EU due to the 
EU’s rejection of the national policy the state was attempting to ‘upload’ to the EU level. This 
suggests that revitalisation occurs not only both ways but along a spectrum. Ultimately, the 
chapter concludes that the British case demonstrates, against the traditional view of crises, 
that the EU in ‘crisis mode’ does not mean the end of the EU. 
Chapter 7 will analyse the second and final case study, the use of Irish activation policy 
in response to the unprecedented unemployment crisis. This chapter will follow an identical 
structure to Chapter 6, further filling the current gap in the literature identified in Chapter 3. 
The purpose of the chapter is to identify the crisis pattern in Irish activation policy to decipher 
whether a ‘crisis spectrum’ is at play, like the British case study, or whether the EU in ‘crisis 
mode’ does mean the end of the EU, as the classical view of crises contends, with Irish social 
policy inhibited by the euro crisis. The case study acts as an interesting comparison to the 
British case on account of Ireland’s Eurozone membership and being one of the first member 
states to collapse in the euro crisis. 
The chapter will explore how the euro crisis positively impacted on the state’s ability 
to exercise and develop activation policy, and identify how the euro crisis had a similar 
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expediting effect on the process of Europeanization at the national level during the euro crisis. 
The chapter executes this through an examination of three-time periods, this time from 2009 
to 2017. The analysis will document how Ireland reformed its activation policy to address the 
unprecedented unemployment crisis as the euro crisis made Ireland’s customary strategy of 
using welfare benefits to support the unemployed unenforceable. The first period from 2009 
to 2011 will document how ‘crisis progression’ initially dominated Irish activation policy with 
the state lacking funds to develop a social policy response as the economic crisis spilled over 
into national social policy. This section will identify how pre-crisis “the logic of the reform was 
there” (Interview 19, February 2016) and, in particular, four pre-crisis policy proposals become 
enacted at an accelerated pace due to the euro crisis. This meant in the crisis there was 
remarkable agreement between the EU and Ireland over activation policy reforms under the 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Troika as the national strategy became accepted and 
enshrined within the conditions of the financial bailout. Hence, it was not the Troika which 
dictated Irish welfare to work policy during the crisis. 
The second period will chronicle how ‘crisis progression’ was transformed into ‘crisis 
diversity’ from 2012 to 2014 as the crisis fostered “a sea change in the approach” (Interview 
15, December 2015) of Ireland’s activation system. This section will account for the significant 
development in activation policy which was motivated by an attempt to integrate the 
placement and benefit functions of the welfare system, namely through a new activation 
strategy Pathways to Work. Accordingly, it documents how ‘crisis diversity’ occurred at an 
accelerated pace at the national level as social policy development occurred based on pre-
crisis ideas, drawing upon experiences in other EU countries, as Ireland converged with EU 
activation practices, thus similarly accelerating the Europeanization process. This section will 
build upon those findings in Chapter 6 which demonstrated that the euro crisis is not inhibiting 
national social policy development. It will also account for how EU social policy was 
accelerated as Ireland undertook the presidency of the European Council and enacted a rapid 
adoption of the EU’s Youth Guarantee.  
The third period will account for Irish activation policy development outside of the 
Troika agreement in the present period of financial recovery from 2015 to 2017, exploring how 
‘crisis stability’ ensued coupled with ongoing incremental policy innovation. It will 
demonstrate how the crisis had facilitated policy development with some policy practices, 
such as the activation conditionality on welfare payments to lone parents, having been 
reversed to their pre-crisis model outside of the Memorandum of Understanding. However, 
structural changes fostered by the euro crisis, such as the new mixed ‘worker-mother-regime’ 
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and the new Europeanized, coercive Pathways to Work activation strategy, are shown to have 
become firmly embedded into the landscape of Irish activation policy.     
The chapter finds that there was a policy response and significant policy development 
during the crisis period in Irish activation policy. The case of Ireland demonstrates how a ‘crisis 
spectrum’ is at play with Ireland moving up from ‘crisis progression’ at one end of the ‘crisis 
spectrum’ to ‘crisis diversity’ at the other end over the course of the crisis period. Hence, the 
crisis pattern of ‘crisis diversity’ in Irish activation policy is found to mirror national social 
policy’s historical development (Chapter 5) and the national level within the euro crisis 
(Chapter 4). Similarly, the chapter finds Ireland’s crisis interaction with EU social policy is 
consistent with its positive historical interaction (Chapter 5). The chapter also finds, in contrast 
to the British case, that Ireland was successful in reversing roles with the EU, according with 
Ireland’s interaction with the EU historically (Chapter 5), through the presidency of the 
European Council, subsequently accelerating EU social policy development. This further 
suggests that revitalisation occurs along a spectrum, as claimed in Chapter 6, and substantiates 
the finding in Chapter 4 for the presence of ‘bi-directional’ Europeanization. Ultimately, in 
accordance with the British case and against the traditional view of crises, the chapter finds 
the EU in ‘crisis mode’ does not mean the end of the EU. 
Chapter 8 will conclude the thesis by conducting a comparison between the British 
and Irish case studies in answering the two research questions stated at the beginning of this 
thesis. The chapter will summarise the main conclusions from each chapter demonstrating 
how the thesis reached its main conclusion. Ultimately, it is concluded that while there are 
elements of ‘crisis progression’ in the euro crisis, this is not the domineering crisis pattern as 
many media and political commentators purported. Instead, ‘crisis diversity’ has featured 
significantly in the euro crisis, borne out of the threat from ‘crisis progression’. Hence, rather 
than being opposed to one another these two perspectives are in tension to one another with 
a spectrum of possibilities between them. Academics and political commentators alike are 
merely seeing one end of the spectrum, one part of a highly complex and interdependent 
picture of the crisis. The chapter concludes what these findings demonstrate in reference to 
the impact of a crisis on the EU system and the nation state, as well as the crisis responses 
respectively. The chapter discusses the implications for Europeanization theory and the crisis 




1.7.1 Events Beyond the Thesis: The ‘Brexit’ Crisis 
This thesis commenced in 2012 before the events that have followed from the British 
EU referendum and subsequent process of Britain leaving the EU, which has become 
commonly referred to as ‘Brexit’. Consequently, this thesis has retained its focus on the euro 
crisis with the majority of research conducted prior to both the EU referendum and 
announcement of an EU referendum being held. During the latter stages of conducting 
interviews for the British case, the Prime Minister (PM) of the time David Cameron announced 
a British referendum on EU membership was to be held. It was not practical or feasible to 
attempt to re-interview the respective actors after this announcement or in the aftermath of 
‘Brexit’ occurring. ‘Brexit’ has subsequently become the next crisis to hit the EU.  
Accordingly, this thesis will briefly discuss and account for these dramatic events 
within the postscript located at the end of this thesis. Within this postscript, the novel crisis 
logics are applied to this new crisis discussing how the crisis logics explain ‘Brexit’ and what 
they expect to happen next. While acknowledging the period of ongoing transition for Britain, 
for the purposes of this thesis it will discuss Britain as a member of the EU due to the state 
technically remaining a member of the EU while negotiations are conducted for two years over 
the type of relationship between the EU and Britain after the state has left the EU in March 





Europeanization vs. Traditional Integration 
Theory 
 
“This is the Great Glass Wonkavator…an elevator can only go up and down but the 
Wonkavator can go sideways and slantways and longways and backways and squareways 
and frontways and any other ways that you can think of…” (Willy Wonka and the Chocolate 
Factory, Gene Wilder, 197116) 
“The spillover hypothesis seemed to suggest that integration was a linear, progressive 
phenomenon; that once started, dynamics would be set in place to continue the momentum.” 
(Rosamond, 2000: 63) 
 
These quotes represent two conceptions of reality. These are two ways of perceiving the EI 
process. These quotes demonstrate the contrast between the two theoretical perspectives of 
the traditional EI theory and the contemporary theory of Europeanization. The Wonka quote 
illustrates the potential diversity of impact, (in)direct effects and responses innate within the 
process of integration on the domestic sphere which is epitomised within Europeanization 
theory. In contrast, Rosamond (2000) discusses the common assumption that underlies 
traditional EI theory, which perceives integration merely capable of going backwards and/or 
forwards within an EU-centric approach. For this reason, Europeanization theory has become 
popularised for its capacity to understand how the EU has become “a natural part of” domestic 
politics, whether this occurs in the form of opportunities or constraints (Vink and Graziano, 
2008: 4).  
This chapter will conduct a theoretical review of the literature on Europeanization 
theory, within which the novel ‘crisis spectrum’ is positioned. The chapter will outline the 
different approaches to Europeanization theory and critically analyse the Europeanization 
debate. The chapter will conduct a comparison between Europeanization theory and 
                                                          
16 (R.Dahl and M. Stuart, 1971) 
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traditional EI theories to analyse whether it fulfils its claim in going beyond these traditional 
theories. The chapter also identifies the gap where the thesis is making an original contribution 
to Europeanization theory literature namely, the new theoretical discussion of 
Europeanization in crisis times, analysing new member states and new policy areas. The novel 
‘crisis spectrum’, discussed in Chapter 1, will also be introduced. The Europeanization process 
refers to the transformation of the domestic arena in response to EU membership. 
Additionally, this thesis examines the impact of Eurozone membership on nation states. 
Respectively, the chapter will be structured as follows. The first section critically 
analyses the debate over the meaning and definition of Europeanization. This is followed by 
an analysis of the taxonomy of Europeanization theory discussing the different approaches to 
analysing the process of Europeanization which all serve a different analytical function and 
purpose. The chapter then continues to critically analyse the debate over the usefulness of 
Europeanization theory examining those academics who have attempted to define 
Europeanization conceptually and those who have relegated it as being a useless concept. 
Critics such as Olsen (2002) argue Europeanization is useless as an organizational concept 
while Vink and Graziano (2008) along with Bulmer (2008) highlight the weaknesses of 
Europeanization without relegating it a useless concept. Europeanization is a multifaceted and 
much contested concept. The EU’s messy structure is epitomised within the messy debate of 
Europeanization theory. 
The chapter then conducts a comparison between Europeanization theory and the 
traditional EI theories to explore whether it goes further than these earlier theories, providing 
a more comprehensive depiction of the EU and its operation as its protagonists’ claim. Finally, 
the chapter introduces the novel ‘crisis spectrum’ explaining each crisis logic in turn and 
positions the traditional EI theories on the ‘crisis spectrum’ to decipher how they conceive the 
impact of EU crises in comparison to Europeanization theory. The chapter argues that 
Europeanization theory does matter and those academics deeming Europeanization theory as 
being useless have been too hasty to discount its utility, with this analysis showing the theory 
is useful. Thus, supporting the consensus amongst academics. This is substantiated by the 
theoretical literature reviewed and the fact Europeanization theory is shown within this 
analysis to surpass traditional EI theory as it claims.       
 Academics on ‘Europeanization’ and the Definitional Contest 
“[Europeanization] It is neither a new theory, nor an ad-hoc approach. Rather, it is a way of 
orchestrating existing concepts and to contribute to cumulative research in political science. 
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Europeanization does not provide any simple fix to theoretical or empirical problems…it can 
deliver if approached as a set of puzzles. A problem in search of explanation – not the 
explanation itself.” (Radaelli, 2004) 
Europeanization theory fully emerged from the success of EI during the mid-1990s. If 
EI explains the process of integration, Europeanization theory queries the impact of what is 
going on inside the process. There are two principal understandings of the Europeanization 
process; firstly, entailing a transfer from the EU level to other areas of policy, institutions, 
beliefs and norms alike and secondly, the construction of the EU’s faculty (Bulmer, 2008: 47). 
“‘Europeanization’ is…a matter of degree” (Featherstone, 2003: 4). The process of 
Europeanization does not occur in all member states, in all sectors or to the same extent nor 
intensity, thus, the Europeanization process can mean many things to many different nation 
states. The degree to which a country is ‘Europeanized’ depends upon pre-existing conditions, 
expectations, criteria, definitions placed upon it and the domestic area being considered. 
Therefore, the challenge from the outset is to settle upon a workable definition of the concept 
of Europeanization, as this thesis did in the introduction (see Chapter 1).  
There is no singular definition of Europeanization and this, in parallel to EI theory, is 
mirrored within the Europeanization research field itself which is similarly expansive and 
multifaceted,  
“There is no single grand theory of ‘Europeanization’ that can help us understand how 
institutions co-evolve through processes of mutual adaption. Nor is there a single set 
of simplifying assumptions about change, institutions and actors that will capture the 
complexity of European transformations” (Olsen, 2002: 944). 
The problem with conceptualising Europeanization is that the ‘object’ under analysis is not 
static.  
However, there are some common themes regardless of the criteria and approach 
used. Europeanization in respect to the three dimensions of domestic impact and change 
consisting of policy, politics and polity involves: diversity and harmonization; divergence and 
convergence; positive and negative integration; institution-building and identity formation; 
and, interactions and socialization. Europeanization is considered to be a process rather than 
an end-state. Europeanization is also perceived as having an enduring character, moreover 
involving the transformation of the domestic and European levels alike.  With such eclecticism, 
it is clear to see how it has become accused of re-branding a pre-existing concept.  
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As academics unremittingly contest over its precise meaning and definition there is an 
increasing danger of the concept becoming confused even with its own possible outcomes. 
Bulmer (2008) claims Europeanization is not a theory rather a “phenomenon which a range of 
theoretical approaches have sought to explain” (2008: 57). Contrastingly, for Radaelli (2004) 
Europeanization is a theory and is defined by three features namely, taking an interest in 
member states adaptation to Europe without making any bold predictions; viewing domestic 
institutions as malleable to varying extents but not weakening or retreating; and, convergence 
is not assumed when analysing the convergence and/or divergence within policy areas and 
historical conditions (2004: 3). Unlike traditional EI theories, there is an absence of 
automaticity within Europeanization theory.  
Respectively, adaptational pressure does not signify the process of Europeanization, 
nor an inevitability that Europeanization will occur. Likewise, an absence of adaptational 
pressure does not mean that Europeanization cannot or will not occur. Hence, emanating 
pressures for adjustment can be seen as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
expecting domestic change (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 57). Moreover, Europeanization as a 
process and a concept does not necessarily entail the involvement of the EU. As Vink and 
Graziano (2008) maintain, “Europeanization is more than and different from EU-ization” 
(2008: 12). The concept of Europeanization can also mean policy transfer between member 
states themselves. For Bulmer (2008) the largest debate in the literature is over the 
Europeanization process being “exclusively a top-down phenomenon or whether it is in part 
horizontal” (2008: 51). Additionally, the concept of Europeanization can also refer to more 
intangible developments such as European identity and culture. Accordingly, many academics 
view the concept as fluid and ambiguous. 
The ‘Europeanization’ turn has ultimately led to a focus upon identifying the 
mechanisms through which the EU impacts upon member states. However, Europeanization 
does not produce unilateral change. There is no single dominant and deterministic causal 
relation, “causal chains are often indirect, long and complex…Interactive processes of 
feedback, mutual influence and adaption are producing interpenetration between levels of 
governance and institutions.” (Olsen, 2002: 942). Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) argue, in 
rejection of many traditional EI theories, that the Europeanization process is not producing a 
coherent, homogenous or harmonized Europe, rather “diversity is inbuilt in Europeanization” 
(2003: 336). There is a consensus amongst academics that the process of Europeanization 
produces divergence more than it produces convergence.  
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 Nonetheless, there is a desperate need for the concept of Europeanization to have its 
boundaries defined, without such limitations in situ a precise and comprehensive definition of 
Europeanization is unfeasible and the debate is inept. Unlike policy studies, impact studies are 
less able to isolate the causation from the EU. As such, Bulmer and Burch (2005) argue that it 
could be discovered that Europeanization is simply reconciling the underlying developments 
within the transformation of the global economy or alternatively that developments are being 
constructed in such a way to make the consequences of globalisation more domestically 
appealing. For some academics there is only one thing that is definite, “Europeanisation is not 
a new theory” (Radaelli, 2004: 15).  
A taxonomy of Europeanization theory involves four different interpretations. 
Europeanization can be understood as a broad phenomenon of ‘top-down’ approach 
examining the impact of the EU upon member states;  alternatively it can be a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach with analytical primacy on the member states; on the other hand it can incorporate 
both of these approaches with an examination of the feedback processes within the ‘bi-
directional’ approach; lastly, there is the less commonly used ‘horizontal’ approach involving 
a non-EU centred analysis with change occurring from member state to member state with 
no, or at the very most little, intervention by EU institutions. The ‘top-down’ approach for 
Featherstone and Radaelli (2003: 337) is a theoretical relic with its proposition of a clear cause 
and effect hierarchal chain of causality. The ‘horizontal’ mechanism of Europeanization 
demonstrates that the effects of Europeanization can be uncertain.  
The main contributors to the Europeanization debate are positioned within two 
camps. Those who approach Europeanization from a ‘top-down’ approach and those from a 
‘bottom-up’ approach. The majority of literature has been written from a ‘top-down’ approach 
with the ‘bottom-up’ approach coming to the fore much later. The most recent analysts 
perceive Europeanization as a ‘bi-directional’ or circular’ process, as is the predisposition of 
this thesis, as it is increasingly acknowledged that Europeanization is not merely an external 
force, but a product of member states influence from the initial stages of policy or institutional 
formations.   
2.1.1 ‘Top-down’ Approach 
The 1970s and 1980s saw the initial development of Europeanization in the form of a 
‘top-down’ approach, constituted by Dyson and Goetz as a ‘first generation’ analysis (Bache 
and George, 2006: 60-61). This initial approach was able to bring the analysis of traditional EI 
theories into the new enquiry of the EU’s influence at the domestic level. Using a formal, 
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observable and hierarchal framework there is an analytical starting point at the European 
level, tracing down to the domestic arena. The approach assesses the impact of pressures 
stemming from EU membership onto the domestic level. It examines changes to political-
administrative structures and policy content.  
Olsen (2002) was one such ‘top-down’ academic. For him, there are ‘many faces of 
Europeanization’ which complement each other, referring to different but still related 
phenomena. In particular, Olsen identifies five ‘faces’ of Europeanization (2002: 923-924). 
‘Europeanization’ as a term is a new and unique concept, for Olsen as a process it is not unique 
(2002: 922). The dynamics of Europeanization remain understandable in terms of ordinary 
processes of change that are well known within other institutionalized systems of governance 
(2002: 923). He perceives the EU as a case study of many within Europeanization theory, the 
uniqueness of the EU lies in demonstrating how mundane processes can produce 
extraordinary outcomes (ibid).  
Börzel and Risse (2003) argue that traditional EI theories conducted a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective exploring how to account for the emergence of a European polity (2003: 57). For 
them, Europeanization theory provides a much needed ‘top-down’ process with primary 
analytical focus on the domestic arena providing a fully comprehensive account of how both 
Europe and the EU matter. Regardless of the area under analysis, Börzel and Risse argue there 
are two circumstances where domestic change is highly likely in response to Europeanization. 
Firstly, Europeanization has to be ‘inconvenient’ to the member state where a degree of 
‘misfit’ between the processes, policies and institutions at the European and domestic levels 
leads to adaptational pressures (2003: 58). Secondly, there are facilitating factors, actors and 
institutions, which respond to this pressure prompting change. 
Referring to the two strands of new institutionalism, rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism, they conceptualise adaptational responses to Europeanization through a 
‘logic of consequentialism’ and ‘logic of appropriateness’ combined with a process of 
persuasion respectively (2003: 58-59). These either act simultaneously or simply characterise 
different phases of adaptational change (2003: 59). In the former, change is mediated by 
multiple veto points and formal institutions (2003: 58). In the latter, “change agents” or “norm 
entrepreneurs” and political culture conjoined with informal institutions affect the extent to 
which the ‘misfit’ between the European and national levels produces change (2003: 59).       
For the authors, this model explains the reason for Europeanization creating more 
divergence than it does convergence. Firstly, the ‘goodness of fit’ between EU and member 
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states varies radically meaning those states with similar national structures, at best, 
experience similar adaptational pressures to one another (2003: 73). Secondly, individual 
states have numerous actors and institutions mediating between adaptational pressures and 
the mechanisms of transformation which facilitate or alternatively inhibit a response to 
Europeanization (ibid). Accordingly, they conclude, as many other academics have (Radaelli, 
2003 and 2004; Goetz, 2006; Dyson, 2002 and 2000), that only partial or ‘clustered 
convergence’ should be anticipated (2003: 73). 
Börzel and Risse prescribe a taxonomy of domestic change; ‘absorption’; 
‘accommodation’ and ‘transformation’ (2003: 69-71). The first sees a low degree of domestic 
change as European policies and/or ideas are incorporated without changing pre-existing 
national processes, policies or polities (2003: 69). ‘Accommodation’ entails only a modest 
degree of change as pre-existing policies, processes and institutions are adjusted without 
altering the core fundamental features or beliefs with new EU policies assimilated into 
national models (2003: 70). ‘Transformation’ comprises of the highest degree of change with 
pre-existing national policies, processes and institutions either replaced with new ones or 
radically altered changing both their core fundamental features and beliefs (ibid).     
Risse et al.’s (2001) ‘goodness of fit’ model depicts one mechanism through which 
domestic change occurs in response to Europeanization, by means of a three step, linear 
process of Europeanization, adaptational pressures and mediating factors (2001: 6). Domestic 
structures are a permanent feature determining the outcome of integration. Risse et al. argue 
that Europeanization is characterised by “domestic adaptation with national colours” (2001: 
1), underlining the limited co-operation and resilient distinctiveness of member states. 
Europeanization generates adaptational pressures upon participating states. The amount of 
adaptational pressure emitted is determined by the ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ existing between the 
national and European institutions. 
 The more incompatibility, ‘misfit’, between the two levels the higher the adaptational 
pressures created, hence the more chance there is of Europeanization occurring. As a 
consequence, a more profound and noticeable change occurs at the domestic level in 
comparison to cases of lower adaptational pressure where changes are more subtle, going 
unnoticed even by those within the nation state.  High adaptational pressures are costly to the 
nation state both financially and culturally, challenging the identity, core structures and 
practices of national institutions (2001: 8). While change under these circumstances is more 
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noticeable it is more difficult to achieve as nation states defend their national interests and 
distinctive national structures (ibid). 
The degree of change is at its height when adaptational pressure falls between these 
two extremes (Radaelli, 2003: 45). Risse et al. distinguishes between two causal pathways 
namely, indirect “policy misfit” between EU rules, regulations and national policies which 
creates adaptational pressure on national administrative and political structures (2001: 7); and 
direct pressures upon institutional structures at the national level which challenge 
administrative styles and historical understandings of national identity (ibid). While Radaelli 
(2004) illuminates the important features of this logic (2004: 9-10), many more academics 
have been highly critical of the model (Radaelli, 2003, 2004; Featherstone, 2003; Buller, 2006; 
Jordan, 2003; Börzel and Risse, 2003, Saurugger, 2014). The principal weakness being that it is 
applicable only when an EU model is prescribed to member states (Featherstone, 2003: 16; 
Radaelli, 2003: 44). 
 Contrastingly, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) identify three mechanisms through which the 
EU instigates domestic adaptation. Firstly, “positive integration” where the EU directly 
stipulates an institutional model for domestic alignment (1999: 1). Secondly, “negative 
integration” which sees EU legislation subtly alter “the domestic rules of the game” without 
prescribing a model for the form of these changes, instead there is a redistribution of power 
and resources alike between actors (ibid). Thirdly, what they term “its weakest form” (1999: 
2), “framing integration” (1999: 3) or “facilitated coordination” (Cini, 2007: 409) where 
understandings and expectations, the “cognitive logic” of domestic actors, are indirectly 
changed (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 2-3).  
 They connect these three mechanisms to three corresponding models of integration. 
The first mechanism is associated to “new regulatory policy” such as the environment, health 
and particular areas of social policy. The second mechanism is related to “old regulatory 
policies” comprising the functioning of the single market. The third mechanism is connected 
to those policies which aim to “change the domestic political climate by stimulating and 
strengthening the overall support for broader European reform objectives” (1999: 2-3). The 
authors maintain there is “no unique approach” to explain the Europeanization process, 
instead there is a need “to consider highly different explanatory factors in order to account 
for the change and persistence of domestic institutions in the light of European requirements” 
(1999: 3).  
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Radaelli (2003) promotes a four-fold taxonomy of domestic change in contrast to 
Börzel and Risse (2003). Firstly ‘inertia’, comprising of an absence of adjustment due to 
significant divergence between the EU and national level (2003: 37). Secondly ‘absorption’, 
implying adaptation to the EU level as domestic structures and policies prove to be both 
resilient and flexible, absorbing some developments while maintaining their essential features 
(ibid). Thirdly ‘transformation’, involving significant “paradigmatic change” due to the change 
in “the fundamental logic of political behaviour” (2003: 38). He distinguishes between 
‘accommodation’ and ‘transformation’ with the former not automatically implying the latter 
(2003: 37). 
Fourthly, ‘retrenchment’ whereby national policy becomes increasingly “less 
‘European’” (ibid), or at the very least is resilient to becoming more Europeanized. As pressure 
is applied to the state its actors become more resilient to change, strengthening national 
interests and their defence of them. However, these domestic coalitions will only be able to 
oppose for a limited period of time. How this occurs depends upon the type of Europeanization 
occurring and mediating factors (ibid). In accordance with Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), another 
distinction that Radaelli argues could be provided is ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ integration, as 
‘positive’ integration leads to the creation of a European model which member states are 
required to adapt the national level towards.  
Meanwhile, ‘negative’ integration sees the amalgamation of European markets 
removing national obstructions to such features as trade and investment, without the 
formation of European models, leading to regulatory competition (2003: 42). Radaelli argues 
that Europeanization and convergence are not synonymous, even in cases where convergence 
does occur (2003: 33). He argues, like Goetz (2006), that the Europeanization process creates 
‘clustered’ convergence. For the most part it is difficult to generalize the effects and outcomes 
of the Europeanization process as even countries with similar structures differ in which actors 
and resources are available at the time.  
  Bulmer and Burch (2005) refer to the Europeanization process as “EU-ization” (2005: 
863). They utilise Risse et al.’s (2001) ‘goodness of fit’ model while recognising the importance 
of agency within national adaptation, conceiving national actors as active participators in the 
Europeanization process in inducing and/or facilitating change rather than being passive 
recipients. They conceive national adaptation as “a process of aligning institutional logics” 
(2005: 866) and, in contrast to Risse et al. (2001), comprising of a two-step process namely, 
“translator devices” are employed at the national level by institutions to administer EU 
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activity; and, in turn, institutions adapt in order that the state government contributes 
effectively to the EU (2005: 866). 
Through their analysis of Britain’s adaptation to the EU, they identify two response 
apparatuses termed “reception” and “projection” (ibid). The former sees national policy 
incorporate a European dimension, meanwhile the latter is where nation states create and, in 
turn, exploit mechanisms to attain a presence and maintain “an effective voice” (2005: 867) 
in the EU’s policy making process. Hence, states come to learn “the EU game” (ibid) which 
largely diverges from the political system at the national level. Projection itself has two 
elements, one concerning appropriate translator devices to contribute to EU policy making, 
and two, in turn exploiting these devices so using the EU as “an opportunity structure for 
resolving domestic policy problems” particularly those which are similarly occurring within the 
international and global sphere (ibid).  
Consequently, projection has to be used systematically so to influence EU action (ibid). 
The only caveat is such a use of the EU is dependent upon the broader political environment 
(ibid).  If the political environment is unfavourable to integration, the Europeanization process 
induces a “quiet revolution” (2005: 885) as attention to changes is kept to a minimum and 
opportunities are disregarded. By implication, those member states where integration is 
perceived more favourably fosters a political consensus and a more favourable environment 
for Europeanization to operate in, thus producing a more substantial state ‘revolution’.  
2.1.2 ‘Bottom-up’ Approach 
The second generation analysis emerged in the 1990s, with an analytical starting and 
end point at the domestic level, it expanded the analysis of domestic change to include the 
impact on ideas, discourses and identities. Unlike the ‘top-down’ approach, the ‘bottom-up’ 
approach is not considered to be “a new form of theorisation with its own vocabulary” 
(Radaelli, 2004: 5). Rather, Europeanization theory within this approach is conceived as an 
“‘orchestration’ of existing concepts and theories” incorporating other areas of social sciences, 
including both vertical and ‘horizontal’ Europeanization (ibid).  
In contrast to the ‘top-down’ approach, domestic actors are capable of using the EU in 
many inexhaustible ways discursively producing impacts, treating the EU as a resource without 
any pressure from the EU itself. Adjustment at the national level is viewed as more than a 
mere reaction. In opposition to realist theorists who perceive the state as an impenetrable 
‘black-box’, ‘bottom-up’ Europeanization theory views the state as more of an open ‘jack-in-
49 
 
a-box’ where the state at any time can adapt, react and correlate policies with those on the 
European level. 
 Radaelli (2003) advocates a move away from the ‘top-down’ approach and towards 
the ‘bottom-up’ approach. For Radaelli, the former “creates an artificial separation between 
events” (2003: 51) namely, the formulation of EU policy and domestic adaptation due to the 
hierarchical reasoning that this perspective is underpinned by. Instead, he purports for the 
exploration of national choices within specific policy areas in order to decipher if, when and 
how the EU impacts on the national level (ibid). In later work, Radaelli further develops this 
argument. Europeanization theory for Radaelli (2004) is more useful when approached from 
beyond a narrow, linear, ‘top-down’ approach incorporating those more creative practices by 
member states. He maintains that analyses of the Europeanization process should not become 
isolated to merely analysing effects of Europeanization as this makes an initial presumption 
that there are effects emanating from the EU (2004: 50).  
For Radaelli, the defining feature of ‘bottom-up’ research is its ability to inform whether 
domestic change is the result of adaptational pressures or an autonomous decision made by 
the member state itself (2004: 11). As with the ‘top-down’ approach, socialisation nor 
formulation of EU policy is necessary for the Europeanization process to occur (ibid). However, 
cause and effect within the Europeanization process is difficult to identify with it being an 
incremental process which evolves alongside domestic processes of policy reform hence 
Radaelli specifies that, “if Europeanization is to produce domestic change, it must precede 
change” (2004: 9).  
Ultimately, he maintains that the Europeanization process is ‘bottom-up’, driven by 
domestic politics and activated by the EU which aims to create convergence (2004: 15). 
Respectively, within this framework Radaelli argues for a need to bring politics back into the 
studies of Europeanization (2004: 16). He claims that Europeanization theory is able to go 
further than traditional EI theories due to its focus on contestation and dynamics of conflict 
which can “penetrate the nature of EU politics” (2005: 15).  
Constructivists approach Europeanization research from a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, 
with its focus on norms, identities and beliefs. For constructivists, political actors “follow 
socially defined rules and norms” even when it is not in their own interest (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006: 393). Furthermore, through social interactions institutions shape political 
actors and vice versa through “an on-going process of mutual constitution” (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006: 396). Respectively, constructivists have analysed the Europeanization 
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process in reference to “how interactions with or within European institutions socialize 
domestic actors, incrementally altering their behaviour” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 397). 
Constructivists fundamental argument is that integration has a transformative affect 
upon the EU and its member states alike (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 399). The interaction 
between national actors and EU institutions creates new identities and interests which are 
assimilated into the national level where they “interact with and socialize agents” (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006: 397). Accordingly, when pre-existing national identities and interests are 
in flux socialization is at its height hence times of crisis and/or policy failure are optimum 
opportunities to create new EU norms as old beliefs become re-evaluated (ibid). Checkel 
perceives the EU as an institutionally dense environment with repeated interactions creating 
a “socializing effect” on actors (ibid). Checkel argues as the EU advances into a fully-fledged 
political union, so its goals are more appropriately comprehended within constructivism 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 399). 
Jordan (2003) advocates opening the ‘black box’ of the nation state within his analysis 
on Europeanization of national structures, exploring whether states are resilient or 
transforming through challenging the distinction between supposedly ‘deep’ Europeanization 
of policy and the ‘shallower’ impact on the corresponding institutions. Notably, Jordan widens 
the definition of structure to include an institutions culture to demonstrate the complete 
impact of the EU on the Department for Environment in Britain.  
Jordan argues national institutions face two options when a state joins the EU. Firstly, 
to innovate and adapt to the new environment so to grow further; or secondly, to retain 
national processes and policy (2003: 270). In this case, the latter was preferred but ultimately 
the former came into fruition. He claims institutions experience ‘organizational learning’ 
highlighting the importance of agency and national actors, similar to constructivists as well as 
Bulmer and Burch (2005). Jordan claims that in the case of the Department for Environment 
“double loop learning” occurred (2003 280) as the department had to unlearn shared beliefs 
of the EU as “errors” occurred forcing the institution to adapt to EU level policy. This 
challenged these pre-existing beliefs which, in turn, led national actors to challenge and 
overcome opposition to this adjustment (ibid). He concedes that the EU was not the only force 
for change, as the EU intensified national and international pressures to adjust national 
environment policy (2003: 280).  
For Jordan the institution experienced a “cognitive leap” (2003: 279). Specifically, 
negotiation guidelines and tactics; the language used; institutional objectives; and, most 
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importantly, shared organizational beliefs all changed in response to the Europeanization of 
national environmental policy (2003: 278). Jordan highlights the important role of crises, due 
to a ‘misfit’ between the EU and British levels, in “unfreezing existing practices and cultural 
assumptions” (2003: 279) to change the culture of the institution. That is, its predisposition 
and perception of the EU from unimportant to “a means to improve domestic environmental 
protection” (2003: 278-279). Aligned to Bulmer and Burch’s (2005) analysis, he concludes that 
the department has adapted so to possess a “greater ability to play the Brussels game” (2003: 
288).  
2.1.3  ‘Bi-Directional’ Approach 
The unidirectional approach to studying Europeanization is now a thing of the past as 
academics increasingly acknowledge the mutual adaption and co-evolution between the 
domestic and European levels. In practice it is not possible to distinguish between these two 
processes. Vink and Graziano (2008) purport using a “bottom-up-down” approach to 
Europeanization (2008: 9-10) as this is the only approach where the EU is not considered as 
the only explanation for change (2008: 10) moreover, they claim “there is nothing inherently 
‘top-down’ about Europeanization research” (2008: 9). Börzel and Risse (2003), despite their 
‘top-down approach’, acknowledged the importance of analysing the feedback loops to attain 
“a more comprehensive picture” of the EU (2003: 57). This thesis will be primarily operating a 
‘bi-directional’ approach.  
Wincott (2003) answers Radaelli’s call and introduces national politics within his 
analysis of the European Social Model (ESM). He claims complexity lies in the EU itself, instead 
of being an external force, whereby the EU is “always still in formation, built through political 
contests and struggles, in which every protagonist is likely to have some success, each of which 
will leave a trace of some sort” (2003: 300). For Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), Wincott’s 
analysis demonstrates the lack of order and coherence at the EU level and as such is “yet 
another nail in the coffin of the top-down approach” (2003: 337). In contrast to both Radaelli 
as well as Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), Wincott (2003) distinguishes between ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ integration concurring that the former produces a European model.  
However, the latter for Wincott relies on “social and economic agents” in the nation 
state to create the Europeanization process from the bottom (2003: 279). Thus, implying a 
‘bottom-up’ Europeanization process within ‘negative’ integration and a ‘top-down’ 
Europeanization process in ‘positive’ integration. He concludes, that the ESM has its roots in 
member states rather than being a prescribed EU model per se, “based on an idealization of 
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some characteristics of certain national policy regimes” (2003: 289). Instead, reversing Knill 
and Lehmkuhl’s (1999) categorisation of policy associated with ‘framing integration’, at the EU 
level this national derived project was “used to motivate a political project at the EU level and 
to recruit supporters from among Europe’s political, policy and intellectual elites” to 
coordinate and promote the ESM project (2003: 289).  
Buller (2006) is another academic who fulfils Radaelli’s request from a ‘bi-directional’ 
approach. Buller argues that since the re-launch of the integration process in the 1980s the 
impact of the EU upon domestic politics of member states has become more relevant (2006: 
390). For Buller, distinctions of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ were necessary in Europeanization 
theory’s infancy however it is now obsolete with the two processes in practice collapsing into 
one, as shown by the British case of monetary policy (2006: 406).  
In concurrence with Bulmer and Burch (2005), he recognises the importance of agency 
within national adaptation, also conceiving national actors as active participators in the 
Europeanization process of British monetary policy, which became politically contested and 
resisted. Within his analysis he identifies three reasons why the Europeanization process 
causes political tensions. Firstly, the process is voluntary (2006: 395) which provides political 
space for debate and thus for divisions to occur. Secondly, national actors endeavour to use 
the EU for “strategic advantage over each other” implicating national actors’ power, interests 
and autonomy (2006: 390). Thirdly, as a result of the former, adaptational processes and the 
Europeanization process alike become “socially constructed in different ways by different 
groups” leading the process to be subjected to competing discourses and subsequently 
politicised (2006: 404). 
These competing discourses in Britain were Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts. The 
latter viewed the Europeanization process and EU as a solution to the state’s domestic 
problems (2006: 395). Meanwhile, this ‘bottom-up’ approach was resisted by the former (ibid) 
who viewed the significant ‘misfit’ between the EU and national institutions constituting a 
threat to Britain’s “institutional fabric” (2006: 399). Respectively, rather than national actors 
being passive recipients of and responders to the Europeanization process, Europeanization is 
or “can be the outcome of an intensely political process reflecting strategic conflict between 
actors with different interests and beliefs” (2006: 405).  
Accordingly, it is arguably the ‘bi-directional’ approach which provides the most 
valuable analytical tool of Europeanization theory, providing a new, vigorous challenge for 
European studies rather than a re-invention of the wheel with further descriptions and 
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explanations for the ‘nature of the beast’. Buller’s study concurs with Radaelli, demonstrating 
how “Europeanization provides a fascinating perspective on how governance is changing” 
(Radaelli, 2004: 16). Featherstone (2003) argues that Europeanization research stresses the 
core changes in contemporary politics, such as the broad adaptation of institutional settings 
as the various political levels respond to the dynamics of EI respectively, or policy transfer and 
imitation between national and sub-national levels (2003: 20). For him, “the study of 
‘Europeanization’ is central to an understanding of the contemporary politics of the continent” 
(ibid).    
Börzel (2002) states explicitly “Europeanization is a two-way process. It entails a 
‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ dimension” (2002: 193). She claims one way to connect the two 
disparate approaches to Europeanization research is to examine the role of member states in 
the EU policy decision-making and implementation processes (2002: 195). She maintains that 
member states ‘upload’ their policies to the EU level, thus increasing the match between the 
two governance levels in order to minimise the costs of adaptation (ibid). Member states are 
“cost sensitive” (2002: 196) in regard to EU policy. She claims member states compete to 
‘upload’ national policy with all having a “general incentive to upload” their policy (2002: 196) 
due to three reasons. Firstly, it minimises adaptation within law and administration. Secondly, 
national industry is better serviced with minimising the possibility for competitive 
disadvantage. Thirdly, member states can resolve national issues which are unable to be 
resolved by national actors (ibid).  
For Börzel, member states respond in three different ways. One way is “pace-setting”, 
comprising of the “active shaping” of EU policy to the national level (2002: 197). Alternatively, 
member states can respond by “foot-dragging” which entails member states obstructing or 
constricting each other’s ability to ‘upload’ their national policy (2002: 203). Lastly, member 
states can also respond by “fence-sitting” where member states are impartial to EU policy or 
alternatively, depending on the EU policy, they participate in various coalitions with ‘pace-
setting’ or ‘foot-dragging’ states (2002: 206). The strategy implemented is contingent on their 
economic development with the wealthiest, the most economically deficient and medium-
developed states implementing these strategies respectively. She does caveat that this 
taxonomy is subject to change with states’ strategies subject to alteration over time, policy 
area and issue (2002: 209). Börzel claims national responses to Europeanization in the area of 




Lee-Ohlsson (2008) similarly employs a ‘bi-directional’ approach highlighting the 
theoretical irrelevance of the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dichotomy maintaining,  
“it is only by combining these two dimensions of Europeanisation that we can actually 
better apprehend the complex relationship between the ESDP [European Security and 
Defence Policy] and member states’ foreign policies”17 (2008: 6).  
He identifies Bulmer and Burch’s (2005) ‘projection’ response in action with Sweden as the 
state was being forced to adapt the European Security Defence Policy by other EU member 
states, despite their resistance to EU policy in this domain. The state gained a voice in the EU 
policy process, “playing a pro-active role and obtaining influence going beyond its size” (2008: 
19) in order to influence the shape of the ESDP.  
2.1.4 ‘Circular’ Approach: Europeanization and Crises   
The euro crisis has initiated a movement in Europeanization research to explore the 
effects of a crisis on the Europeanization process. Saurugger (2014) has attempted to build 
upon existing Europeanization theory in expanding the ‘top-down’ approach, and arguably 
developing another variant of ‘bi-directional’ Europeanization, through this new exploration. 
She maintains that Europeanization is a circular rather than a linear process (2014: 184). 
Consequently, she critiques Risse et al.’s (2001) ‘goodness of fit’ model in particular for its 
linear, three staged process of national adaptation to the EU level and for conceptualising the 
mediation of the Europeanization process through national institutional fit alone (2014: 191).  
Saurugger’s ‘Circular Europeanization’ identifies three key factors which have a key role 
in the (non)adaptation of member states, particularly at crisis times, namely timeframe, at the 
national and EU level; salience of the issue; and the degree of politicisation of the public and 
political actors alike (2014: 184). The increased salience and politicisation of an issue leads to 
increased resistance and renegotiation of EU policies (2014: 185). For Saurugger 
“Europeanization inevitably turns more political over time” at the EU level, across and within 
member states (2014: 190). The model accounts for the influence of the national level on EU 
policy through its adaptation to the EU level, in addition to the EU’s influence on the national 
level, thus assuming an automatic renegotiation and adjustment of EU policy when rejected 
by member states. She claims, “domestic change is induced by European norms, and this 
change then influences the revision of exactly these norms at the EU level” (2014: 184). 
                                                          
17 There is a large amount of literature on the Europeanization of national foreign policy, for an overview 
see Tonra (2013).  
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Ultimately, she maintains that Europeanization can only be of conceptual use in analysing crisis 
times “if it takes feedback loops stemming from the impact of EU policies at the domestic level 
seriously” (2014: 191). 
Meanwhile, other research has examined particular policy areas in (crisis) countries 
illuminating the heterogeneity of crisis responses to the Europeanization process within 
different national policy areas during the euro crisis. Thus, mirroring the divergence in 
responses during non-crisis times analysed hitherto. Triandafyllidou (2014) analyses Greece’s 
immigration and asylum policy during the euro crisis, identifying a process of de-
Europeanization within national citizenship law and the conversely increased process of 
Europeanization in irregular migration and asylum policy. Christou and Kyris (2017) identify 
further Europeanization of national foreign policy in Cyprus. Meanwhile, González (2017) 
similarly purports an “acceleration of Europeanization process in Spanish politics” (2017: 29) 
from 2010 to 2012 with the euro crisis politicising Spanish politics.  
Windwehr (2017) explores the crisis reform of pension policy in Germany, Sweden, 
Poland and Italy. Only in the case of Italy is the euro crisis a “game-changer” creating a 
“qualitative leap” (2017: 1312) in the Europeanization process of national pension policy. 
European influence decreased in the case of Germany and, consistent with non-crisis times, 
remained insignificant in Sweden. Ultimately those hit hardest from the crisis were deemed 
to have undergone the greatest policy reform. Notably, in all cases anti-Europeanization forces 
developed in both the political and public spheres including those with a historically positive 
predisposition to the EU such as Greece and Cyprus. The only exception is Spain where political 
elites retained an overwhelmingly positive discourse. Respectively, this thesis is novel for both 
the countries and policy areas under analysis, thus contributing to constructing a holistic 
picture of how a crisis impacts the EU system. 
2.1.5 Concept and Debate: The Controversy of Usefulness  
Europeanization is post-ontological (Radaelli, 2003: 33) with an assumption that the 
process of EI is a continual, present and enduring process. Its focus upon the domestic arena 
has provided an opportunity for the development of new European theories, enabling a new 
and more in-depth perspective on a more mature EU system. As Vink and Graziano similarly 
claim, “Europeanization research has at least enriched the study of European politics by 
providing new empirical data on previously under-researched questions related to domestic 
politics in an integrating Europe” (2008: 5). Through using Europeanization theory, the 
researcher can immediately access a broad range of developments which are both current and 
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complex, “it is precisely the breadth of application and the demanding explanatory framework 
needed that attests to the value and importance of the term” (Featherstone, 2003: 19).  
Europeanization theory is both unique and useful in having both converging and 
diverging tendencies, while simultaneously being asymmetric and diverse. Though it overlaps 
with the concepts of European regional integration and convergence, it is not simply a 
reinvention of the wheel of EI, nor is it a synonym for previous terms that have gone before it. 
However, it is precisely this breadth and complexity that has seen Europeanization theory 
receive heavy criticism and become subjected to significant scepticism. 
Vink and Graziano (2008) contend there are two key weaknesses of Europeanization 
theory, namely “failure to feed back to the traditional integration theories” (2008: 13) and, 
“over-determination of the European factor, when explaining domestic change” (2008: 16). 
Contrastingly, Bulmer (2008) identifies four key limitations in Europeanization theory namely, 
prioritising “hierarchy over coordination” when theorising the process of Europeanization; 
underutilising themes from historical intuitionalism (2008: 55); the persisting “gaps of 
theoretically informed studies of Europeanization” (2008: 55-56); and, the methodological 
issue of knowing for certain that research findings are accredited to the Europeanization 
process (2008: 56).  
Radaelli (2003) similarly identifies three potential risks in the development of 
Europeanization as a concept; firstly “concept misinformation”; secondly, “conceptual 
stretching”; and thirdly, “degreeism” (2003: 28). The primary flaw in the concept of 
Europeanization for Radaelli is the indefinability of its boundaries, as increasing knowledge 
does not correspond to discovering its specific features (Radaelli, 2003: 31-32). The lack of 
cohesion amongst academics over Europeanization as a concept and a process has seen the 
term attacked for being “unwieldy” and “futile” as an organizational concept (Olsen, 2002: 
921). However, Marciacq (2012) attributes the weaknesses in the concept of Europeanization 
within the field of Europeanization itself for continuing to use Europeanization as a 
phenomenon rather than “an embryonic would-be theory” (2012: 69). 
Europeanization theory is compatible with other disciplines of politics and international 
relations alike making it difficult to discern the theory’s usefulness as an independent 
framework. Like globalization, the Europeanization process can be used as a scapegoat for 
unexplainable developments at the domestic level. Respectively, it is important to define what 
the process of Europeanization is equally as much as to define what it is not (Vink and 
Graziano, 2008: 10-11; Radaelli, 2003: 33-34). In this regard, Marciacq (2012) supplements 
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Radaelli’s criticisms of the theory, maintaining, in contrast to Vink and Graziano (2008), that 
the concept of Europeanization suffers from conceptual stretching due to its connection, 
namely being premised, within EI which she argues constrains its development as a concept 
and creates the EU-bias found in many studies (2012: 67), as Vink and Grazino (2008) critiqued. 
Rather, she advocates Europeanization would be better premised within governance theories 
which would provide “a more fertile ground” and “better account for the conceptual diversity 
characterising Europeanization research” (2012: 68).  
Conversely, Europeanization theory is useful for equally the same attributes namely, its 
compatibility with other disciplines, its extensive boundaries and understandings as both a 
concept and a process which affords its unique eclecticism. As Radaelli (2003) maintains, the 
inability of academics to agree on a single definition is beneficial to the field of Europeanization 
and a sign of strength, “an indicator of a vibrant debate” (2003: 28). He concludes that 
Europeanization theory is not simply an up-to-date re-invention as some academics’ claim. 
Europeanization theory produces specific questions about Europe and the integration process 
in comparison to traditional EI theories (ibid).  
Nevertheless, Radaelli claims for the concept of Europeanization to be ascribed a 
precise meaning, the term must be narrowed down to addressing specific rather than general 
aspects of the processes and impacts from the EU (2003: 27). This is a similar weakness within 
traditional EI theories thus presenting an opportunity for Europeanization theory to 
comprehensively and simultaneously contend with the various elements which comprise the 
Europeanization process in isolation from one another. Marciacq (2012) similarly calls for 
conceptual clarity claiming it is both desirable and attainable despite Europeanization being a 
contested concept as “all conceptions of Europeanization are not equally good” (2012: 69). 
Subsequently, as aforementioned within the introduction of the thesis, Radaelli 
concludes that Europeanization can be defined as, 
“Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared 
beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public 
policy and politics and then in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures, and public policies” (2003: 30). 
In spite of the criticisms and scepticism, there is a consensus amongst academics that 
Europeanization theory is useful, the ongoing application of the theory to a wide-range of 
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policy and political contexts despite the aforementioned weaknesses and criticisms is 
testament to and verification of its usefulness. Featherstone and Radaelli argue 
Europeanization will be far from a “passing fad” given the subject matter of its analysis (2003: 
331). Featherstone agrees that Europeanization would have little value if it merely repeated 
an existing notion. However, it does not, “it is a process of structural change, variously 
affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests” (Featherstone, 2003: 3). At its most 
extreme, domestic adaptation is isomorphic of European structures. At its weakest it 
encompasses a response in some shape or form to European policy developments (ibid). 
Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) argue that if Europeanization theory is to remain 
useful avoiding the ‘academic isolation’ EI theory encountered, it should draw and provide 
feedback on previous traditional findings and disciplines; either rectifying or adding 
knowledge, “Europeanization is not so much a theory as a distinct set of processes in need of 
explanation. These processes establish foci for research” (2003: 333). Olsen (2002) is cautious 
over the significance and potential future of Europeanization, as it may “turn out to be less 
useful as an explanatory concept than as an attention-directing device and a starting point for 
further exploration” (2002: 943). Like the EU itself, it may be an unrelenting process rather 
than an end-point.  
Olsen predicts that Europeanization as political unification may transpire to being of 
most interest because it encompasses both internal and external aspects of European 
dynamics (2002: 943). However, Buller (2006: 390) disputes this presumption of the EU 
achieving such unification, concurring with the idea of the EU being simply “cooperative 
federalism without a state” (Featherstone, 2003: 11). Hence, if Olsen is correct 
Europeanization theory could suffer from a crisis in interest and value.  
Ultimately, Europeanization theory can refine analyses to a set of complex changes 
demonstrating the diverging intensity and breadth not previously exposed. Europeanization 
theory is sensitive to both the application and adaption of pre-existing theories. It reveals new 
processes and indicators for transformation, while remaining sensitive to the complex reality 
that Europe is both converging and fragmenting within the same process. Previously these 
occurred separately (neo-functionalism provided an account of convergence; while 
intergovernmentalism analysed fragmentation as an outcome of the integration process), now 
they are occurring simultaneously. 
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 Europeanization Theory: Going Beyond the Traditional Integration 
Theories18? 
The ‘Europeanization’ turn provides the other side of the coin to EI within European 
studies, “Europeanization would not exist without European integration” (Radaelli, 2002: 33). 
It has clearly been able to supersede the boundaries in which traditional EI theories have been 
constrained in, rectifying the mistakes previously made. Europeanization theory goes further 
than EI theory, explaining the effects of EI at the European level and domestic level. It 
specifically analyses the role of domestic institutions during adaptation and examines 
individual state responses to the Europeanization process. In contrast to traditional EI 
theories, Europeanization theory perceives integration as a process rather than an end 
product, taking divergence and convergence as equal possible outcomes.  
Europeanization has an understanding which is the same as traditional EI theory but 
diverges on analytical focus by concentrating on the “central penetration of national systems 
of governance” (Bulmer and Burch, 2005: 863). In this sense Europeanization theory is an 
evolutionary new way to approach European studies, theorizing EU events from a more 
comprehensive perspective in attempting to discern causality. Particularly in the area of 
politics, Europeanization theory is proving innovative in highlighting original and new insights 
by showing “the evolution of new layers of politics that interact with older ones.” (Risse et al., 
2001: 3). Within traditional EI theory the nexus of debate was between neo-functionalists and 
intergovernmentalists. In Europeanization theory it is between the ‘top-down’ and the 
‘bottom-up’ approaches.  
2.2.1 Neo-functionalism vs. Europeanization 
Europeanization theory has been described by some as being merely warmed up neo-
functionalism, while there are overlaps this thesis would argue this statement goes too far. 
Both its authors Haas and Lindberg believed integration to be a process rather than an end 
state similar to Europeanizationists, regarding more than just the member states as relevant 
actors. Olsen argues akin to a neo-functionalist, that the Europeanization process cannot be 
analysed without acknowledging the tensions within the integration process (2002: 928). 
Likewise, actors within both theoretical schools of thought are rational, self-interested actors 
who retain the ability to learn and change their preferences. However, from this point onwards 
                                                          
18 See Ioannou et al. (2016) and Börzel and Risse (2017) for EI theory applied to the euro crisis. 
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a distinction needs to be drawn between neo-functionalist characteristics and 
Europeanization’s features.  
The Europeanization process has a dynamic quality; its structural effects are not 
necessarily permanent or irreversible, this is why ‘Europeanization’ is not a new label for ‘neo-
functionalism’ (Featherstone, 2003: 4). A discrepancy must be recognised between the 
socialisation process of elites within neo-functionalism and that of governmental and non-
governmental actors within Europeanization theory. Furthermore, neo-functionalist ‘spill-
over’ presumed the integration process to be of a linear, progressive nature which once 
started would be facilitated by the unrelenting commitment of member states. However, 
Europeanization theory has been able to demonstrate that the integration process involves as 
much regression as it does progression. 
2.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism/Intergovernmentalism vs. Europeanization 
In a direct challenge to the automaticity within neo-functionalisms ‘spill-over’ 
Europeanization theory like intergovernmentalism demonstrates how nation states can 
dictate the integration process, bringing it to a halt when state resilience persists in defence 
of their national interests. In correspondence to liberal intergovernmentalism, 
Europeanization theory and the ‘goodness of fit’ model provides an answer to the traditional 
dividing question of the role of states within the integration process. Europeanization theory 
overlaps with the idea of conferring different levels of politics, ‘high’ and ‘low’, with 
distinguishing between different institutional logics.  
In a similar setting to that of the Single European Act (SEA) where liberal 
intergovernmentalists argued the treaty was only achieved through states aligning their 
concerns of ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics to allow for the formation of EU policy, so within 
Europeanization theory aligning the EU institutional logic with that of the nation state (Bulmer 
and Burch, 2005) leads to domestic change. When adaptational costs are too high, either 
financially or politically, member states fall back upon their pre-existing national strategies, 
safeguarding their domestic interests. Europeanization theory implies that states are driven 
by ‘issue-specific’ interests creating a flexible and ‘positive-sum’ outcome akin to that of 
intergovernmentalists.  
However, rather than supranational institutions providing the framework for co-
operation, within the process of Europeanization it is the EU itself which is providing the arena 
for convergence. Similar to intergovernmentalists, who argue that states’ national 
governments are the ‘gate-keepers’ of the EI process, so within Europeanization theory 
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institutions are the interface between the EU and domestic levels of governance. Brözel and 
Risse (2003) argue in concurrence to Featherstone (2003), that to differing degrees, all 
member states including the big three are Europeanized. This conversely challenges liberal 
intergovernmentalists who imply that bargains are made on the lowest common denominator 
by the powerful member states, thus excluding them from the effects of the Europeanization 
process.  
One of the criticisms of liberal intergovernmentalism was for ignoring the endogenous 
effects of being an EU member state and for neglecting the ways in which pre-existing EU 
institutions shaped and constrained intergovernmental policy-making. Arguably, 
Europeanization theory fills the void on both these accounts.  
2.2.3 Multi-level Governance (MLG) vs. Europeanization 
MLG is the theory sharing most common ground with the Europeanization debate.  
Academics such as Mike Goldsmith (2003) have accounted for this commonality in-depth. The 
MLG framework has been incorporated into the Europeanization literature by multiple 
academics, such as Buller who argues “the EU is a complex organisation where the national 
and European levels are increasingly intermeshed in a pattern of multi-levelled governance” 
(Buller, 2006: 390). States within both theories can simply observe as power becomes 
dispersed and they become displaced as the primary actors driving the integration process. 
The “fluidity” (Rosamond, 2000: 111) and “open-endedness” (Marks, 1992: 221) of the EU 
system in MLG is similarly depicted by Europeanization theory with there being no permanent 
area possessing power.  
Likewise, both are interested in exploring the EU without making any explicit 
predictions. Radaelli (2004) identified this as a defining feature of Europeanization theory, 
meanwhile MLG went only as far to say that the boundaries between the various levels of 
governance would become increasingly indistinguishable. Similarly, within both, complexity is 
depicted as the fundamental feature of the EU. Again, both are of a pluralistic nature with the 
EU relegated from a decisive actor to a decision-making arena. Furthermore, state sovereignty 
is indirectly challenged within both as the state becomes superseded by other actors within 
other levels of governance. Both view EI as a simultaneous vertical and horizontal process 
involving “a system of continuous negotiation” (Marks, 1993: 392) across multiple levels of 
governance moreover, engaging “a multiplicity of politically independent but otherwise 
interdependent actors – private and public” (Schmitter, 2004: 49).  
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Fundamentally, both view the EU as a diverse system with MLG advocating that “policy 
diversity is a fundamental and enduring characteristic” (Marks, 1992: 223) of the EU. Within 
this thesis, Europeanization theory will go further demonstrating how this characteristic 
endures even at times of crisis. 
 The ‘Crisis Spectrum’ and Integration Theories: The Impact of Crises 
In the proceeding chapters, this thesis will be employing three crisis logics namely, 
‘crisis progression’, ‘crisis diversity’ and ‘crisis stability’. The logic of ‘crisis progression’ 
believes that crises are a threat to the EU, capable of arresting, and ultimately ending, the 
European project (see figure 3). It has been a long-standing assumption within early, 
traditional EI theories that crises are ‘progressive’ creating a ‘domino’ effect where a crisis at 
the core spills over into surrounding interconnected policy areas which become crippled one 
by one subsequently impeding European development and creating significant periods of 
‘eurosclerosis’.  
 The logic of ‘crisis diversity’ perceives crises within a positive framework whereby 
crises ensure the EU’s survival (see figure 4). These academics believe that crises are a catalyst 
for EI, facilitating the EU’s development. This is a more ‘evolutionary’ and ‘organic’ process 
whereby policy areas respond flexibly and autonomously rather than uniformly falling which 
results in a ‘crisis cushion’ allowing the rest of the European system to operate as normal (see 
figure 5). For them, more progress is made at crisis times than in non-crisis times. These two 
crisis logics constitute the two extremes of the spectrum.  
It is the difference between dropping a pebble in the water and watching the 
subsequent ripple effect, to someone belly flopping into the sea creating an enormous splash 
where water cascades randomly making mini splashes in the surrounding area. ‘Crisis 
progression’ is always in the background of ‘crisis diversity’; the opportunity of an action is 
always occurring in the context of a threat. Respectively, rather than being in opposition, the 
two logics are in tension with one another. Paradoxically, one cannot exist without the other 
but they are mutually exclusive logics within a single policy area. 
The logic of ‘crisis stability’ purports that core (policy) areas, which are the foundations 
to other policies and for the whole system, defend against policy change where such a 




In a mechanical linear fashion, a crisis from the core spills 
over into interconnected policy areas which one-by-one, in a 
‘domino’ effect, become inhibited as the wave of crisis 
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The EU not only survives but becomes 
stronger from the crisis as new policies 
reinforce the process of EI encouraging more 
member states to participate. However, 
caution is taken not too be flexible beyond 
the limits of the system which would cause 
the destruction of the system, similar to 
‘crisis progression’. 
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The policy areas respond, taking the impact of the crisis thereby creating a ‘cushion’. 
The EU system is able to operate 
as normal; this in turn allows 
certain policy areas to operate as 
normal namely those that 
cooperate and are essential to the 
proper functioning of the EU 
system, such as the four 
fundamental freedoms. This 
thereby creates “pockets of 
stability” within a system inflicted 
by crisis. 





























Policy areas are to varying degrees 
entrenched within the EU system, when a 
crisis hits the EU those entrenched policy 
areas (highlighted in red) defend the area 
in response to the crisis, repelling the 
impact of the crisis onto other less 
entrenched areas. These less entrenched 
policy areas adapt and innovate in 
response to the crisis. 
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‘Crisis stability’ is imperative in order to anchor the system down so to allow surrounding 
policy areas to react flexibly and for the system to be amenable. All crisis logics are 
simultaneously potential threats and opportunities to the EU, excluding ‘crisis progression’. 
There is a tension between ‘crisis stability’ and ‘crisis diversity’, namely between too much 
rigidity and excess flexibility. 
Correspondingly, ‘crisis progression’ impedes the Europeanization process with the 
potential of fostering a process of de-Europeanization as the crisis mechanically spreads 
throughout the EU system overwhelming the mechanisms for policy development. De-
Europeanization occurs when the EU system is overwhelmed, spreading to the national system 
which, as a result, can no longer service the Europeanization process due to intervening factors 
at the national level. ‘Crisis diversity’ encourages the Europeanization process as a crisis comes 
into being organically, acting as a catalyst for policy development.  
Thus, such a crisis has the potential to expedite the process of Europeanization and 
provides an opportunity for the process of Europeanization to occur which is necessary, at 
times essential, for the survival of the EU due to the continual presence of ‘crisis progression’ 
in the background. Conversely, ‘crisis progression’ creates the conditions upon which the 
Europeanization process is necessary, at times essential, for survival of the EU on account of 
‘crisis progressions’ mechanical ‘domino’ effect. ‘Crisis stability’ leaves the process of 
Europeanization untouched by a crisis with nothing gained and nothing lost in such a crisis. 
When applying these logics to leading EI theories, a divide emerges between the old 
and new theories. Traditional integration theories (neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism 
and liberal intergovernmentalism) possess a classical view of crises (‘crisis progression’) 
viewing the EU as a linear, rational organisation, with a mechanical view of EU responses (the 
system either moving forwards or backwards in an orderly, linear fashion) (see Appendix).  
Contrastingly, new EI theories (constructivism, multi-level governance and 
Europeanization) view the EU as a complex system, with more subtle processes occurring in 
countless directions mirroring the expansion of the EU at the time (see Geyer, 2003), and 
conceive policy responses as autonomous and non-linear (see Appendix). The advocates for 
‘crisis diversity’ demonstrate a move away from intergovernmentalism and towards 
Europeanization theory therefore, once again, rejecting the criticism that Europeanization 




This chapter has demonstrated the strength and versatility of Europeanization theory 
showing that those academics deeming Europeanization theory as being useless have been 
too quick to discount the usefulness of Europeanization theory. Thus, this analysis supports 
the consensus amongst academics. While the Europeanization debate is messy, it is able to 
acknowledge complex processes of governance occurring simultaneously. Its eclecticism 
allows it to make unique and original contributions to other areas of political science, such as 
policy analysis and comparative politics. It adds novel, stimulating moreover, intriguing 
questions to the debates surrounding the evolution of the EU. Above all, Europeanization 
theory has added to the ‘theoretical relic’ (Radaelli and Featherstone, 2003) of EI theory, 
adding the detail omitted by previous EI theories while contributing innovative ideas and 
insights previously undiscovered. 
Europeanization theory underpins the discussion in this thesis. In the following chapters 
the novel crisis logics of ‘crisis progression’ and ‘crisis diversity’ will be employed to identify 
the type of crisis pattern, ascertaining whether a ‘crisis spectrum’ is at play, if and the type of 
Europeanization process that is occurring in the ongoing euro crisis. These logics will be 
employed in: a review of the European literature on EU crises (Chapter 3); an analysis of the 
ongoing euro crisis at the EU and national level (Chapter 4); an examination of the 
development of and interaction between EU and national social policy (Chapter 5); and, an 
analysis of specific areas of national social policy in Britain (Chapter 6) and Ireland (Chapter 7) 
respectively.  
This research will contribute and build upon existing Europeanization theory, in 
particular the ‘bi-directional’ and ‘circular’ approaches. It is the aim of this thesis to contribute 
to the latest theoretical discussion on the Europeanization process in the context of the euro 
crisis. The thesis will take Europeanization theory further than it has currently been applied by 
analysing new countries and new policy areas, exploring whether a crisis: is an opportunity for 
the Europeanization process; expedites the process of Europeanization; is an obstruction to 
the Europeanization process; or, a combination of all these scenarios. Furthermore, whether 
there is a uniform effect from a crisis on the Europeanization process and response to the 
Europeanization process in a crisis, or a disparate impact as this theoretical review would 
suggest. 
The proceeding chapter will review the literature on EU crises and the European crisis 
debate in particular, exploring where scholars from the field of economics and politics lay on 
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the ‘crisis spectrum’. It will examine whether they lay towards ‘crisis diversity’, perceiving the 
euro crisis as an opportunity and catalyst for policy development, or closer to ‘crisis 
progression’, conceiving the euro crisis as a threat which is inhibiting policy development and 




Europe in Crisis: The Disunion of the 
European Union 
 
“For the past six decades, steps forward to greater European Union have taken place at 
moments of incipient crisis. None, though, has been taken in a time of disaster. The next leap 
in integration looks set to change that.” (The Economist, May 2012) 
“Since the start of Europe’s debt crisis in 2009, there has been a steady drumbeat of 
predictions that the euro is doomed…the risks are rising that the debt crisis is slipping out of 
Europe’s control and the weight of the combined threats to the euro is becoming 
overwhelming…The more time slips away, the more likely the euro will too.” (Time, May 
2012) 
 
These quotes epitomise the scepticism and domineering consensus that the euro crisis is 
signalling the end of the EU, not simply the Eurozone. Positive comments surrounding the 
conclusion of the euro crisis are difficult to locate. Nonetheless, the initial quote demonstrates 
that there are those who believe the EU will survive the euro crisis; that crises are not the end 
of the EU but signify the strengthening and advancement of the European project to new, 
previously unchartered territory. However, are the sceptics really dominating the crisis 
debate? Is this really the crisis to end all crises?        
 This chapter reviews the literature on EU crises and the European crisis debate in 
particular. The review serves to explore where scholars from the field of economics and 
politics lay on the ‘crisis spectrum’ in relation to the spectrums two extremes. This identifies 
whether the sceptics are dominating the crisis debate, with EU crises and the euro crisis in 
particular viewed as a threat to EU policy development and the EU system, aligned to ‘crisis 
progression’. Alternatively, the review explores whether this image is a falsity and of equal 
significance in the crisis debate are those viewing EU crises and the euro crisis as a catalyst, 
accelerating EU policy development and providing an opportunity for the EU system to 
strengthen, aligned to ‘crisis diversity’. The chapter identifies the gap in the literature which 
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this thesis is filling, namely the euro crisis literature currently only examines the impact on the 
ESM and on welfare states as a collective. Hence, the thesis is bridging the literature on EU 
crises and the euro crisis literature with social policy literature.  
 The chapter will be structured as follows. The economic literature is initially reviewed 
in relation to the two extremes of the ‘crisis spectrum’, identifying those economic ‘crisis 
progressionists’ and economic ‘crisis diversifiers’. The economic arguments on the euro crisis 
are briefly reviewed on account of the dominance of the discussion on economic policy which 
makes this literature important to include within this literature review. This is followed by a 
review of the political literature in relation to the two extremes of the ‘crisis spectrum’, 
similarly identifying those political ‘crisis progressionists’ and political ‘crisis diversifiers’. It is 
within this section that the chapter identifies the gap this thesis is filling and identifies the 
literature which is most closely aligned to this thesis and thus will be built upon, namely 
Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2015) and Kühnhardt (2009). Underlying this literature within both 
these fields, as will be seen, is a debate between ‘more’ or ‘less’ Europe. The chapter argues 
that despite the dominant image emanating from the EU and the media of ‘crisis 
progressionists’ dominating the crisis debate this is a falsity with ‘crisis diversifiers’ appearing 
prominent within the crisis debate as the euro crisis is increasingly being viewed within a 
positive framework as the crisis continues.  
This chapter highlights the intrinsic connection between economics and politics which 
is key to this thesis. The majority of the crisis literature focuses on the field of economics due 
to the important scholarly focus on the core crisis area of economic policy. However, the 
economic field is disregarded for two key reasons. Firstly, this is a saturated field where an 
extensive volume of discussion on the euro crisis has already taken place; hence any additional 
research is obsolete or contributes little impact. Secondly, as will be shown, there are a 
minimal number of economists who view the crisis from a broad spectrum, inclusive of the 
opportunities the crisis is creating. Respectively, on account of the core research aims and 
questions of this thesis, this literature adds little to this research.  
 Economic Crisis Literature: ‘Crisis Progression’ vs. ‘Crisis Diversity’ 
3.1.1 The ‘Dominant’ Economic ‘Crisis Progressionists’ 
The majority of economists view the euro crisis as an existential threat for the euro 
and in some instances the EU too. The causes of the euro crisis are highly contested within 
economic literature. Nevertheless, economists are in accordance that the EU/Eurozone 
requires reform and are similarly sceptical of the degree to which any reforms will be 
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competently implemented by the EU. However, reflecting the debate within the EU itself of 
how to save the euro (Copsey and Haughton, 2012: 2), the type of change involved is widely 
debated with an array of recommendations for the most appropriate way reform could be 
achieved and by what means. Respectively, there are five key strands to the economic 
literature on the euro crisis. The first of these strands is the popular recommendation of 
creating Eurobonds (Begg, 2012; De Grauwe, 2011a; Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Frankel, 2015).  
A second strand is the debate over an EU level supervisory institution which retains a 
significant role for national authorities (Wolf, 2008; Begg, 2009). There is a sub-debate over 
this issue of dividing responsibilities between the national and EU level discussed by scholars 
from the perspective of new member states (Spendzharova, 2012); and those who argue for 
a European Financial Agency in tandem with national financial supervisors, taking into account 
both those host countries authorities involved and the interests of depositors (Schoenmaker 
and Oosterloo, 2008).  
Within this strand there is a second sub-debate over whether the European Central 
Bank (ECB) should be fulfilling such a role with discussions over the current role of the ECB in 
the crisis and its future role in the EU (Begg, 2009; Carmassi, Gros and Micossi, 2009; Gros, 
2012; Wolf, 2008; Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010; Eijffinger, 2012; Smaghi, 2009; Mazinotto, 
Spair and Wollf, 2011; Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Veron, 2011; Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2005; 
Gros, 2012; Drudi et al., 2012; De Grauwe, 2011b; Frankel, 2015; Schlosser, 2015). The third 
strand debates the need for EU level supervision without the involvement of member states 
(Lanoo, 2009; Obstfeld, 2013). Against both of these groups is a fourth strand where 
economists disagree with such proposals, instead advocating for a new supervisory institution 
separate of EU institutions, that have arguably played a part in fostering the crisis (Giavazzi 
and Spaventa, 2010). 
The fifth major strand comprises of a debate over whether the crisis is the result of an 
economic failing (Begg, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012; Eijffinger, 2012; Carmassi, Gros and 
Micossi, 2009; Krugman, 2013) or political weakness (De Grauwe, 2011a; Stockhammer, 2012; 
Veron, 2011). Contrastingly, there are economists who combine both perspectives, claiming 
the issue is with both economics and politics, as European economics is in tension and conflicts 
with European politics, and vice versa (Daianu, 2012; Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Pauly, 2009). In 
addition, there is a more minor strand of the economic debate over where to place blame for 
the crisis, the EU structure or member states’ national policy actions (Givozzi and Sparenta, 
2010; Gros, 2012; Davras, 2008; Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012). Daianu (2012) and Begg (2012) 
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maintain that one of the consequences of the crisis is a division between northern and 
southern member states as well as between non-Eurozone EU members and Eurozone EU 
members respectively. Daianu sums up the economist attitude towards the Eurozone when 
he states, “the design of the EMU [Economic Monetary Union] needs to be thoroughly 
remade” (2012: 27).  
In contrast to these economists there are those who go as far to claim that a resolution 
of the sovereign debt crisis is insufficient for saving the euro (Koskinen et al., 2014). There is 
also a view that renationalisation of currencies is inevitable (Klose and Weigert, 2014) and 
there are ways to resolve the crisis without drastic treaty or policy changes (Polito and 
Wickens, 2014). Krugman (2013) intriguingly poses the question of whether the euro should 
be saved given its inherent weaknesses and policy faults from its inception. He concludes that 
it should be saved on political grounds, while there would be high economic costs, politically 
the disintegration of the euro “would amount to a huge defeat for the broader European 
project” (2013: 447). Krugman implies that this defeat could be fatal for the European project 
stating the EU has “done a vast amount of good, and…no citizen of the world should want to 
see [it] fail” (ibid).   
3.1.2 The Economic Perspective of the EU’s Hidden Opportunities  
 There are only a handful of economists who view EU crises and the euro crisis in 
particular as an opportunity for EU (policy) development. Hagen (2009) is one such economist 
from the wider crisis literature who is of relevance to this thesis asserting a crisis incites further 
co-operation from member states. Hagen claims a crisis fosters the EU’s development and that 
the EMU has been created explicitly through crises, with the EMU used in turn to encourage 
further, deeper integration by raising “the expected benefits from economic cooperation in 
Europe to preserve the existing cooperation among the member states” (2009: 64). The EMU 
as an instigator of further integration has been spent according to Hagen, respectively “future 
crises will need expansions of the scope of European integration in other areas to fulfil that 
role” (2009: 67). Thus, suggesting that ‘crisis diversity’ within peripheral policy areas will be 
necessary. For him, the EMU “emerged from a series of crises” and it will “be completed 
through a crisis” (2009: 76).  
This crisis would either be political or economic in nature, namely; a political crisis 
outside of the EU, which increases the benefits of closer political co-operation in the EU; or, 
an unprecedented economic crisis which de-incentivises member states’ fiscal integration, but 
in turn sees a political union replace the EMU as the instigator for continued integration, 
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subsequently ensuring member states benefit from their continued commitment (ibid). Hagen 
claims “neither political nor fiscal integration in Europe is likely to proceed in small steps” 
(2009: 62). Significantly, to this thesis, Hagen concludes “if it is a crisis, it may well push the EU 
forward a long way toward fiscal and political union” (2009: 76). The only caveat to Hagen’s 
argument is that a large development in political or fiscal integration will not occur unless EU 
member states can see sufficient benefits from doing so (ibid).  
 In relation to the euro crisis debate specifically, there are only a handful of economists 
who similarly view the crisis as creating an opportunity for a new international system 
(Smaghi, 2009; Helleiner, 2010). Helleiner (2010) is critical of those who are terming this crisis 
moment as ‘a new Bretton Woods moment’ claiming that it is a long process to create a new 
system (2010: 636). Nonetheless, Helleiner maintains this rhetoric could lead the euro crisis 
to be a catalyst for policy development, stating “if it encourages bold and ambitious politics, 
the transition from the current interregnum to a more constitutive phase could be 
accelerated” (ibid). Smaghi (2009) expresses concern that there is growing complacency which 
increases the chances for the reinstatement of “nationalistic tendencies and institutional 
jealousies” (2009: 12), and for a growing consensus to develop in support of maintaining the 
status quo. He claims, “if these forces are not firmly counteracted, this crisis could turn out to 
have been a wasted opportunity. And the next crisis could move closer” (ibid). After all, as 
Lannoo (2009) entitled his contribution, “a crisis is a terrible thing to waste”. 
Darvas (2008) purports that bailout conditions, while a high price to pay for domestic 
policy mistakes, facilitate new EU member states adopting the euro. For Davras there are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, “the single currency has gained new appeal for outsiders since the 
global financial turmoil intensified” (2008: 1) on account of the solutions the Eurozone can 
provide for states’ national economic crises. Lane (2008) concurs with this assertion within his 
study of the Icelandic recovery. Latvia’s accession to the Eurozone in January 2014 also 
supports such suggestions (The Guardian, December 2013c). Secondly, states such as Hungary 
were expected to meet the Maastricht criteria sooner than anticipated due to these new 
provisions hence expediting their euro membership.  
 There are those who conceive the euro crisis as a blend of the two crisis ideals, viewing 
opportunities and the threat of collapse as inextricably connected. Drudi et al. (2012) conclude 
that governance within the EU is changing because of the threat of the crisis driving policy 
decisions and actions (2012: 896). They maintain that these changes were needed long before 
the crisis hit Europe however, “it could be argued that the current crisis in the Eurozone has 
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accelerated the process of strengthening EU-wide institutions as well as fiscal co-operation” 
which are necessary for the “stability and success of the EMU” (2012: 896). They emphasise 
the opportunity arising from the destruction of the EU’s economic structure to resolve the 
fundamental weaknesses and ‘incompleteness’ of the EMU.  
Similarly, Lane (2012) views the euro crisis as beneficial for the EU with it providing 
“an opportunity to implement reforms that are necessary for a stable monetary union but that 
would not have been politically feasible in its absence” (2012: 65). He traces EMU 
developments historically from the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, concluding that the 
collapse of the EU is “no longer unthinkable” (2013: 65). Nonetheless, he retains an optimistic 
predisposition that “the unfolding reform process will deliver a monetary union that can 
survive” (ibid). In accordance, Buti and Carnot (2012) conceive the crisis as a catalyst for policy 
development over long-standing and long-debated issues of economic weaknesses. For them, 
the EU was not equipped to manage a crisis (2012: 906). Nonetheless, they suggest that from 
the threat posed by the crisis the current reforms could lead to significant policy development 
asserting, “with hindsight, the decisions started by the recent crisis may come to emerge as a 
decisive stage on the road to ‘ever closer union’” (2012: 910). 
Of particular note, Stockhammer (2016) accords with those fellow economists arguing 
the crisis has both economic and political origins, namely a political choice of following 
neoliberal policy which has been exacerbated by the economic structure of the EMU. 
However, he maintains that the neoliberal agenda has meant “political forces in Europe have 
built half a European state” while simultaneously deconstructing “the ability of nation states 
to counter an economic crisis (and by implication to underwrite social comprises)” (2016: 373), 
intentionally. He claims a complete shift away from neoliberalism is required comprising of, 
along with a re-think on wage policy and finance, a European social security system which is 
tantamount to establishing a European welfare state. For Stockhammer, “this could give a new 
life to the project of European integration. And it would make economic sense” (2016: 376).   
Boyer (2013) takes account of both ends of the crisis spectrum, with both the potential 
death of the EU and its survival as equal potential outcomes from the euro crisis. Boyer states 
“the future of the euro is open” (2013: 566). The collapse of the euro is still a plausible 
consequence of the euro crisis, as is the complete renationalisation of the economic project. 
However, for Boyer EU citizens may demand revitalisation of EU democracy which will entail 
either retention of democracy at the national level or, at long last, the emergence of a fully-
fledged European democratic state. In contrast to Stockhammer, Boyer asserts that when it 
76 
 
comes to the euro an assessment of the weaknesses of EI are needed however, “polity still 
matters more” (2013: 562). His “prognosis” concludes that “the euro crisis is here to stay and 
it will likely bring many surprises” (2013: 566).  
Similar to Boyer, Bresser-Pereira and Rossi (2014) conceive both ends of the crisis 
spectrum and rejects the proposition that the euro crisis means the potential termination of 
the EU. Rather, for them the threat is coming from within the EU. Similar to Stockhammer, 
who viewed neoliberalism as a threat to the EU, so they view the ongoing policy of austerity 
as a threat to the EU due to the stationary position it places the economy. For Bresser-Pereira 
and Rossi, “discontinuing the Euro is a way to consolidate the political union” (2014: 14), hence 
the collapse of the euro could save the EU rather than being a threat to the EU. They maintain 
that a retreat in economic EI is necessary rather than damaging, namely through 
renationalisation or the creation of a ‘common currency’ area where the euro exists alongside 
national currencies (2014: 13). They conclude “history has examples to offer where the pursuit 
of utopia led to disaster, but there may also be the case where disaster can be prevented with 
utopias” (2014: 14); a Federal EU with the euro as a fully-fledged European currency is the 
utopia they advocate aiming for.   
In accordance with this argument purported by Boyer (2013) together with Bresser-
Pereira and Rossi (2014), Honkapohja (2014) analyses those policies and reforms already 
implemented and “stimulated by the crisis” (2014: 269), namely the banking union and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. He maintains that both need strengthening, with greater 
integration occurring in general so to avoid a future crisis. He is a sceptical diversifier however, 
in accordance with his economic colleagues, viewing competent implementation as essential 
for these new EU structures to be resilient against similar economic shocks in the future 
stating, “the past record of the EU is not good in this respect” (2014: 270).   
Schlosser (2015) analyses the new fiscal policy measures of the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack 
and the Fiscal compact, providing evidence against the traditional view that “the closer a policy 
issue lies to the core of state sovereignty, the least likely it is for integration to occur in that 
domain” (2015: 1). In opposition to this contention, Schlosser follows the processes involved 
during the euro crisis. He discovers that EU norms were “spilling out of the central level” (2015: 
26) and “exported to the domestic level” (ibid) in order to ensure a buttressing of the EMU’s 
surveillance of national fiscal policies. What Schlosser terms “vertical institutionalization” 




There was a divide amongst EU actors over whether to export norms to the national 
level or retain control at the EU level. However, flexible coalitions saw the European 
Commission (EC), the European Parliament and ECB all actively shape the policy processes and 
subsequent corollary (2015: 23). For Schlosser, “the euro crisis has resulted in a substantial 
revamp of Europe’s fiscal surveillance regime” (2015: 26). Of particular importance for this 
thesis, his analysis demonstrates how the euro crisis is turning conventional processes upside 
down.   
 Political Crisis Literature: ‘Crisis Progression’ vs. ‘Crisis Diversity’ 
3.2.1 The Political ‘Crisis Progressionists’ 
 In contrast to the economic field, political scholars are in accordance that the 
structural weaknesses of the EMU have caused the euro crisis and the majority of scholars 
within the political sphere view the euro crisis more optimistically. However, there is a 
minority who view EU crises and the euro crisis in particular, as a potential threat to the 
survival of the EU19. Elvert (2009) analyses EU crises through a critical, historic evaluation to 
identify the role of crises within the EI process and the wider implications for the EU. He 
analyses from the premise that crises have a destructive effect on EI. Curiously, he defines the 
term ‘crisis’ on the premise of its original usage in a medical context to mean a “very decisive 
moment” where a bifurcation occurs between a patient surviving or dying, which he equally 
applies to institutions (2009: 50). Hence, for Elvert, ‘crisis’ in his analysis means “to identify “a 
severe or existential crisis,” threatening the EEC’s, EC’s or EU’s very existence.” (ibid).    
He claims that “the idea that crises reinforced integration should better be considered 
a rather provocative working hypothesis” (2009: 51) on the premise that the EU process is an 
“intellectual construction” (ibid). His historical analysis of EU crises proceeds with the purpose 
to test this theory.  Within the analysis he identifies three phases and crises within each of 
these phases which are subjected to his test namely, ‘implementation’, ‘reconciliation’ and 
‘Europeanization’ with each comprising of a different outcome for the development of EI 
(2009: 54-56). For Elvert Europeanization is defined as the following; 
“a significant fusion of national and European politics, which did not replace the 
traditional nation state by a European federation but has created a mixture of national 
and European resources, competences, and responsibilities, set up in a multilevel 
system of growing complexity and opacity” (2009: 53). 
                                                          
19 See The Journal of Democracy (2012) comprising of a series of articles on European Disintegration. 
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In spite of where his analysis begins, on the premise of crises being a negative occurrence, 
Elvert concludes the opposite stating a crisis can alter the direction of EI, for the betterment 
of the EU project (2009: 59-60). 
Quaglia et al. (2009), argue that the euro crisis has highlighted the intrinsic weakness 
of EU policy co-ordination between member states. For them the core of the problem is with 
weak European institutions which fail to adequately incite EU co-operation, or as they term it 
the “semi-public good” (2009: 84). Quaglia et al. perceive the crisis spilling over in a mechanical 
fashion, spreading from one policy area to another. For instance, they claim it is spill-over from 
the international domain which led to the liquidity crisis in Europe. In turn, the crisis of liquidity 
led to a solvency crisis within the European financial system whereby banks sold illiquid assets 
to rebuild liquidity but a decline in asset prices diminished the capital of banks. 
 Quaglia et al. claim “co-operation between national governments, central banks and 
financial supervisors” (2009: 71) is and ought to be most important to the EU and that suitable 
policy making is possible when a shared framework is in place. However, crisis prevention and 
crisis management are divided between the national and EU governance levels making co-
operation between member states at a time of crisis highly challenging (Quaglia et al., 2009: 
70-73). In the EU, crisis prevention is divided between the multiple levels of governance, 
namely, financial regulation is performed at the EU level and financial supervision is executed 
at the national level (Quaglia et al., 2009: 70).  
It is this divide which is implicitly highlighted by Quaglia et al. as causing problems in 
the EU’s financial responsibilities, as nation states are responsible to their national authorities 
rather than their European counterparts. Compounding such weaknesses, the EU has the 
foundations for crisis management through a series of “vague and non-mandatory” (Quaglia 
et al., 2009: 72-73) Memorandum of Understandings. The absence of united action is what is 
allowing the crisis to become a threat to the EU. Hence, it is the internal response to the crisis 
causing a threat to the EU rather than the economic crisis itself. Ultimately, they claim the EU’s 
response to the euro crisis demonstrates how the union is able to “respond quickly and 
collectively, but not necessarily adequately, to an unexpected crisis” (2009: 84). Arguably, 
Quaglia et al. are suggesting a bigger crisis is needed for the EU to learn how to adequately 
form a unified EU crisis response. Their analysis is suggestive that the ongoing euro crisis is not 
existential as perceived and conveyed as there has been latitude for a muddled crisis response 
from the EU that has, so far, successfully staved off disaster.   
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 In accordance, Schuknecht et al. (2011) view both the ambiguous framework in which 
member states operate and inadequate reforms as the dual weaknesses that are prohibiting 
the defence of the EU system. Similar to economists Buti and Carnot (2012), Schuknecht et al. 
view the EU as being unprepared for the euro crisis. They claim the first years of the Eurozone 
to 2007 are “best characterised as “wasted good times” during which the foundations were 
laid for the present crisis in EMU” as “almost as soon as the euro had been introduced, 
consolidation fatigue set in” (2011: 10). For Schuknecht et al. this has resulted in the Eurozone 
fiscal policy today being “at a crossroads” (2011: 17). 
 They maintain what is necessary to take the correct road is a “quantum leap” (2011: 
5) within the framework for EU fiscal governance. They make recommendations themselves 
as well as analysing those reforms already suggested. In regard to those suggested reforms 
they conclude, “it is questionable whether the revised governance framework will be 
implemented in a rigorous manner” (2011: 16) leaving great uncertainty around the stability 
of EU finances (ibid), and a pathway for history to repeat itself. The one positive Schuknecht 
et al. identifies is that the euro crisis forced Eurozone member states to support crisis 
countries “at considerable political cost at the domestic level” (2011: 15). Respectively, for 
Schuknecht et al. this crisis experience has the potential to “encourage national governments 
to exercise more peer pressure” (2011: 16), which was only tentatively applied in the early 
years of the Eurozone (2011: 11). Thus, aligned with the economists previously reviewed, for 
Schuknecht et al. the mistakes of the past could be rectified in the future through this crisis.  
Hall (2012) poses the same question as this thesis, “Will the crisis ultimately advance 
the process of political integration in the European Union or impede that process?” (2012: 
355). For him, the euro crisis “is the most serious crisis the EU has faced since its inception, 
with the potential to open up durable fissures among its member states” (2012: 370). Hall 
argues that in order to guarantee the EU’s survival “more intensive fiscal co-ordination in the 
Eurozone will be required” (2012: 369). For him, the euro crisis has had a negative impact on 
EI whereby, despite fiscal co-ordination increasing, rather than accelerating the integration 
process “the crisis has exposed its fault lines” (2012: 368).  
The common political support for EI has also been undermined by the crisis rhetoric 
which places the origins of the euro crisis at the national rather than EU level (ibid). As such, 
the euro’s survival is “a matter of doubt” (2012, 369) for Hall, with the potential for political 
will to keep it afloat (ibid). However, Hall is one of the few progressionists to also acknowledge 
the ability of the EU to foster integration in crisis times concluding, “the capacity of the 
80 
 
European states to turn a crisis into a crucible for further integration, as the Single European 
Act did, should not be underestimated” (2012: 370).  
Hall (2014) maintains that the euro crisis has spilled over from economics into politics 
threatening the legitimacy of national governments and the EU (2014: 1238), consequently 
placing the EU at “a crossroads” (2014: 1239). This necessitates a re-think of the raison d’être 
for the EU. Hall believes the national consensus of ‘more Europe’ in the crisis is a “rhetorical 
fig leaf” (2014: 1238) which is masking the deep-seated disagreement over its meaning in 
actuality and “a more profound legitimacy crisis that calls into question what the EU can 
expect to achieve in the coming years” (ibid). He claims the increase in Euroscepticism and the 
declining support for free movement exemplifies this legitimacy crisis as “a sauve-qui-peut20 
strain” infiltrates “into its politics at both the national and transnational levels” (2014: 1239).   
There is an innate paradox in the EU at this crisis time with the EU needing institutional 
capacity to distribute resources in such a way to ensure EU prosperity (this is what ‘more 
Europe’ is for Hall), at a time when political support for increasing the EU’s capacity is declining 
(ibid). Hall believes that for the EU to survive it needs to embrace its diversity rather than 
fostering a convergence through a one-size-fits-all approach. He claims, “the motto of the EU 
is not ‘uniformity’ but, rather, ‘unity in diversity’”21 (2014: 1239), with the future of EI 
determined by the EU’s capacity to deliver on this. Hall concludes, “the political precondition 
for progress is the development of a new vision for Europe, specifying what interdependence 
requires and what collective action can deliver” (ibid). 
There is infrequent examination of social policy within the euro crisis literature due to 
a dominant academic focus on the core crisis policy area of economic policy, with the 
exception of the following scholars22. In concurrence with Hall (2014), Busch et al. (2013) 
claims the euro crisis has spilled over from economics into politics. For them the crisis is 
spreading mechanically, threatening both the ESM and the national welfare state (2013: 29), 
as a result of the domineering austerity policies (2013: 25-27)23. Busch et al. argue that the 
social aspects of EI have “increasingly been sidelined in the EU” (2013: 26), subsequently 
                                                          
20 Disorder, panic. 
21 Fabbrini (2014) similarly concludes that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is no longer feasible stating “the 
euro crisis has falsified the dominant paradigm of the unitary nature of the process of integration” 
(2014: 17). 
22 Also see, Intereconomics Forum (2012) for an in-depth examination of the opportunities and 
challenges to the welfare state and ESM. Of particular note, see contributions from Hemerijck and 
Vandenbroucke; Anderson; as well as Pochet and Degryse’s.  
23 Kramer (2012) concurs, see discussion pp.85-87. 
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placing a question mark over the future of the ESM (2013: 27). For them, the fate of the 
Eurozone is intrinsically connected to the prospects of the ESM (dis)integrating. They propose 
three possible paths for the Eurozone namely, ‘muddling through’, ‘collapse of the Eurozone’, 
and ‘a paradigm change’ (2013: 28-29).  
They lean towards the destruction of the Eurozone stating, “for a number of reasons 
the Eurozone could collapse in the coming months” (2013: 29). For them, this is “not scare-
mongering” but an increasing reality “whose likelihood has increased month by month since 
spring 2012” (ibid). However, they concede that the latter scenario “cannot be ruled out 
entirely” (ibid). For them, the escalation of the euro crisis and exponentially growing threat to 
the EU and Eurozone has induced “something of a learning process” in “regard to the 
dominant policy and what hitherto has been unthinkable is getting onto the European 
Council’s policy agenda” (2013: 30-31). Hence, there is anticipation that total disintegration 
can be avoided and a revival of the EU can be fostered.  
Busch et al. contend that, “only in this way could the economic and social crises in 
Europe be overcome and the project of the European Social Model revived with new 
prospects” (2013: 31). This thesis will analyse two distinct areas of social policy to substantiate 
such comments. Degryse et al. (2013) similarly claim that the ESM is under attack due to the 
euro crisis. Social reforms for them are unrelated to the current economic context rather “they 
are actually aimed at reconfiguring whole areas of the European Social Model” (2013: 37).  The 
euro crisis has seemingly bolstered the hand of economic actors (2013: 39) and consigned 
social policy to the new means of currency devaluation, despite its “efficacious in the crisis for 
avoiding a serious deterioration of the situation within the economy and on the labour 
market” (2013: 38). Pochet and Degryse’s (2013) analysis echo these arguments. 
 Degryse et al., in concurrence with Busch et al (2013), maintain the only means to 
reverse such a demotion of social policy is “to put social issues back onto the political agenda 
at both the national and European levels” (2013: 39), complete the EMU and reform economic 
policies towards “sustainable and shared prosperity” (ibid). The evidence that suggests 
citizens’ political support is economically contingent is also interpreted as threatening the 
future of the EU in its entirety (Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014). However, Kuhn and Stoeckel’s 
(2014) analysis contradicts such conclusions, finding that the public are generally supportive 
of economic governance which is contradictory to public support for EI (2014: 636).  
Consequently, they conclude that this irregularity could be exploited to increase the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy namely, “by assuming an active role as effective crisis manager, 
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the EU could achieve output-legitimacy” rather than leaving this role for member states (2014: 
637). The only caveat to their findings is that for citizens to be supportive of economic 
governance, they need to weakly identify with the European identity as those possessing a 
strong national identity were not supportive of economic governance (2014: 634).    
3.2.2 The Political ‘Crisis Diversifiers’  
 There are a group of scholars spearheading the conceptualisation of crises as a driving 
force for EU policy development. Kühnhardt (2009), as highlighted within the introduction, 
identifies two types of ‘crisis integration’, these are; “crises of integration” and “crises in 
integration” (2009: 1-2). The first type has the potential to challenge both the rationale and 
existence of integration. The second type is associated with the difficulty of implementing 
policy objectives and goals without any detrimental effects to the integration process. 
However, this ‘crisis of integration’ occurs only infrequently. He recognises there is no 
determinism within his hypothesis, that not every crisis will produce progress and vice versa. 
Crises for Kühnhardt are innate within the EI process. This is reflected in his definition 
of EI which he expresses as; “a contingent process of oscillation between failure and success, 
or between challenge and response” (2009: 3). Applying this logic to those works already 
reviewed, out of challenge (threat) comes a response (opportunity). For him, historically 
“crises had always required courageous responses in order to turn into new opportunities” 
(2009: 10). Kühnhardt maintains there is a lack of literature reviewing European crises as a 
positive occurrence to be able to assess their impact and significance for the EU (2009: 2). This 
thesis aims to contribute to filling this gap within EU crisis literature.   
For Kühnhardt, the international level is inextricably connected to the EU level. 
Specifically, when the international domain is in disorder so EI becomes a place of anarchy. He 
claims, “the important adaptation crises and turning points in European integration have been 
linked, one way or the other, to fundamental developments and adaptation crises in 
transatlantic relations.” (2009: 8). He asserts that these interwoven crises have been 
transformed into opportunities creating the most successful and defining periods for both EI 
and International Relations (2009: 9).  
Kurzer and Cooper (2011) similarly claim “the EU’s strongest public health measures 
have resulted from crises that threatened the single market” (2011: 110). In contrast to 
Kühnhardt (2009), they view opportunities from crises arising from the threat of crises. They 
analyse how EU officials fostered a threatening, crisis discourse around obesity in order to 
manufacture an opportunity for the EC to carve out a new sphere of competence. Assisted by 
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the World Health Organisation (WHO), EU officials achieved this by advancing integration from 
above, linking the threat from obesity to Europe’s public health, its health systems and its 
economic prosperity (2011: 108). 
The WHO and EU operated as two sides of the same coin. Without the WHO the EU 
could not access data, either in terms of quantity or quality, which is required to advance the 
EU’s public health agenda. In turn, the WHO has no mechanisms with which to implement 
policy hence, relying on national states to do so. Consequently, the EU could translate the 
WHO’s objectives into policy in order to advance the EC’s remit. The WHO provided the EC 
with a new vision for Europe whereby the “war against fat became a major public health 
crusade” (2011: 111), with an atmosphere of urgency successfully fostered (2011: 114-115). 
This analysis provides significant support to Kühnhardt’s aforementioned notion that the 
international level is inextricably connected to the EU level. Kurzer and Cooper conclude, 
“international organisations disseminate scientific ideas and European institutions 
appropriate these ideas to create (through political spillover) a new field of action for 
themselves” (2011: 116). 
Gehler (2009) takes a historical view of EU crises, similar to Elvert’s (2009) analysis, 
identifying five serious crises in the EU’s history (2009: 124). He reaches the conclusion that, 
“there is a definite, one might even say not insufficient need for crises, a necessity for crises, 
without which the dynamics of integration would not have got by, and even will also not get 
by in the future, which appears to be essential for advances” (2009: 118). Throughout his 
analysis Gehler regularly refers to Romain Kirt another ‘crisis diversity’ protagonist who argues 
Europe’s history is a “history of crises”24 (Gehler, 2009: 110). For Kirt, “there have always been 
crises in Europe” and in accordance with Elvert’s (2009) comments, crises “are nothing new, 
but their effects upon the unification process and the dynamics of integration represent a new 
and current challenge for research in contemporary history. They are therefore to be studied 
more precisely” (Gehler, 2009: 110). It is such further precise study which this thesis 
undertakes in its examination of the euro crisis. 
 Gehler concurs with both Elvert (2009) and Kirt commenting, “it remains to be studied 
more precisely as to whether the chatter about crises in and surrounding the EU had a 
functional and instrumental character in order to give a new boost to integration” (2009: 118). 
He views the EI process not as linear rather in a similar vein to Europeanization theory (see 
                                                          




Chapter 2) as “a complicated zigzag path with a gradually increasing density integration” 
(2009: 116). He asserts that, “most suggestions for and attempts at reorganization arose from 
emergency situations and predicaments” (2009: 118). For Gehler, “the state of crisis of 
European integration appears to be a normal state” (2009: 118).  
While the term ‘crisis’ has increasingly lost its original meaning in modern day usage, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, Gehler intriguingly defines the term ‘crisis’ within its original 
(source) Greek meaning of “decision” or “decisive change” namely, “as a difficult situation in 
a dangerous time that requires a decision” (2009: 110). He views the whole ‘crisis spectrum’ 
conceiving crises as equally constructive as they are destructive stating explicitly, ““crisis” is 
understood here both in the “positive” effect upon unification – that is, for the course of 
integration in the constructive sense – and in its “negative” effect in a counterproductive 
manner” (2009: 111). In addition, he later states in his work that, “one thing is for sure for the 
time being: there is a degree of crisis of a political and economic nature that can saddle the 
integration with weariness and can make it possible for no new advances to be made” (2009: 
117).  
Aligned to this more progressionist view, Gehler claims an additional argument within 
his analysis that crises within the EU have been more of a threat to EI than external crises, at 
least in the short term (2009: 116). He claims that forced EI and fears of disintegration can 
have negative effects on the EI process, however “they can also turn out to be exaggerated 
and in the end actually promote the community’s solidarity and thus the further unification 
process” (2009: 118). From this perspective, the prevailing view that the euro crisis is an 
existential threat to the EU could paradoxically be beneficial for the EU and EI process. Gehler 
identifies three types of crises, “real”, “concrete” and “feared and ficticously imagined crises” 
which all “play a role in a reactivated policy of integration or one that is to be revitalized” 
(2009: 118).  
Analogous to Kurzer and Cooper (2011), scholars Hodson and Quaglia (2009) view EU 
crises as a combination of a threat and opportunity, with an emphasis on the latter. In relation 
to the euro crisis in particular, they have an underlying premise that the EU will not survive 
the crisis. However, significantly they highlight the opportunities the euro crisis will potentially 
lead to and do not reject the notion that the EU will survive the crisis. They consider there to 
be two opportunities within this crisis namely, new political opportunities within the EI process 
and the chance to foster European co-ordination and co-operation between member states. 
Hence, arguing in a similar manner to Hagen (2009) and Drudi et al.’s (2012) propositions 
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within the economic field, as well as in accordance with Buti and Carnot’s (2010) assertion 
within the political field that the euro crisis could create an ‘ever closer union’.  
They cite the Spring European Council summit in March 2009 as an exemplar of the 
euro crisis fostering EU co-operation amongst member states, subsequently reversing the pre-
existing “beggar-thy-neighbour” (2009: 942) policy approach. In accordance with Quaglia et 
al. (2009), they view the inaction of EU policy responses being due to member states following 
their national interests over those of the EU’s. They cite Ireland’s guarantee of bank deposits 
instigating a ‘guarantee race’ amongst member states which was subsequently reversed 
through a G8 meeting (2009: 942).  
Hence, highlighting the other side of the coin to the lack of co-operation between 
member states that other scholars have discussed, the interconnection between the member 
states has created a problem in fashioning a cohesive EU crisis response for Hodson and 
Quaglia. The crisis has demonstrated how the EU is both a “global vanguard and a victim of 
global circumstances” (2009: 950). Additionally, they accord with the claim made by Davras 
(2008) that the euro has gained appeal to outsiders stating, “Iceland’s application in July 2009 
to join the EU suggests that the economic crisis may bring new political opportunities” (2009: 
944).  
Hodson and Quaglia conclude that “it remains to be seen whether the crisis will 
intensify or impede the process of European integration” (2009: 944). They argue that 
regardless of the outcome, the crisis is offering an opportunity within academic circles to 
better understand how interdependence, or Europeanization, can be both EI’s leader and 
enemy. Copsey and Haughton (2012) similarly view the euro crisis as a combined threat and 
opportunity. In line with the theoretical logics within this thesis, they argue that opportunities 
emerge from the threat of the crisis whereby “the very weaknesses and vulnerabilities of 
Europe exposed by the Eurozone crisis are also the reasons why individual European states 
need to integrate and show solidarity” (2012: 2).  
Kramer (2012) goes one step further, acknowledging the full range of the ‘crisis 
spectrum’. For him there are three possible outcomes for the EU, which align to the crisis logics 
within this thesis of ‘crisis diversity’, ‘crisis stability’ and ‘crisis progression’ respectively. These 
are, “a Silver Age, based on a resurgent continent; a Bronze Age of muddling through; or an 
Iron Age of disarray” (2012: 82). For the ‘Iron Age’ he places a maximum and minimum vision, 
postulating that the Eurozone could partially or fully collapse which could mean the weakening 
of the EU or its total collapse respectively (2012: 90). Kramer does not settle on any of these 
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visions, rather he concludes that the most obvious path is the ‘Bronze Age’ comprising of a 
continuation of the euro crisis and a “worsening of current negative trends” (2012: 90). 
However, regardless of which path comes into fruition “Europe’s Golden Age has passed 
Europe is embarking on a new chapter” (2012: 91).  
Verdun’s (2012) brief analysis demonstrates how far the EU is responding to the 
ongoing euro crisis. She states, “the EU has been seeking to find ways to respond to this crisis 
in all its permutations” (2012: 863). Referring back to her asymmetrical EMU25 and according 
with the view that the EMU needs substantial reform, she maintains the need for its redesign 
has been firmly placed at the top of the EU agenda (2012: 864). However, there is still no 
resolution or clarification on how to resolve the long-standing, in-built institutional flaws even 
after the unprecedented effects of the crisis. However, she maintains there is the “potential 
for major reform. It is clearly a moment of truth for the EU” (2012: 865). For Verdun the euro 
crisis has created the opportunity for member states and EU leaders to influence this redesign 
of the EMU, Eurozone area and wider EU in responding to the crisis (2012: 864).  
Craig (2014) assesses from a legal perspective the “complex array of political 
responses” (2014: 40) as well as the economic and political repercussions of the euro crisis. 
He categorises the EU’s crisis responses into those assisting Eurozone member states and 
those macro-level measures increasing national budgetary supervision. For Craig, these 
responses have been implemented “in an accelerated manner as warranted by the nature of 
the crisis” (2014: 40). He claims, “this flurry of initiatives has not yet come to an end nor is it 
likely to do so in the short term” (2014: 19).  
Complimentary to Braun and Tausendpfund (2014), Craig states that citizenry belief in 
the EU fostering peace and prosperity has been severely dented. He argues this issue of trust26 
“may be the single most damaging fallout from the current crisis” (2014: 36), and “the most 
important and long-lasting impact on the ‘EU brand’, when viewed from the perspective of the 
ordinary citizen” (2014: 36). Craig pertinently concludes, “the EU may weather this particular 
storm, but the nature of the polity that emerges thereafter remains to be seen” (2014: 40).  
Mourlon-Druol (2014) accords to this view claiming it is difficult to predict the 
development of the EU in the future due to the EU and Eurozone being complex systems 
(2014: 1292). His analysis demonstrates how the causes of the euro crisis, hence the crisis 
                                                          
25 See Verdun (1996). 
26 This issue of a loss of trust due to the euro crisis has been explored by other scholars, see discussions 
by Armingeon and Ceka (2014); McLaren (2010); and Roth et al. (2014).    
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itself, was predictable. However, contrastingly the crisis response from EU institutions, 
particularly the ECB, have been unpredictable stating, “such an evolution could hardly have 
been anticipated 14 years ago” (2014: 1293). He also concurs with Hall’s (2012) comments, 
concluding himself that “in these developments, and in the broader history of European 
integration since the Second World War, lies perhaps a last lesson history can offer: the value 
of expecting the unexpected” (ibid). Morlon-Druol also contests the aforementioned view held 
by economists Klose and Weigert (2014) that member states exiting the Eurozone is inevitable, 
arguing that exiting the Eurozone is more difficult and “less advantageous” today than in its 
early conception (2014: 1292).  
Hurrelmann (2012), in a similar vein to Craig (2014) and Mourlon-Druol (2014), 
highlights the range of different outcomes from the euro crisis for the EU. He analyses the 
potential politicisation of EI and divides them into four categories. He cross references these 
with three possible crisis outcomes for the EU namely, ‘no change’, ‘disintegration’ and 
‘integration’ which produces twelve prospective scenarios (2012: 4). Hurrelmann concludes 
from his typology that the crisis has “the potential to take the EU in a number of very different 
directions” (2012: 6) comprising of new challenges to the EU’s authority. He remarks that in 
actuality there may be multiple scenarios occurring all at once (ibid). He concludes that 
politicisation “is not inherently “good” or “bad””27 (2012: 6), similar to the crisis logics within 
this thesis which are not inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Rather, the outcome will be determined 
by the interaction of the developments within the society and EU leaders’ institutional 
decisions (ibid).   
The analysis of the euro crisis by Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2015)28 is closely aligned to 
this thesis. They pose the question, “Is the current crisis going to be a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ one for 
the process of European integration?” (2015: 4). For them, “economists and financial 
experts…have almost completely dominated the debate – despite the fact that the problem 
facing Europe today is primarily political”29 (2015: 4). Their research is based upon previous 
work by Schmitter (1970) where he develops a new theory of regional integration through his 
new model of crisis induced decision-making cycles which revises neo-functionalist thought.  
                                                          
27 Contrastingly, Meijers (2013) concludes that politicisation is a negative occurrence with an increase 
in negative coverage of the EU exclusively focused on economics. 
28 Also see Schmitter (2012) from which this analysis originates. 
29 Lehmann (2014; 2015), who contrastingly views the crisis from a progressionist stance, similarly 
claims the crisis is political not economic. Rather, the economic crisis has emanated from and 
contributed to a deeper political crisis as “both interact with – and sustain one another in complex and 
interdependent ways” (2014: 44-45). 
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The main premise of Schmitter’s model is that in non-crisis times regional actors 
operate in a ‘zone of indifference’ where (in)activity is unchallenged. When a crisis strikes, 
actors are forced out of this state of apathy and “a series of crisis-provoked decisional cycles” 
(1970: 842) are initiated with national actors implementing seven possible strategies (1970: 
846). In turn, this either expands or contracts both the scope and level of activity. For 
Schmitter, pertinent to this research, if a process fails to respond to the crisis “it has 
disintegrated” however if it responds, repeating earlier strategies “it has reached a state of 
stable self-maintenance” (1970: 844).  
If the crisis response expands the scope and level of activity, national actors’ (sectoral) 
interests and identities similarly transform, instigating additional changes within actors’ 
expectations and strategies (Lefkofridi and Schmitter, 2015: 6). On the basis of Schmitter’s 
model, Lefkofridi and Schmitter outline what a ‘good’ crisis constitutes namely, such a crisis 
will;  
“disappoint established member expectations and/or raise the prospect of new 
opportunities and, thereby, compel actors to redefine either the tasks or the level of 
authority (or both) of regional organizations by making their collective agreement 
‘spill-over’ into previously untreated or ignored areas” (ibid).  
They maintain that based on the conforming characteristics of the euro crisis to 
Schmitter’s theorem, the euro crisis should have been the (‘good’) crisis to drive political 
integration however it has not, at least not yet (2015: 7-8). While the crisis has broken the EU 
out of the ‘zone of indifference’ exemplified by the argument for ‘more Europe’, “the objective 
remains ambiguous – even among its proponents” (2015: 9), as Hall (2014) argued. They 
substantiate why the euro crisis is a ‘bad’ crisis through demonstrating how the crisis is 
creating challenges and threatening the advancement of EI that neo-functionalism assumed, 
which underpins Schmitter’s (1970) model. For them, with the conclusion of the crisis still to 
come into fruition, “there is still an opportunity to turn an apparently bad crisis into a good 
one” (2015: 19).  
In general, they conceive crises in the EU positively claiming, “crises have been an 
integral part of the process of European integration and, by and large, they have had positive 
effects” (2015: 4). For them, the reason for this positive crisis effect is self-evident, both due 
to the complexity and range of possible outcomes which cannot be accounted for rationally 
combined with unanticipated consequences (2015: 4-5). They argue that national actors’ 
collective responses to successive crises have “led to an increase in the authority and/or an 
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expansion of the tasks of the institutions of the EU and its predecessors” (2015: 4). They 
maintain “this capacity to exploit successive crises positively by repeatedly breaking out of its 
momentary zone of indifference” is a unique attribute of the EU that no other organisation 
has (2015: 6).  
Jones et al. (2016) propose that EI advances through the concept of ‘failing forward’. 
They claim this “fail forward pattern” of EI (2016: 1015) comprises of a “cycle of piecemeal 
reform, followed by policy failure, followed by further reform” (2016: 1013). Premised on a 
synthesis of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, they claim that the various biases 
within the EU means policy agreements occur on the lowest common denominator leading to 
incomplete reforms and institutional structures. This incompleteness creates neo-
functionalist spillover which instigates a crisis and further piecemeal reforms are produced in 
response to the crisis caused by the previous incomplete reforms, which are agreed upon, 
again, at the lowest common denominator. These compromises accumulate over a particular 
period, laying the ground for further EI.  
For them, this pattern has been apparent within the euro crisis. In contrast to those 
political scholars reviewed so far, they argue that the incompleteness of the EMU created 
spillover causing both the crisis and the necessary pressure for further integration (2016: 
1020). They document reoccurring solutions and agreements which were made on the lowest 
common denominator throughout the euro crisis thus far, culminating in “incomplete action” 
which left EU leaders a step behind the crisis, but nonetheless moved EI forward (2016: 1023). 
As they claim, “Europe’s solution is still piecemeal, and yet the direction it points to is clear” 
(2016: 1026). They view the epoch of the euro crisis as “one of the most rapid periods of 
deepening integration in EU history” (2016: 1012).  
They maintain that these “suboptimal solution[s]” (2016: 1026) with minimal transfer 
of power to the EU level could ultimately lead to profounder integration than “ever imagined 
in the heat of the crisis” (ibid). However, they caution that this cycle is “self-undermining” 
(2016: 1017), with crises spurring further EI and further crises, and is potentially unsustainable 
in the long term (2016: 1027). In particular, the image of the EU being in a constant state of 
crisis is undermining both political support for EI, and the EU’s position on the international 
stage (2016: 1013). 
The European Policy Centre’s (EPC) (2011) strategy paper is similarly premised on 
conceptualising EU crises as a catalyst for European development while nonetheless 
acknowledging that the other end of the spectrum remains in the background to ongoing 
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events. The EPC maintains that the euro crisis has “compelled EU institutions and Member 
States to step up to the plate” (2011: 11). For them, the euro crisis is a significant test, “more 
profound and more serious than ever before” (2011: 8) which has meant “the end of the euro 
and even a disintegration of the European Union are no longer taboo” (ibid). However, the 
EPC comments that historically EI “seems to follow an ‘iron law’ to ‘never waste a good crisis’, 
to weather the storms by creating more momentum rather than merely strengthening its 
defences” (2011: 6).  
Respectively, the EU has consistently overcome crises, emerging stronger rather than 
weaker from a crisis with EI tending to “grow out of crises” (2011: 8). They maintain that while 
EI is not “crisis-resistant” it is “crisis-proof” (ibid). They identify six factors which constitute a 
successful crisis including the EU’s capacity to adapt to both internal and external challenges 
which is facilitated by the fact that EI is in a permanent state of being “a ‘project in the 
making’” (2011: 10). In line with Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2015), they view this attribute as 
being unique to the EU (ibid).   
 Questioning whether the ‘iron law’ of EI will occur once again in the euro crisis, they 
pose an analogous question to this thesis namely, “Will the European Union be able to master 
or even ‘exploit’ the current crisis and emerge stronger than before?” (2011: 9). Crises have 
historically been overcome through “ambitious coalitions, opt-in strategies and close 
cooperation with EU institutions” (2011: 8). They maintain the EU needs this again today, but 
questions whether it can deliver. For them, the EU’s unique adaptive capacity and consensus 
over EI have noticeably weakened as “signs of erosions appear like writing on the wall” (2011: 
6). Meanwhile, the long-term national and European economic, financial, political and social 
consequences of the crisis threaten the EU’s capacity to control both the ongoing euro crisis 
and future crises (2011: 11).  
 For them, corresponding with economist Hagen (2008), the euro crisis has illuminated 
the fragility of the EU and placed uncertainty over the tenets of EI (2011: 8). In turn, this is 
necessitating a renewal of the EU’s raison d’être which without, would “risk letting 
Euroscepticism grow into eurosclerosis once again” (2011: 31). In contrast to many other 
political commentators reviewed so far, the EPC claim the EU should not attempt to foster an 
end destination for the EU. For them, this would be counterproductive to renewing the EU’s 
appeal in the face of significant divergences between member states (2011: 21). Ultimately, 
the question posed by the strategy paper is unable to be answered at this point in time as, 
“bigger challenges as well as opportunities lie ahead” (2011: 31).  
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 Majone (2012) ardently maintains that the euro crisis is a positive episode for the EU, 
going as far to state that “the crisis may turn out to be a blessing in disguise”, provided lessons 
are learnt (2012: 1). He substantiates his claim by arguing, in concurrence with Lane (2012), 
Drudi et al. (2012) as well as Buti and Carnot (2012), that while the crisis is significant it has 
advantageously drawn attention to the inherent structural weaknesses of the EMU which 
were previously concealed by overt, political optimism (2012: 1). Majone suggests the crisis of 
the EMU can act “as a parable” (2012: 28) for EI, namely to abandon the “fait accompli” 
approach (2012: 30). Analogous to the EPC, he asserts that ambitions for a ‘federal’ Europe 
are counterproductive (2012: 29).  
Contrastingly for Majone, and directly against the ‘crisis progression’ literature, there 
is no intrinsic connection between the collapse of the euro and collapse of the EU stating, 
“there is no political or economic reason why the failure of monetary union, in its present 
form, should entail the failure of “Europe”” (2012: 3). He claims it is the weakness of the EU’s 
crisis management which has caused a “sudden shift from the total optimism of the past to a 
mood of catastrophism” (2012: 2).  
Saurugger and Terpan (2016) similarly accord with Copsey and Haughton (2012), 
Hodson and Quaglia (2009) as well as Kurzer and Cooper’s (2011) analyses in conceiving crises 
as both a threat and an opportunity, with opportunities emanating from the threat posed by 
the crisis. For them, the larger the threat the greater the opportunity for policy development 
and more significant the policy change. They premise their work on a synthesis of Kingdon’s 
(1984) theory of policy change through opening windows of opportunity and, in turn, Keeler’s 
(1993) claim that significant policy reforms are a product and contingent upon the size of the 
window of opportunity. 
By implication, Saurugger and Terpan maintain that “large windows of opportunity 
increase the possibility for policy entrepreneurs to bring about dramatic change” (2016: 36), 
and explore whether crises drive policy to become more deeply imbedded or more lenient. 
They define a crisis as comprising of three key features: posing a threat to policy goals 
prioritised by policy makers; a surprise to actors; and, requiring an urgent crisis response which 
is time constricted (2016: 39). The size of the window of opportunity is measured by how 
strong or weak these characteristics feature in the crisis (ibid). Hence, for policy development 
to occur in a crisis there needs to be a threat which in turn requires a timely response. 
From their analysis, the euro crisis is a “severe crisis” (2016: 48) with featuring a strong 
presence of all three of these crisis elements (ibid). Consequently, they claim this has produced 
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the largest window of opportunity possible in a crisis for radical policy reform, hence the euro 
crisis has created a significant transformation of soft EU governance into hard law. Saurugger 
and Terpan demonstrate how the euro crisis has fostered European co-ordination and co-
operation as Hodson and Quaglia (2009), Buti and Carnot (2010), Hagen (2009) and Drudi et 
al. (2012) postulated. They maintain that it is due to the co-operation and consensus between 
member states, EU institutions and supranational institutions in responding to the crisis that 
this window of opportunity has been taken advantage of and created significant policy 
development (2016: 46-47). Saurugger and Terpan conclude that it is the “consensus-based 
coherence amongst policy entrepreneurs” which is key to explaining “why radical change can 
occur in periods of crisis” (2016: 51). 
In a similar vein, Schimmelfennig (2015), Niemann and Ioannou (2015) and Verdun 
(2015) apply EI theory and testify that the euro crisis is creating further integration due to the 
threat of the Eurozone’s disintegration30. Through the application of neo-functionalism, 
Niemann and Ioannou assert that functional pressures, augmented by the euro crisis, have led 
to further integration (2015: 202-203). Schimmelfennig’s application of liberal 
intergovernmentalism maintains that member states believed integration would create 
“lower losses than stagnation or even disintegration” (2015: 181). Hence, EI has been fostered 
due to a “common interest in avoiding the costs of non-integration” (ibid). Despite a common 
desire for deeper integration, the provisos for this integration varies according to states’ fiscal 
conditions (2015: 183).   
In applying historical institutionalism, Verdun maintains the euro crisis is “a critical 
juncture” namely, a period of transition which provides a number of different policy options 
(2015: 222). In accordance with Saurugger and Terpan (2016), the euro crisis has created a 
significant sense of urgency with policy decisions required in a timely fashion due to the severe 
threat of the crisis. For Verdun, it is the threat of contagion to the existence of the EMU which 
has led to a new system being formed (2015: 224), with EI developing through “moments of 
intense crisis and a need to offer a response” (2015: 221).  
 Conclusion 
“History is returning to Europe” (Kramer, 2012: 81), which on account of this literature 
review should be a positive occasion. It is clear from this literature review that as the euro 
crisis has proceeded so there has been a growth in those arguing the EU will continue 
                                                          
30 See Journal of European Public Policy Special Issue (2015).  
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developing and emerge stronger from the crisis. Initially, conceiving the euro crisis as a 
mechanical, rational process at the outset, to one more organic, comprising of opportunities 
and benefits for the EU. This research will contribute to the pre-existing literature on EU crises 
and particularly that literature which conceives EU crises in a positive framework and has 
dominated this review. In particular, this thesis will build upon those analyses by Lefkofridi 
and Schmitter (2015), and Kühnhardt (2009).  
This chapter has demonstrated there is an abundance of crisis literature, both 
economic and political, on the EMU with minimal literature emerging on social policy. Instead, 
crisis literature focuses on the ESM and national welfare states as a collective. It is the aim of 
this thesis to fill this gap in the literature and to bridge the literature on EU crises with 
literature on social policy; namely, exploring the implications of the euro crisis for the EU 
through an examination of two distinctive areas of social policy. Thus, this research will 
perform a deeper level of analysis than has currently been considered. “Moments of crisis 
offer dangers, but also opportunities” (Copsey and Haughton, 2012: 2), it is the contention of 
this thesis to provide an in-depth analysis exploring whether the euro crisis is providing 
opportunities for national social policy responses, or inhibiting such policy development.    
The following chapter will similarly apply the crisis ideals of ‘crisis progression’ and 
‘crisis diversity’ to the initial period of the euro crisis, identifying the crisis pattern at the EU 
and national levels. The beginning of the euro crisis was ascribed a dominant ‘crisis 
progression’ narrative within the national press. The chapter will explore the peak of the euro 
crisis from an objective standpoint, identifying whether the media perception of ‘crisis 
progression’ was an accurate portrayal of the euro crisis or whether ‘crisis diversity’ was 
occurring and, by implication a ‘crisis spectrum’, has been overlooked by political 








Old Tensions, New Crisis: A ‘Progressionist’ 
Start to the Euro Crisis? 
 
“What was once deemed unthinkable is now, I believe, inevitable: withdrawal from the 
eurozone of one or more of its member countries…The euro was a boom-time construct. In 
the biggest bust for 80 years, it is falling apart.” (The Telegraph, May 2010b) 
“This charade has gone on long enough. It is killing Ireland, but it is also killing the EU.” (The 
Irish Times, November 2011) 
 
At the onset of the euro crisis commentators saw the crisis as a mechanical process, arresting 
the EU of its adaptive capabilities, as the previous chapter evidenced and these quotes above 
confirm. Within the national press ‘crisis progression’ was seemingly the dominant narrative. 
However, with the benefit of hindsight it is now possible to examine the euro crisis from an 
objective standpoint. Was this actually happening? Was the euro crisis developing through a 
crippling wave of progression, arresting policy development and threatening the future of the 
EU? 
     This chapter will examine the beginning of the crisis from 2010 to 2013, identifying 
the crisis pattern at both the European and national levels to analyse the impact of the euro 
crisis at its peak. This analysis will explore whether this media perception of ‘crisis progression’ 
was accurate or whether ‘crisis diversity’ was being overlooked, and by proxy the presence of 
a ‘crisis spectrum’, due to the predominance of this mechanical vision of crises. This chapter 
will identify whether the EU was on the brink of disintegration as those within academic circles 
and the media believed, or alternatively whether even at the beginning the euro crisis was not 
the death of the EU. This analysis will provide an overview of how the euro crisis emerged 
rather than an in-depth analysis of crisis events which will be provided in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Three questions will be posed in this chapter, namely;  
• Is ‘crisis diversity’ or ‘crisis progression’ occurring within the current economic crisis? 
95 
 
• The more poignant question, is the EU level exhibiting the same crisis pattern as the 
national level, or are they different? 
• As a result of the former, what are the implications of a different crisis pattern 
occurring at the respective governance levels for the EU? 
The chapter is divided into two sections for this analysis, mirroring the separate 
European and national governance levels. Respectively, the chapter will be structured as 
follows. The European section identifies a crisis pattern of ‘crisis progression’ through charting 
the course of the euro crisis from the collapse of Greece to the fall of Cyprus and an analysis 
of the subsequent European crisis response. The European crisis response is found to be 
limited due to the lack of rescue mechanisms built within the EU system which has allowed 
Germany to dominate and dictate both the EU’s crisis response as well as the composition of 
bailouts to crisis countries. This is followed by a special analytical focus on the Fiscal Compact 
and Banking Union due to two defining features. Firstly, these were the two most significant 
measures developed in response to the euro crisis in this early period. Secondly, related to the 
first, these measures entailed significant Europeanization of national policies. To conclude, 
this section is brought up-to-date with a brief overview of the latest crisis events since 2013 
accounting for the economic and political issues persisting in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy 
illustrating how ‘crisis progression’ has continued to prevail after the peak of the euro crisis.   
 The national section analyses the Irish variant of the euro crisis and Britain’s role in 
the euro crisis as a non-Eurozone member state, conversely identifying a crisis pattern of ‘crisis 
diversity’. This section of the chapter highlights how flexible and adaptable member states 
were, and their imperative role within EU crises and the wider EI process. Additionally, it 
highlights the inherent interconnection and interaction between European economics and 
national politics which motivates this thesis. The examination of the Irish crisis charts the 
collapse of the Celtic Tiger and analyses the national crisis response, detailing: the resistance 
to an EU bailout; the attempts to gain control through fiscal policy; and, the inevitable political 
crisis which ensued as Ireland became rescued by the EU through a seemingly unsatisfactory 
negotiated bailout. This is followed by an analysis of the European response to the Irish crisis, 
accounting for the political issue over Ireland’s low corporation tax and the politics around 
Ireland’s economic bailout package as the EU attempted to stop contagion of the euro crisis.  
Subsequently, the chapter analyses Britain’s role in the euro crisis, examining the 
political controversy around the state providing financial aid to Ireland. This section also 
highlights how Britain became a ‘pace-setter’ through the proposal and enactment of the 
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‘Brown Plan’ as the non-Eurozone member state led the Eurozone policy response to the 
economic problems of the euro crisis. This section demonstrates how national policy 
developments were reinforcing the EU structure and saving the EU from disintegration. This is 
followed by an analysis of the negotiations surrounding the EU budget where political tensions 
arose between Eurozone and non-Eurozone member states, between the rich and the poor 
member states, as well as between France and Germany as Britain became poised to use its 
veto along with France and Denmark. The analysis demonstrates how the euro crisis was 
shaping European affairs as political divisions led Britain to become the scapegoat for a lack of 
European cohesion, primarily by virtue of France, subsequently leading to issues within the 
Franco-German relationship. 
This chapter finds evidence for a ‘crisis spectrum’ operating in the peak of the euro 
crisis which has been overlooked. This is corroborated by the pattern of ‘crisis diversity’ at the 
national level and, contrary to the dominant ‘crisis progression’ image, the fact that the two 
governance levels are exhibiting different crisis patterns, hence different crisis responses. 
Hence, the euro crisis was not uniformly arresting policy development and policy responses in 
a progressive, mechanical fashion and steering the EU towards disintegration. These 
distinctive crisis responses also demonstrate how overall a process of ‘bi-directional’ 
Europeanization was occurring in the EU system as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes 
were ultimately indistinguishable from one another. The chapter subsequently deems the 
media perception of the euro crisis as a story of ‘crisis progression’ a media creation due to an 
EU-centric focus overlooking national activity. The chapter argues that these two different 
crisis responses facilitated member states flexibly reversing roles with the EU as a ‘crisis 
cushion’ formed, by virtue of the differing crisis responses, whereby national responses 
resolved national issues in conjunction with the EU structure unconsciously. This allowed the 
EU to continue to operate and exist, thus helping to save the EU from the euro crisis by 
prohibiting the perpetuation of ‘crisis progression’.    
PART I: Europe and the Euro Crisis  
 Story of the Crisis31: The Collapse of the European Edifice  
4.1.1 The Greek Tragedy 
At a time when the Eurozone was under close scrutiny with the onset of the global 
economic crisis, Greece’s public debt was revealed as being higher than projected. The Greek 
                                                          
31 See Begg (2012); Journal of Macroeconomics (2014); Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015).  
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crisis was a combination of European and domestic inadequacy32; while it quickly became 
evident that in 2001 Greece had significantly under reported its deficit in order to qualify as 
the twelfth member of the Eurozone, so the EU had allowed Greece to run a large current 
account deficit (Katsimi and Moutos, 2010).  
The EU moved to reassure both the markets and all (non) Eurozone member states 
that the stability of the Eurozone would not be undermined by Greece’s fabrications or 
financial profligacy33. In return the state reassured EU officials and fellow member states that 
the country needed no assistance. Instead Greece requested a provisional bailout to be 
drafted in an attempt to ease borrowing costs. However, the mere suggestion of a bailout 
proved to be a divisive issue within the EU. Germany in particular argued that instead of a 
bailout there should be a review of Eurozone rules to ensure those member states that 
incessantly breached fiscal rules were disqualified and ultimately expelled.  
It was this failure of member states to give a clear indication of their readiness to 
support the state (Kouretas and Vlamis, 2010: 396) which led Greece to become the first 
member state in history to be bailed out. The provisional bailout loan was announced all too 
late as the Greek crisis became “exacerbated by the political divide within the EU” (The 
Guardian, April 2010). A second bailout predictably followed which the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) simply needed to ‘sign-off’. However, many argued a third “silent 
bailout” (The Economist, November 2012) was created as private creditors looked to face a 
higher ‘haircut’ than initially stipulated. 
Multiple disagreements ensued as the near economic collapse of the country was 
followed by the complete collapse of Greek politics. A political crisis ignited when George 
Papandreou, PM at the time, announced that he would seek public approval over the second 
European bailout in an attempt to bridge domestic divisions, both politically and socially. He 
was explicit that the referendum would not include a question over Greece’s membership to 
the EU/Eurozone. However, Germany, France and the IMF chief cautioned the state that 
future support, including the second bailout, was to be withdrawn until the rescue package 
was ratified34. With limited cash reserves available there was now a “binary path” (Arghyrou 
                                                          
32 See Discourse and Society Special Issue (July 2014). 
33 However, this is not the only cause of Greece’s economic troubles. See Kouretas and Vlamis (2010) 
for an analysis of the instigating internal and external factors which are beyond this thesis. 
34 The analysis by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) provides support for Germany and France’s argument, 
highlighting the lack of commitment in undertaking unpopular structural reforms as a reason for the 
crisis escalating. Also see Oltheten et al. (2013) for a complimentary analysis.  
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and Tsoukalas, 2011: 186) to recovery. Greece had to make or break from the euro; either 
implement the much needed structural reforms or have no option but to leave the euro. For 
Schelkle the Greek crisis emphasised what makes the EU politically attractive but economically 
costly for member states (2009: 31).  
With Greece’s relations in and outside the Eurozone at their lowest ebb, Papandreou’s 
administration collapsed35. Lucas Papdemos, an economist, became the new PM of the rapidly 
disintegrating state. The second rescue package was subsequently passed, securing both the 
Eurozone’s and Greece’s future, at least for now. After five months of the interim technocratic 
government a general election was held within the most “decisive and uncertain” (Sky News, 
April 2012) of political environments ever experienced in Greek history. As a result, it took two 
general elections to produce a conclusive result.  
4.1.2 The Portuguese Problem  
Portugal36 was “the third eurozone domino to fall” (The Guardian, April 2011a) 
primarily because of Greek problems spilling over into the country. Unlike Greece or Ireland, 
Portugal had simply allowed its debt to grow at a time when its economy had not. Portugal’s 
debt was simultaneously downgraded with Greece’s due to fears of contagion and “weaker 
fiscal fundamentals” (Santis 2012: 3)37. For many this was “the clearest evidence yet that the 
European sovereign debt crisis [was] spreading” (The Guardian, April 2010). 
 In contrast to Greece a political crisis created the economic crisis as Jose Socrates, PM 
at the time, resigned after the government’s austerity measures were rejected in parliament. 
He claimed it had “taken away from the government all conditions to govern” (The Guardian, 
March 2011). With the country in “political limbo” (The Guardian, March 2011) pressure on 
Portuguese bond yields38 heightened and interest rates on debts soared. The government 
itself admitted that the political crisis was doing “irreparable damage” economically (The 
Guardian, April 2011a). Similar to Greece, the lack of political consensus was compounding the 
state’s economic problems. 
After a month of negotiations, a three year €78 billion EU/IMF rescue package was 
agreed in return for Portugal reducing its deficit from 9.1% to 5.9% GDP (The Guardian, May 
                                                          
35 Nezi (2012) explores the relationship between voting and the economy within Greece.   
36 See Reis (2013). 
37 Santis (2012) examines these spillover effects from sovereign downgrades on government bond 
issues. 
38 The return an investor makes on the respective bond(s) on maturity.   
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2011). Unlike the Greeks, the Portuguese public did accept the austerity measures, they simply 
disagreed with where the cuts were made and correspondingly how much. There was 
particular dissatisfaction with cuts to the public sector. 
4.1.3 Spain and Italy: ECB Rescue as PIG becomes PIIGS39 
“The euro’s woes were multiplying” (The Guardian, July 2011) as Spain40 and Italy41 
followed suit, both becoming on the verge of total economic collapse. Both countries were 
unable to restructure their economies and were significantly larger, hence more important 
and a greater threat than Greece, Ireland or Portugal. A failure by either state to repay their 
debt would see far reaching consequences, far beyond the EU. Many started to speculate and 
predict that non-Eurozone member state Britain would be dragged into the Eurozone crisis. 
Both member states saw their borrowing costs accelerate. Spain unlike Italy had 
experienced a collapse in their housing bubble. As a result, its banking system was vulnerable 
and resulted in the first banking bailout of its kind. However, the bailout was added to the 
government’s national debt, hence counteracting on the state’s borrowing costs. Spain 
attempted to apply pressure on the ECB to resume buying Spanish bonds while Italy proposed 
that the EU should use the European Single Market and European Financial Stability Facility as 
a means to buy indebted state bonds. Both strategies aimed to reduce the borrowing costs so 
they could continue to access the financial markets. Many viewed the Italian plan as the first 
step towards a common Eurobond. The ECB’s new president Mario Draghi responded stating, 
“within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And 
believe me, it will be enough” (ECB, 2012). 
 Respectively the ECB tackled both crises with the same resolution, namely the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT); the politics of the ECB had changed (BBC News, 
August 2012). De Grauwe (2011b) argued at the time that only a more active ECB which took 
on the lender of last resort role within government bond markets of the Eurozone would 
stabilise the markets and stop the endemic nature of the euro crisis. Although this scheme 
stopped short of such a comprehensive role for the ECB it was successfully implemented, 
despite German opposition. Germany viewed the go-ahead of the scheme as undermining and 
overpowering the Bundesbank values (BBC News, September 2012) and had concerns that it 
was surmountable to printing money. The ECB argued the OMT was a necessity due to the 
                                                          
39 The indebted states were initially Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Then it became Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece and Spain.  
40 See Carballo-Cruz (2011).  
41 See Perissich (2012). 
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markets which had begun to include the likelihood of the Eurozone breaking up into bond 
yields. The OMT would subsequently “cut off the tail risk of a eurozone implosion” (The 
Financial Times, February 2013).  
The scheme was successful despite no bonds being purchased. Furthermore, the 
consequences of a Greek exit subsided. If Greece had exited and the markets increased bond 
yields once again, then the OMT scheme would have deterred adverse effects. The Eurozone 
could now stand up to fiscally profligate states without fear of the consequences. However, 
this made the departure of indebted member states increasingly likely (The Telegraph, 
September 2012). The OMT was designed to prevent a break-up of the Eurozone; arguably 
that was exactly what it had constructed.       
4.1.4 Cyprus: The Crisis Island42 
Cyprus was the final state to join the “casualty list” (The Guardian, March 2011). The 
crisis was a spillover effect from Greek bonds being written off. Despite the Troika being aware 
of the repercussions for Cyprus they took no action to protect the state’s banks, demonstrating 
that the crisis was not “a storm in the teacup of a small marginal country, it [was] a symptom 
of what is wrong with the entire EU system” (The Guardian, April 2013b); namely a lack of 
cohesion, a lack of a European voice.  
Cyprus being a mere “breath away from collapse” (The Telegraph, March 2013b), was 
the closest any member state had come to exiting the currency union. The most severe crisis 
led to the most austere response as taxpayers’ money became used directly to rescue the 
country from complete economic ruin, a strategy not used within any other bailout43. The 
Troika insisted the rescue would not be a template for other Eurozone states. Cyprus had to 
find €6 billion to secure the €10 billion bailout from EU/IMF otherwise national parliaments 
such as Austria and Germany were going to block the rescue package.  
Conversely, many Cypriots saw the crisis as an “equalising factor” creating an 
opportunity to end the social division between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (BBC News, 
March 2013). For the EU, the crisis demonstrated an urgent need for a European banking union 
to support failing banks. American banks of the equivalent size to those in Cyprus failed 
without causing a stir (Huffington Post, March 2013). Along with a European fiscal union 
                                                          
42 (The Guardian, March 2013) 
43 See Zenios (2016) for an analysis of the Cypriot bailout and some lessons to be drawn from it on 
account of it now being the standard rescue procedure for banking crises. 
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whereby those stronger economies could assist their weaker counterparts. The EMU needed 
radical reforms; the Troika could not be the Eurozone’s saviour forever.  
4.1.5 The Response to the Crisis44: The German “Master of Europe”45 
The problem for the Eurozone was that under EU rules member states were not able 
to assist Greece in its recovery due to the no-bailout clause enshrined within the Lisbon Treaty 
under Article 125. The member states were also unable to devalue their currency on account 
of their membership to the Eurozone. Moreover, the ECB was prohibited from any actions 
which could be classified as monetary financing; hence it could not directly lend money to 
(indebted) member states. Consequently, both the Eurozone’s stability and member states’ 
future were dependent on pressure from the markets raising the cost of issuing debt to ensure 
fiscal restraint. With a lack of rescue mechanisms, the bailouts from the EU and the EU’s crisis 
response were subsequently dictated by Germany, increasingly these “reckless overspenders” 
(The Financial Times, April 2013) became forced to become more like Germany (The Guardian, 
May 2013b). Arguably, rather than being the “paymasters of Europe” Germany were 
confirmed as the indispensable power of Europe (BBC Two, June 2013).  
The Eurozone which was meant to be fiscal heaven was now turning out to be fiscal 
hell (Eurocrisis LSE Series, November 2012) as “a result of excessive austerity in southern 
countries and unwillingness in the north to do anything else” (BBC News, November 2012a). 
Consequently, a divide emerged between the north and south, the rich and poor states 
respectively. Southern states appealed for austerity measures to be abandoned so “citizens 
see Europe not as something negative but as something positive” (Aljazeera, April 2013). In 
defence Angela Merkel argued that the aims were for “Europe to emerge stronger from the 
crisis than before” (Aljazeera, April 2013) and to restore confidence in every member state. 
However, even Francois Hollande claimed that youth unemployment could lead to “the 
complete breakdown of [future citizens] identifying with Europe” (The Guardian, June 2013). 
As former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt warned, “if we let ourselves be seduced into 
taking a leading role in Europe, our neighbours will brace themselves against us” (BBC Two, 
June 2013).  
                                                          
44 See Schelkle (2012: 42-52), Patomäki (2012) and Verdun (2015). 
45 (BBC Two, June 2013) See Bulmer (2014) for an analysis of Germany and the euro crisis and Meiers 
(2015) for in-depth analyses of Germany’s role in the crisis. 
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4.1.6 Fiscal Compact (March 2012): Towards “One Voice”46 
The Fiscal Compact was to reform the Stability and Growth Pact, aiming to strengthen 
fiscal discipline and enforce stricter surveillance. The compact was to create a new type of EU 
with a new relationship to its member states, one comprising of more European authority. 
This was to create the biggest split in the EU’s history (The Independent, December 2011). 
Germany and Spain had already written a ‘Golden Rule’ into their constitutional law. Germany 
wanted such provisions to be mandatory and expanded EU-wide. However, despite being 
written in Germany and German-led, many German officials were critical about the lack of 
state manoeuvrability. It was anticipated all twenty-seven member states would sign the 
treaty. However, Britain was refused an opt-out when its demands to prevent London being 
undermined by the reforms were rejected. Subsequently, the state implemented its veto47 
forcing “a treaty outside the EU treaty” (The Independent, December 2011) to be agreed.  
The Czech Republic followed in British footsteps and refused to sign the agreement 
highlighting “constitutional reasons” (BBC News, January 2012) for their abstention. British 
Deputy PM, at the time, Nick Clegg believed there was now “an increased risk of a two-speed 
Europe in which Britain’s position [had become] more marginalised”. Meanwhile many others 
viewed the veto as the beginning of the end for Britain’s membership within the EU. 
Nevertheless, the euro was still the main concern, after all “an EU without Britain would be 
more parochial and less liberal. [However] an EU without a euro might not exist at all” (The 
Economist, December 2011).  
The EU had anticipated problems with the ratification process. Subsequently the EU 
ensured that it only needed twelve member states to ratify the treaty for it to be launched. 
However, even securing a mere twelve appeared challenging as both Italy and Germany faced 
an “uphill battle” (The Telegraph, May 2012a). As all twelve member states successfully 
ratified the compact it became immediately tested. Both the Netherlands and Spain 
announced they would miss their debt targets and France’s deadline for deficit targets was 
extended to 2015 on account of its struggling economy. History repeated itself as France was 
once again becoming the biggest offender.      
                                                          
46 (The Guardian, April 2013a) 
47 The first time in British history that a PM had used a veto to block an EU treaty. One British official 
argued, “To write into law a Germanic view of how one should run an economy and that essentially 
makes Keynesianism illegal is not something we should do” (Reuters, January 2012). Merkel insisted 
the rejection by Britain would not stop the compact being formally incorporated into the founding 
treaties within five years. 
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4.1.7 The Banking Union (June 2012) 
While the euro crisis had tested the political will of the EU, now the banking union 
would test the political will of member states (BBC News, October 2012a). This would be the 
first time, since the crisis began, that EU states would respond to the crisis in a fully concerted 
manner. The Cyprus crisis epitomised the EU’s criticisms of member states and created a new 
impulse for the creation of a European deposit insurance along with the banking union. 
However, sharing costs meant centralised decision-making powers and potentially centralised 
resolution powers within the supervisory role itself (The Economist, May 2013). The crisis was 
creating an impulse for change, the banking union in particular was “a further example of how 
the eurozone crisis [was] carving out a new Europe less from choice but more by the need to 
survive” (BBC News, December 2012).      
The “deadly embrace” (De Grauwe, 2013) between national banks and governments 
was to be broken by the ECB within its new supervisory role. The ECB would be able to directly 
supervise European banks and intervene if, or when it became necessary. It had the authority 
to close banks which failed to comply with EU rules and direct control over those banks which 
possessed assets over €30 billion, which equated to a fifth of all states’ national output (The 
Financial Times, December 2012b). A loophole in the Lisbon Treaty meant the ECB was 
technically able to begin its supervisory role before it was consented to by all member states. 
German opposition once again became aroused (The Financial Times, May 2013a). The EU was 
becoming an increasingly centralised organisation, revolving around the ECB. 
A practical question was subsequently asked by economists, was the ECB capable and 
did it have the capacity to be the ultimate decision maker? (The Financial Times, October 2012) 
Some, such as De Grawue (2013) argued not. He argued that the ECB undoubtedly should 
provide liquidity but not provide conditions on receiving this liquidity. There were various 
elements of the banking union which Germany and France disagreed upon, from the role of 
the ECB to the structure of the banking union and which banks should be placed under 
supervision. The founding member’s relationship was changing. Germany was becoming the 
‘Britain’ of the Eurozone members; it wanted a banking union but on German terms (The 
Financial Times, December 2012a).  
A new round of talks was held in May 2013 discussing the details of the banking union. 
Another split emerged as EU ministers wanted to remain flexible, operating on a case specific 
basis while the ECB insisted on a distinctive hierarchy. Tensions were high as Italian PM Enrico 
Letta argued the banking union agreed on a year ago remained without “any precise form”. 
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He criticised the indecisiveness of the EU and warned, “if it [the EU] does not step on the 
accelerator it will implode" (Reuters, May 2013). Hence, the general pattern that can be 
identified at the European level is one of ‘crisis progression’. 
4.1.8 The Latest Crisis News  
 ‘Crisis progression’ continued at the EU level. Portugal was “threaten[ing] to push the 
eurozone crisis into a new phase” (The Telegraph, April 2013) as another political crisis 
reignited concerns over a second bailout. Spain also experienced a regional (political) crisis in 
the face of re-centralisation as the system of devolution became too expensive to preserve. 
Subsequently, sovereignty became not only contested within the EU but within Spain itself as 
the regions of Catalonia and Basque demanded secession claiming that the government was 
“using the crisis as pragmatic justification and political cover to roll back a highly devolved 
system of regional government” (The Financial Times, August 2012).  
Greece continued to receive successive bailouts from the Troika with a potential 
“Grexit” remaining on the agenda (The Financial Times, July 2015; The Guardian, February 
2017b).  This was despite divisions between the EU and IMF (The Guardian, February 2017a) 
and despite the announcement in August 2015 that the Greek crisis was over (The Guardian, 
August 2016). Nonetheless, with Greece mirroring the EU in entering a constant state of crisis, 
in 2017 it was Italy which took centre stage of the euro crisis. Significant concerns grew over 
the state’s mounting deficit and its breach of fiscal pledges in national budget plans (The 
Financial Times, February 2017b). Italy cited the migrant crisis of 201548, the catastrophic 
earthquake in 2017 and slow economic growth for their fiscal profligacy, arguing for more 
flexibility from the EU (ibid).   
The situation turned “politically toxic” (ibid) with national calls for a referendum on 
Italy’s Eurozone membership. Similar calls were also being heard in France, with growing 
support for Front National and their budget deficit looking to breach the 3% Eurozone limit in 
2017/2018 (The Financial Times, February 2017a). This, combined with the British economy 
remaining more resilient then the EU anticipated after the ‘Brexit’ result (ibid), intensified the 
euro crisis which had previously been “shelved” rather than resolved (BBC News, April 2016a).  
                                                          
48 In 2015 a crisis emerged over the number of illegal immigrants entering the EU through Italy and 
Greece from Africa and Middle East, particularly from war torn Iraq, Libya and Syria, and using the 
Schengen area to locate to northern Europe, particularly Germany (see Chapter 6 for further discussion 
and Sidjanski 2016). A deal was made with Turkey, orchestrated by Germany, that any new migrants 
arriving on Greek and Italian shores who do not apply for asylum or are rejected will be deported back 
to turkey; a scheme which is reportedly a success (BBC News, April 2016b).   
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Nonetheless, there were successes within the EU with Ireland exiting from their 
bailout package in 2013, setting them on the path to recovery (this will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 7). Portugal followed suit exiting from its bailout in 2014 without 
retaining the European Stability Mechanism as a failsafe should adverse economic conditions 
return (The Financial Times, May 2014). Additionally, its budget deficit reached a record low 
of 2% in 2017 thus no longer breeching EU rules (The Financial Times, May 2017). Spain also 
exited from the European Stability Mechanism at the end of 2013 (The Telegraph, December 
2013b) and Cyprus returned to economic growth in 2015 (BBC News, July 2015).  
Increasingly, an anti-austerity movement was emerging within Southern states who 
were demanding a policy change subsequently challenging Germany’s prevailing approach 
which the ECB could no longer overlook (BBC News, April 2016a). Murmurings of a “Euro Crisis 
2” (ibid) were being triggered at the beginning of every proceeding year that the euro crisis 
continued and were particularly rife when Britain voted to leave the EU. However, in the 
background of this impeding threat and doom commentators caveated predictions of 
disintegration with the stipulation that crises were not new to the EU rather, “the EU has a 
habit of muddling through each crisis. It is never elegant, never the complete answer, but 
survival is the ultimate virtue” (ibid). This was viewed largely due to European political will, 
without such an engine the EU could fall (ibid). Respectively, there was a priority for politics 
over economics which was continually being overlooked. 
PART II: Member States and the Euro Crisis 
 The Taming of the Celtic Tiger 
4.2.1 Story of the Crisis: The Collapse of the Celtic Tiger49 
The initial success of Ireland’s membership makes the demise of the nation even more 
traumatic. The majority of Ireland’s economic expansion could be assigned to their property 
market. On joining the euro Ireland’s interest rates were radically decreased allowing for 
cheap borrowing, instigating the Irish property boom which saw the housing stock quadruple 
and construction swell to an eighth of the economy (The Financial Times, November 2010). 
Europeanization exacerbated domestic economic ebbs and flows. Inevitably, the 
unsustainable level of growth saw the bubble eventually burst in a catastrophic manner taking 
both the banks and the country itself down. British, German, Belgian and French banks alike 
had attempted to exploit the Irish property bubble.  
                                                          
49 See Gillespie (2012); Donovan and Murphy (2013); Whelan (2014).   
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The loans were supervised by both the national central banks and the ECB itself, none 
of which raised any form of objection or concerns to the nature of lending. Nevertheless, the 
Irish crisis within Europe was seen as “a purely Irish problem with purely Irish responsibility” 
(The Financial Times, March 2011). Following the collapse, the banks were left in a substantial 
amount of debt. Subsequently, the banks became bailed out by the government which in turn 
produced a budget deficit of 32% GDP for 2010 (BBC, November 2010). The total sum of €45 
billion (BBC, December 2010) had to be paid out by the government who had already 
accumulated debt of their own. Ironically, on the eve of the crisis Ireland’s public debt was 
only 25% of GDP, at the time the lowest in the Eurozone (The Financial Times, November 
2010).  
While the government’s debt on its own was sustainable, the banks’ debt added a 
pressure that sent the economy into disarray. To put this into perspective, this was 30% of the 
value of its economy (BBC, September 2010). The Eurozone was not able to provide the 
internal stability it promised as the global crisis combined with the Eurozone’s monetary 
control, positioning Ireland in an unsustainable and artificial condition of prosperity, leading 
to an unimaginable level of depression. The problem was not the set-up of the Eurozone per 
se; it was the capital flowing from the larger member states, such as Germany, into the 
economically weaker periphery state of Ireland within a property bubble rather than as a 
stable investment. However, as documented in the previous chapter, it was the inadequate 
set-up of the Eurozone which saw it incapable of managing economically crisis-ridden member 
states.  
The issue was that politically the EU could not resolve these inadequacies. There was 
a persisting concern that politicians were failing to make decisions to secure prosperity for the 
future (The Economist, July-August 2011). The prosperous and expanding EU of the past was 
a community in crisis as “EU leaders [were] bringing about exactly what they pledged to avoid” 
(The Telegraph, August 2011). However, there were arguably issues at the national level 
compounding these weaknesses within the EU structure. There was a line of argument that 
maintained it was domestic policy makers who caused the crisis. Reasons included, a lack of 
national fiscal discipline (Lane, 2011); inappropriate fiscal policy responses which encouraged 
irrational lending by Irish banks (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012); inappropriate fiscal policy in 
light of its Eurozone membership at a time of low real interest rates (Kinsella, 2012); and, a 
reliance on the construction sector and taxes related to consumption combined with pro-
cyclical fiscal policy fostering both the crisis and escalating the housing crash (Dukelow, 2012). 
After all, a currency union can only provide adequate protection from a financial crisis if 
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domestic policies are as efficient and robust as their counterparts (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 
2012). 
The problem was the generalised loss of confidence within the markets. Arguably in 
isolation Ireland could have rejuvenated, but within the international environment and the 
“toxic interactions” (The Irish Times, December 2010) recovery was more complex and 
challenging. Contrastingly, Connor et al. (2010) argued even in isolation Ireland would be 
struggling, maintaining the Irish crisis would have happened even without the American crisis 
destabilising the international system. Ireland had an advantage in possessing a flexible 
economy, but any adjustments economically needed to be politically supported to succeed. 
When examining the history of Europeanization, this has not always been feasible.  
4.2.2 The Irish Response to the Crisis 
Throughout the crisis Ireland attempted to operate independently, creating a 
formidable obstruction to European co-operation. Speculation of an imminent bailout began 
and Ireland’s international reputation begun to dwindle, at least financially. In parallel to the 
Greek crisis, the markets became blamed for undermining Ireland’s position. Ireland’s Europe 
Minister claimed that it was only after the price of borrowing became too high that the 
decision of accepting the bailout became an imminent scenario. Moreover, it was claimed such 
funds were only intended to support the banks rather than the economy as a whole (The 
Telegraph, November 2010b). Dublin insisted it was fully financed, covering its outgoings 
through issuing bonds, thus bypassing the markets to borrow more money.  
The unrealistic guarantee previously given to the banks meant debts accumulated and 
foreign investors increasingly questioned the ability of the government to see the guarantee 
through. Increasingly more money was beginning to be taken out from the banks leading to a 
dependency upon the ECB for emergency funds. Both the ECB and other member states 
became perturbed with this developing situation. The only individuals who were benefiting 
from the guarantee were the banks of other member states, such as Britain. Hence, it was the 
member states that eventually pushed Ireland into accepting the bailout. Germany was once 
again leading the other member states. The IMF emerged as a further pressure amidst fears 
that Ireland’s crisis could lead to contagion moreover, wider and unprecedented ramifications 
than the Eurozone or EU could adequately resolve.  
The Irish government was unexpectedly unrelenting in its refusal of a bailout insisting 
it did not need rescuing for the domestic implications it entailed. The Irish government at the 
time was facing a political crisis in the form of a challenging by-election and a pre-crisis loss of 
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support. The stigma of being rescued would only increase this national mood towards an 
already dwindling government. Ireland hoped for a more restricted agreement whereby 
liquidity would be restored to the banks so borrowing would become easier, culminating in 
less humiliation. However, this did not materialise.  
With a lack of control over monetary policy, Ireland attempted to take a degree of 
control back through their fiscal policy moreover, endeavoured to ease the unrest at the 
domestic level. A budget outlined a 10% reduction in new employees’ wages within the public 
sector and a 6% reduction in the public sector workforce (Department of Finance, 2010a), 
which the public deemed socially unacceptable (The Telegraph, December 2010). After already 
being inflicted with the bailout this would potentially prove to be disastrous for a government 
who was struggling to maintain its popularity. Furthermore, the government outlined a 
reversal of the €1 an hour cut in the national minimum wage (Department of the Taoiseach, 
2011: 7), supported by the IMF and EU (Independent.ie, April 2011) designed to support 
competitiveness and stimulate employment.  
Domestically economic concerns transpired into political anxiety. The Irish 
government was the first casualty of the Eurozone crisis (BBC, January 2011) as Ireland became 
the first crisis-ridden member state to hold an election since their bailout. The Irish 
government was forced to form a coalition with the Labour Party in an effort to deal with the 
country’s escalating economic crisis. However, this only acted as a form of damage limitation 
by spreading the burden of responsibility as the government came under increasing pressure 
to resign. The economic crisis created a domestic political crisis as even the coalition failed to 
operate in unison.  
The predecessor, Taoiseach Brian Cowen, negotiated a seemingly poor bailout of €85 
billion (£75 billion) which was initially incurring 5.8% interest per annum (The Irish Times, 
November 2010). What is more, as part of the bailout conditions, Ireland had to contribute 
€17.5 billion of the total sum which the government paid for by using its national pension fund 
and similar cash reserves (ibid). Subsequently he was forced to call the election a year early 
and wisely did not stand for re-election. However, even the opposition party had supported 
the guarantees given to the creditors of Irish banks. Political disagreement continued over the 
austerity budget even when it appeared potentially threatening to the EU/IMF funding. Cowen 
was insistent on the budgets approval, but even then rebel MPs were demanding his 
resignation. The national political crisis was on the verge of de-railing the European economic 
rescue. However, some commentators claimed that balancing the government budget and 
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disengaging from the banks would enable Ireland to become free of the European institutions 
posing a threat to national sovereignty.   
Whereas in the past the national government acted as a ‘gatekeeper’ to the 
Europeanization process, as Ireland became economically troubled the government felt in an 
inferior position with little bargaining power as the country looked set to default. Ireland was 
too accustomed to being rewarded by Brussels to start fighting against it, even in a matter of 
national survival (Independent.ie, May 2011). Ultimately, the Irish crisis had brought to light 
the chief weaknesses within the EU namely, an incomplete institutional design of the EMU and 
an inadequate European banking system (Lane, 2011: 33).    
4.2.3 The EU’s Response to the Irish Crisis: EU/IMF and ECB 
The Irish bailout money50 came from a similar framework to that of the Greek 
settlement, this time with bilateral loans from Britain, Sweden and Denmark (BBC, November 
2010). After the initial bailout there was much scepticism as to whether the combination of 
the national austerity programme and bailout would be enough to reinvigorate the Irish 
economy and successfully bailout the banks. At the time it was reported to be not unrealistic, 
if losses were to continue, to envisage even more funds needing to be allocated in the 
direction towards the banks (Channel 4, December 2010). However, this fear abated when the 
second bailout package for Greece helped to facilitate Ireland to return to some sort of 
normality within the markets, thus increasing their chances of escaping the constraints of the 
rescue package (The Financial Times, July 2011). 
Unlike states such as Cyprus, Ireland’s bailout agreement did not include a provision 
of an increase in corporation tax. However, an interstate disagreement ensued as Germany 
and France applied pressure onto Ireland’s government despite tax policy being in the domain 
of the member state (The Financial Times, April 2011). Ireland had gained a veto within the 
Lisbon Treaty that its cornerstone of national industrial policy would not change, nor be 
required to. Ireland’s low corporation tax was key to attracting companies to its shores, hence 
its reluctance. The issue of Irish corporation tax was two-fold, a wider movement towards 
harmonisation of states’ corporation tax; and Germany’s attempt to incorporate national debt 
limits within state constitutions.  
The IMF disagreed with France and Germany, arguing the fiscal recovery programmes 
should focus on public spending cuts and producing a wider tax base rather than any other 
                                                          
50 Lane (2011: 17-25) provides a detailed assessment of the bailout package. 
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taxes or higher corporation. The member states were attempting to exploit the crisis to 
prevent losses from their own tax systems. This demonstrates the extent to which 
Europeanization was increasingly by-passing the EU during the euro crisis, providing autonomy 
to the larger states in controlling and instigating EU affairs. Adjusting corporation tax would 
have made negligible difference to Ireland’s recovery, if anything an adjustment would have 
made matters even worse. What was at stake was no longer national interests but “national 
survival” (Independent.ie, May 2011).  
Externally the overriding concern was to stop any contagion of the crisis. As the 
statement by the Eurogroup demonstrated, it was the numerous “contagion channels” 
through which the crisis could spread which similarly concerned the EU the most (Eurogroup, 
2010). The “spill-over pressure” (The Irish Times, June 2011) from the Greek crisis caused 
problems in rescuing Ireland as Irish borrowing costs rose to record levels. The problem for 
Ireland was that by being a part of Europe and more importantly the Eurozone, Europe wanted 
to make an example of the country to deter other member states from being lacklustre in the 
conduct of its economic affairs. The bailout was subsequently designed to act as a deterrence 
upon which other member states would act accordingly, stemming the wave of economically 
fractured member states. Paradoxically, some argued that the bailout of Ireland would 
conversely create a “disastrous domino effect” (The Independent, November 2010b). To an 
extent it did, every day a new member state was taking centre stage of the euro crisis. 
Commentators and observers such as the former IMF director anticipated that by 
2013 there would have to be some form of sovereign debt rescheduling. These predictions 
were correct as 2013 saw the state restructure and defer its debt repayments, or ‘promissory 
notes’. Ireland by now had debt levels below Germany’s. The ECB hesitantly approved the new 
agreement as it attempted to avoid setting a precedent for other Eurozone member states, 
namely Spain, who also owned a significant amount of debt after rescuing their banking 
system. Moreover, to avoid participating in ‘monetary financing’ which would be in violation 
of its mandate. The national central bank maintained they were a “special case” (BBC News, 
February 2013) and no precedent was being set. Ireland’s government made a promise that 
no bank would fail; the ECB was forcing the state to keep its promise.   
The general consensus, which remains to this day, was that the individual efforts of 
nation states were going to be the decisive factor in finding a resolution to the problems as 
the EU floundered as “a world of political institution[al] constraints” (The Guardian, April 
2011b) inhibited an appropriate response. The EU was preventing the Eurozone from acting 
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as the protector of external forces which, as had been proved, could be detrimental on an 
unprecedented scale with repercussions reaching well beyond Europe. In this sense, the EU 
was the cause of its own demise. Yet again, all of these issues were stemming from the main 
handicap of the EU, its political inadequacies. The EU failed to take any definitive steps during 
the initial period of the euro crisis as it continued to learn how to manage disparate economies 
under one economic system. With the lack of political mechanisms and economically literate 
politicians there were a lack of ideas and a lack of vision as to what the euro/Eurozone would 
be like after the crisis was solved (BBC News, January 2011). The fall of the Celtic Tiger was 
seemingly both economic and political. 
 The British Dilemma: “No Banking System is an Island”51 
4.3.1 British Bailout to Ireland: A “Friend in Need”52 
European issues “ripped open old wounds within the Tory Party” (The Telegraph, 
November 2010a) as Eurosceptics within the party argued it was the ECB and the European 
Regulators responsibility to ensure capital movement within the banking sector resumed, not 
Britain’s. Many became angered arguing, “why should Britain have to do it when we’re not 
part of the euro area?” (The Telegraph, November 2010c). Some argued that Ireland was being 
‘bullied’ into a rescue package by the EU in the first place. David Cameron, British PM of the 
time, argued that it was the economic and social consequences of the Irish economy failing 
which left Britain with no choice but to contribute to the bailout. Ultimately it was a political 
decision which left Britain handcuffed to the rescue. 
Socially the collapse of Ireland would have adverse consequences as Britain was 
already in recession with people competing for jobs, should Ireland collapse jobs would 
become even more scarce and competitive as Irish nationals arrived en mass. Economically 
the banks, even RBS and Lloyds, had outstanding loans of £50 billion and £27 billion 
respectively (The Daily Mail, November 2010b). Thus, if Irish banks were to fall so Britain’s 
would follow. Politically, Britain had ‘voluntarily’ agreed to assist. This reverted back to the 
‘five-day limbo’ in which Labour lost the election and the new coalition government came to 
power. The Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling represented Britain at an EU summit 
where a deal was signed committing Britain to £13 billion of a new £52 billion European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (The Telegraph, May 2010a). 
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Despite a phone conversation reportedly advising him not to commit to such a deal 
with the next Chancellor George Osborne (House of Commons, 2011: Column Number 35), 
Darling accepted the terms. However, had the chancellor refused to agree, the ministers of 
the council would have overruled his decision and forced his hand regardless. This decision 
effectively made British taxpayers financially responsible for the debt of a government over 
which they had no democratic control over. Britain was prohibited from vetoing the rescue 
package because decisions on emergency funds were taken by Qualified Majority Voting under 
Article 122 of the Lisbon Treaty (House of Commons Library, 2011: 1-2), arguably this “takes 
the EU’s democratic deficit to a whole new level” (The Spectator, November 2010). 
Nevertheless, Britain did not sign up to the €378 billion support fund which angered the EU 
who told the state not to turn to the EU for support should it find itself in similar economic 
troubles, hence “rather than bringing Europe together, the euro risks tearing it apart” (The 
Telegraph, November 2010a).   
The Irish bailout was the third European problem to face the coalition party in as many 
weeks. This was not an Irish problem it was a euro(pean) problem. The Irish bailout was 
counterpart to safeguarding the Eurozone/euro currency, as the German Finance Minister 
Wolfgang Schauble argued, “we are not just defending a member state, but our common 
currency” (The Telegraph, November 2010c).  However, Britain was not interested in saving 
the Eurozone at a cost to British interests, “it [was] not simply a case of economics” (The 
Guardian, November 2010) it was a matter of politics. Politicians and economists alike were 
concerned for the economic effects on the state as Britain had to borrow more in order to 
bailout Ireland, thus contributing to the state’s pre-existing, significantly high deficit.  
Britain also contributed to the IMF hence the state would have to underwrite further 
funds in order to rescue Ireland. Additionally, on account of the poor experience that Britain 
had as a member of the European Single Market, British (Conservative) politicians believed it 
had also not worked for Ireland whose economy had been growing rapidly before the crisis. 
While interest rates would have been adjusted, Ireland could not on account of the euro. 
Consequently, there was a widespread point of view which said Britain should help fund 
Ireland out of the euro. There was also the issue of Ireland’s low corporation tax; this was not 
only an issue for the EU.  
Despite Ireland being Britain’s “key economic partner” (The Daily Mail, November 
2010a) British politicians and businesses were similarly concerned that bailing out their Irish 
partner was counterproductive for Britain as many argued that Britain was subsidising Ireland 
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in order that the state could retain its low corporation tax. Some argued that bailing Ireland 
out was tantamount to Britain “helping [its] competitors” (Belfast Telegraph, February 2011). 
On the other hand, there were others who were concerned about a similar attack from the EU 
on London threatening the city’s competitiveness, “no banking system [was] an island, and 
even less so when London is (and wants to remain) the leading financial centre for Europe” 
(The Times, January 2011). As Britain proceeded to provide bailouts to both Ireland and 
Portugal, concerns grew over Britain becoming further integrated into the euro crisis. 
4.3.2 Britain’s Bank Rescue: The ‘Brown Plan’53 
America had proposed the ‘Paulson Plan’ (The Economist, September 2008) however, 
this failed to gain support and was subsequently abandoned. Concerns grew that London’s 
financial markets would be paralyzed in weeks; if not days and that a run would occur on high 
street banks. The scenes of social unrest in Southern Europe were ebbing closer to Britain. The 
subsequent ‘Brown Plan’ followed in Ireland’s footsteps and guaranteed an unlimited supply 
of liquidity to those banks in crisis however in a ‘Cyprus-esque’ way by using, in part, taxpayers’ 
money. These were "extraordinary times" (The Telegraph, October 2008a) and this was an 
extraordinary response.  
There were concerns that the government would have to borrow more than planned 
in the short-term. However, Britain had used the same strategy within the successful rescue 
of its own bank, Northern Rock. While the ECB was not permitted and struggled not to do this 
within the Spanish and Irish bailouts, member states possessed both the flexibility and 
mandate to do what the EU could not. In the emerging euro crisis, the nation states were 
reviving the EU, a conscious strategy whereby EU political will was choosing to integrate 
member states policy initiatives, even those from the ‘awkward partner’.  
In an unprecedented move by the EU, PM of the time Gordon Brown was invited to 
the Paris Summit Eurogroup meeting. PM Brown urged the fifteen leaders to adopt the British 
strategy. It was essential for the actions of member states to be coordinated because of 
concerns that investors would only go to the banks which were reinforced with the 
government acting as a shareholder. At the meeting it was guaranteed that no major bank 
would be permitted to fail (The Daily Mail, October 2008a) as France, Germany, Spain and Italy 
all confirmed they would adopt the ‘Brown plan’ and invest in their distressed banks. The 
                                                          




Commission made a promise to fast-track the approval of the other Eurozone members rescue 
packages, provided they met EU rules.  
Brown hailed the agreement as a "coordinated and comprehensive European plan" 
(The Telegraph, October 2008b) to tackle the financial crisis and called for a new ‘Bretton-
Woods’ agreement, akin to that formed in 1944. The ‘Brown Plan’ also became accepted 
outside of the Eurozone. Despite the American government already implementing a £410 
billion rescue plan, the government also prepared to follow Britain’s lead and invest directly 
in their banks. Even the bank of Japan stated it was considering similar measures (The Daily 
Mail, October 2008b).    
Within Britain the rescue plan unified political parties rather than fragmenting them54, 
as had been seen in Southern Europe, as leader of the opposition party Nick Clegg argued, 
“today is a day to stand together” (The Telegraph, October 2008a). Britain had learnt from 
their Southern European counterparts that during a crisis there was no time for party politics. 
Arguably the European crisis had now permeated into Britain, a non-Eurozone member, as 
one economist argued “a recession [was] now built into everybody's calculations” (BBC News, 
October 2008). Overall, in stark contrast to the EU level, ‘crisis diversity’ has characterised 
member states’ response to the euro crisis.  
4.3.3 EU Budget and Britain: “The Fall Guy for Failure”55  
The EU budget negotiations were an archetypal messy process and epitomised how 
the euro crisis was shaping European affairs. The EU was advocating for an increase of 5% in 
the next seven year budget (2014-2020) (BBC News, November 2012d). Hence, Europe was 
attempting to spend its way out of the euro crisis while forcing member states to cut their 
spending. The EU’s legitimacy in continuing to demand that crisis ridden countries follow a 
programme of austerity was now being made on precarious grounds. PM Cameron argued the 
plan was merely “picking the pockets” of European citizens (BBC News, November 2012c). At 
worst Britain wanted a budgetary freeze, at best a decrease. Domestically divisions occurred 
as Labour backed Tory rebels pressured Cameron into guaranteeing a reduction in real-terms.  
A significant sub-divide occurred between rich and poor states as the crisis permeated 
and shaped European affairs. There were numerous views and contrasting proposals 
suggested by every member state. Britain suggested EU funding to poorer regions in rich 
                                                          
54 Hodson and Mabbett (2009) identify two consistent political obstacles to British economic policy 
which left any political party with little manoeuvrability.   
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member states should be abandoned. Herman Van Rompuy similarly proposed that Spain and 
Italy’s funding should be reduced, both states considered such suggestions as “unacceptable” 
(BBC News, November 2012d). Germany wanted an agreement to be reached by all twenty-
seven states in order to avoid annual negotiations as they would be more expensive than if 
there was an increase in the budget. France was attempting to secure an agreement without 
Britain.  
Furthermore, while all member states in the opposition camp wanted a reduction in 
the budget, all wanted it reduced by differing amounts. With so many contrasting positions 
there was an air of pessimism surrounding the budgetary debate with “both a fear and an 
expectation of failure” (ibid) even before negotiations had begun. Divisions were rife within 
both sides of the debate. Despite how it was portrayed, Britain was not alone in preparing to 
use its veto. The inter-state dispute over the size of the budget correspondingly led to a 
difference of opinion over what the budget was spent on. The sub-divide between rich and 
poor member states became replicated within this parallel dispute.  
Since its inception the majority of the budget had always been spent on farming 
subsidies, France’s ‘sacred cow’. Many member states considered this inappropriate within 
modern society. Pressure on Britain to lower its rebate also ensued as Denmark attempted to 
acquire a £100 million rebate of its own (BBC News, October 2012b). Italy and France, who 
directly funded Britain’s rebate, disliked the amount. Italy’s PM argued it was unfair that rich 
countries would be subsidised in such a way. Both member states suggested the way it was 
calculated should be changed. Consequently, France, Britain and Denmark were all equally 
poised to use their veto.  
Rich countries did not want to finance the poorer countries within the Eurozone who 
they viewed as being the cause of the euro crisis. The poorer countries likewise did not want 
to subsidise the rich countries when they were being forced to follow stringent austerity 
measures. Moreover, rich countries already had an advantage over them and simply had 
enough money when they did not. Correspondingly, a divide also occurred between Eurozone 
member states and non-Eurozone member states, as countries such as Britain did not want to 
pay for a crisis which they were not a part of. PM Cameron argued the EU budget should not 
be used “to make up for difficulties and problems in the Eurozone” (The Telegraph, November 
2012a).  
 The democratic deficit became clear once again, this time within the European 
Parliament’s (EP) negotiations. Discussions inevitably led to a political deadlock between 
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Members of the European Parliament (MEP) and member states. Therefore, the EP 
implemented its new powers under the Lisbon Treaty56, restoring the €6.5 billion funding 
which governments had removed from the 2013 budget (The Telegraph, November 2012b). 
Additionally, the EP rejected Britain’s long-term freeze in spending, tabling increases for 2012. 
The assembly also voted in support of the Commission’s demand for an increase in the long-
term budget. The Lisbon Treaty was a significant loss of sovereignty, more significant than it 
had initially appeared.    
 The Franco-German relationship had been on tentative grounds up until now, 
however the EU budget ensured their separation. Germany became angered by attempts from 
France and the President of the Commission to “quarantine” (The Guardian, November 2012) 
Britain from negotiations and secure a deal without them. France’s newly elected PM Francois 
Hollande maintained “I have been told a solution cannot happen with Britain. But why should 
one country decide for 26 others?” (The Times, February 2013). With its reputation of being a 
challenger to EU proposals and the EU budget being strewn with disagreements, Britain 
became portrayed as a “deal breaker” (BBC News, November 2012d).  
Ultimately the state could be a scapegoat for the lack of European cohesion; Britain 
was being lined up as the fall guy for European failure (BBC News, November 2012b). 
Accordingly, many member states began to welcome a British veto. However, Britain was now 
Germany’s closest ally and Germany was the ‘Master of Europe’.   
 Conclusion: ‘Crisis Progression’ and ‘Crisis Diversity’ in Action I 
“When written in Chinese the word crisis is composed of two characters. One 
represents danger, and the other represents opportunity” (John F. Kennedy, 1959). In this 
spirit, the current economic crisis has presented the EU with various elements of ‘crisis 
progression’ (danger) and ‘crisis diversity’ (opportunity) at various times, leading to many 
simultaneously condemning it to death and praising its survival.  
In reference to our original three questions: 
• Is ‘crisis diversity’ or ‘crisis progression’ occurring within the current 
economic crisis?  
• Is the EU level exhibiting the same crisis pattern as the national level, or are 
they different?  
                                                          
56 The EP could vote down any deal which was reached by EU governments should its calls for increased 
funds be discounted.  
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• What are the implications of a different crisis pattern occurring at the 
respective governance levels for the EU? 
Regarding Question 1: In relation to the crisis pattern both ‘crisis diversity’ and ‘crisis 
progression’ are occurring within the economic crisis. The key arguments for ‘crisis 
progressionists’ are:  
• The crisis has spilled over in a mechanical fashion, producing a ‘domino’ effect 
as it spread from one member state to another. 
• The EU’s crisis response is yet to diversify. 
• The crisis has spilled over from the economic sphere to the political domain. 
• The founding features of the EU, such as Franco-German relationship, are 
being overwhelmed. Hence so are the EU’s adaptive capacities which are 
unable to respond appropriately (hence the lack of crisis responses). 
• The crisis has spilled over from the Eurozone to the EU, hence Britain’s 
involvement.  
In contrast, the key arguments for ‘crisis diversifiers’ are: 
• The crisis has been going on for many years, yet it has still not spread to Britain or 
surrounding policy areas. 
• The crisis has occurred with national colours, all have different causes57. 
• Integration has advanced throughout the crisis. 
• The adaptive capacities of the EU are operating to their optimal, hence the “Franco-
German” relationship is transforming into the “Berlin-London axis” (The Guardian, 
November 2012).  
• The crisis response is one response on a path of many and amongst many; Ireland 
attempted to tackle the crisis by itself through fiscal policy; hence there are so many 
contradictions within the system. 
• Policy areas are responding, new policy strategies are being created and adopted by 
member states, with or without the EU’s involvement. 
• The EU/Eurozone is changing, hence Britain wants the EU’s powers re-defined and a 
new relationship negotiated.  
                                                          
57 Connor et al. (2010) compares the Irish Crisis in relation to the USA crisis and finds “diversity in the 




Regarding Question 2: Despite ‘crisis progression’ appearing to be the order of the 
day, the story was more interesting than the media perception inferred. From this analysis it 
appears that on the surface the initial phase of the euro crisis has characteristics of ‘crisis 
progression’. However, underneath ‘crisis diversity’ is bubbling away, operating behind the 
scenes to ensure the EU adapts to the crisis conditions and further integration continues, 
creating a ‘crisis cushion’ which allows the EU to operate as normal.  
Therefore, it is concluded that the EU and the national levels are exhibiting different 
crisis patterns whereby the latter is displaying tendencies from within the logic of ‘crisis 
diversity’ and the former is comprised of characteristics from the logic of ‘crisis progression’. 
Hence, a ‘crisis spectrum’ is occurring in this initial period of the euro crisis which was being 
overlooked. Correspondingly, Europeanization is not occurring at the EU level with no policy 
development materialising. However, Europeanization is occurring at the national level with 
policy development advancing as member states respond to the euro crisis. Hence, ‘bottom-
up’ Europeanization is occurring within this immediate period of the euro crisis as policy 
developments are accelerated through national rather than European provisions, 
subsequently ensuring the EU’s survival. In fitting with Jordan (2003) as well as Bulmer and 
Burch (2005) in Chapter 2, overlapping interests between the EU and national level, in this 
instance the survival of the EU, is driving the transformation of national policy.  
This appearance of a domineering ‘crisis progression’ vision could be perceived in two 
different ways. Firstly, that the ‘crisis progression’ perception was purely a media creation 
rather than the reality whereby national issues were simply generalised to the EU level. 
Alternatively, because national issues were rendered European responsibility, despite being 
addressed through national efforts, (European) ‘crisis progression’ was viewed in higher 
regard and with more significance than (national) ‘crisis diversity’. In other words, there was 
an EU-centric focus within media analysis which was overlooking activity at the national level.  
Regarding Question 3: The different crisis patterns occurring at the respective 
governance levels had significant implications for the EU. It was the divergence in crisis 
response and pattern between the European and national levels which allowed a ‘crisis 
cushion’ to form whereby national responses were solving national issues. However, 
unconsciously they were reinforcing the EU’s structure subsequently helping to save the EU 
from the euro crisis, hence allowing the EU to continue to operate and exist. Accordingly, it 
can be deduced that the EU needs the autonomous states, needs the diversity, it is this which 
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provides the EU with its flexibility. Moreover, it was this which ensured its survival in the 
immediate years of the euro crisis.  
Respectively, this differing crisis pattern demonstrates how overall a ‘bi-directional’ 
process of Europeanization is occurring in the EU system as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
processes ultimately become indistinguishable from one another. Such as in the euro crisis, 
policy development was fostered due to demands at the EU level, however policy was 
nationally driven thus collapsing the Europeanization process into one comprehensible 
process as discussed by Buller (2006) and Börzel (2002) in Chapter 2. In the initial period of the 
euro crisis, member states were active participators in the Europeanization process (Buller, 
2006) as member states acted as ‘pace-setters’ in responding to the euro crisis namely, 
actively shaping EU policy to the national level (Börzel, 2002).  As exemplified by Britain gaining 
a voice within the Eurozone policy making process despite its lack of membership.    
Consequently, the early period of the euro crisis demonstrates how national issues 
were no longer solved in isolation but in conjunction with the European structure. The 
automaticity of this process was subtle and indirect. Nation states were now truly thinking 
European. While many commentators, both in academic circles and the media, believed the 
EU was on the brink of disintegration in the initial years of the crisis this chapter has provided 
support for those ‘crisis diversifiers’ arguing the opposite is true. The states flexibly, in an 
uncoordinated fashion, prohibited the perpetuation of ‘crisis progression’ and, by implication, 
helped to prevent the failure of the EU.   
As a result of this analysis it is anticipated that ‘crisis diversity’ will also be occurring 
at the sub-policy level, social policy. The proceeding analysis of the historical development of 
European social policy and national social policy in Britain and Ireland will explore whether 
social policy has traditionally developed through a pattern of ‘crisis diversity’, ‘crisis 
progression’, or alternatively a combination of these scenarios. The chapter will trace social 
policy’s development from the 1950s to 1970s through to the euro crisis, identifying whether 
it is the case that ‘crisis diversity’ is also occurring within social policy in the euro crisis or 
whether a simultaneous crisis is occurring in social policy as advocates of ‘crisis progression’ 






Social Policy and the Absent Crisis 
 
“The European Community, rather than undermining the achievements of the welfare state, is 
in fact addressing many quality-of-life issues which traditional social policies have neglected - 
consumer protection and equal treatment for men and women, for example. The evidence I 
have presented strongly suggests that the 'Social Europe' of the future…will be, not a 
supranational welfare state, but an increasingly rich space of social-regulatory policies and 
institutions.” (Majone, 1993: 168) 
“The overall scope of EU interventions has been…extensive. These interventions reveal that 
national welfare state regimes are now part of a larger, multi-tiered system of social policy. 
Member governments profoundly influence this structure, but they no longer fully control it.” 
(Leibfried and Pierson, 1995: 289) 
 
EU social policy is typified by four main tensions and contradictions which these quotes 
highlight, namely: 
• Expensive yet has minimal funding, relative to the national level; 
• Social but economically contingent; 
• An EU construct but nationally contingent; and, 
• A secondary policy area to economic policy yet possesses a legitimizing role for 
economic policy to maintain its course of development. 
After years of development, social policy remains in a subordinate role due to the core 
parameters in which it operates. Conversely, it is because of these restrictions and 
contradictions that social policy is so diverse and innovative. The EU and national levels are 
both independent and interdependent, as the previous chapter demonstrated by their 
differing crisis patterns in the euro crisis. However, is this the same with EU and national social 
policy? Has EU social policy developed through mechanical or organic crises? How has this 
impacted on national social policy developments?  
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This chapter will analyse the crisis pattern within the historical development of EU and 
national social policy in Britain and Ireland. The chapter identifies whether social policy has 
traditionally followed a pattern of ‘crisis diversity’, with social policy developing because of EU 
crises. On the other hand, if a pattern of ‘crisis progression’ has typically transpired, where 
periods of crisis have faltered the development of social policy. Alternatively, whether a 
combination of these scenarios has occurred, thereby moving up and down the ‘crisis 
spectrum’ in different phases of social policy’s development and demonstrating the historical 
presence of a ‘crisis spectrum’.  
This analysis provides the foundations upon which it will be possible to analyse the 
British and Irish social policy responses to the euro crisis. The crisis pattern and interaction 
between EU and national social policy identified within this chapter will serve as a comparison 
to the crisis pattern and interaction between the EU and national social policy within the euro 
crisis period in individual areas of British and Irish social policy. Three key questions will be 
posed in this chapter;  
• Has ‘crisis diversity’ or ‘crisis progression’ occurred within the development of EU and 
national social policy? 
• The more poignant question, is the EU level exhibiting the same crisis pattern as the 
national level, or are they different as in the euro crisis and what are the implications 
of this? 
• How have Britain and Ireland interacted with EU social policy developments and has 
this interaction changed from pre-euro crisis to during the euro crisis? 
Following an identical structure to the preceding chapter, this chapter will be divided 
into two sections to mirror the separate European and national governance levels under 
analysis. Respectively, the chapter will be structured as follows. The European section 
chronicles the development of EU social policy, identifying a crisis pattern of ‘crisis diversity’ 
as conceptualised within four developmental phases from the 1950s to 1970s through to the 
euro crisis. The 1950s to 1970s phase accounts for the establishment of the core parameters 
of EU social policy, as outlined above. This initial period is typified by inactivity which 
demonstrates the necessity of a political or economic challenge for EU social policy to develop 
without which there is a lack of political will or necessity to break from the status quo. The 
1970s to early 1990s charts the significant positive impact of EU crises on the development of 
EU social policy. This phase illustrates how periods of ‘crisis progression’ were followed by 
‘crisis diversity’ as successive economic crises brought national social policy issues to the fore, 
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leading to a strengthening of social policy. It is within this phase that EU social policy became 
established as the ‘step child’ of EU policy due to British opposition. 
The 1990s to 2007s charts the peak of EU social policy development under the 
Amsterdam, Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties as an environment of high unemployment, 
declining economic growth and economic crisis acted as a catalyst, further consolidating the 
development of EU social policy. The final phase from 2008 to the present-day context of the 
euro crisis accounts for the absent crisis in EU social policy, demonstrating how EU social policy 
operated unaffected by the euro crisis; namely operating within the same parameters as in 
the 1950s due to the vastly different policy structure of social policy in comparison to 
economic policy. The national section accounts for the historical development of British and 
Irish social policy identifying an identical pattern of ‘crisis diversity’ as conceptualised within 
four developmental phases.  
In contrast to EU social policy, national social policy is dependent upon national 
economic policy, thus creating very different implications for the development of national 
social policy. The analysis of Britain highlights the highly political environment in which 
national social policy developed. This section initially charts the development of a 
comprehensive welfare state and extensive role for the state from the 1940s to 1970s, in the 
context of unprecedented crisis which rendered EU social policy a supporting role to varying 
degrees. Specifically, depending on the political party in government. The 1970s to 1990s 
charts the beginning of the tug of war between Britain and the EU over social policy, examining 
the successive rejections of EU social policy. Nonetheless, in the background to this tug of war 
national social policy continued to be revitalised as Britain borrowed concepts from the EU 
level and ‘downloaded’ them in order to reinforce the national trajectory of national social 
policy. 
The 1990s to pre-crisis 2007s phase examines the radical shift in Britain’s interaction 
with EU social policy developments as the election of New Labour created a new non-
threatening relationship with EU social policy. This phase examines the simultaneous 
modernisation of the ESM and British welfare state as Britain reversed roles with the EU, 
subsequently driving social policy’s development. The final phase from 2008 to the context of 
the present-day euro crisis returns to the familiar tug of war over social policy as Britain viewed 
the economic crisis as an opportunity to radically reform the welfare state and increase the 
dependency of EU social policy on the national level as once again EU social policy 
developments became conceived as a threat. At the national level, social policy became the 
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fall guy for the economic crisis. The revitalisation of the EU and national levels is found to be 
opposed in both directions. 
The analysis of Ireland demonstrates a vastly different, contrastingly unpolitical story 
as the initial period from the 1930s to 1970s accounts for the lack of national demand for 
social policy which is exacerbated by the minimal role of the state. The 1970s to 1990s phase 
analyses how EU social policy became the driving force for Irish social policy. This expansion 
of social policy’s development is initially hindered by the 1980s national economic crisis which 
left Ireland financially challenged to implement EU social policy, highlighting the difference 
between EU and national social policy. Nonetheless, this phase illustrates how ‘crisis diversity’ 
is borne out of this ‘crisis progression’ as EU social policy developments combined with the 
economic crisis to accelerate the modernisation and Europeanization of the Irish state.  
The 1990s to pre-crisis 2007 phase accounts for the reversal of roles between Ireland 
and the EU with the advent of the Celtic Tiger. For example, Ireland’s National Anti-Poverty 
Strategy provided a template for the EU’s approach to social exclusion. This revitalisation is 
found to be a two-way process as the European Employment Strategy reinforced the national 
trajectory of employment policy leading to significant national social policy development. The 
final phase from 2008 to the euro crisis illustrates the interdependency between national 
economic and social policy as the economic crisis spilled over into national social policy, with 
social partnership bearing the costs of the crisis. This phase analyses how ‘crisis diversity’ 
emerges from significant ‘crisis progression’ as welfare benefits were reformed and Ireland 
drove EU social policy through its presidency of the European Council, filling the policy void at 
the national level.    
This chapter finds, in contrast to the present euro crisis (Chapter 4), the two 
governance levels are exhibiting the same crisis pattern and this has facilitated the 
development of EU and national social policy. Specifically, at different times out of ‘crisis 
progression’, ‘crisis diversity’ has been borne, demonstrating the historical and continual 
presence of a ‘crisis spectrum’ which is currently being overlooked within the euro crisis 
debate. The chapter finds, due to the identical crisis patterns, Britain and Ireland recurrently 
reversing roles with the EU and becoming the ‘pace-setter’ for the development of EU and 
national social policy, as in Chapter 4, at times when EU social policy is stifled, thus ensuring 
policy progress for both governance levels. The chapter also finds that while Britain and Ireland 
share the same crisis pattern, they have interacted with EU social policy developments and 
been impacted by EU social policy developments differently. Respectively, the chapter argues 
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that the euro crisis is unable to be an existential crisis (‘crisis progression’) as there is no 
uniform structure at either the EU or national level.    
PART I: European Social Policy, the ‘Good’ Crises and the Absent Crisis 
 Phase 1: Initial Inactivity (1950s-1970s) 
  Scharpf deems this early stage of EU social policy development as “the road not 
taken” (2002: 645), a missed opportunity in which to promote and co-ordinate a truly 
European social policy independent of the national level. He substantiates this claim 
maintaining, the structural similarities between national welfare states and the diminutive 
number of states involved meant “harmonization would not have been hopeless – much less 
difficult, at any rate, than it would now be” (2002: 646). However, rather than a missed 
opportunity this initial development phase demonstrates the necessity of a crisis, or at the 
very least a political or economic challenge, within the EU for policy progress to occur, and 
thus for harmonization, as Kühnhardt (2009) and Gehler (2009) argued in Chapter 3. Without 
this, there is no political will or necessity to break from the status quo, as Schmitter’s (1970) 
model purported. The road was not taken because it was not required. 
 The initial treaties established the core parameters of EU social policy, the first of 
which was social policy’s secondary, supportive role to economic policy. The Treaty of Paris 
(1952), which established the European Coal and Steel Community, was debatably more 
orientated towards social policy than the Treaty of Rome (Kleinman, 2002: 82) with enshrining 
the conditions for establishing a common internal market, hence the focus on the free 
movement of labour within immigration policy. However, it was within this first treaty that 
social policy’s shadowing role to economic policy was founded. Social policy was coupled with 
economic policy under the third title, ‘Economic Expansion, Growth of Employment and a 
Rising Standard of Living’.   
Similarly, the Treaty of Rome (1958) consigned member state co-operation within 
those sub-areas of social policy that were required for economic integration (Hantrais, 2000: 
3). Concerns over ‘social dumping’ or “regime shopping” (Majone, 1993: 159) in France, due 
to concerns over French businesses being at a competitive disadvantage to those countries 
without such legislation, led to minor harmonization over equal pay for men and women 
(Article 119) along with holiday pay (Article 120). Hence, as Kurzer and Cooper (2011) claimed 
in Chapter 3, only those social areas connected to the single market would develop.    
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    Regional policy commenced meagrely with a lack of “concrete incentives” coupling 
the “forceful expressions” (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995: 131) enshrined within Article 2, which 
stipulated harmonious development within the community, and Article 92 which permitted 
state aid to underdeveloped or disadvantaged regions (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995: 133). The 
European Social Fund (ESF, Article 123-128) established minimal funding for EU social policy 
and cemented its dependency on economic policy with being merely developed out of 
economic necessity and with a narrow remit. Namely, to offset the negative effects of 
economic growth for those poorer areas and populations, rather than being an EU fund to be 
utilised on social policy EU wide.  
This fund was aimed towards retraining or resettling individual workers who had lost 
employment due to the creation of the common market. Contrastingly, there are those who 
view the establishment of the ESF as confirmation that social policy was viewed in its own right 
rather than as a secondary policy area, or merely operating a supporting role for facilitating 
and attaining economic objectives (Collins, 1966: 27). It was due to the minimal finances that 
the EU level was required to appeal to the national level with the EC subsequently demoted 
to a co-ordination and management role. The EU was now doubly dependent, not only 
economically contingent but nationally dependent too. The EU, implicitly the EC, could 
assimilate national laws which affected the establishment and functioning of the single 
market, acting on a Commission proposal through a unanimous vote in the Council within 
Article 100.  
Additionally, Article 235 ascertained that the Council could take “appropriate 
measures” (Cini, 2007: 273) during the operation of the single market when a treaty objective 
was at stake, even when a treaty did not permit such action, on the provision that the EC 
consulted with the EP and acted based on a Commission proposal. The EU attempted to break 
out of its nationally contingent structure through the ‘subsidiary competence’ which 
permitted a long-term loophole for EU intervention and harmonization in social policy (Cini, 
2007: 273). The final parameter of EU social policy was additionally established through a 
crisis, namely the so-called ‘empty chair crisis’ (1960) which was “the most serious 
constitutional conflict in the EU’s history” (Dinan, 2010a: 37).  
The crisis emerged from a disagreement over the EC’s proposals within the Treaty of 
Rome for extending the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) procedure within the Council of 
Ministers. France became isolated, thus the state abstained from the Council of Ministers in 
1965 bringing EU policy making to a near grinding halt (Cini, 2007: 24) and inducing “six-
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months of near paralysis [within] Brussels” (Dinan, 2010a: 39). Out of this ‘crisis progression’ 
manifested ‘crisis diversity’. The resolution was the Luxembourg Compromise (1966), a non-
legally binding agreement that stated issues of vital national interest would be resolved 
through an accord amongst member states, thus retaining a de facto veto. Hence, 
demonstrating Jones et al.’s (2016) ‘failing forward’ thesis of piecemeal reform following 
periods of EU crisis. Accordingly, the EC became politically tentative with the crisis reaffirming 
the EU’s dependency on nation states within the policy making process.  
These initial developments arguably demonstrate how there was a constant social 
dimension to the EU, albeit in a limited capacity (Bache and George, 2006: 364). Nevertheless, 
economic policy was to be the trailblazer for the development of social policy. Only those 
social policy areas which were the other side of the coin to economic policy were the locus of 
EU policy development.  
 Phase 2: A Period of Crisis Integration (1970s-early 1990s) 
This second phase begins where the first phase concluded, in a “mood of crisis” (Cini, 
2007: 24). After successive crises, namely the ‘snake’ failing and quadrupling oil prices, 
creating periods of ‘eurosclerosis’, for both economic and social policy, social policy came to 
the fore as member states experienced significant social difficulties (Hantrais, 2000: 218). This 
subsequently fostered a favourable environment in which social policy could develop. The oil 
crisis was “met by recourse to nationally oriented policy programmes and not by EC-sponsored 
projects for economic recovery” (Rosamond, 2000: 98). The crisis underscored “the extent to 
which EC integration could be undermined by turbulence in the international economic 
system” (Laffan, 1992: 53). As Kühnhardt (2009) claimed and Kurzer and Cooper (2011) 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, the international and EU level were inextricably connected.  
Following on from the impact of the ‘empty chair crisis’, the Commission’s role as 
being the motor force of EI was non-existent (Laffan, 1992: 10). Respectively, out of threat 
came an opportunity not only for EU social policy but for a concerted European policy response 
to a crisis. A series of Social Action Plans (SAP) over a four year period were established to 
monitor national social problems and aimed to achieve: full employment; improve living and 
working conditions; vocational training; equality between men and women in accessing 
employment; and, equal rights in the workplace (McCormick, 2008: 179; 181-183). While 
‘crisis progression’ spread meaning the recession hampered the success of the SAPs, the equal 
pay directive (1975) and equal treatment directive (1976) were delivered.  
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The Commission’s proposal for a European regional policy coupled with a European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) had fallen on unsupportive member state ears as only Italy 
experienced a regional crisis. However, an economic crisis and the entry of member states 
Britain and Ireland led to further economic concerns over implementing the Werner Proposal. 
Concerns centred over inflicting further adverse economic effects on underdeveloped regions 
through establishing a fixed exchange rate. Subsequently, Italy’s request for a European 
regional policy bore fruits in 1975 as it became “galvanized into a new European Regional 
Development Fund” (Marks, 1992: 194). Such funds supplemented rather than replaced 
national regional policy spending and were assigned on a regional basis, thereby embedding 
the dependency of EU social policy on the national level. Hence, this “regionalization of 
European social policy could preempt the Europeanization of social policy” (Anderson, 1995: 
147-158). 
Following this protracted period of ‘crisis progression’ was a significant period of ‘crisis 
diversity’, with the lack of international competition conversely leading to the re-launch of the 
internal market (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 326). The concept of a social dimension, or 
‘social space’ as first muted by Francois Mitterand (1981), was expanded by the new president 
of the Commission, Jacque Delors (1985). Delors ensured economic support for the European 
Single Market from member states and other various actors, such as the trade unions, workers 
and citizens, through social measures; the economic objectives were legitimised by social 
initiatives.  
Thus, while social policy was economically contingent the SEA highlighted how 
economic policy was equally socially contingent, to the advantage of EU social policy. Delors 
emphasised this interdependence, claiming without the latter the former (single market) 
would fail. Accordingly, he aimed to (re)invigorate the process of EI and extend the EU’s social 
dimension, with employment policy at its centre. Through recognising the implicit social costs 
of the single market member states would commit to further EI. In accordance with Hagen’s 
(2009) analysis in Chapter 3, the EMU was being used to promote further, deeper social 
integration. Many workers and citizens felt overlooked by the EC who they believed favoured 
supporting the needs of businesses (Kleinman, 2002: 86) and attaining economic benefits.  
The SEA instigated this process of social concessions for economic developments and 
objectives of the single market. The act, primarily aimed to revive the economy after 
significant recession and economic crisis, epitomised the social impetuous Delors espoused 
thus “greatly accelerate[ing] [both] the process of European integration” (Leibfried and 
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Pierson, 1992: 2) and social policy-making process (Hantrais, 2000: 6). Social policy issues were 
subsequently divided between QMV, namely those social issues connected to the 
establishment and functioning of the European Single Market such as freedom of movement, 
and unanimous voting for those issues not related to the European Single Market, such as 
workers’ rights. Replacing harmonization, ‘mutual recognition’ and ‘subsidiarity’58 became the 
new strategy through which to proceed with social integration. Member states, workers and 
their trade unions concerns over ‘social dumping’ (Geyer, 2000) were subsequently 
resurrected and compounded with the entry of Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986). 
Thus, even before the current euro crisis there was a north-south and/or core-periphery divide 
amongst member states (Rhodes, 2009). 
  In turn, the entry of these states raised fears over regional disparities obstructing the 
completion of the single market, leading to a two-fold increase in structural funds, an 
increased focus on poorer member states, and the EC acquiring significant control over 
regional policy in combination with its new competition regulations. Arguably, the increase in 
funds compensated for the differential economic costs of the single market, which constituted 
a “harsh test” on these poorer member states (Marks, 1992: 202-204). Once again, economic 
objectives were strengthening social policy. This strategy continued within the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, or the ‘Social Charter’ (1989), which 
provided another “boost for social policy” (McCormick, 2011: 100) in response to economic 
concerns of ‘social dumping’.  
Akin to the increase in structural funds, the charter provided social concessions for 
economic initiatives as a “trade-off [was made] between the acceptance of the Single Market 
and the promotion of a “social dimension” or “social dialogue” (Mullard, 1997: 1). The Social 
Charter, through establishing a “discourse of universal [social] rights” (ibid), transcended 
national boundaries, setting in motion a path towards a legal deepening of EU social policy. 
The charter declared that the social dimension should have the same importance as the 
economic dimension (Kleinman and Piachaud, 1993: 2) and was subsequently combined with 
the Commission’s SAP in the same year.   
Despite the charter being a “solemn declaration” (Hantrais, 2000: 7) rather than 
binding by law, Britain voted against it. Nevertheless, the charter passed successfully, hence 
“with the single market on track and the economy booming, political support for an active 
                                                          
58 This meant policy should only be produced at the EU level if lower levels of governance could not do 
so and/or it was not appropriate. 
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social policy began to gather speed” (Dinan, 2010a: 423). The Maastricht Treaty (1993) 
embodied both an economic milestone, with the final stage of the EMU and introduction of 
the euro, and a social landmark, epitomised by the introduction of EU citizenship through the 
extension of free movement to all EU citizens. The treaty was to incorporate the Social Charter 
under the ‘Social Chapter’. However, Britain’s persistent opposition led to the removal of the 
charter from the main body and the creation of a social protocol, thus condemning EU social 
policy as the “step child” (Leibfried and Pierson , 1992: 5) of EI.    
The pace of progress for EU social policy significantly decelerated as difficulties in 
passing legislation ensued with only two directives accepted under the protocol (Dinan, 2010a: 
425; Kenner in Lynch et al, 2000: 112). Arguably with economic concerns now abated and no 
economic crisis, social policy enjoyed no policy progress. However, as the Maastricht criteria 
resurrected concerns over regional disparities, social policy regained pace with a further 
expansion of the ESF and a new cohesion fund to help “the poor four”59 (Leibfried and Pierson, 
1995: 142), so to ensure member states met the conditions for the establishment of the EMU. 
Member states argued that with the option of devaluating their currency removed, the only 
instruments to regain competitiveness would be through wage reductions and tighter fiscal 
policies, all of which would create further unemployment (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995: 141). 
However, the familiar conditions of crisis returned as an economic crisis emerged 
within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) with Italy and Britain forced to exit the ERM in 
September 1992. With concerns centred on the future of the EMU and the euro, once again 
EU social policy came to a standstill as ‘crisis progression’ embedded into the EU system.   
 Phase 3: Consolidation (Mid 1990s-2007)   
The 1990s represented the high point for EU social policy as Delors successfully moved 
the social dimension to the top of the agenda, facilitated by a familiar context of high 
unemployment and dwindling economic growth. The economic crisis was a catalyst for 
establishing the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) which, due to the unemployment crisis and a 
change of political leadership in Britain, enshrined Maastricht’s social protocol and the 
agreement on social policy into the main body of the treaty. Positioned under the Social 
Chapter, this signified yet “another turning point for the social dimension” (Hantrais: 2000, 
18-19) and ascribed EU employment measures “a status they had not previously enjoyed” 
(Casey, 2009: 31). The treaty placed an emphasis on policy “consolidation rather than 
                                                          
59 Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland (Marks, 1992: 191).  
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innovation” (McCormick, 2008: 113), setting a precedent for forthcoming developments; 
namely, consolidation of previous policy progress.  
Respectively, for the first time, the EU possessed a common employment policy which 
obligated member states “to work towards developing a co-ordinated strategy for 
employment” (McCormick, 2008: 181), in accordance with the Maastricht Criteria (Casey, 
2009: 31). Despite this preferment of employment policy, at the subsequent Luxembourg Jobs 
Summit (November 1997) there was no additional funds dedicated to employment, rather it 
was claimed that ESF resources were available “to serve employment needs wherever 
possible” (Casey, 2009: 32). The succeeding European Employment Strategy (EES) provided an 
alternative to further regulation (Cini, 2007: 281) and represented “a radical departure from 
the policy developments of the past”60 (Rhodes, 2005: 290).  
The EES provided a wider remit for EU intervention on national social policy without 
needing to confront national governments directly. Through the EES national social policies 
could be EU-motivated, EU-shaped and EU-guided. Respectively, the economic crisis was 
providing an avenue through which the EU could increase its competency within “jealously 
guarded” (ibid) social policy areas. Policy innovation ensued with a reorientation of the EU’s 
employment focus, from protection to creation without replacing or impinging on national 
policies as historically feared by states (ibid). Immigration initiatives were similarly promoted 
and integrated into EU law as the advancement of the single market obligated member states 
to coordinate national rules and treatment for foreign nationals. 
Accordingly, the Schengen Agreement was formally integrated into the EU’s 
institutional and legislative framework by virtue of the incorporation of the social protocol. A 
series of immigration and asylum measures to set minimum standards within asylum policy 
were outlined (Schierup et al., 2006: 69). Hence, the “Amsterdam Treaty marked a historic 
shift which laid down the broad outlines for a future EU policy on immigration and asylum” 
(ibid). The freedom of movement was also significantly expanded as Amsterdam afforded 
rights of residence to those other than workers. Specifically, students; unemployed; those 
nationals of member states, together with their families, who currently had no legal rights to 
residence under community law; along with equal treatment to all state citizens including third 
country nationals, as “freedom of movement [applied] to all those [residing] within the 
territory of the Community” (Moussis, 1998: 310). Social areas were once more categorised 
                                                          
60 See Mosher and Trubek (2003). 
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under QMV and unanimous voting. This was the period in which most pre-existing social policy 
areas obtained a policy base and QMV status (Geyer, 2000: 207). The debate over the Social 
Charter for workers was revived as economic concerns surfaced over the implications of the 
economic goals of the EMU, now fully functioning, for fundamental rights and human rights of 
EU citizens.  
Social concessions in exchange for economic developments continued to be provided. 
On this occasion policy innovation rather than policy progress ensued through the creation of 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), which had at its foundations 
in the earlier Social Charter (1989). From the EU’s perspective member states could not 
challenge the charter. This consolidated pre-existing social rights, appropriated from within 
the European Social Charter (1961) and Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers (1989), as well as the European Convention on Human Rights. Hence, these rights 
were already being applied, and by implication agreed to, by member states.  
The purpose of consolidation was to place pre-existing and pre-accepted rights into 
one document so to provide them with “greater visibility” and create “legal certainty within 
the EU” (Europa: EUR-Lexb). However, these were not legally enforceable rights that produced 
new competences for the EU, they were ‘ideals’ (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 248). A second 
period of unfavourable economic conditions and high unemployment saw the EU’s 
performance and productivity significantly lag the US. To redress the balance the Lisbon 
Agenda/Strategy (March 2000) was created, almost exclusively focused on employment. This 
signified a further shift from improving employment rights to improving employability, 
through developing “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy” (Nugent, 
2006: 373).  
In support of the Lisbon objectives, and the EES, immigration policy was expanded to 
include labour immigration for the first time as the EC denounced the EU’s zero policy 
“unrealistic”, subsequently calling for “efficient management of migrant flows” (Schierup et 
al., 2006: 69). The Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) was utilised to coordinate national 
recruitment schemes. Hence, the EU could now respond to changes in the labour market 
requirements at the national, regional and local level (Schierup et al., 2006: 70). The challenge 
was “to attract and recruit migrants suitable for the EU labour force to sustain productivity 
and economic growth” (EC, 2003). 
  Arguably it was at this point that, demonstrating the extent of interdependence 
between the two policy areas, economic policy divorced itself from those social policy areas 
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that were impinging on economic growth and competitiveness in a type of “colonisation of 
the Welfare State by the economic policy-making process” (Schierup et al., 2006: 80). The EU 
intended to modernise the ESM through structural reforms of national labour markets and 
welfare states (Hix and Hoyland, 2011: 201). Furthermore, foster economic growth through 
increasing investment in education and training to tackle social exclusion, which many 
member states were financially and politically strapped to execute (Dinan, 2010a: 416). 
   A divide emerged between those member states favouring structural reforms and 
those favouring investments within human capital (Hix and Hoyland, 2011: 201). This was 
exacerbated by the EC’s inability to initiate legislation, as delineated within the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties. This void necessitated a new method of co-operation which the Lisbon 
Strategy provided as the EU continued to lack the necessary “power to intervene directly in 
producing most of the reforms deemed necessary” (Giddens, 2007: 15). The OMC was a 
consolidation of the EES, providing “the methodological backbone...to modernize the 
European employment, economic, educational and social policies” (Heidenreich and Bischoff, 
2008: 499). The “naming and shaming” (Hix and Hoyland, 2011) involved facilitated EU 
influence within areas which were “off the agenda of European integration but have a 
profound effect on the EU’s overall economic performance” (Dinan, 2010a: 429-430). 
The Lisbon Strategy cemented “the basic dichotomy – economic policies to the EU, 
social policies to the member states” (Grahl and Teague, 2013: 683-684). However, both the 
Lisbon Strategy, despite being revised, and the OMC proved inadequate due to the vague 
objectives, the political divide over reforms, and member states lacking the political will and 
engagement to implement the necessary measures to achieve the strategy objects as noted 
in the High Level Group report (2004). It was agreed at a European Council meeting that the 
Lisbon targets needed to be more focused and more achievable (Nugent, 2006: 374). Lisbon 
was explicitly criticised for “relegating the social objectives to a secondary priority or ‘add-on’ 
status” (Copeland and Daly, 2015: 140). Arguably, Lisbon had failed precisely because it had 
divorced itself from certain areas of social policy which were viewed as impinging on economic 
growth, demonstrating the necessity for both sides of the coin. While EU economic and social 
policy were not on a level playing field in policy terms, in practice they were equally as 
important and equally as needed.  
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Following the largest enlargement of the EU in 2004 with the accession of ten new 
member states61, a political crisis emerged over the Constitutional Treaty (2005) which was to 
facilitate further enlargement. The treaty epitomised the policy activity of this time, 
consolidating all pre-existing treaties and measures into one single document. This provided a 
legal status to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and an expansion of QMV into areas 
previously covered by unanimous voting. The treaty caused an existential crisis as rejections 
emerged from France and the Netherlands, subsequently placing a question mark over the 
direction of EI (McCormick, 2011: 125) and the EU’s very foundations (Best, 2005: 180). 
Conversely, ‘crisis diversity’ dominated as the EU not only continued to operate but 
reinvigorated the EU policy process, despite this lack of institutional confidence.  
The enlargement of the EU continued with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
(January 2007) and negotiations restarted to create a replacement treaty as “despite some 
national leaders’ serious misgivings about the Constitutional Treaty, no government stood in 
the way of relaunching the negotiations on treaty reform” (Dinan, 2010a: 151). A consensus 
emerged between member states and EU officials to substitute the constitutional elements 
for reformist aspects in the treaty (Nugent, 2010: 75). Ultimately, the Lisbon Treaty reformed 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Maastricht Treaty. For many the 
Lisbon Treaty was the Constitutional Treaty, “by other means and with a different name” 
(McCormick, 2011: 126).  
Many measures were consolidated under the Lisbon Treaty including The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which became law for a second time, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and issues of immigration and asylum became decided 
under QMV, while regional policy was consolidated under the co-decision procedure. With the 
European Court of Human Rights becoming an official institution, the Lisbon Treaty permitted 
the EU to ratify agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. On the one 
hand, the EU was gaining constitutional, state-like characteristics and a “legal personality” 
(McCormick, 2011: 144) despite the lack of a constitutional treaty and/or agreement. On the 
other hand, these characteristics were arguably only in appearance and not in substance 
(Nugent, 2010: 84).  
                                                          
61 Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Cyprus, Malta, Poland and Estonia. 
However, initially only Britain, Ireland and Sweden opened their borders. A month before enlargement 
a new Directive (2004/38/C) was created, consolidating all legislation on freedom of movement of EU 
nationals and their families, limiting the grounds on which entry or residence in a state could be denied. 
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Ireland was the only member state legally obliged to hold a national referendum on 
the treaty. The Irish initially rejected the treaty with the decision only reversed by the onset 
of the 2008 economic crisis which acted as a catalyst, steering Ireland towards the “relatively 
safe port” (Dinan, 2010a: 154) of the Eurozone.  
 Phase 4: Crisis and Consolidation (2008-Present Day) 
The euro crisis struck the EU in 2009, plunging Europe into its familiar surroundings of 
economic crisis and an unprecedented (youth) unemployment crisis, begetting a “twin 
economic and social crisis” (Segol, 2014) which EU officials “managed one month to another” 
(BBC News, June 2013). This provided the flexibility for the continuance of active and 
innovative policy consolidation. Once more, the EU operated as normal despite the euro crisis. 
Notably, despite the crisis, EU social policy continued functioning within the same parameters 
as it had in the 1950s. Its unique regulatory structure, namely possessing minimal finances, 
meant the financial crisis in economic policy circumvented social policy. The different policy 
structures culminated in different consequences from the euro crisis. The only change was 
that inadequate finances were now an EU-wide phenomenon rather than being confined to 
EU social policy.  
The first of the core parameters which were evident in the crisis was the dependency 
of social policy on economic policy. The unprecedented (youth) unemployment crisis was 
eventually only addressed with haste due to the associated economic costs, which the 
European Council totalled at “1.21% of the EU's GDP” (European Council, 2013), rather than 
being addressed as the unprecedented crisis that it was. Economic policy had not divorced 
itself entirely from those areas impinging on economic growth as the unemployment crisis 
represented a significant challenge to economic recovery.   
The reciprocal dependency of economic policy on social policy was laid bare from the 
very beginning of the euro crisis as adjustments to improve economic conditions were focused 
and dependent on social policy at the national level. As a condition of the economic bailouts 
to redress economic deficits, member states were forced to implement significant social cuts 
within workers’ wages, public spending on social services and, in some member states, public 
ownership (Busch et al., 2013: 7-25). Even those states outside the Eurozone, such as Britain, 
had to redress their deficits through cuts in welfare provision. Social policy was once again the 
EU’s fall guy in a state of economic crisis.  
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 EU social policy also remained an EU construct but nationally contingent. Arguably this 
national contingency intensified within the euro crisis as a German response rather than an 
EU response emanated. This is reflected in the fact that many member states attributed their 
social problems to Germany rather than the EU because of Germany’s focus and endorsement 
of austerity rather than growth62 (see Chapter 4) when uploading their national model to the 
EU level (Aljazeera, July 2013). Policy innovation occurred as “the crisis facilitated a policy 
development in the social field” (Interview 6, March 2015) with the launch of the Social 
Investment Package for Growth and Social Cohesion (SIP) (February 2013). This was the first 
social response to the euro crisis, arguably constituting “a quiet paradigm revolution” 
(Hemerijck, 2014). Laszlo Andor stated “social investment is key if we want to emerge from 
the crisis stronger, more cohesive and more competitive” (EC Press Release, 2013a).  
 However, it has since been shown that the SIP is not translating into national welfare 
policy with “little evidence of [an] enhanced SI [social investment] orientation in LMPs [Labour 
Market Programmes]” although similar reforms were implemented within established welfare 
states (Bengtssona et al., 2017: 384). However, with the crisis rendering “core social policies 
at the EU level completely unrealistic” (Grahl and Teague, 2013: 686), the EU has few options 
but to remain nationally contingent. Arguably due to the crisis, national governments are now 
positioned “like company CEOs, responsible for turning their citizens into the most productive 
workers for the sake of export-led growth” (Tsoukala, 2013: 76). 
Diverging from previous (economic) crises, economic policy crowded out social policy 
issues to take centre stage of the crisis as the euro/Eurozone became in danger of collapse. 
Respectively, social policy was further relegated and overshadowed by economic policy as 
“the social policy question [was] seen exclusively from the standpoint of the coordination of 
economic policies” (Pochet and Degryse, 2013: 113). Social policy’s legitimising role was 
similarly demoted as the crisis response required policy activity which was detrimental to the 
ESM (Busch et al., 2013; Regan, 2012; Crespy and Menz, 2015; Hacker, 2013; Hermann, 2017; 
Vaughan-Whitehead, 2015), namely a policy of austerity.  
However, out of this latent period of ‘crisis progression’ has come the beginnings of 
‘crisis diversity’ with arguments that the euro crisis is affording and pushing the argument for 
a “renewed and strengthened social policy”, specifically “a social union” (Grahl and Teague, 
2013: 678). Thus, social policy’s legitimising role has become revived with many 
                                                          
62 76% in German; 56.5% in Spain; and 59.2% in Greece blamed Germany (Aljazeera, July 2013). 
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acknowledging that new (social) measures and mechanisms are required to provide stability 
to the crisis-ridden Eurozone. These suggestions comprise of: an employment programme in 
the absence of a fully fledged EU welfare state (Grahl and Teague, 2013); an unemployment 
benefit scheme for the Eurozone (Andor and Pasimeni, 2016); a strengthening of the ESM 
(Pochet and Degryse, 2013); an updated EMU criteria to account for the social dimension 
(Porte and Heins, 2016b); and, “a macro-economic demand stabilisation device that 
incentivises Member States to pursue supply side social investment reforms in sync” 
(Hemerijck, 2014). 
Additionally, social policy is viewed as the means to ensure that economic reforms are 
efficient and successful by securing “effective convergence of economic performance within 
the monetary union” (Grahl and Teague, 2013: 689). With social policy’s legitimising role 
ascending, the single market is now being relegated to a means to an end rather than the end 
itself so to provide a new social purpose for the EU. Specifically, this new social purpose would 
entail guaranteeing “the welfare of European populations…[which] could be effectively 
signalled by the adoption of an ambitious and solidaristic social policy” (Grahl and Teague, 
2013: 689).   
Policy consolidation continued to dominate63 as the principal crisis initiative, Europe 
202064 (2010) resembled the Lisbon Strategy in all respects but name. Although Lisbon 
ultimately failed, some scholars believe it succeeded in providing a social dynamic at the EU 
level (Daly, 2006; Porte et al., 2011) by incorporating areas of national competence into EU 
strategies. Responsibility for 2020’s success was shared between EU institutions, member 
states, as well as the social partners. Hence, the 1980s emphasis on the ‘social dialogue’ was 
re-introduced thirty-three years after its inception and first implementation. Policy methods 
were also consolidated with the use of the OMC retained and expanded65.  
The overdue response to the youth unemployment crisis merely comprised of a 
recycled structural reform. The European Youth Guarantee (2013) was a new social innovation 
however, one previously used in the 1980s, funded through the ESF. Rather than creating 
                                                          
63 Comparing Hix and Hoyland’s (2011) most up to date list of the recent developments within areas of 
social policy to aforementioned list by Geyer (2000) demonstrates how consolidation has been the 
name of the date with many overlapping policy areas. 
64 For a critique of the social elements in Europe 2020 see Daly (2012) and Armstrong (2012). 
65 There are those who view the OMC as creating a sphere of influence for the EU within national social 
policy (Carmel, 2003; Thorlakson, 2011; Schelkle, 2003; Savio and Palola, 2004; Atkinson, 2002) and 
those who claim the OMC is insignificant to EU social policy’s development (O’Connor, 2005a and 
2005b; Daley, 2006; Chalmers and Lodge, 2003; Atkinson, 2002).  
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policy responses, with economic policy taking precedence, the EC encouraged young 
jobseekers to “consider taking advantage of freedom of movement for workers to see what 
employment possibilities exist where the situation is better and the grass — or the map — is 
greener” (EC Press Release, 2013c).  
There were no funds devoted to social policy during the euro crisis period despite 
social policy’s unprecedented (youth) unemployment crisis. While the EU claimed to provide 
an extra €6 billion through the new Youth Employment Initiative (February 2013), in reality, as 
one interviewee reported, “there was no additional overall funding at an EU level” (Interview 
18, February 2016). Rather it was “a reallocation of existing resources towards youth” (ibid). 
Hence, social policy remained devoid of money even at a time of, reportedly, existential crisis. 
Ultimately, EU social policy has minimal finances at the EU level and the crisis is of a 
financial nature. Hence the diversity of the EU’s structure, with social policy’s structure being 
vastly different to economic policy, has meant social policy remains unaffected with the 
context of its operation unaffected. In the absence of a uniformed structure no ‘domino’ 
effect, ‘crisis progression’, can occur. EU policymakers had to learn to do more with less, for 
EU social policy this has always been a necessity.  
PART II: National Social Policy and the History of Revitalisation 
Britain 
 Phase 1: Initial Activity (1940s-1970s) 
 Contrasting to EU social policy, “the key building blocks” (Ellison and Pierson, 2003: 6) 
of the British welfare state were established during a period of unprecedented crisis and hyper 
policy activity with the experience of war time accelerating the development of national social 
policy. The Beveridge report (1942) marked “a distinct change of gear in the progress of British 
social policy” (Miller, 1999: 20) creating a blueprint for the British welfare state and “providing 
the main direction of social security” (Hill, 1993: 8). The report concurred with the pre-war 
Fabian Society (1884) which viewed the state’s role in providing welfare services an “essential, 
and inevitable, development” (Alcock, 2008: 4). Clement Attlee’s Labour government followed 
this blueprint, subsequently establishing a comprehensive ‘cradle to the grave’ system (Evans 
and Williams, 2012: 3). 
 An economic debate over social policy instigated as early as the 1940s as a significant 
increase in public expenditure was viewed as a product of parallel economic growth (Miller, 
1999: 26). A political divide emerged over the economic viability of the welfare state. 
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Analogous to EU social policy, the Conservatives viewed the welfare state as a necessity for 
economic and social cohesion, “a compensation for the areas of economic and social life 
where the free market did not deliver” (Fraser, 2009: 289). Thus, national social policy also 
possessed a legitimising role for the continuing development of economic policy. 
Contrastingly, Labour viewed the welfare state as a citizen right which facilitated (equal) 
access to further rights (Sullivan, 1996: 88), the success of social policy was contingent upon 
economic growth. Hence, social policy was not devoid of money at the national level, rather it 
was dependent upon it. 
 Out of economic necessity, Britain joined the EU as a period of protracted recession 
encouraged the state to pool its sovereignty. Economic crises influenced rather than 
determined national economic and social policy (Sullivan, 1996: 56). However, with Britain 
possessing a comprehensive welfare state and a correspondingly extensive role for the state, 
EU social policy was rendered a supporting role to varying degrees, namely depending on the 
political party in power. Britain had joined out of economic necessity, not social necessity. 
Respectively, the advancement of EU social policy would be largely rejected by Britain who did 
not want the state dictated to in managing its social affairs.  
 Phase 2: Recession and Resistance (1970s-Early 1990s) 
  Britain initially interacted positively with EU social policy as Edward Heath, PM at the 
time, attempted to bring “tangible benefits” (George, 1998: 69) from EU membership. 
However, with the onset of the oil crisis and Britain’s selective Europeanism (May, 1999: 54) 
the jurisdiction over social policy rapidly became a ‘tug of war’ as the EU attempted to create 
a sphere of autonomy at the national level. This started with Heath’s obstruction to a common 
energy policy coupled with disagreement over the size and distribution of the ERDF. While the 
economic crisis had fostered a favourable environment for EU social policy to develop, it 
created a hostile environment for EU-member state relations hence creating a period of ‘crisis 
progression’ as ‘eurosclerosis’ ensued.  
The election of Margaret Thatcher signified “a radical turning point in the British 
welfare state” (Evans and Williams, 2012: 1), with an emphasis on individual responsibility, 
and a “sudden and dramatic shift in approach” (Evans and Williams, 2012: 9) to Britain’s 
relationship with EU social policy. Thatcher wanted the state to be autonomous in its actions 
with no external interference, relegating EU social policy’s secondary role to non-existent. 
Respectively, Thatcher assented to the SEA on account of her interpretation of the treaty 
setting limits on EI. Thatcher also endorsed Delors for a second term as the European 
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Commission Chief, a move she would come to regret, as the development of the EU’s social 
dimension accelerated under his tenure.  
Delors ambitions were revealed with the announcement to the EP; “in ten years, 80 
per cent of economic legislation – and perhaps tax and social legislation – will be dictated from 
the Community” (May, 1999: 74). Thatcher dismissed these comments by Delors as “over the 
top” (Gowland et al., 2010: 110). Delors became favoured amongst the trade unions, 
Thatcher’s arch enemies, by virtue of his claim in a speech to the Trade Union Confederation 
(TUC) (September 1988) that a single market was impossible without a common social policy, 
through which the interests of workers needed protecting. Thatcher responded, in her famous 
Bruges speech, asserting that the government had not “rolled back the frontiers of the state 
in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state 
exercising a new dominance from Brussels” (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1988).  
The Social Charter garnered further support from the trade unions, elevating Delors 
into the “surrogate champion for the British worker” (Gowland et al., 2010: 112), and further 
opposition from Thatcher who contested the charters position under QMV, denouncing it as 
Marxist and a “creeping back-door [for] Socialism” (Gowland et al., 2010: 110). Delors became 
the paradoxical figure of national inspiration and threat to national sovereignty. It is debatable 
how far the succeeding administration under PM John Major was a continuation or break from 
Thatcherism as the only means by which Major could unite his government was through a 
mutual opposition to EU social policy, thereby continuing Thatcher’s antagonism to EU social 
policy.  
Accordingly, Britain secured an opt-out from the Social Charter in the Maastricht 
Treaty forcing the formation of the social protocol. ‘Crisis progression’ was being actively 
harnessed to keep EU social policy out of the British social model and in an attempt to shape 
a limited EU social policy, as Britain desired. The European economic crisis spread 
mechanically, as a period of ‘crisis progression’ embedded arresting the normal operation of 
national politics, and by implication national policy responses. ‘Black Wednesday’, the day 
Britain exited the ERM, caused opt-outs from Maastricht to subsequently become viewed as 
warning signs and dangers of the wider treaty (Baker et al., 1994: 38). Correspondingly, the 
economic crisis spilled over and transformed into a national political crisis. Euroscepetics 
resistance to Britain’s participation in Maastricht extended to EU membership.  
Contrastingly, Labour was in favour of greater participation in Maastricht, claiming the 
“double opt-out” from the EMU and Social Charter rendered Britain a “semi-detached 
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member of the Community” (Geroge, 1998: 244). This led to a “parliamentary siege” (Baker et 
al., 1994) over the ratification of Maastricht, which became the longest ratification process in 
history. By implication, the Eurosceptics had seemingly been successful in constraining the 
future actions of the government who “would certainly not dare to bring any new treaty 
before Parliament that furthered European integration” (Baker et al., 1994: 47). EU policy 
progress was arresting national policy responses to the economic crisis and causing significant 
fractures within the political landscape. Notably, this dispute led to the creation of the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), as Nigel Farage absconded from the party in protest.  
Nonetheless, ‘crisis diversity’ continued in the background as EU social policy 
revitalised national social policy with Major borrowing concepts from the EU level and applying 
Thatcher’s logic to it, as reflected in the Citizens Charter within public services and Patients 
Charter within the National Health Service (NHS). The EU’s strategy of increasing female 
participation also served to revitalise and reinforce the national trajectory of social policy. 
Major was simultaneously encouraging young and single mothers off benefits into 
employment. To this end, Major had enacted the 1993 EU directive which stipulated maternity 
provision had to be made for female workers, including part-time workers, when commencing 
employment. 
Major had also abolished the Wage Councils in 1993 and increased the age of 
retirement for women, a proposal previously opposed by Thatcher. However, further changes 
by the EU went beyond a supportive role for the nation state. This led the then Employment 
Secretary, Michael Portillo, to resist EU policy progress relating to changes in parental and 
paternity leave in 1994 on the grounds that it would restrict competition and, more 
importantly, such matters were private matters between employee and employer 
(Glennerster, 2007: 214). Thus, continuing Major’s defence of workplace regulation. However, 
Major did assent to the EC’s Working Time Directive after successfully negotiating an opt-out 
for those employees who wanted to work longer hours. 
 Phase 3: Revitalisation and Innovation (Mid-1990s -2007) 
  After a period of protracted ‘crisis progression’, with difficult economic and political 
relations with the EU, “a moment of good matching” (Interview 11, April 2015) ensued with 
the election of Tony Blair’s New Labour Party. Blair’s tenure embodied a significant period of 
‘crisis diversity’ as a new relationship with EU social policy emerged. EU membership and EU 
proposals were viewed as an opportunity rather than a threat (Gowland et al., 2010: 144), in 
opposition to the Conservative party’s policy. Blair simultaneously revitalised the seemingly 
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out of date British welfare state and equally out of date ESM, reconciling the competing 
pursuits of economic and social prosperity at both governance levels. On account of New 
Labour’s new interpretation of EU social policy, Britain actively shaped EU social policy from 
within the EU.  
Subsequently, employment policy became the core of both national and EU social 
policy. At the national level, the Blair administration was influenced by the new Commission 
on Social Justice which concluded the welfare state should be a “springboard to success not a 
road to dependency” (Fraser, 2009: 314), therefore placing employment at its centre. 
Additionally, after adopting the EU’s focus on social exclusion despite its notable absence from 
Labour’s election manifesto (The Economist, December 1997), work became viewed as the 
“inclusive cement of society” (Glennerster, 2007: 223) in tackling social exclusion. At the EU 
level, Blair’s rhetoric of the importance for Britain to be at the core of the EU for its “influence, 
strength and power in the world” (Stephens, 2001: 68) resonated with a minority of states 
leading Britain to gain allies in Spain, Portugal and Italy. 
Britain and its new allies attained a commitment from EU states to create the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy, through this employment centred social 
policy approach, as a role reversal ensued with Britain leading EU social policy under the rubric 
of the Lisbon Strategy. Hence, the Lisbon Strategy “stood as a powerful symbol of the direction 
in which the Blair government wanted the EU to move” (Gowland et al., 2010: 148). In fitting 
with the vision of Delors, Blair actively encouraged EU social policy to shadow the policy 
development of the single market throughout the British presidency in 2005. Thus, under Blair 
Britain became transformed from “a marginalised outsider to an active participant in EU social 
policy” (Thorklakson, 2011: 273).  
Blair was able to influence and create a “non-threatening European social policy 
model” (Thorklakson, 2011: 273) by virtue of the new OMC, derived from the EES. This 
safeguarded national sovereignty in conjunction with non-binding EU proposals, thereby de-
politicising EU social policy.  Under the Amsterdam Treaty, Blair drove ‘crisis diversity’ further 
reversing Britain’s opt-out from the social protocol which subsequently became embedded 
within the main body of the treaty, hence further integrating and facilitating the policy 
progress of EU social policy. QMV was subsequently extended, albeit with the retention of 
national vetos, with member states now pledging to coordinate employment policy, 
“particularly promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce” (May, 1999: 89).  
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This commitment to a common employment strategy reinforced and revitalised the 
policy efforts at the national level, and enabled the EU “to overcome many of the earlier 
antagonisms between its economic and social dimensions and forge a new policy framework” 
(Geyer et al., 2005: 78). Blair announced to the Westminster Parliament that “for the first time 
in a decade Britain is setting a positive agenda for Europe” (May, 1999: 89). The EES was 
analogous to the national strategy designated for modernising the welfare state, hence it 
could be argued that “despite a history of opposition to European employment initiatives, 
adapting to the EES has been easy for the British” (Geyer et al., 2005: 69).  
Respectively there is much debate over the impact of the EES on British employment 
policy with a divide between those who claim it has had a limited impact (Geyer et al., 2005; 
Mailand, 2008; Ardy and Umbach, 2004; MacPhail, 2010) and those who claim an impact has 
occurred, albeit subtly (Jacobsson, 2004; Heidenreich and Bishoff, 2008). The only consistency 
between the Conservative and New Labour administrations was Britain’s opt-out from 
immigration initiatives, with an opt-out from the Schengen agreement and a guarantee that 
the state would retain control over its borders as the freedom of movement advanced under 
the treaty. Both Britain and Ireland were treated as special cases due to their island statuses 
(Gowland et al., 2010: 149). 
For Britain, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and subsequent formation of the 
Lisbon Treaty placed uncertainty around the legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU. This was despite Britain negotiating a special protocol which stated the charter did 
not extend the powers of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or create "justiciable rights 
applicable to the United Kingdom” (BBC News, July 2007). 
 Phase 4: Crisis and National Resistance (2008 – Present Day) 
The parliamentary debate continued despite the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Westminster launched a report into the implications for the legal status of the Charter, 
concluding the Charter was legally superior to national law in those areas which fell within the 
remit of EU law, and created no new rights or new EU competences (House of Commons, 
2014a). Arguably, while Blair had been partially successful in making his case in Europe for 
Britain, he had failed to make Europe’s case in Britain (Stephens, 2001: 67). ‘Crisis diversity’ 
continued as David Cameron, the new PM of the first coalition government since the Second 
World War in 2010, continued New Labour’s participation in the EU’s strategy to increase the 




Maternity leave was extended from its position under New Labour, comprising of an 
entitlement to twelve months leave with the first fourteen weeks assigned to the mother and 
the rest could be either divided, or simultaneously taken, between the two parents (March 
2008). However, unlike New Labour, the Conservatives under Cameron encouraged the father 
more than the mother to take more leave after the birth of their child (Williams and Scott, 
2011: 517). There were numerous employment and social rights which could not be removed 
by the new government because they were embedded within EU law because of the opt-in to 
the Social Chapter and implementation of the Working Time Directive (Grimshaw and Rubery 
2012: 109-113).   
With the onset of the financial crisis, at the national level a “unique opportunity” 
emerged for Cameron to lead the Conservatives to “implement radical changes in the welfare 
state which both the Thatcher and Major governments shied away from” (Page, 2010: 13). 
Thus, many critics claimed the Conservatives non-state and non-market strategy of the ‘Big 
Society’ (Alcock, 2010; Kisby, 2010; Smith, 2010; Evans, 2011; Scott, 2011; Jordan, 2010; 
Norman, 2010; Glasman, 2010; Pattie and Johnston, 2011; Teasdale et al., 2012) was a cover 
for big spending cuts and a decline in public services (Kisby, 2010). Ultimately, national social 
policy was the fall guy in an economic crisis.  
At the EU level, a parallel opportunity emerged for Cameron to revisit the days of 
Thatcher and Major. With the euro in crisis, EU social policy was interpreted once again as a 
threat to the state. Thus, ‘crisis progression’ was once again harnessed to keep EU social policy 
out of the national social model and render EU social policy non-existent, this time through 
intensifying the national contingency of EU social policy. Cameron’s Europe speech (2013) 
outlined this strategy of containment, claiming,  
“power must be able to flow back to Member States, not just away from them…let us 
use this moment, as the Dutch Prime Minister has recently suggested, to examine 
thoroughly what the EU as a whole should do and should stop doing” (BBC News, 
January 2013).  
Ultimately, this challenge to EU competences centred on the principle of free 
movement as the EU’s encouragement of workers to utilise free movement was poorly 
received in Britain. As consecutive economies faltered, fears grew in Britain that there would 
be an influx of Irish, Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese citizens in search of employment and a 
better life should the European economy disintegrate (The Telegraph, November 2010e). As 
the crisis gained momentum and the euro was seemingly teetering on the brink of collapse, it 
144 
 
was reported within British media that the state was heading for a “migration meltdown” (The 
Daily Mail, March 2014). Furthermore, that the Home Office was drawing up emergency plans 
in reaction to the potential break-up to manage the imminent influx of “euro-immigrants” (The 
Independent, May 2012) from the “stricken economies” (BBC News, May 2012) of the south, 
who would be attracted to Britain on the basis of its non-Eurozone status. 
With the intensification of the Greek crisis and discussions over a possible ‘Grexit’ a 
particular concern emerged over Greek citizens coming to Britain. Cameron explicitly stated 
that he would prohibit Greek citizens’ free movement to the country, subsequently rejecting 
Britain’s treaty obligations, claiming “the legal powers are available if there are particular 
stresses and strains” and he was “prepared to do whatever it takes to keep our country safe, 
to keep our banking system strong, to keep our economy robust” (The Guardian, July 2012). 
These concerns over a tidal wave of EU nationals to Britain’s shores created further concerns 
over the EU’s control of domestic policies, particularly immigration policy, as ‘crisis 
progression’ resurfaced with the economic crisis spilling over into a political crisis once more. 
These concerns were exacerbated as the restrictions placed upon accession states 
Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 terminated on 31st December 2013. At a time of economic crisis 
the state had to reduce public expenditure and British citizens were finding it difficult to attain 
employment. In this context, the acceptance of other member states accessing public services 
and jobs was received with public and political hostility from those on the right who were 
chiming the familiar calls for the withdrawal of Britain from the EU.  
Respectively, ‘crisis diversity’ was borne out of ‘crisis progression’ as a debate over the 
principle of free movement dominated British politics during the crisis period fostering policy 
innovation as various suggestions emerged from the disarray of the economic crisis. However, 
‘crisis progression’ was once again harnessed. This time, rather than keeping EU social policy 
out of the national social model, suggestions were made to remove EU social policy from the 
British social model altogether. This was due to the conditions fostered by the economic crisis 
influencing national social policy and an opportunity arising to constrain a now substantial 
body of EU social policy, as Britain desired. Labour supported the government’s insistence on 
reforms over the free movement of labour but not the principle itself while additionally 
insisting that reform occur within rather than outside of the EU (The Daily Mail, November 
2014). This issue with free movement will be fully explored in Chapter 6. 
A second challenge to EU competency emerged with the implementation of the EU 
Youth Guarantee. The British government was the only member state to oppose the EU’s 
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Youth Guarantee (House of Lords, 2014b: 32-33). It was unclear whether this was due to 
familiar Euroscepticism or concerns over the approach (House of Lords, 2014b: 33). The 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills supported the government’s position, claiming 
there was already “a clear strategy for supporting young people into work” (DBIS, 2013: 23). 
Additionally, they advised the EU Internal Market, Infrastructure and Employment Sub-
committee against Britain implementing the EU’s Youth Guarantee asserting that the initiative 
was “likely to reduce the number of opportunities and the diversity of the opportunities 
available for young people” (House of Lords, 2014a: 189).  
They claimed there was a risk that “any attempt to impose a one-size-fits-all approach 
to traineeships would constrain employers from offering young people work placements” 
(House of Lords, 2014a: 189). Contrastingly, the TUC were not supportive of the government’s 
decision with a senior policy officer arguing that the only reason for the government’s 
opposition was “that it was not invented here [in the UK]” (House of Lords, 2014b: 33). 
Another witness maintained, the “Youth Guarantee should be seen as an opportunity not an 
imposition” (ibid). The House of Lords concluded, based on the evidence, that the Youth 
Guarantee was vastly different to the Youth Contract with the national initiative addressing 
longer-term structural issues around entry-level positions, while the new EU initiative 
contended with the increase in youth unemployment since the financial crisis struck in 2008 
(House of Lords, 2014b: 35-36). 
Hence, the House of Lords was “not convinced by the UK Government’s argument that 
the Youth Contract meets the aims of a Youth Guarantee” (House of Lords, 2014b: 35). The 
Lords advised the government to reconsider and pilot the EU’s Youth Guarantee within those 
areas eligible for EU funding (ibid). Despite these recommendations and the government 
producing a Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan (March 2014), which the EC condemned 
as being “very limited”, and pilots taking place in Croydon, Hartlepool and Pembrokeshire 
(House of Commons, 2015: 159), Britain remained without the EU Youth Guarantee (EC, 2017). 
While the EU resisted national changes to the principle of free movement, so Britain had 
returned to its familiar position of resisting EU changes to national employment policy, 
ensuring the state’s role was not superseded. In the context of economic crisis, revitalisation 




 Phase 1: Inactivity of the Free State (1930s-1970s) 
Ireland’s indirect involvement in the First World War and abstaining from the Second 
World War meant minimal impact on the national social system and social policy, culminating 
in a minimal role for the state, in the absence of experiencing total war, and a lack of social 
pressure for change in the context of an agrarian, small farming economy. Accordingly, the 
role of women within the home persisted longer than in Britain. This was compounded by the 
1930s depression which led to constraints on women’s access to employment in order to 
protect male employment and reduce the high rate of unemployment (Considine and 
Dukelow, 2009: 33). The state’s lack of finances compounded its marginalisation, leading to a 
partnership of convenience with the Catholic Church which subsequently attained jurisdiction 
over social policy (Fahey, 2007: 146-147). 
The church cemented its dominance through the principle of subsidiarity66 which 
stated that only once “the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted” (Esping-
Anderson, 1990: 27) could the state interfere. Respectively, the Beveridge report, with its 
blueprint for the first ever welfare state, “made shock waves around the world, no more so 
than in Ireland” (Burke, 1999: 28), with placing in stark contrast the underdeveloped Irish 
system (Considine and Dukelow, 2009: 41). As a result, health became a government priority 
leading to a radical proposal for the incremental development of a universal health system. 
However, due to the social and cultural context of Ireland, proposals such as The Mother and 
Child Scheme (1951) failed to gain political traction. The scheme was severely “out of tune 
with the ideology of the day” (Burke, 1999: 28), providing free health care to pregnant or 
nursing mothers and children up to the age of sixteen-years-old (Lee, 1989: 313-322; Millar 
2003).  
During a parliamentary debate over the Health Bill, the Minister for Health 
emphasised how the government was not accepting responsibility for providing free health 
services for all (Adshead and Millar, 2003: 13). These characteristics were to dominate Irish 
social policy’s development, namely a minimal role for the state, economic policy’s dictation 
of social policy’s expansion and a lack of national demand for social policy. Instead, demand 
for national social policy emerged from EU membership. On entry to the EC Ireland assented 
to the equal pay for men and women within the Treaty of Rome. Despite the ECJ’s judgement 
                                                          
66 Origins in Catholic Church social teachings in the publication of the papal encyclical Quadragesimo 
Anno (1931) (Considine and Dukelow, 2009: 30). 
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that the equal pay article did not include that of the state’s social welfare payments, the Irish 
welfare system was interconnected to employment hence a change in one rendered an 
adjustment within the other (Cousins, 1995: 98). Thus, Ireland changed its constitutional law 
to provide primacy to EU law within matters of employment and social welfare (Finnegan and 
McCarron, 2000: 167).  
Predictably, this was rapidly challenged as Ireland’s trade unions picketed against the 
hiring of women. Nevertheless, the court upheld the right to earn a living without 
discrimination and deemed it to be a right protected by the Irish constitution (see Murtaugh 
Properties Ltd v. Cleary). The EC’s supplementary equal pay directive provided Irish women 
and the numerous women’s movements a powerful ally, the EC, who they could rely on when 
facing national resistance. 
 Phase 2: “The False Dawn”67 (1970s-Early 1990s) 
  Ireland’s persistently high unemployment levels and poor economic conditions post-
independence meant entry to the EU was a “natural ending” (O’Mahony, 2004: 16) to the 
reorientation of Irish social policy. The demand for a comprehensive welfare state remained 
notably absent. Contrastingly to Britain, Ireland joined enthusiastically in 1973, participating 
within European economic and social integration. Ireland was “uniquely susceptible to [the] 
Europeanization effect because of the nation-wide consensus of opinion in favour of EU 
membership” (Adshead, 2005: 162). Mcaleese and Matthews (1987: 40) argue membership 
made no difference to Ireland during the 1980s, however the succeeding evidence would 
suggest otherwise.  
 With a lack of national demand for social policy, the EU instantaneously became the 
driving force for national social policy as revitalisation initially occurred in one direction. The 
decision to join the European Monetary System had also been driven by the EC’s financial 
support to weaker states (Keatinge, 1991: 78). Subsequently, Ireland was initially a “taker 
rather than a shaper” of EU policy as the state became a net beneficiary of the ESF and ERDF 
(Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008: 257). Ireland received “twice as much from the EU budget than 
it [had] put in” since 1973 (Dedman, 2010: 178). In line with Britain, the state disagreed over 
the size and distribution of the ERDF, namely advocating for a larger ERDF but ultimately 
received only 6% of the funding (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008: 37).   
                                                          
67 (Considine and Dukelow, 2009: 51) 
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 Nonetheless, EU officials within the ESF modernised Irish approaches to vocational 
training providing a “new voice to the domestic system of policy-making” and “a critical role 
in Irish development” (Laffan and O’Mahoney, 2008: 260). During the 1980s, Ireland 
experienced significant economic difficulties facing an unprecedented recession which 
brought “some of the most serious of the setbacks encountered” with high levels of 
emigration, unemployment at 18% and national debt at 125% of GNP (Crotty, 2002: 4). The 
state was threatened with an IMF bailout and three elections were held from 1980 to 1982. 
Hence, with Ireland financially challenged to immediately implement EC social policy the 
government, in conjunction with the Federation Union of Employers, requested exemption 
from the EC’s equality directives68.  
 While the exemption request was unsuccessful in relation to equal pay, leading to the 
introduction of the Anti-Discrimination Act (1974), an exemption of six years was successfully 
attained in regard to equality in access to employment (1976) including access to vocational 
training and equal working conditions, and equal treatment in social security (1979)69. 
Although the Dáil (Parliament) passed the Employment Equality Act (1977) ensuring 
constitutional law was aligned to EU law in permitting access regardless of gender or marital 
status (Finnegan and McCarron, 2000: 167). The exemption was based on financial grounds 
and the composition of the Irish social system (Cousins, 1995: 105). Ironically, this came at a 
significant cost as the state was obliged to pay £60 million to over 40,000 married women 
(Cousins, 1995: 27) after a combination of campaigning by interest groups and legal action 
being threatened from the EC (see Carberry v. The Minister for Social Welfare; Tate v. Minister 
for Social Welfare; Cotter and McDermott v. Minister for Social Welfare, Emmott v. Minister 
for Social Welfare70). 
 However, transitional payments were excluded and discrimination towards women 
was readily maintained as Ireland retained its dependency based approach rather than 
adopting an individualisation of welfare benefits (Cousins, 1995: 105). Additionally, while the 
EC acted as a catalyst for the incremental introduction of equality within the labour market 
and social security system, this largely impacted women already participating within the 
labour market and created a negligible impact within social security (Cousins, 1995: 99; 
Cousins, 2005: 125; O’Mahony, 2004: 20; Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008: 38-39). Economic policy 
                                                          
68 See Badger (2009: 66-92) for the development of equal opportunities and the expansion of them 
under successive ECJ rulings. 
69 See Cousins (1995: 94-106).   
70 See Whyte (2002). 
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dictated social policy as ‘crisis progression’ ensued, forcing the state to provide equality at the 
lowest common denominator. Ireland had a “welfare society”71 (Conroy, 1999: 45) rather than 
a comprehensive welfare state. 
 However, a period of ‘crisis diversity’ emerged from this initial episode of ‘crisis 
progression’. Social policy’s progress continued as the 1980s recession coincided with the two-
fold increase in structural funds to poorer states which stipulated that EC funds had to be 
matched at the national level, subsequently fostering a larger increase in public investment 
than otherwise would have been pursued (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008: 42). Additionally, a 
significant shift also occurred from an annual project based approach to a multi-annual 
programming approach (Quinn, 2010: 109). The EC stipulated the production of four yearly 
National Development Plans (NDP) and twelve programmes comprising the Community 
Support Framework (CSF). This created the environment necessary for a change in the national 
governance approach (Adshead, 2008: 67). 
 This new approach required “institutional innovation rather than adaptation” due to 
the lack of institutional structures for regional development within Ireland (Quinn, 2010: 120). 
This was a facet of national underdevelopment and the EC’s structural funds encouraging 
national rather than regional development (Quinn, 2010: 107). New monitoring committees, 
comprising of trade unions and a range of organisations from the business sphere to the 
voluntary sector, introduced social partnership72 as “a key principle in the management and 
delivery” (Adshead and McInerney, 2009: 1) of regional policy. This was fitting for a state 
espousing a minimal role for the government. The 1980s economic crisis had left a political 
vacuum, created by tensions between employers and trade unions, subsequently creating 
“new institutional spaces” where social partnership could establish (O’Rain, 2008: 182). 
 EC developments combined with the economic crisis to accelerate both the 
modernization of Ireland (Rush, 1999: 161) and “the process of embedding the national in the 
European, and the European in the national” (O’Donnell, 2000: 3-4). However, social 
partnership had a narrow focus on regional policy and served economic growth objectives, 
hence national social policy suffered under social partnership. The EC’s expanded employment 
policy also greatly impacted on Ireland, benefiting the majority of citizens through the 
                                                          
71 “one where people recognize responsibilities towards each other in the first instance. The role of the 
state is to provide services for and between themselves, to facilitate local employment, local services 
and local participation” (Conroy, 1999: 45). 
72 See House and McGrath, 2004; O’Donnell, 2008, 2001; Teague and Donaghey, 2009; Allen, 2000; 
Murphy 2002; Rush 1999; Roche, 2007. 
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adoption of the Social Charter (Rees, 2010: 94). However, Ireland, alongside Portugal, resisted 
harmonisation within employment policy, arguably in defence of the minor role the Irish state 
played. Ireland subsequently diluted several employment provisions, thus inhibiting a “binding 
instrument” (Teague and Grahl, 1991: 216) for minimum wage and definitive policy action 
(Teague and Grahl, 1991: 217).  
 The advent of the Celtic Tiger incrementally transformed Ireland from a net 
beneficiary to a net contributor (Bruyn, 2012: 94), rendering Ireland’s “long-standing strategy 
of ‘reaction’ to EU policy developments” obsolete within this new phase of European policy 
progress (O’Mahony, 2004: 30-31). Even with unprecedented economic prosperity, social 
inequality prospered constituting a significant missed opportunity (Interview 19, February 
2016; also see O’Connor, 2008: 183, Murphy, 2010). At this time, support for liberal legislation 
was growing as epitomised in the unanimous political support for permitting divorce in Ireland 
in the referendum of 1995 (Adshead, 1996: 140). This burgeoning liberalisation culminated in 
the election of Ireland’s first female President, Mary Robinson.  
 Some viewed her election as reflecting ongoing change towards a “modernising state” 
(Adshead, 1996: 141), while others viewed her election as representing “the potential for 
social change” (Considine and Dukelow, 2009: 69-70). However, what was not to be 
underestimated was the growing view of the importance of liberal values within Ireland which 
acted as a force for change (Adshead, 1996: 141). Despite such changes, the Maastricht Treaty 
presented a significant social challenge to Ireland’s stance towards abortion, which remained 
unaffected. Ireland secured a protocol within Maastricht which ensured the national 
constitutions Article 40.3.3 banning abortion would be secluded from EU liberalisation of 
abortion law.  
 However, the Supreme Court’s judgement in the ‘X Case’ (Attorney General v. X et al.) 
(1992) constituted an unprecedented liberal reading of Article 40.3.3, creating ambiguities 
over its interpretation and application. Both supporters and opponents of the anti-abortion 
amendments advocated for a vote against Maastricht on the grounds of the protection 
Maastricht provided the new liberal reading and the constraints it placed on information and 
travel for abortions respectively. Consequently, the ratification of Maastricht was delayed. 
Ireland ratified Maastricht with 69% voting yes on a 57% turnout (Dinan, 2005: 125) triggering 
constitutional amendments to Article 40.3.3 with the public passing two out of three. Abortion 
cases were now assessed on their individual characteristics.  
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 Phase 3: Reciprocal Revitalisation (Mid 1990s-2007) 
Policy development continued as the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in Ireland acted as a 
catalyst to address poverty once and for all, leading Ireland to reverse roles and revitalise the 
EU. Ireland utilised their experience from the EU Anti-Poverty Programmes (EAPP), namely the 
third anti-poverty programme (1989-94) where focus shifted “away from a simplistic concept 
of poverty to the more complex one of social exclusion” (Langford, 1999: 96). Hence, the EU’s 
approach to social policy stimulated Ireland’s adoption of the term and concept of social 
exclusion, thus revitalising Ireland’s strategy for addressing poverty (Considine and Dukelow, 
2009: 185). It is widely acknowledged that Ireland established and adopted the National Anti-
Poverty Strategy73 (NAPS) before the EU (Cousins, 2005: 126; O’Donnell and Moss, 2005: 315).  
Irish NAPS “represented the first attempt by any state to adopt an explicit strategy 
and set of targets against which progress towards reducing poverty could be monitored” 
(Adshead and McInerney, 2009: 7). They were an “extended model of social partnership”, 
comprising “a form of new governance” (Adshead and Millar 2008: 67). Ireland’s President 
Patrick Hillery, as EU Commissioner for Social Affairs, had been a prominent influence in the 
drafting of the EC’s first SAP which provided the foundations to the first EAPP (1975-80).  
Additionally, Ireland’s Combat Poverty Agency had informed many of the key 
European poverty and social exclusion reports (The Irish Times, August 2008). Accordingly, the 
state rapidly become renowned “as a constructive and fully committed member” (O’Mahony, 
2004: 18), providing a template for the EU in its approach to social exclusion (Considine and 
Dukelow, 2009: 73-74). The EU’s fourth anti-poverty programme was unenthusiastically 
received by most member states (Geyer, 2000: 162), with the programme entirely thwarted 
by German opposition. Germany claimed the EU was breaching the subsidiarity principle with 
it being the responsibility of member states to mainstream their national poverty programmes 
and apply the policy lessons from EU programmes (Langford, 1999: 95). 
However, Ireland uploaded its NAPS thinking into the drafting of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, during its presidency in 1996, after announcing its commitment to drawing up NAPS at 
the 1995 UN World Summit in Copenhagen (Adshead and Millar 2008: 13). Thus, ensuring that 
the EU had a legal basis to provide “incentive measures” (Langford, 1999: 65-96) to states to 
combat social exclusion in a coordinated fashion. The language from the third anti-poverty 
                                                          
73 See Adshead and Millar (2008). It is important not to overstate the NAPS as there is an argument that 
the strategy never gained full political support across the Irish government or administration with policy 
innovation in one department resisted by others.  
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programme was promoted to the main body of the treaty by virtue of Ireland (Langford, 1999: 
104). Social exclusion was subsequently part of the EU’s social policy agenda thereby 
guaranteeing financial support. Ireland argued such measures would be significantly beneficial 
to all member states, without states incurring significant additional costs (Langford, 1999: 95-
96).  
Consequently, the EU reformed the ESF (1998) to include social exclusion, thus 
following Ireland’s lead and adopting the language of the third EAPP within the ESF. The 
common employment policy within the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced the national trajectory 
of employment policy. The redefinition of social exclusion in Ireland subsequently fostered a 
redefinition of employment as a social issue and a solution to social exclusion (Quinn et al., 
1999: 7), namely as a distinct issue rather than part of a broader issue of employment policy 
(Fitzgerald, 2005: 102). The Programme for Economic and Social Progress (1990-93) 
established the first long-term, experimental strategy for unemployment (Fitzgerald, 2005: 
120), creating a “leapfrog effect” (Conroy, 1999: 45) within Irish employment policy.  
Additionally, the revitalisation of the EU’s employment policy similarly revitalised 
national employment policy as the focus on youth unemployment was adopted at the national 
level within Ireland’s Employment Action Plan (1998). This attempted to reduce the “in-built 
unemployment traps” (Fitzgerald, 1999: 121) within the national social security system. The 
EES also revitalised the Irish labour market by way of prescribing a new approach to gender 
equality which attempted to avoid the pitfalls of intergovernmental directives (O’Connor, 
2005b: 37-38). On the one hand, the EU acted as “a catalyst, by putting mainstreaming on the 
agenda as an issue to be used within the internal political process by various interest groups 
and political parties” (Rubery, 2003: 4).  
On the other hand, in practice the EES was ineffectual with a lack of policy innovation 
within gender policy and notable absence of childcare provisions and policy, resulting in a “gulf 
between policy commitment and implementation” (O’Connor, 2005b: 41). Arguably, this was 
due to gender equality re-emerging within the EES for economic purposes rather than social 
objectives (Rubery, 2003). As in the British case, there is much debate over the impact of the 
EES on Irish employment policy with a divide between those who claim it has had a limited 
impact (O’Connor, 2007, Rubery, 2003) and those who claim an impact has occurred, albeit 
subtly (Goetschy, 1999).  
Nonetheless, many Irish officials viewed the OMC as beneficial in providing a forum 
which highlighted areas requiring further action or necessitating greater attention in the 
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future (O’Donnell and Moss, 2005: 329). Ireland was once again ahead of the EU regarding the 
Lisbon Strategy. This had already been incorporated into national social partnership, moreover 
Lisbon had also replicated the Irish NAPS strategy, hence Lisbon priorities were a national 
priority. Respectively, comparative to the past, the EU was not the driving force behind 
national social policy’s development (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008: 156). Accordingly, a political 
crisis ensued bringing national social policy to a halt as the social partners became divided 
leading to ad hoc policy development. In addition, the three drivers for national social policy, 
specifically social partnership agreements, national development plans and NAPPs, “were at 
times operating at cross purposes” (Moran, 2010).  
The Developmental Welfare State (NESC, 2005) (DWS), representing the compromise 
reached between the social partners, was subsequently foiled and was notable for the lack of 
debate it instigated (Considine and Dukelow, 2009: 77). Arguably, “delivering change in a 
context of success can in some instances be even more difficult than when faced with an 
impending crisis” (Flinter, 2005). There is a debate between those viewing economic 
prosperity bringing social prosperity, at least to the majority (Fahey et al., 2007), and those 
who claim economic prosperity exacerbated the inequalities within Irish society (Coulter and 
Colemans, 2003) as the EU’s White Paper Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: The 
Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century (EU, 1993) had cautioned.  
While, the Celtic Tiger presented “a unique opportunity for the creation and 
development of social policies” (Quinn et al., 1999: 1) there was seemingly still a lack of 
demand for such development with citizens few and far between caring about the state having 
“a robust welfare state or not” (Millar, 2008: 102). 
 Phase 4: The “Sick Man of Europe”74 as the Poster Child for Austerity (2008- 
Present Day) 
  While the onset of the financial crisis fostered a favourable environment for ratifying 
the Lisbon Treaty (Bruyn, 2012; Dinan, 2010b), in combination with a new Irish Protocol (The 
Independent, November 2010a), the crisis adversely impacted the already struggling DWS and 
intensified economic policy’s familiar domination over social policy. It was acknowledged that 
unprecedented economic success had masked the mismanagement of national fiscal policy 
(Dukelow, 2012; Kinsella, 2012; Lane, 2011; Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012). However, blame 
was apportioned to the lack of a tax base to support the growth in social expenditure. This 
                                                          
74 (The Independent, November 2010a) 
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focus on fiscal discipline and criticism of social expenditure “shifted the problems of the crisis 
to the welfare state domain” (Considine and Dukelow, 2012: 268). 
 Throughout the euro crisis, the EU had no demand for social policy with its entire focus 
on economic policy, hence Irish social policy’s progress began to falter. Combined with the 
fact that, in contrast to the EU, national social policy is funded by economic policy, hence the 
crisis in economic policy became mirrored in social policy. Subsequently an initial, significant 
period of ‘crisis progression’ developed. A policy of European and national austerity ensued to 
maintain the economic system at both governance levels.  
 Respectively, as Ireland accepted financial assistance from the Troika, the conjoining 
Memorandum of Understanding consisted of: widening the tax base (Department of Finance, 
2010b: 9); a restructuring of the benefit system to reduce unemployment (Department of 
Finance, 2010b: 10, 20); reductions in payments which protected the most socially vulnerable, 
namely social transfers, working age, universal child benefit, tax credits (Department of 
Finance, 2010b: 9) and the minimum wage (Department of Finance, 2010b: 20). The provision 
of means-tested social assistance persisted by way of limiting “the economic and social fallout 
of the crisis” (Department of Finance, 2010b: 7). Arguably, the recession was seized “as [a] 
political opportunity by those who want to establish Ireland as an ungenerous social welfare 
model and a more neoliberal welfare state” (Murphy, 2010: 5).  
 To reform the benefit system, Ireland began to model itself on British social policy, 
namely adopting Pathways to Work (DSP, 2012; 2013; 2014; 2016) and exploring the feasibility 
of creating a single social assistance payment, which would align Ireland to the rest of the EU 
and those countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (DSP, November 2010). As one interviewee claimed, “the response to the Irish crisis 
represents adaptation of practices which are to be found working in other countries” 
(Interview 15, December 2015). Of all the social issues it was the unemployment crisis which 
“quickly became one of the most serious consequences emanating from the crisis” (Considine 
and Dukelow, 2012: 9). The (youth) unemployment crisis was unprecedented in Ireland, even 
relative to the 1980s, meaning Ireland once again became “no country for young men” (The 
Financial Times, September 2012). Unemployment rapidly increased from 4.6% in 2007 to 
14.2% in 2011 (Kinsella, 2012: 224), reaching a peak of 15% in 2012 (The Financial Times, 
February 2014). 
  The government was unable to create an appropriate policy response leading to 
“policy paralysis” (Murphy, 2010: 6) as the crisis spread mechanically to national social policy. 
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Arguably the government’s focus was misplaced rather than absent, focusing on achieving the 
economically necessitated social cutbacks rather than the unemployment crisis (Social Justice, 
2014: 8). Accordingly, both the EU’s Youth Guarantee and SIP were created and adopted under 
Ireland’s presidency of the European Council in 2013 to fill this policy void. Ireland, 
unsuccessfully, attempted to reverse roles with the EU to revitalise the austerity-focused ESM 
to one based on social investment (Ireland, 2013). Analogous to the years of the Great Famine, 
a policy of encouraging emigration was also allegedly implemented so to ease the 
unemployment crisis (BBC News, December 2013).  
 However, Ireland remained a country of immigration rather than emigration with 
migrants comprising 11% of Ireland’s population (Krings, 2010). This ‘crisis progression’ in 
employment policy was transformed into ‘crisis diversity’, which will be explored in greater 
detail within Chapter 7. The economic crisis penetrated deeply into social policy engendering 
a new social problem, namely the working poor, requiring a new social policy response. In 
2010, working poor adults accounted for 30% of those experiencing poverty (Watson et al., 
2012: iv). By 2014, of the 750,000 people living in poverty, 16% of adults were classified as 
working poor (Social Justice, 2014: 1).  
 Homelessness also came to typify the Irish crisis as a cap on rent supplements, a lack 
of (local authority) housing and the decline in construction fostered a housing boom (BBC 
News, June 2014). Correspondingly, with the emergence of the working poor a “new 
dimension to the homelessness problem” (The Irish Times, April 2014) arose as the profile of 
homeless citizens changed substantially to comprise those with employment. Official statistics 
showed 3,351 people as homeless with 1,660 of these people coming from within the labour 
force thus accounting for half of the homeless population (CSO, 2012: 7). Ireland was at risk of 
becoming “the homeless capital of Europe” (BBC News, June 2014) as ‘crisis progression’ 
persisted. This was “the economic cost of failing to address that social issue” (Interview 14, 
November 2015). 
 To address the housing crisis significant investment was required. However, as one 
interviewee reported,  
 “when we raised this with European officials they say that is a domestic issue, if Ireland 
increases its taxes then it can invest in housing. Yet, when we raise it domestically we 
are told, no we cannot do that because of EU rules.” (ibid). 
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 Social partnership also became a significant victim of the crisis as the economic crisis 
spilled over into a political crisis, once again adversely impacting on the vision of a DWS and 
creating a dramatic change in the political context (Interview 23, March 2016). At this time, a 
perception of social partnership being undemocratic and bypassing parliament proliferated. A 
rupture emerged due to the decision to place the burden upon workers, the poor and the 
young leading to the marginalisation of both the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and 
business leaders (Regan, 2013: 3). Such strained relations created fractures within the national 
wage agreement as the ICTU assented to a reduction in expenditure but not public sector pay. 
The government rejected the ICTU’s strategy creating a deadlock between the social partners.  
 Consequently, the government superseded the Non-Payment of Wages Act through 
new legislation so to further reduce public sector pay to achieve the necessary cuts. Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) subsequently withdrew from the process, 
meaning for the first time in twenty-three years Ireland was without a national social 
partnership agreement (Regan, 2013: 10). Ad hoc agreements such as the Croke Park Deal 
(McDonough and Dundon, 2010: 17) and an informal private sector agreement between ICTU 
and IBEC (Regan, 2013: 10) ensured industrial peace. The president of IBEC, Larry Murrin 
maintained, “social partnership has had its time” with policy solutions likely to be produced 
on a “sector-by-sector or company-by-company basis” (The Irish Times, September 2014). 
Ultimately, contrary to media reports, “it was the Irish government’s plan, rather than a plan 
imposed from outside, that formed the basis for the ongoing fiscal adjustment” (Fitzgerald, 
2014: 9).  
 While the EU fixed the parameters and “specified the coat horse”, the government 
made the policy decisions (Interview 23, March 2016). In the absence of social partnership, 
Ireland subsequently “turned to powerful external institutions for its legitimacy” (Moran, 
2010: 10-11). December 2013 saw Ireland become the first crisis country to exit “financial 
rehab” (BBC News, December 2013), however austerity continued (The Guardian, December 
2013a; The Financial Times, July 2014) with pockets of ‘crisis progression’ persisting and 
pockets of ‘crisis diversity’ flourishing. Ireland had the highest employment growth in the EU 
as unemployment decreased to 12.1% but also possessed the second highest rate of 
unemployed households in the EU (The Financial Times, February 2014), indicating a deeper 
problem persisting within Ireland’s labour market. Within the crisis, rather than Ireland 
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revitalising the EU or vice versa, the EU (response) was a threat to Ireland through limiting 
national public spending75 (Interview 14, November 2015; Interview 21, February 2016). 
The Irish recovery continued at pace, by July 2015 Ireland’s economy had grown larger 
than even the Celtic Tiger years and had the highest growth in the Eurozone for the second 
consecutive year (The Guardian, July 2015). Correspondingly, the social landscape also 
improved, combined with a strengthening of the construction industry (RTÉ, June 2015). Youth 
unemployment improved to a rate of 14.5% in February 2017, while unemployment overall 
decreased from 8.8% in February 2016 to 6.6% in February 2017 (CSO, 2017) as policy 
responses generated results. Homelessness is the outlier with having persisted throughout the 
recovery, from 912 families recorded homeless in February 2016 (Department of Housing, 
Planning, Community and Local Government Report, 2016) to 1,239 families homeless in 
February 2017 (Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government Report, 
2017). However, with the upturn in construction over time this social issue should surpass, 
allowing policy space for ‘crisis diversity’ to supersede ‘crisis progression’.  
 Conclusion: ‘Crisis Progression’ and ‘Crisis Diversity’ in Action II  
 “The development of social policy is not a simple story of linear progress…from the 
past to the present, [social policy] can be marked as much by repetition and regression as by 
progression” (Considine and Dukelow, 2009: 22). In this spirit, this chapter has shown how 
Britain and Ireland at different times, and by different actors, have seen national social policy 
accelerated, arrested or facilitated by EU social policy developments, and vice versa, with 
reciprocal revitalisation occurring. Correspondingly, EU social policy has had various moments 
of opposition (‘crisis progression’), out of which progress (‘crisis diversity’) has been borne as 
national social policy has responded in diverging ways. Ultimately, this demonstrates the 
historical and continual presence of a ‘crisis spectrum’, with member states transitioning along 
the spectrum throughout the different development phases based on their national political 
contexts and structures. 
 In reference to our original three questions:  
• Is ‘crisis diversity’ or ‘crisis progression’ occurring within the development of EU and 
national social policy? 
                                                          
75 Porte and Heins (eds.) (2016a) argue this control on national budgets, due to the EU’s focus on fiscal 
consolidation with the increased monitoring and application of EU processes as a result of the euro 
crisis, is creating unprecedented EU intervention in national welfare states. Ultimately, the EU can 
indirectly influence national social policy through their direct control over national economic policy. 
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• Is the EU level exhibiting the same crisis pattern as the national level, or are they 
different as in the euro crisis and what are the implications of this? 
• How have Britain and Ireland interacted with EU social policy developments and has 
this interaction changed from pre-euro crisis to during the euro crisis? 
Regarding Question 1: In relation to the crisis pattern both ‘crisis diversity’ and ‘crisis 
progression’ are occurring within the development of EU and national social policy. The key 
arguments for ‘crisis progressionists’ in relation to EU and national social policy are:  
EU Social Policy 
• Economic and political crises have spilled over mechanically into social policy and 
inhibited its development, e.g. the ‘empty chair crisis’, oil crisis and ERM crisis. 
• The ongoing euro crisis has led to a lack of demand for EU social policy initiatives. 
National Social Policy 
• Actively harnessed ‘crisis progression’ in the British case has inhibited EU social policy 
development, such as the Social Charter which initially became a social protocol 
instead. This actively harnessed ‘crisis progression’ aimed to keep EU social policy out 
of the British social model and attempted to shape a limited EU social policy. 
• Economic crises translated into political crises in Britain which have impeded EU social 
policy, such as ‘Black Wednesday’ which caused ratification issues over Maastricht and 
led to the emergence of the UKIP party which became a permanent opposition to the 
EU due to such strong feelings of opposition. 
• The euro crisis has led to national efforts and attempts to weaken EU free movement 
in Britain as a result of an economic crisis once again translating into a political crisis, 
significantly threatening the EU’s foundations. 
• In the Irish case Maastricht was controversial, even an EI-enthusiast such as Ireland 
could not avoid a political crisis over the new treaty which, albeit momentarily, 
inhibited EU social policy progress. 
• In the Irish case, the euro crisis has spilled over into the political realm rendering social 
policy initiatives obsolete, thus hindering Irish social policy’s development and 
damaging the EU’s immaculate record for being a positive force in Ireland.  
• The economic crisis has spilled over into Irish social policy. National social policy is now 
mirroring the crisis in economic policy, subsequently national social policy 
development has become impeded within national employment policy.  
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 In contrast, the key arguments for ‘crisis diversifiers’ in relation to EU and national 
social policy are: 
EU Social Policy 
• EU social policy and its regulatory sphere has regularly advanced in the aftermath of 
economic crises, such as in the case of the SEA. 
• The ongoing euro crisis has not affected EU social policy, it is able to innovate and 
suggestions for its progression are being proposed. 
• While there is a lack of political demand for individual EU social policy initiatives in the 
ongoing euro crisis, there is demand for a significant advancement of the ESM, namely 
to foster a social union.  
National Social Policy 
• Moments of political crisis due to opposition to further EI did not inhibit a Eurosceptic 
Conservative government downloading EU social policy, such as the political crisis over 
Maastricht which did not inhibit the government downloading concepts from the EU 
level to revitalise national social policy, creating the Citizens Charter and the Patient 
Charter.  
• In the British case, under a Labour government EU social policy revitalised national 
social policy after political and economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s; the EES made 
inroads within the nationally guarded area of employment policy and Britain set the 
agenda for the first time during the mid-1990s. 
• The 1980s economic recession led to an increase in EU structural funds to Ireland 
which in turn created the conditions for the introduction of social partnership. 
• The economic crisis counterintuitively ensured the Irish ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty; as Ireland began to experience social difficulties this encouraged Ireland to 
remain supportive of the EU to ensure financial and political support should the state 
need it, thereby progressing EU social policy.  
 Regarding Question 2: The two governance levels are exhibiting the same crisis pattern 
facilitating EU and national social policy whereby ‘crisis progression’ has recurrently led to 
‘crisis diversity’. The EU level is clearly exhibiting a pattern of ‘crisis diversity’, with EU social 
policy developing through organic crises where crises act as a catalyst for policy development. 
The national level is similarly exhibiting a pattern of ‘crisis diversity’, where periods of crisis 
have been followed by periods of national social policy progress.  
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 The Irish case is demonstrating clear ‘crisis diversity’, following the trajectory of EU 
social policy’s development due to an absence of national demand to drive Irish social policy. 
Irish social policy was accelerated by EU social policy developments as the national level 
responded enthusiastically. ‘Crisis progression’ has only occurred when EU social policy 
activity declined. Contrastingly, in the British case national social policy has been facilitated by 
EU social policy developments. British party politics has actively driven stronger politically 
charged periods of ‘crisis progression’.  
 This has created a reoccurring political crisis in response to EU social policy 
developments with the aim to restrict these developments and shape EU social policy in order 
that the EU does not supersede or dictate the state’s extensive role and management of 
national social policy. As Buller (2006) outlined in Chapter 2, and supported by the analysis of 
the British case in this chapter, the Europeanization process is subject to competing discourses 
with different normative connections held by different national groups who use the EU to gain 
strategic advantage over one another. It is these competing discourses which politicise the 
Europeanization debate at the national level.  
 This common crisis pattern has facilitated the progress of EU and national social policy 
whereby member states have flexibly reversed roles with the EU at times when EU social policy 
has been stifled. For example, Ireland reversed roles to upload the NAPS which manoeuvred 
around those member states opposing the EU’s role in addressing poverty, particularly 
Germany. Britain reversed roles with the EU in the 1990s under New Labour to modernise the 
ESM after Britain, under the Conservatives, had significantly inhibited EU social policy 
development. By implication, this analysis of EU social policy is further evidence for the 
existence of ‘bi-directional’ Europeanization occurring in the EU system which was identified 
in Chapter 4.  
 Regarding Question 3: Despite having the same crisis pattern, Britain and Ireland have 
had different relations and interacted very differently with EU social policy developments, 
driven by very different dynamics. Responding to Radaelli’s (2004) demand to bring politics 
back into the study of Europeanization, this analysis of EU social policy does exactly that. 
British social policy responses to EU social policy developments have been influenced by its 
pre-existing welfare state, economic crises and driven by the highly political context in which 
social policy operates. Meanwhile, Irish social policy has responded more acceptingly on 
account of Ireland having no social model to consider and in a contrastingly non-political 
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manner, instead driven by fiscal demands which have dictated national social policy responses 
and initially constrained the extent to which Ireland could exhibit its EI-enthusiast attitude.  
 This demonstrates why the euro crisis cannot become an existential crisis as different 
structures exist at the national level just as they do at the EU level, as aforementioned social 
policy has a different structure to economic policy, hence there is no uniform structure for 
‘crisis progression’ to occur. Prior to the euro crisis both states were open to EU social policy, 
albeit in the British case this was on a limited basis which was “all politically and ideologically 
driven” (Interview 11, April 2015), namely in the areas where the EU facilitated Britain’s pre-
existing, comprehensive national welfare state. During the euro crisis both states have become 
more cautious in their approach to EU social policy developments thus demonstrating, as 
Buller (2006) advocated in Chapter 2, the increasing relevance and importance of the EU’s 
impact upon domestic politics. In the British case, the historical political divide over the EU has 
been exacerbated as Eurosceptics feel vindicated in their opposition to the EU, consequently 
reaching crisis point over the issue of free movement, demonstrating the disproportionate 
strength of Euroscepticism in Britain in comparison to other states (Interview 4, February 
2015).  
 In the Irish case, there was a political consensus over EU policy that “it’s European it’s 
a good thing” (Interview 21, February 2016). However, post-crisis Ireland has converged with 
Britain’s politicisation of the EU.  Irish politics like Spanish politics (González, 2017) has been 
politicised by the euro crisis, substantiating Saurugger’s comments in Chapter 2 that 
“Europeanization inevitably turns more political over time” across and within member states 
(2014: 190). There has been much debate over the lack of a debate and discussion over joining 
the euro (Interview 21, February 2016) which was so positively conceived of and yet has 
become unprecedentedly problematic. Thus, there is now a debate to be had in Ireland over 
EU social policy as the national context becomes more self-aware of its EU membership and 
EU (social) policy becomes increasingly questioned and politicised, as one actor stated “it [the 
euro crisis] has certainly woken up the governmental system” (ibid). Respectively, as 
Featherstone (2003) maintained in Chapter 2, Europeanization stresses the core changes in 
contemporary politics and “is central to an understanding of the contemporary politics of the 
continent” (2003: 20).    
 The proceeding chapters will analyse specific areas of national social policy in Britain 
and Ireland to explore whether this national crisis pattern is mirrored and what the 
implications are for the EU level, starting with the British case. The next chapter explores how 
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Britain used national welfare policy mechanisms in control of the state to manage welfare 
entitlement of EU nationals in the context of EU free movement where national immigration 







Britain, Free Movement and the Stable 
Euro Crisis 
 
“As far as the freedom of movement is concerned...this is a basic principle of the EU since the 
very beginning and I am not prepared to change this because if we are destroying the 
freedom of movement other freedoms will fall in a later cause. So I am not ready to 
compromise in an irresponsible way.” (Incoming President of the European Commission, Jean-
Claude Junker, October 201476) 
"Countries need flexibility so they can make changes to their welfare systems to better 
manage migration…Are we going to find the flexibility to address the concerns of the UK and 
work together to fix this?" (PM David Cameron, December 201577) 
“It does not look like there is going to be a huge amount of scope to change things 
dramatically, other than if we leave the European Union.” (Interview 5, March 2015) 
 
These quotes epitomise the two competing conceptions of the principle of EU free movement, 
exemplifying the dispute between the EU and Britain which led to a turning point in their 
relationship. For many political commentators at the time, the unprecedented challenging of 
the EU’s principle of free movement substantiated their belief that the euro crisis was a 
crippling crisis of progression and the EU was potentially on the path to disintegration. 
However, as we know today, the euro crisis was contained, EU free movement was 
maintained, and Britain voted for ‘Brexit’. Conversely, as the final quote alludes to, at a time 
of substantial instability there was significant stability at the EU level. It is this stability from 
free movement as a ‘locked in’ EU policy area which compelled a significant discussion within 
                                                          
76 (The Guardian, October 2014) 
77 (BBC News, December 2015) 
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British social policy over how to mitigate the social impact of EU free movement, namely 
controlling EU nationals’ access to welfare benefits. 
 This chapter examines the case study of Britain and the British response to the free 
movement of EU nationals during the euro crisis within the state dispute with the EU. The 
chapter will analyse how the euro crisis facilitated the state in its ability to exercise the social 
mechanisms at the national level and develop new social policy to inhibit EU nationals’ access 
to welfare benefits. It will identify the crisis pattern within British welfare policy, deciphering 
whether a ‘crisis spectrum’ is at play. Furthermore, this analysis will examine how the euro 
crisis had notably no effect on the process of Europeanization with Britain’s attempts to de-
Europeanize, so to keep EU social policy out of the British welfare model, ultimately failing due 
to the EU’s rigid defence of the principle of free movement. This defence of free movement 
created an equal defence over the process of Europeanization with both the policy area and 
the process left untouched by the euro crisis.  
Immigration policy will be referred to within the chapter but it is not the focus of this 
analysis. Immigration policy is purely of contextual importance within this chapter. The 
references to immigration policy merely serve to provide the important context in which the 
social policy responses were operating. Furthermore, to facilitate exploring the focus of this 
chapter. Specifically, how Britain used those social policy mechanisms which were in control 
of the state to manage welfare entitlement of EU nationals in the context of EU free movement 
where national immigration policy is invalid. 
As many of the interviewees remarked, the “significant source” (Interview 11, April 
2015) of Britain’s dispute with the EU was over the conceptualisation of free movement. 
Britain, politicians and public alike, treated free movement as a form of immigration. For the 
EU, free movement was a form of mobility78 and a political right of EU nationals afforded from 
EU citizenship, thus notably distinct from immigration, which conferred other political rights 
and certain social entitlements at the national level79. Hence the significant national social 
policy discussions that ensued from the immigration debate. This chapter will, filling the 
current gap in the literature identified in Chapter 3, examine the national social debates and 
social policy developments which emerged from the national immigration debate in response 
to the significant rigidity at the EU level. The crisis pattern identified within this chapter will 
                                                          
78 For the purposes of this chapter and to use the correct terminology this thesis will refer to ‘EU 
mobility’ when discussing the movement of EU nationals. 
79 See Favell (2014) for a brief analysis of why free movement is not immigration. 
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serve as a point of comparison for the succeeding chapter, in terms of how responses from 
specific areas of national social policy are being impacted by the euro crisis. Three questions 
will be posed in this chapter, namely; 
• Is ‘crisis diversity’ or ‘crisis progression’ occurring in the crisis response from 
national welfare policy? 
• Does the crisis pattern identified within British welfare policy and its 
interaction with EU social policy mirror that identified previously in Chapter 
5? 
• What has been the impact of the euro crisis on Britain’s national social policy 
response in welfare policy, and what does this tell us about the EU in ‘crisis 
mode’? 
The analysis is divided into three-time periods, documenting how Britain came to use 
its national welfare state as “an exclusionary mechanism” (Interview 11, April 2015) to counter 
the social impact of the EU’s principle of free movement. The first period from 2010 to 2011 
identifies how the immigration debate has its origins outside of the euro crisis and how the 
social tensions over EU nationals’ access to British welfare benefits were borne. This section 
accounts for the introduction of the Right to Reside test, designed to counter the broad 
definition of a ‘worker’ at the EU level and thus control EU nationals’ access to national welfare 
benefits. This test was to become a significant source of conflict between the EU and Britain, 
acting as a significant strain on political relations.  
The second period charts the height of the free movement debate between 2012 and 
2014 accounting for the significant development of British social policy to exclude EU nationals 
from the British welfare state with the introduction of a new single welfare payment Universal 
Credit and other welfare initiatives. The section also documents the heightened tensions over 
the Right to Reside test as the dispute over the test reached its peak with the EU referring the 
case to the ECJ. This was despite a separate court case supporting Britain’s contention that 
free movement was linked to employment and an EU national’s ability to be financially 
independent. Accordingly, it documents how ‘crisis stability’ played out at the EU level and 
how the path was created for ‘Brexit’ as both Britain and the EU remained immovable over 
their respective policy stances as the British welfare model clashed with the conception of EU 
citizenship.  
The third period from 2015 to 2016, up to when the British EU referendum campaign 
begun, documents the triggering of ‘Brexit’ as ‘crisis stability’ continued within the EU’s first 
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and only response to Britain’s concerns within the renegotiation package, with only minimal 
policy reforms pledged in relation to the EU’s regulation on social security co-ordination. This 
chapter finds that ‘crisis diversity’ at the national level was met with significant ‘crisis stability’ 
at the EU level, substantiating the findings within this thesis so far for a ‘crisis spectrum’ at 
play (see figure 7). This analysis also substantiates the claim made hitherto, building upon 
those findings from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, that the euro crisis is not an existential crisis as 
evidenced by free movement remaining untouched. Hence, the crisis pattern of ‘crisis 
diversity’ in British welfare policy is found to mirror national social policy’s historical 
development (Chapter 5) and the national level within the euro crisis (Chapter 4). Similarly, 
Britain’s crisis interaction with EU social policy accords with its negative historical interaction 
(Chapter 5). However, the chapter finds, in contrast to Britain’s interaction with the EU 
historically (Chapter 5), that Britain is unsuccessful in reversing roles with the EU due to the 
EU’s rejection of the national policy the state was attempting to ‘upload’ to the EU level. This 
suggests that revitalisation occurs not only both ways but along a spectrum. Ultimately, the 
chapter concludes that the British case demonstrates, against the traditional view of crises, 
that the EU in ‘crisis mode’ does not mean the end of the EU. 
 Phase 1: The Mismanagement of Managed Migration (2010-2011) 
6.1.1 Pre-Crisis Concerns: The Dawn of Britain’s Anti-Free Movement  
“The big event was 2004” (Interview 5, March 2015). As discussed in many of my 
interviews, the source of Britain’s concerns with free movement paradoxically lay outside of 
the euro crisis period. Hence, in order to identify the crisis pattern within the free movement 
debate we must first reflect on past events to be able to analyse the debate going forward. 
The 2004 enlargement had “marked a historical watershed” (Galgoczi et al., 2011: 5), as the 
largest enlargement of the EU in its history. Correspondingly, it led to Britain’s largest influx of 
immigration in its history (Salt and Millar, 2006: 335) being one of only three member states 
to operate an open borders policy. Hence, it is possible to argue that prior to 2004 free 
movement never existed, or at the very least not in the form it does today (Interview 9, April 
2015; Interview 3, December 2014).  
The unprecedented arrival of EU nationals caused anxiety among the British public as 
Eastern EU nationals resided in localities “less accustomed to migration” (Interview 5, March 
2015). Respectively, these areas lacked the integration structure to receive them, creating 
significant social challenges (Interview 3, December 2014). A “perceived threat” (Interview 8, 
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discourse. As a by-product of this, “the integration question” (Interview 5, March 2015) in 
relation to EU nationals has become much debated as several interviews highlighted80 
(Interview 3, December 2014; Interview 5, March 2015; Interview 12, May 2015).  
Prior to the ten new member states accession, a political debate occurred over the 
extent to which EU nationals should be able to access welfare benefits on entry. The principal 
concern was that welfare benefits and social housing would be readily available and act as a 
pull factor for EU nationals. If welfare states became the driving force for EU mobility, this 
would lead to an increase in the movement of non-economic EU nationals, thus placing a 
substantial burden on the national welfare system. In turn, this would lead to competition, 
potentially a ‘race to the bottom’, between member states in order to deter EU nationals, 
eliciting an “erosion of the welfare state”81 (Munz et al., 2006: 38). The Conservative party and 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), had advocated for a longer time frame before the new 
EU nationals could access the welfare state (Clark and Hardy, 2011: 6).  
However, Tony Blair reassured the public that EU nationals would not be able to come 
“simply to claim benefits or housing. There will be no support for the economically inactive” 
(The Guardian, April 2004). These concerns drove two policy developments, namely the 
introduction of the Workers Registration Scheme and a new Right to Reside Test. This test was 
to become the source of great dispute throughout the crisis period epitomising the difference 
of opinion between the EU and Britain which was to drive the free movement debate. The 
Right to Reside Test supplemented the EU’s Habitual Residence Test82 (HRT). It required EU 
nationals to prove they were economically active before they could access non-contributory 
national welfare benefits (BBC News, September 2011b). Hence, irrespective of the euro crisis 
“immigration was becoming more of an issue” (Interview 8, March 2015) as reflected in the 
escalation of political and public anxiety. 
                                                          
80 Again, this appeared to be a debate that was separated between those viewing free movement as 
‘migration’ and those conceiving free movement as a ‘political right’, as one interviewer commented “if 
you do not see these people moving to different countries as migrants then you miss out totally on the 
debate around integration” (Interview 12, May 2015). This was reflected when I questioned the 
relevance of integration policy to addressing British concerns around free movement in one interview 
to which the interviewee remarked, “they cannot be subjected to integration policy, member states are 
not allowed to do it” (Interview 9, April 2015). 
81 See Gary Freeman (1986) who maintains that European welfare politics has become ‘Americanised’, 
creating a mirror image, whereby an open policy of migration interacts with the closed nature of the 
welfare state to create a political conflict to the latter’s detriment.  
82 This applied to those nationals from the European Economic Area which included EU nationals and 
those who are part of the single market namely, Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and Lichtenstein. It also 
applied to returning British nationals.  
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6.1.2 New Crisis, Old Concerns, New Policy Response 
  Following the 2004 enlargement, combined with the precipitation of the global 
economic recession, Britain lost its confidence in the economic arguments for immigration 
(Interview 3, December 2014) due to the emergent social challenges. At this time, the EU 
remained resolute in reinforcing free movement and the associated regulations with the 
proposal of a Free Movement Card to create “a step change in favour of mobility” (Monti, 
2010: 22). Additionally, a three-pronged approach to guarantee free movement rights in 
practice was formulated namely, ensuring the rights were “fully enforced on the ground by 
Member States”; simplifying the exercise of free movement rights; and, raising awareness 
amongst EU citizens of their free movement rights (EC, 2010: 22). This filtered into the planned 
dedication of the year 2013 to EU citizens, raising awareness of free movement rights.  
The advent of the euro crisis caused EU labour markets to respond vastly differently 
to one another as EU-wide unemployment ensued. ‘Crisis progression’ took hold as a 
“separate public concern crisis” (Interview 12, May 2015) ignited with the euro crisis 
exacerbating pre-existent immigration concerns (Interview 3, December 2014). Subsequently, 
immigration policy’s development became hindered with the policy “no longer operating in a 
thoughtful place” (Interview 3, December 2014) as it undertook a ‘firefighting’ role to placate 
public fears. Immigration policy initially responded to this ‘public-concern-crisis’ as, akin to 
those concerns in 2004, public concern led to the government introducing sweeping changes 
to policy in “a response to the perception that immigration policy had failed” (Interview 9, 
April 2015). Hence, analogous to the 2004 enlargement, the election of the new Conservative-
led coalition government in 2010 “had more of an impact on migration policy than the 
Eurozone crisis” (Interview 12, May 2015).  
The new 2010 government started a reversal of New Labour’s ‘open door’ policy on 
EU mobility. The government pledged to “apply transitional controls as a matter of course in 
the future for all new EU Member States” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 21), while retaining support 
for ongoing EU enlargement. Additionally, there were numerous changes to immigration 
policy in relation to non-EU nationals, such as a temporary cap placed on non-EU migration of 
24,100 (House of Lords Library Note, 2010) and on skilled migration to the size of 21,700 (BBC 
News, November 2010).  
One of the key changes that influenced other government policy on immigration 
(Interview 12, May 2015) was the then Home Secretary, Theresa May’s cap on net immigration 
of “tens of thousands” (The Telegraph, January 2010). The cap came under considerable 
170 
 
political criticism. Nonetheless, migration pressure groups, such as Migration Watch, and the 
CBI welcomed the cap for breaking the connection between economic migration and migrants 
who could reside in Britain, with priority given to those with a job offer, which they viewed as 
substantially benefiting the economy (BBC News, November 2010). However, as one 
interviewee observed, these policies did little to restore public confidence as non-EU 
migration was not the “major driver of public anxiety” (Interview 3, December 2014).  
Moreover, resources devoted to addressing the impacts of immigration were either 
removed or dissipated, through mainstreaming these resources into the public services 
(Interview 5, March 2015). In particular, the Migration Impacts Fund was terminated. In the 
context of a government determined to reduce and reform the “bloated and inefficient 
welfare system”, which discouraged the unemployed from seeking employment (The 
Guardian, May 2010), they maintained the cap was more useful in addressing the impacts of 
immigration and that it was a non-priority funding stream in the context of austerity policy 
(The Guardian, August 2010). This policy change created what local authorities termed a 
“perfect storm”, with “numbers increasing and resources being scaled back at the same time” 
(Interview 5, March 2015).  
Hence, under the new Conservative led coalition government policy of austerity, 
welfare reform, and retrenchment there was growing concern over the number of EU 
nationals arriving to Britain to take advantage of British welfare benefits, so-called ‘benefit 
tourism’ (Papademetiou et al., 2010: 58). The recession combined with an austerity policy and 
higher than normal levels of migration meant people were “associating cuts and migration, 
thinking about them side by side” (Interview 5, March 2015). Thus, as politically the two issues 
became conflated so the political discourse surrounding migration policy changed (Interview 
4, February 2015), acting as a further constraint on immigration policy.  
6.1.3 The Beginning of the End: British Welfare State vs. EU Citizenship  
The alteration in the political discourse surrounding immigration coincided with an 
intensifying anti-EU discourse as Eurosceptics became incited over Britain’s involvement in the 
bailouts of Ireland (£10 billion, see Chapter 4), Portugal (£4.2 billion), and Greece (£1 billion). 
This was despite declarations from both the PM and Chancellor to avoid such bailouts. The 
Adam Smith Institute also criticised Britain’s involvement, claiming such actions reversed the 
benefits of the country remaining outside of the Eurozone and made “a mockery of the 
spending cuts” (The Telegraph, November 2010d). Ultimately, the Eurozone crisis cast doubt 
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over the economic competence and benefits of the EU, bestowing more political questioning 
in Britain.  
 Consequently, a “significant argument” developed that the government was driving 
immigration anxiety not the public (Interview 9, April 2015; Hatton, 2014: 8). After all, in 
Britain there was a substantial electoral and political incentive in targeting free movement and 
perpetuating “the ‘threat’ of open doors eastwards as a tool for berating the impact of the 
EU” (Favell, 2008: 703), particularly under a Eurosceptic Conservative government. Some of 
those interviewed claimed the issue with free movement was a “fig leaf” (Interview 1, 
December 2014) for the lack of national investment that had led to the social challenges with 
free movement. Others similarly claimed the issue with free movement was “a scapegoat for 
domestic problems” (Interview 10, April 2015). For instance, David Cameron, the PM at the 
time, cited the threat of mass immigration contributing to the governments controversial 
decision to provide an unprecedented £10 billion loan to the Irish state. He asserted economic 
collapse in Ireland “would have a huge impact on Irish people coming to the UK for work” (The 
Telegraph, November 2010e). As one interviewee affirmed, “free movement gets 
instrumentalised by political actors for whom it is convenient to instrumentalise it” (Interview 
11, April 2015).  
Similarly, the legal dispute between the EU and Britain over the Right to Reside test 
drove public anxiety over immigration. This legal dispute was a key illustration of the 
conceptual differences between the EU and Britain over free movement. The EU defined the 
status of a ‘worker’ very broadly to enable people to seek employment so to truly be a free 
moving worker (Interview 8, March 2015) hence, free movement “unavoidably has an impact 
on other national policies which are the competence of EU Member States” (Interview 6, 
March 2015). The EU opposed the test claiming it discriminated against EU nationals with 
British and Irish citizens automatically passing and accessing British welfare benefits based on 
their British citizenship (EC Press Release, 2011b). Despite Britain’s legal victory nationally (see 
Supreme Court, Patmalniece case 2004), the EU remained firm in its position requesting for 
the test to be brought “into line with EU law” (ibid) within two months.  
Consequently, Britain’s relationship with the EU became strained over the matter as 
in comparison to other member states, the state was “more vocally resistant to Commission 
pressure to change various aspects of its policies” (Interview 11, April 2105). As demonstrated 
by Ian Duncan Smith’s, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions at the time, retort in The 
Telegraph which incited further national immigration anxiety. Smith maintained that inactive 
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EU nationals83 arrived “with the sole purpose of accessing a more generous benefit system” 
(The Telegraph, September 2011b). This perpetuated those post-enlargement concerns and 
sowed the seeds for the national concern over so-called ‘benefit tourism’. Additionally, 
reflecting the uniqueness of the British welfare model, Smith maintained it presented a threat 
to Britain’s social contract with its citizens by way of breaking “the vital link which should exist 
between taxpayers and their own Government” (ibid). ‘Crisis progression’ was once again 
being harnessed to inhibit the EU from dictating national social policy (Chapter 5), namely in 
relation to paying the unemployed, so to assist the government in delivering its austerity 
policy.  
Inevitably, on account of free movements centrality to the European Project and EU 
citizenship alike, the Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs of the time, Laszlo 
Andor, responded defiantly. He stated that legally the EU was “very sound” with it being “very 
important” that where EU nationals cannot secure employment immediately they have access 
to welfare benefits (BBC News, September 2011b). Andor declared it was possible that EU 
nationals could move to a host state where benefits were higher than their home state, 
however “since we have a European Labour market we have to accept this as a fact” (ibid). As 
substantiated by an economist, free movement requires states “to let in people you do not 
necessarily particularly want…that is the nature of the game” (Interview 2, December 2014).  
At the same time, Eurosceptic sentiments increased in Britain. A public appeal was 
made by Mark Pritchard, a Conservative backbencher, to Cameron to hold an EU referendum 
claiming “bail-out fatigue” was undermining political support in the Conservative party for an 
economic crisis that was “self-inflicted” (The Telegraph, September 2011a). A petition of 
100,000 signatures from the public as well as MPs and MEPs from within both the Conservative 
and Labour parties called for a referendum on EU membership (BBC News, September 2011a). 
However, the motion was defeated in a vote when debated in the House of Commons (The 
Guardian, October 2011). This vote incited one of the largest Conservative revolts in political 
history (The Telegraph, October 2011).  
Ultimately, three independent and interdependent tensions set the stage for an 
unprecedented debate over the (in)flexibility of EU free movement. Namely, British public 
concern over the number of EU nationals in Britain; the British politicians concerns with 
inactive EU nationals’ access to welfare benefits and EU membership; and an unyielding EU. 
                                                          
83 See Baumbast case (C413/99) (Europa: EUR-Lexa) which provided the legal grounds for EU nationals 
receiving welfare benefits while economically inactive. 
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Respectively, national social welfare policy’s response to the crisis issue was to be both driven 
and mediated by national politics, EU law, and the politics of the rest of the twenty-seven 
member states.   
 Phase 2: The Crisis Response (2012-2014) 
6.2.1 The Stable Crisis: Right to Reside and the Inflexible Positions of Britain and the 
EU  
Initially, the EU and Britain were at a stalemate with ‘crisis progression’ threatening to 
overwhelm both governance levels. There was an impending political crisis if a limit was placed 
on free movement, leading to the unravelling of the EU project, and if free movement was not 
limited respectively. Thus, stability dominated the EU’s response to Britain’s concerns as free 
movement was “a part of being in Europe” (Interview 8, March 2015). Free movement was 
‘locked in’ hence adjustment pressure was transferred away from the EU level. Respectively, 
with the EU remaining committed to its irrefutably, inflexible standpoint over not changing 
free movement policy, it was the euro crisis which was “offering an opportunity for re-
discussing [free movement] policies” (Interview 4, February 2015).  
Britain seized this opportunity, committing to its position that free movement could 
be adjusted to resolve national concerns. Thus, a significant period of ‘crisis diversity’ emerged 
with a significant amount of discussion ensuing over ways to limit free movement (Interview 
2, December 2014). Euroscepticism was already disproportionately present in Britain (see 
Chapter 5). However, politically the euro crisis had increased British Euroscepticism (Interview 
4, February 2015) which in turn “encouraged politicians to view European migration as a 
problem that requires them to make a response” (Interview 10, April 2015). Namely, adjusting 
social policies to appear “as if they are responding to increased migration” (ibid).  
Thus, a new form of Euroscepticism was fostered, one “predominantly clothed in anti-
immigrant rhetoric” (Interview 11, April 2015). Financially, the euro crisis caused free 
movement to challenge “the ability of countries to support high levels of EU migrants” 
(Interview 12, May 2015). Out of this challenge came policy change. Together these concerns 
created a “snowball effect” (Interview 1, December 2014) within the development of national 
social welfare policy, despite the ongoing euro crisis. In a dramatic transformation during the 
crisis period, British anti-immigration rhetoric went from being addressed in immigration 
policy to within social welfare policy (Interview 11, April 2015).  
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The policy response initially continued within national immigration policy, despite 
being obsolete in responding to the social impact of EU free movement. In 2012, with both 
Ireland and Greece seemingly on the brink of exiting the Eurozone, Theresa May, Home 
Secretary at the time, disclosed details of emergency immigration controls should the euro 
crisis deepen with the collapse of the European single currency (The Telegraph, May 2012b). 
Nonetheless, the EU retained its obstinate policy approach, defending free movement by way 
of strengthening non-EU third country nationals’ free movement rights, in parallel to its 
defence of EU nationals (EC, 2012). The EC proposed a new EU mechanism to coordinate and 
“ensure complementarity” (ibid: 6) between the national and EU level approaches to third 
country nationals’ access to welfare benefits. Opposition was raised by Britain on both political 
and economic grounds (House of Commons, 2012: Column Number 4-5).  
Correspondingly, the EU’s inflexibility over social security co-ordination regulation in 
relation to Britain’s Right to Reside Test continued as the EC issued a second reasoned opinion 
due to four areas of national policy still not being brought into line with EU law (EC Press 
Release, 2012). Similarly, the ‘European Year of Citizens 2013’ further preserved free 
movement with the EC intent on extending the stipulated three-month period in which 
unemployment benefits could be exported to EU jobseekers to facilitate their free movement 
(EC, 2013: 8). Paradoxically, at a time of celebration at the EU level over the success of free 
movement and EU citizenship, at the national level Cameron announced the Conservatives 
would hold a referendum on EU membership, should the party be re-elected in 2015. The 
referendum constituted the potential for “a very dramatic change” (Interview 5, March 2015) 
from the euro crisis with either ‘Brexit’ or changes to free movement as the threat of an ‘out’ 
vote afforded both political “sway” over controlling EU free movement and an incentive for 
national policy innovation (Interview 3, December 2014). 
At this time, Britain’s policy response transferred to social welfare policy as Britain’s 
rigid stance in not paying welfare benefits to inactive EU nationals living in the state was 
accommodated within national reforms of the welfare system. The Welfare Reform Act 
introduced a new single benefit payment, Universal Credit (UC), replacing welfare benefits 
treated differently under EU law respectively (House of Commons Library, 2013: 11). The 
government categorised UC as social assistance, on the basis it was replacing not 
agglomerating benefits. Thus, it was “outside the scope” of EU social security regulations and, 
by implication, “not exportable” (ibid). Others claimed special non-contributory would be a 
more appropriate classification (Sibley and Widmann, 2013).  
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EU nationals’ access to UC was inextricably connected to employment status, with 
only those working, self-employed or seeking employment who passed the HRT qualifying 
(DWP, 2012: 4). Those not seeking work (DWP, 2012: 5), students and the inactive who had a 
right to reside were ineligible (DWP, 2012: 4). Contrastingly, reflecting the EU’s firmer policy 
position, a new EU directive was created which went beyond EU law (House of Lords, 2013a: 
6) to explicitly “ensure real and effective application of existing legislation” (EC Press Release, 
2013b). This was in light of the “lack of awareness and consistency” (EC MEMO, 2013) within 
the national application of free movement rights. Hence, putting into action the three-
pronged approach to guaranteeing free movement rights in practice.  
Andor maintained that because of the euro crisis it was “all the more important to 
make it easier for those that want to work in another EU country to be able to do so” (EC Press 
Release, 2013b). In parliament, it was deemed the new directive did not impact on Britain in 
any significant way (European Scrutiny Committee, 2013; House of Lords, 2013a; House of 
Lords, 2013b). Nonetheless, opposition was voiced by Mark Harper who argued the directive 
did little in the way of addressing British concerns, maintaining the directive would “not 
rebalance the rights and responsibilities debate at all” (House of Lords, 2013b: 28). Harper 
claimed that if public concerns were not addressed, “it becomes very difficult for the public to 
support, first, our membership of the European Union, and, secondly, free movement rights” 
(House of Lords, 2013b: 12).  
Euroscepticism reached its climax with public concern over Romania and Bulgaria’s 
forthcoming accession and the economic recovery “fuelling” further inflows (Interview 5, 
March 2015), affording UKIP Conservative seats in local elections84 (The Guardian, May 2013a). 
In this context, the EC finally referred the matter of Britain’s Right to Reside Test to the ECJ 
after “two years of fruitless negotiation” (The Guardian, May 2013c). In addition to disputing 
the Right to Reside criteria, the EC also maintained that Jobseeker’s Allowance was not a form 
of social assistance, even the non-contribution element of it (The Guardian, May 2013c). 
However, British officials expected both British and EU law to be amended to take into account 
the unprecedented public concern (The Financial Times, May 2013b).  
A spokesman from the EC stated the court case was unavoidable as "the difference 
between us is fundamental” (The Guardian, May 2013b). Stephen Booth from Open Europe at 
the time commented, “if the commission wants to push the UK out of the EU, it's doing a pretty 
                                                          
84 See Geddes (2014). 
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good job" (ibid). In response, Britain conceived the test as already aligned to EU law and “a 
vital and fair tool” (DWP, 2013) to safeguard British welfare benefits. The government argued 
that Britain was committed to the EU’s principle of free movement but could not have a 
welfare system permitting “‘inactive’ migrants to become a burden on our welfare scheme” 
(ibid). Hence, the stalemate looked set to continue.    
6.2.2 British Policy Innovation over Non-Intervention: The Battle over ‘Benefit 
Tourism’ 
British welfare policy development was subsequently driven by this policy of non-
payment to unemployed EU nationals as Cameron took the opportunity and “used those 
concerns and crises to advocate quite radical policies” (Interview 12, May 2015). The 
government began to think creatively over how to inhibit EU nationals’ accessing British 
welfare benefits through national social welfare policy. There were plans to disallow EU 
nationals from being on council housing waiting lists for up to five years, as local councils 
became legally obliged to conduct local residency tests (The Telegraph, March 2013a). 
Additionally, there were suggestions to create a “proper residency test” in order that all 
foreign nationals’ automatic access to claim legal aid in civil cases over receiving state benefits, 
housing, and other claims was terminated (The Daily Express, February 2013). Considerations 
were also given to restricting access to the NHS (ibid).  
Cameron encouraged ministers to “think like Conservatives” (ibid) in coming up with 
new social welfare policy to control migrants’ rights. Ultimately, such a policy would indirectly 
restrict population movements (Interview 4, February 2015) in the absence of being able to 
respond through changes in national immigration policy. On account of the bourgeoning 
debate, by order of Andor, the EU subsequently conducted its own study into ‘benefit 
tourism’. The study revealed inactive EU nationals comprised of a small proportion of the 
overall EU population claiming benefits, namely between 0.7% and 1.0% (DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2013: 13). The only exception to the rule was Ireland with 3% of 
inactive EU nationals claiming benefits (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2013: 
200). In Britain, the number of economically inactive EU nationals had increased by 42% in the 
period from 2006 to 2012 (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2013: 170).  
Nevertheless, the report cautioned that the figures should be treated “as order of 
magnitude estimates” given the lack of data on inactive EU nationals (DG Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion, 2013: 204). The study ultimately suggested that the British concern over 
EU nationals’ access to the welfare state was “exaggerated” (BBC News, October 2013). 
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However, Eurosceptics interpreted the study as evidence that Britain needed greater control 
over its borders and welfare alike (The Telegraph, October 2013a). Accordingly, despite 
attempts to disprove and discredit ‘benefit tourism’ the report paradoxically incited further 
anti-EU and anti-free movement sentiments. Conservative MP Douglas Carswell claimed it was 
no longer tenable to allow free use of the welfare state and allow EU nationals to “flee the 
Eurozone” to Britain, “it is decision time. I would rather we quit Europe and had our own 
system of social protection” (ibid).  
Andor maintained that while he recognised regional and local pressures, the report 
“puts into perspective the dimension of the so-called benefit tourism which is neither 
widespread nor systematic” (The Telegraph, October 2013b). In opposition to this evidence, 
national policy development continued as the Department of Working Pensions strengthened 
the HRT through an IT system which tailored questions to an individual’s circumstance (HM 
Government, 2013). In conjunction, the Home Office created a new requirement that EU 
nationals’ right to reside through their status as ‘jobseekers’, and thus having access to welfare 
benefits, would terminate after six months unless the person in question could prove they 
were “actively seeking work and have a real chance of getting a job” (ibid).  
Two months away from the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, ‘crisis diversity’ 
reached a high point as Cameron further utilised public concern to announce additional new 
social welfare policy in relation to the forthcoming new EU nationals. Within an article for the 
Financial Times, Cameron outlined the new limitations. Specifically, EU nationals would be 
unable to claim housing benefit, aligned with young British nationals, and would not be 
entitled to out of work benefits for three months. If EU nationals required ongoing financial 
assistance, Cameron pledged “we will no longer pay these indefinitely” (The Financial Times, 
November 2013). 
From January, no EU national had a right to Jobseeker’s Allowance for more than six 
months without evidence they could gain employment. Access to benefits was to be 
contingent on a new minimum earnings threshold which was to be introduced. All proposals, 
as far as the Coalition considered, were in accordance with EU law (The Guardian, November 
2013). Cameron also proposed limiting free movement at the EU level by use of economic 
criteria and national immigration policy respectively. This comprised of new member states 
having to reach a certain GDP per head before free movement could be fully exercised (The 
Financial Times, November 2013).  
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Additionally, old member states would be able to impose a cap on EU mobility should 
their inflow reach a certain number in a single year (ibid). Once again there was a “robust 
response from Europe” (Interview 5, March 2015) to Cameron’s article as stability continued 
at the EU level and thus within national immigration policy. The EU once again stood firm as 
Viviane Reding, European Justice Commissioner, stated free movement was “non-negotiable” 
and stated if Britain wanted to exit the single market “you should say so” (Reuters, November 
2013).  
Andor stated that the PM’s publication was an “unfortunate over reaction” (The 
Telegraph, November 2013a). As an interviewee discussed, the EU’s concerns over a cap being 
introduced were due to the policy proposals being “such a fundamental change that it would 
have led to a referendum” (Interview 3, December 2014). Nigel Farage, UKIP leader at the 
time, attacked Cameron’s measures for being inadequate claiming “it doesn’t sound very 
tough to me…we are still being far too generous” (The Telegraph, November 2013b). Cameron 
subsequently sent a warning to the EU that Britain would veto new EU members in the future 
unless there were reforms to the freedom of movement principle (The Financial Times, 
December 2013). Despite the EU’s rejection of a cap, Britain re-attempted to respond to 
national concerns through immigration policy.  
A proposal to place an annual cap of 75,000 on EU nationals was leaked as 
Conservative MPs called for the accession deadline of Romania and Bulgaria to be extended 
by two years (The Guardian, December 2013b). The leaked report also proposed banning EU 
nationals from accessing the welfare state for five years (The Independent, December 2013), 
in line with non-EU nationals. National social policy development continued with the ongoing 
political debates. Smith announced the implementation of the strengthened HRT before the 
end of the year (The Telegraph, December 2013a). To gain access to welfare benefits, nationals 
from the European Economic Area were required to provide more detail and answer more 
questions than previously. Innovatively, they would now be asked if their language skills were 
a barrier to gaining employment. Additionally, they were also required to provide evidence 
that they had attempted to attain employment before arriving to Britain. 
Once more the EC was quick to voice its opposition, stating the test had already been 
harmonised and agreed to by Britain at the EU level. The EC maintained that the test was to 
determine “where a person’s centre of interest is located, which has nothing to do with 
language” (ibid). Despite the EU’s rejection of all British proposals, Cameron claimed at the 
beginning of 2014 that “all options are on the table” (The Guardian, January 2014). Policy 
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debates at the national level were also considering changes to the British welfare state. As 
attempts were being made to introduce a private bill to restrict EU nationals’ access to welfare 
benefits, during the second reading Sir Edward Leigh stated, “if the only way we can deal with 
this problem is to move to a contributory system, perhaps we should” (House of Commons, 
2014b: Column 1138). As many interviews affirmed, “Britain has lots of non-contributory 
benefits which is obviously a problem” (Interview 9, April 2015).  
Christopher Chope, author of the bill, opposed such suggestions claiming Britain “as a 
sovereign country” should not have to tailor its welfare system to avoid abuse under the EU 
(House of Commons, 2014b: Column 1139). As an interviewee stated, Britain would not see 
why they should conform to the EU model and the other twenty-seven member states would 
not see justification to change “the whole of the EU treaties” to fit with Britain’s welfare model 
(Interview 12, May 2015). David Nuttall maintained that if a renegotiation around welfare 
benefits was not possible the public “would be absolutely right to vote to leave the EU so that 
we can get back control over such matters” (House of Commons, 2014b: Column 1149).  
With national immigration policy proposals once again reaching an impasse with the 
EU, the pressure moved towards British welfare policy. Subsequently, those policy proposals 
announced the previous November were implemented as Smith announced that from April 
2014 EU nationals would be unable to access Housing Benefit, while British and Irish nationals’ 
rights to Housing Benefit remained unaffected (DWP Press Release, 2014a). Britain also 
introduced a more stringent test for EU nationals to attain a ‘worker’ status. From the 1st 
March 2014, there would be a “minimum earnings threshold” of £150 per week for the 
previous three consecutive months (DWP Press Release, 2014b).  
In addition to removing EU nationals’ rights to Housing Benefit, an EU jobseeker would 
have to be resident for three months and successfully pass the HRT before accessing national 
welfare benefits. After six months, those EU nationals remaining unemployed and without 
evidence they can gain employment would cease entitlement to claiming Jobseeker’s 
Allowance benefit. These proposals acted as a means by which to “cap welfare and reduce 
immigration” (ibid). Policy development was also being fostered by those outside the political 
sphere. The Institute for Public Policy Research facilitated welfare policy innovation proposing 
firstly, in accordance with Sir Edward Leigh and many interviews, a “stronger contributory 
element” (IPPR, 2014a: 67) to be re-introduced into the welfare model.  
Secondly, advocating for a renegotiation of the principle of exportability in relation to 
paying welfare benefits on arrival and Child Benefit payments to children residing outside 
180 
 
Britain and, “fairer forms of conditionality” (IPPR, 2014b: 27). The government commissioned 
review of the balance of competences between Britain and the EU regarding free movement 
generated innovative policy proposals covering changes to, EU law; the exportability of 
welfare benefits; and, the EU’s social security rules (HM Government, 2014: 54-57). 
Conversely, many of those changes suggested in relation to changing EU law would have been 
illegal under EU law in practice. As a legal expert stated when interviewed, free movement “is 
not something you can adapt or change in policy terms” (Interview 8, March 2015). 
Open Europe, arguably the most influential think-tank within the social debate over 
EU free movement at the time, advocated for a policy which stipulated EU nationals had to 
reside in Britain for up to three years before they either qualified for all welfare benefits 
through a new EU Directive on Citizenship and Integration (Open Europe, November 2014a), 
or qualified for access to in-work benefits (Open Europe, November 2014b). Policy 
development continued within the political sphere as Cameron attempted to combine the 
policy strategy in immigration policy to welfare policy. After multiple failed attempts to foster 
EU support for a cap on the number of EU nationals arriving, the PM proposed a cap on the 
number of national insurance numbers provided to low skilled migrants as a means to reduce 
the number of EU nationals arriving to Britain (The Telegraph, October 2014).  
Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the EC, immediately challenged the proposal and 
defended free movement maintaining, “the principle of freedom of movement is essential, we 
have to keep it” (ibid). Barroso claimed, “any kind of arbitrary cap” (ibid) would be illegal under 
the principle of non-discrimination. Nonetheless, it was thought the policy would form the 
principal policy of the forthcoming immigration speech, until government sources denounced 
the new policy as speculation (ibid). Ultimately, against the background of the euro crisis, 
unprecedented EU free movement rigidity spawned unparalleled British social policy 
innovation and development.  
6.2.3 British Innovation from the Impasse over Immigration   
 The policy response continued within national welfare policy as Cameron laid out 
further innovative policy proposals within his immigration speech. Cameron had promised the 
Tories a “game-changing new immigration policy” (The Times, October 2014). Reports in The 
Times of an “emergency break” (ibid) on the arrival of EU jobseekers were subsequently 
denounced as mere “speculation” (The Financial Times, October 2014). However, in 
anticipation of the immigration speech there were those on the one hand reporting that 
Cameron would stretch EU rules “to their limits” and “square” the proposals with Merkel prior 
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to his speech (The Sunday Times, November 2014). On the other hand, there were voices 
muting Cameron would ensure a “German-compliant package of measures” (The 
Independent, November 2014). Such suggestions were met angrily by Conservative MPs, such 
as David Davis who claimed there should be no such measures (BBC News, November 2014a).  
At the same time, it was reported by Der Speigel that Germany rejected Britain’s policy 
proposal of placing a cap on EU nationals (Spiegel Online, November 2014). If such a 
suggestion was made Merkel would reportedly rescind her efforts to ensure Britain remained 
in the EU. Respectively, Merkel was viewing ‘Brexit’ as a real possibility (ibid) over this policy 
proposal. Merkel believed such limits on low-skilled EU workers would bring EU free 
movement to an end (The Sunday Times, November 2014). David Davis dismissed Germany’s 
comments as being fuelled by domestic politics with Germany concerned that more EU 
nationals would go to Germany if access was restricted to Britain (The Telegraph, November 
2014a). Ultimately, the speech was expected to create a path for a ‘Brexit’ with no support 
from Germany or the other EU states (New Statesman, November 2014).   
Meanwhile, the calls for ‘Brexit’ grew as senior cabinet members including Oliver 
Letwin, Chris Grayling, Theresa Villiers and Michael Grove all stated Britain should leave the 
EU in the event that Cameron could not attain a significant reform of Britain’s membership 
with the EU (The Guardian, November 2014a). Merkel deemed Cameron was “putting 
domestic politics before and party management ahead of diplomacy” (The Telegraph, 
November 2014b). Prior to Cameron’s speech there were reports that Merkel had influenced 
the PM, deterring him from advocating a cap (The Telegraph, November 2014e). An additional 
influence on Cameron’s immigration speech was the ECJ’s ruling in the Dano Case (2014) (see 
Verschueren, 2015; Thym, 2015). The ECJ ruled that Germany did not have to pay welfare 
benefits to an inactive Romanian national. Hence, the judgement reinforced Britain’s 
contention that “free movement is still linked to employment and the ability to support 
yourself” (Interview 9, April 2015).  
In the wake of the British immigration target being abandoned (The Telegraph, 
November 2014c), Cameron gave his immigration speech which signified a significant change 
in national tactics (BBC News, November 2014b) rather than changing the game. In a “sea 
change” (Interview 3, December 2014) Cameron concentrated new policy efforts on reducing 
the number of EU nationals arriving to work in Britain through welfare policy, as Open Europe 
advocated, rather than addressing ‘benefit tourism’ per se. Cameron outlined how EU 
nationals would have to be resident in Britain for four years before being entitled to welfare 
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benefits, including Child Benefit and tax credits, and social housing. In what would have been 
“a fundamental change to what free movement is all about” (Interview 3, December 2014), 
EU jobseekers would be required to have a job offer before arriving to Britain. Those who did 
not would be ineligible for welfare benefits.  
Cameron stated a new law would be passed so that EU jobseekers could not claim UC, 
which would be enacted within existing EU law. Those jobseekers who after six months were 
still without employment would have to leave Britain. Additionally, Child Benefit would no 
longer be paid to children residing outside of Britain (Prime Minister’s Office, 2014). 
Ultimately, Cameron presented a “welfare problem rather than an immigration problem” (The 
Telegraph, November 2014d), declaring “EU jobseekers who don’t pay in will no longer get 
anything out” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2014). Cameron stated these proposals provided “a 
bigger element of control” than an “arcane mechanism within the EU” (ibid), referring to the 
absent cap. He claimed such a mechanism would be under the control of the EC and not Britain 
(ibid).  
Arguably, Cameron had reached “a cul-de-sac” after taking attempts to change EU law 
“to its limit and drew back” (Interview, 5, March 2015). Cameron stated Britain would not 
launch “a fundamental assault” on free movement but would “rule nothing out” if the EU did 
not respond to concerns (Prime Minister’s Office, 2014). EU reaction to Cameron’s speech was 
predictably negative. Germany accused Britain of blackmailing the EU (The Guardian, 
November 2014b). Poland stated its opposition to proposals advocating for Britain to change 
its welfare state to a more contributory system, with the principle of equal treatment being 
“an absolute red line” (The Telegraph, December 2014). An EU official ruled out treaty change 
on the grounds “it could be counterproductive” (The Guardian, November 2014b). The EU was 
experiencing a “shut down” in some areas so to avoid opening a “Pandora’s box of other 
problems” whereby “things start to unravel” (Interview 12, May 2015). Meanwhile, the EC 
stated Cameron’s proposals were “part of the debate” (BBC News, November 2014c).  
Nationally, threat of another Conservative revolt emerged as Eurosceptics responded 
angrily to reports of Merkel’s interference and were concerned the proposals were inadequate 
(The Telegraph, November 2014e). Farage maintained that while Cameron had taken away 
“one or two of the pull factors, you cannot control immigration as a member of the European 
Union…that is something he isn’t going to challenge” (The Guardian, November 2014c).  
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 Phase 3: The British Negotiation (2015-2016)     
6.3.1 EU Policy Stability  
Against the background of the wider European migrant crisis, which significantly 
impacted the British debate at the time but is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss, the 
Calais Crisis and the reignition of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, the 2015 General 
Election85 led to an unexpected majority win for the Conservative Party. Accordingly, Cameron 
announced that an in/out referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU would be held before 
the end of 2017 (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015), and set out his position for the forthcoming 
EU negotiations. This included: policy proposals for EU nationals to be ineligible to claim in-
work benefits and housing for four years; terminating the payment of Child Benefit to children 
living outside Britain; and, reigning back ECJ judgements that had expanded free movement 
rights (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015).  
Stability at the EU level continued despite the threat of the impending British 
referendum. The EC, along with numerous member states, reacted characteristically resolute 
in its position on free movement branding Cameron’s proposals as “highly problematic” (The 
Guardian, November 2015). Germany continued to state that free movement and non-
discrimination were “non-negotiable” and an achievement of EI that could not be “haggled 
over” (The Telegraph, October 2015). Nonetheless, Donald Tusk, the EU Council President of 
the time, proposed peripheral policy changes in response to British concerns. Hence, although 
there were signs of ‘crisis diversity’ at the periphery, free movement itself was not 
undermined, indicating fundamental stability at the EU level. As one interviewee stated prior 
to the 2015 general election, “there will have to be some reforms to free movement over the 
next few years” (Interview 12, April 2015).  
Within Tusk’s draft negotiation package, in relation to EU nationals’ free movement 
rights in accessing welfare benefits, policy reforms included changes to the EU’s secondary 
legislation. Firstly, there would be changes to the regulations surrounding social security co-
ordination. In regard to Child Benefit, Britain was still required to pay those with children 
outside of the state. However, policy would be introduced to permit payment of Child Benefit 
at the rate of the member state in which the child was living (European Council, 2016a: 15).  
Secondly, there were changes to the regulation on the free movement of workers. A 
new “alert and safeguard mechanism” (European Council, 2016a: 15) would be introduced. In 
                                                          
85 All mainstream political parties “shifted their view and position” on EU nationals access to welfare 
benefits, outlining “tougher policies” (Interview 12, May 2015).  
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a clear response to Cameron’s Open Europe-influenced policy proposals, this allowed Britain 
to suspend payment of in-work benefits to new EU nationals for four years in response to “an 
exceptional magnitude” (ibid) of EU nationals arriving. The package stated that this suspension 
would be permitted for “an extended period of time” (ibid). Over these years, the limits on EU 
nationals’ access to the welfare state would be incrementally removed “to take account of the 
growing connection” between EU nationals and the host state’s labour market (ibid). 
Notably, EU nationals’ entitlement to access national welfare benefits could be 
temporarily suspended under these new proposals. This mechanism would be enacted under 
one of the following three conditions, namely where EU nationals were: impacting on the 
operation of “essential aspects” of the welfare system and “primary purpose” of in-work 
benefits; creating “serious” and persistent problems within the employment market; or, 
exerting “excessive pressure” on the “proper functioning” of national public services (ibid).  
Nonetheless, the package clarified that the mechanism would be under the 
jurisdiction of the Council and EC. There were also changes to primary law regarding new 
“appropriate transitional measures” (European Council, 2016a: 16), without detailing the 
specifics. Thus, the EU had successfully upheld free movement in the context of 
unprecedented challenges. 
6.3.2 The Dawn of a New Crisis 
At this point the other twenty-seven member states politics became imperative, as “in 
order to have innovative policy making you need support from the rest of the EU” (Interview 
12, May 2015). Four countries including Poland were opposed to the restrictions proposed on 
EU nationals’ access to welfare benefits twenty-four hours before head of states were to meet 
at the final summit to agree on the package (BBC News, February 2016a). There were also 
clashes over how long the emergency brake on welfare benefits should last (The Independent, 
February 2016b). Nonetheless, these policy changes were agreed to by virtue of Cameron 
compromising on his original negotiation position (BBC News, February 2016b). The 
emergency break could operate for seven years rather than thirteen, meanwhile Child Benefit 
rules would apply immediately to new EU nationals only, rules would apply to currently 
residing EU nationals from 2020 (ibid). These changes were to become effective on the event 
of a successful referendum over Britain’s EU membership (European Council, 2016b).  
Despite Cameron declaring a victory for Britain, nationally politicians and the media 
judged the package as a failure. Cameron claimed Britain now had "tough new restrictions on 
access to our welfare system for EU migrants" with “no more something for nothing” (The 
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Independent, February 2016c). However, the package came under heavy criticism from within 
and outside the Conservative government. Conservative Liam Fox branded it “watered down 
in every area” (The Independent, February 2016a), meanwhile Boris Johnson claimed, “what 
would be better would be if we had a brake of our own” (Sky News, February 2016a). Open 
Europe were more receptive to the deal calling it “a step in the right direction” (Open Europe, 
2016) with it being “the largest single shift in a member state’s position within the EU” (ibid). 
For Eurosceptics the package reinforced their belief that the only means for Britain to gain 
control was to leave the EU (The Independent, February 2016d). 
Most importantly, the public overwhelmingly viewed the settlement as being a bad 
deal for Britain with 44% claiming it made them more likely to vote in favour of ‘Brexit’ (Sky 
News, February 2016b). After the cabinet assented to the government campaigning to remain, 
Cameron announced that the date of the EU referendum would be 23rd June 2016 (The 
Independent, February 2016d). Thus, public dissatisfaction over the negotiation settlement, 
with Cameron having to comprise over EU nationals’ access to welfare benefits, arguably 
meant the ‘out’ vote for ‘Brexit’ on the 23rd June had been confirmed. A ‘Brexit’ vote was 
subsequently the “big long-term impact” of the euro crisis (Interview 12, May 2015). 
Ultimately, national politics had been forced to compromise with EU politics as economics and 
politics clashed, leading Britain to the exit door and a new crisis to begin.  
 Conclusion: ‘Crisis Progression’ vs. ‘Crisis Diversity’ 
“I do not see…that this is some crisis that requires some fundamental re-evaluation of 
free movement” (Interview 9, April 2015), and neither did the EU. In this spirit, this chapter 
has shown how there was substantial stability within the most unprecedented, protracted 
crisis of the EU’s history. The challenge on EU free movement created significant British 
welfare policy development. In turn, an uncharacteristically rigid EU response ensured free 
movement remained untouched (‘crisis stability’), despite significant instability within the EU 
system. This stability contained the euro crisis within economic policy and confined the free 
movement debate to the national level. Ultimately, substantiating the findings within this 
thesis so far, this demonstrates the presence of a ‘crisis spectrum’ at play. 
In reference to our original three questions: 
• Is ‘crisis diversity’ or ‘crisis progression’ occurring in the crisis response from 
national welfare policy? 
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• Does the crisis pattern identified within British welfare policy and its 
interaction with EU social policy mirror that identified previously in Chapter 
5? 
• What has been the impact of the euro crisis on Britain’s national social policy 
response in welfare policy, and what does this tell us about the EU in ‘crisis 
mode’? 
Regarding Question 1: in relation to the crisis pattern both ‘crisis diversity’ and ‘crisis 
progression’ are occurring within the crisis response from national welfare policy. The key 
arguments for ‘crisis progressionists’ in relation to social welfare policy are: 
• The euro crisis has spilled over into free movement producing a ‘domino’ 
effect. 
• The euro crisis has spilled over from the EU to the national level, as an EU 
economic crisis characteristically translated into a national political crisis 
(Chapter 5). 
• Once again, Britain actively harnessed ‘crisis progression’ to inhibit EU policy 
dictating and being incorporated into national social policy. 
In contrast, the key arguments for ‘crisis diversifiers’ are: 
• The political crisis facilitated national social welfare policy developments over 
EU nationals’ welfare eligibility.  
• In particular, the threat of an ‘out’ vote in the referendum and public concern 
alike facilitated national social welfare policy development. 
• The crisis response is one response of many, largely dominated by national 
politics, as a Conservative government who was being politically challenged 
by UKIP “enhanced this anti-immigrant discourse and anti-immigrant stance, 
there are other responses that are possible” (Interview 11, April 2015).  
• The national social welfare policy developments ensured there was no excess 
rigidity within the EU system. 
For ‘crisis stabilisers’ the key arguments are: 
• The EU did not adjust free movement, creating an area of stability and 
containing the euro crisis within economic policy, due to the damage it would 
inflict on the EU system with being a core, foundational policy; the EU viewing 
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such policy change as unnecessary; and, the EU not desiring such a change in 
policy.  
• Free movement anchored the system down allowing surrounding policy areas, 
namely British social welfare policy, to react flexibly and the rest of the system 
to be amenable. 
• Free movement ensured there was no excess flexibility at a time of crisis when 
the system was already in flux. 
Regarding Question 2: The crisis pattern identified in British social welfare policy, does 
mirror national social policy’s historical development (Chapter 5), and the national level within 
the euro crisis (Chapter 4). Namely, a pattern of ‘crisis diversity’. The euro crisis prompted an 
immigration debate over free movement and proceeded to act as a catalyst for social welfare 
policy development. Specifically, ‘crisis progression’ led to ‘crisis diversity’ as welfare policy 
developed through an organic crisis. ‘Crisis progression’ emerged as the euro crisis 
exacerbated public concern over the number of EU nationals arriving to Britain. This was 
viewed as a threat, particularly to the welfare state. Thus, supporting Saurugger’s (2014) key 
factors for member states (non)compliance during a crisis in Chapter 2, free movement 
became a significant salient issue which incrementally became politicised within Britain 
leading to an increased resistance and attempts to renegotiate the EU policy. The EU’s 
inflexibility forced a national policy response. 
Respectively, out of threat came opportunity as UKIP heightened and capitalised on 
these concerns. Meanwhile, the 2010 to 2015 Conservative government utilised public 
concern to create new welfare policy, aligned to national austerity policy, accommodating 
both the public and the politicians’ concerns. Hence, while the crisis provided an opportunity 
for Europeanization and the expediting of the Europeanization process Britain rejected such 
opportunities and followed national policy strategies. Although the EU system was not 
overwhelmed, with experiencing ‘crisis stability’ in free movement, there were intervening 
political factors at the national level which meant the state was no longer willing to service the 
Europeanization process. A national referendum presented a further threat, while being 
politically expedient in neutralising the threat of UKIP, and facilitated welfare policy’s 
development to reduce the desirability of an ‘out’ vote. Radaelli’s (2004) calls for the re-
introduction of politics into Europeanization studies, which this thesis begun in the previous 
chapter, has been answered loud and clear within this analysis. The national party politics and 
political ideology of the government of the day dictated Britain’s crisis response.  
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Additionally, this analysis further substantiates Buller’s (2006) assertion in Chapter 2 
of the politicisation of the Europeanization debate and active political agents at the national 
level which make Europeanization a social construct. The interaction with EU social policy is 
also mirrored. Britain attempted to use national welfare policy to keep EU social policy out of 
the British welfare model and shape a limited EU free movement policy, however this time EU 
social policy was not impeded. Risse et al.’s (2001) ‘goodness of fit’ model (Chapter 2) can 
clearly be seen to be playing out in the British case as the conceptions of national and EU 
citizenship were a ‘misfit’86. Free movement was a direct challenge on the historical 
understanding of British national identity which was inextricably connected to its universalist 
welfare state and the states national administrative style of welfare benefits (Risse et al., 
2001).  
Thus, recurrent attempts to ‘upload’ policy from the national to the EU level were 
rejected and EU free movement experienced ‘crisis stability’. As such, while historically Britain 
had successfully reversed roles with the EU (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) this case of national 
social welfare policy constitutes a failed attempt to do so. Thus, suggesting that revitalisation 
also occurs along a spectrum. In this instance, Britain was attempting to revitalise the EU with 
no significant effect on the state. Instead, the opposite occurred as revitalisation of the 
member state’s welfare policy had no significant effects for the EU, due to opposition from 
the EU. Hence, rejecting the automaticity assumed within Saurugger’s (2014) model, the EU 
did not adjust EU policy. By implication, within policy areas where member states have already 
committed to Europeanization there is no ability to renegotiate, hence Saurugger’s model can 
only hold true where EU policy areas are in formulation.  
Respectively, at one end of the spectrum there is revitalisation of member states with 
no significant effect on the EU. At the other end there is revitalisation of the EU with no 
significant effect on member states, which also occurred at different times historically with 
Britain as discussed in Chapter 5. In the middle there is revitalisation of both the EU and 
member states either in concurrence or not at all (see figure 8). 
 
                                                          
86 See Ruhs (2016) who supports this contention through his analysis of how national institutions and 
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Regarding Question 3: The euro crisis has facilitated the British crisis response within 
welfare policy as evidenced by the aforementioned crisis pattern. Britain was attempting to 
use de-Europeanization as a defensive strategy against the destabilising effects of the crisis on 
the national economy. Thus, substantiating Risse et al.’s (2001) contention that adaptation to 
EU policy occurs in national colours. However, this attempt failed as free movement was 
unaffected by this strategy as the EU defended the principle creating an area of stability 
through the rejection of Britain’s flexible policy position, despite the system being in crisis. 
Hence, Europeanization was untouched by the crisis with nothing gained and nothing lost. 
Respectively, against the classical view of crises this analysis demonstrates that the EU in ‘crisis 
mode’ does not mean the end of the EU.  
National welfare policy development has not been inhibited. Hence, this case study 
demonstrates how a crisis can see the continuing development of the EU, possibly a stronger 
EU, from a crippling crisis as is the growing counter view (see Chapter 3). Ultimately, 
substantiating those findings in the previous chapter, the euro crisis is not an existential crisis 
as evidenced by EU free movement remaining untouched.  
The succeeding chapter will analyse the Irish case of national activation policy under 
control of the Troika. It will similarly explore the impact of the euro crisis on the development 





Ireland, The Troika and the Catalytic Euro 
Crisis 
 
“The crisis created a dynamic that really there was no option but to change it, even if you 
didn’t agree with it.” (Interview 21, February 2016) 
“The political imperative to do so might not have been there without the crisis, if anything 
you know the saying you shouldn’t waste a good crisis, it certainly helped to focus our minds 
on that part of the equation.” (Interview 18, February 2016) 
“The euro crisis has created a political context in which the changes can happen more quickly 
than otherwise would have happened.” (Interview 13, November 2015) 
 
Against the classical view of crises, the above quotes epitomise the stark consensus that the 
euro crisis was a catalyst for Irish activation policy. The euro crisis translated into an 
unprecedented unemployment crisis in Ireland requiring an equally unprecedented national 
social policy response. In comparison to the British case, with such differences to be further 
discussed within the conclusion of this thesis, there is a notable lack of conflict between 
Ireland and the EU despite the Troika controlling state policy as a parallel fiscal crisis evolved. 
Once again, the EU drove Irish social policy development (Chapter 5) as a new ‘active’ Irish 
activation system was borne out of the significant threat of the state’s financial crisis and 
collapse in employment.  
This chapter will examine the case study of Ireland and the use of national activation 
policy to respond to and address the unprecedented levels of unemployment in the euro crisis. 
The chapter will explore how the euro crisis positively impacted on the state’s ability to 
exercise and develop activation policy. It will identify the crisis pattern within Irish activation 
policy, deciphering whether a ‘crisis spectrum’ is at play. Furthermore, it will identify how the 
euro crisis had a similar expediting effect on the process of Europeanization at the national 
level.   
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 This case study acts as an interesting comparison to the previous case study on Britain. 
Ireland is a Eurozone member state and was a crisis country after becoming one of the first 
member states to collapse despite the government’s attempts “that Ireland wouldn’t be 
associated with the so-called PIGS” (Interview 21, February 2016). Ultimately, this chapter’s 
focus on a different sphere of national social policy, within a different member state, 
demonstrates the flexibility of the theoretical logics and the fact they can be applied to a 
variety of policy areas.  
 This chapter will follow an identical structure to the preceding chapter, further filling 
the current gap in the literature identified in Chapter 3. The three key questions posed in this 
chapter will mirror those posed in the previous chapter in order to compare the two case 
studies, namely;  
• Is ‘crisis diversity’ or ‘crisis progression’ occurring in the crisis response from 
national activation policy? 
• Does the crisis pattern identified within Irish activation policy and its 
interaction with EU social policy mirror that identified previously in Chapter 
5? 
• What has been the impact of the euro crisis on Ireland’s national social policy 
response in activation policy, and what does this tell us about the EU in ‘crisis 
mode’? 
Accordingly, to answer these questions this analysis of Ireland’s social policy response 
within activation policy is divided into three-time periods, this time from 2009 to 2017. The 
analysis documents how Ireland reformed its activation policy to address the unprecedented 
unemployment crisis as the euro crisis made Ireland’s typical strategy of using welfare benefits 
to support the unemployed unenforceable. The first period from 2009 to 2011 documents 
how ‘crisis progression’ initially dominated Irish activation policy with the state lacking funds 
to develop a social policy response as the economic crisis spilled over into national social 
policy. This section identifies how pre-crisis “the logic of the reform was there” (Interview 19, 
February 2016) and, in particular, four pre-crisis policy proposals become enacted at an 
accelerated pace due to the euro crisis. This meant in the crisis there was remarkable 
agreement between the EU and Ireland over activation policy reforms under the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Troika as the national strategy became 
accepted and enshrined within the conditions of the financial bailout. Hence, it was not the 
Troika which dictated Irish welfare to work policy during the crisis. 
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The second period chronicles how ‘crisis progression’ was transformed into ‘crisis 
diversity’ from 2012 to 2014 as the crisis fostered “a sea change in the approach” (Interview 
15, December 2015) of Ireland’s activation system. This section accounts for the significant 
development in activation policy which was motivated by an attempt to integrate the 
placement and benefit functions of the welfare system, namely through a new activation 
strategy Pathways to Work. Accordingly, it documents how ‘crisis diversity’ occurred at an 
accelerated pace at the national level as social policy development occurred based on pre-
crisis ideas, drawing upon experiences in other EU countries, as Ireland converged with EU 
activation practices, thus similarly accelerating the Europeanization process. This builds upon 
those findings in Chapter 6 which demonstrated that the euro crisis is not inhibiting national 
social policy development. It also accounts for how EU social policy was accelerated as Ireland 
undertook the presidency of the European Council and enacted a rapid adoption of the EU’s 
Youth Guarantee.  
The third period accounts for Irish activation policy development outside of the Troika 
agreement in the present period of financial recovery from 2015 to 2017, exploring how ‘crisis 
stability’ ensued coupled with ongoing incremental policy innovation. It demonstrates how 
the crisis had facilitated Irish activation policy development with some policy practices, such 
as the activation conditionality on welfare payments to lone parents, having been reversed to 
their pre-crisis model outside of the MoU. However, structural changes fostered by the euro 
crisis, such as the new mixed ‘worker-mother-regime’ and the new Europeanized, coercive 
Pathways to Work activation strategy, are shown to have become firmly embedded into the 
landscape of Irish welfare to work policy.     
The chapter finds that there was a social policy response and significant social policy 
development during the crisis period in Irish activation policy. The case of Ireland 
demonstrates how a ‘crisis spectrum’ is at play with Ireland moving up one end of the ‘crisis 
spectrum’ to the other over the course of the crisis period (see figure 9). Notably, while the 
euro crisis was an existential threat to the survival of the member state, “in addressing that 
threat opportunities arose or were found and certain policies were implemented (Interview 
19, February 2016). Hence, the crisis pattern of ‘crisis diversity’ in Irish activation policy is 
found to mirror national social policy’s historical development (Chapter 5) and the national 
level within the euro crisis (Chapter 4). Similarly, Ireland’s crisis interaction with EU social 
policy is consistent with its positive historical interaction (Chapter 5). The chapter also finds, 
in contrast to the British case, that Ireland was successful in reversing roles with the EU, 
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presidency of the European Council, accelerating EU social policy development. This further 
suggests that revitalisation occurs along a spectrum, as claimed in the previous chapter, and 
substantiates the finding in Chapter 4 for the presence of ‘bi-directional’ Europeanization. 
Ultimately, in accordance with the British case and against the traditional view of crises, the 
chapter finds the EU in ‘crisis mode’ does not mean the end of the EU. 
 Phase 1: The Activation of Activation Policy (2009-2011) 
7.1.1 Pre-Crisis Activation Thinking 
There were numerous innovative policy proposals prior to the crisis which “all had said 
that we needed to put more into activation” (Interview 18, February 2016), in recognition that 
Ireland had an underdeveloped and ‘passive’ activation regime which was “out of step with 
the rest of Europe” (Interview 15, December 2015). Arguably, this underdevelopment was 
associated to the historical development of the welfare state which was underpinned by a lack 
of national demand for a robust welfare state and thus established a minimal role for the state 
in citizens’ affairs, creating a mixed welfare state (Chapter 5). Respectively, to understand how 
the euro crisis acted as a catalyst for Irish activation policy development it is integral to reflect 
on pre-crisis policy thinking. It is these policies which were implemented during the crisis in 
response to the unemployment crisis. As many interviews confirmed, “the innovation which 
was around ideas and policy analysis was known long before the crisis” (Interview 13, 
November 2015). 
At the EU level both the Kok report (2003) and the Council of the European Union Joint 
Employment Report (2004/2005) recommended that Ireland increased access to activation 
programmes (2005: 42), with the latter citing “insufficient evidence of a policy response” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2005: 86). At the national level it was a lack of 
consensus after a review of Irish active labour market programmes (DETE, 2004) rather than a 
lack of innovative policy ideas which meant activation policy was not pursued more rigorously. 
In accordance with EU recommendations, the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
advocated a significant boost to Irish activation policy at a time of political stalemate. The 
NESC’s DWS (2005, see Chapter 5) proposed a significant paradigm shift in national activation 
policy by basing this new welfare state model on three concentric circles of activation, 
services, and income supports. The aim for Ireland was to “increase the size of the activation 
circle without impacting on the size of the other two” (Interview 18, February 2016). 
Additionally, the NESC made specific activation policy proposals. Firstly, to rid the Irish 
system of its unfriendly employment benefits system (2005: 55) the NESC advocated replacing 
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the contingency-based criteria of Irish welfare payments, which created “perverse incentives” 
to remain unemployed (2005: 74), with a new single welfare payment for working age 
unemployed. The NESC proposed an Irish variant of flexicurity87 with a new baseline 
“participation income” payment (2005: 219), with conditionality based on a person’s barriers 
to employment (2005: 220) and requiring “meaningful participation” (ibid) in activation 
supports. Welfare payments to lone parents were cited for supporting “a lifetime dependency 
on social welfare” (2005: 182). 
Additional proposals supporting the reform of the welfare benefit system were voiced 
beyond the NESC. FÁS claimed Rent Supplement for lone parents receiving the One Parent 
Family Payment (OPFP) incentivised dependency on the state (2005: 43) and thus proposed 
an uplift in the threshold for secondary benefits (2005: 42). Ireland’s largest activation 
programme Community Employment (CE) was also criticised for incentivising OPFP recipients 
to remain on welfare (2005: 44). A more radical reform was proposed by the McCarthy Report, 
advocating the abolishment of “double payments” (2009: 17) altogether.  
The introduction of an age differentiation in unemployment benefit was also 
recommended with a “grading of jobseekers’ assistance by age” (McCarthy et al., 2009: 70) 
and replacement of Jobseeker’s Allowance to those aged under twenty-five with alternative 
supports which were “more developmental for the young people concerned” (NESC, 2009: 
92). Succeeding the NESC’s criticisms of OPFP, the government proposed to replace this with 
a new Parental Allowance payment. The payment was conditional upon the participation of 
lone parents in the National Employment Action Plan (NEAP) when a child was aged five (DSFA, 
2006: 24-26; 98-102) and would terminate when the child turned seven (DSFA, 2006: 101). 
The issue of childcare was acknowledged with suggestions for either paying a childcare 
allowance or delaying implementation of proposals until provisions were prepared (DSFA, 
2006: 100).  
There was significant support pre-crisis for introducing profiling into the activation 
system, with the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) taking the lead in developing a 
profiling model. The system would facilitate in activating the short-term unemployed who 
were most at risk of long-term unemployment. An initial successful feasibility pilot study in 
Galway and Waterford (Layte and O’Connell, 2005) led to a national pilot in conjunction with 
the Department of Social and Family Affairs (DSFA). This identified the critical use of a 
                                                          
87 FÁS (2006) opposed Irish flexicurity. 
197 
 
probability score to ascertain the possibility of claimants exiting the Live Register88 into 
employment. In turn, this provided a hierarchy of need for activation supports and a “rational 
basis for allocating scarce resources” (O’Connell et al., 2009: 43). Claimants previous 
participation on CE was identified as a key characteristic for remaining on the Live Register (O’ 
Connell et al., 2009: 32). 
The NESC (2006) supported proposals for client profiling with it facilitating 
appropriate, timely engagement and prioritising who should be supported first (January 2006: 
83). This made possible a new activation system comprising of individual progression plans for 
every client, detailing activation supports and their activation obligations, and the 
employment service acting as a “job broker” (January 2006: 86). There were multiple 
proposals for a single national employment service with employment supports currently split 
across numerous departments, agencies and organisations89. The NESC (2006) proposed a new 
“networked model” (January 2006: 37) through new “Service Delivery Agreements” (January 
2006: 51), creating two new ‘one stop shops’; one for employment services and one for 
welfare payments. This would avoid service gaps and duplications by providing a personalised 
“needs-based approach” (January 2006: 58) moreover, clarity over access to benefits when 
entering employment.  
The “social partners themselves said that a lot of fundamental change is needed” 
(Interview 17, January 2016) as reflected in the ten year partnership agreement Towards 2016 
(T2016), which committed Ireland to introducing a new active single employment service. This 
new integrated service was underpinned by “an active outcome-focused individual case 
management” approach (Department of the Taoiseach, 2006: 57) through an innovative Social 
and Economic participation programme. This would create “a route map starting with the first 
point of engagement” with the DSFA (Department of the Taoiseach, 2006: 51). The McCarthy 
Report similarly supported the creation of a single employment service through the unification 
of FÁS and the Local Employment Service which it deemed “would be better placed to pursue 
a strong agenda of activation measures” (2009: 16). 
                                                          
88 This recorded the numbers on unemployment benefit including those working part-time, seasonal 
and casual workers. By implication, lone parents on OPFP and spouses in an unemployed couple, who 
received jobseeker’s payments through their partner, typically the husband, were excluded from this 
register. 
89 38 labour market and social inclusion measures were maintained by 8 government departments and 
13 different agencies in combination with non-statutory organisations (NESC, 2006: xiv). 
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7.1.2 The Grubb Report: The “Grandfather”90 of Activation 
As many interviews highlighted, of all the pre-crisis reports it was the OECD’s ‘Grubb 
report’ (2009) which was the most influential. Although it could be argued that Grubb would 
have been implemented in Ireland regardless of the crisis, “maybe not at the pace it did 
because of the crisis” (Interview 21, February 2016). The Grubb report was a blistering critique 
of the Irish activation system which highlighted the extent to which it was out of line with 
international practice and requiring reform. 
First and foremost, Ireland was one of a few OECD countries who had the placement 
and benefit functions of the national employment service separate (2009: 43). Secondly, the 
OECD deemed the Irish employment service as “under-resourced” with a disproportionate 
number of staff administering employment benefit over placements (ibid). In contrast to FÁS’s 
role in administering training, its role in providing job creation programmes was deemed 
“problematic” (2009: 131). Thirdly, Grubb was highly critical of Ireland’s welfare benefit 
system due to four features: the high level of welfare payments and the commitment to retain 
such high levels; the weak conditionality attached to unemployment benefits and lack of 
activation conditions attached to welfare benefits in general; recipients on unemployment 
payments either not seeking or available for employment (2009: 94); and, payments being 
premised on income rather than peoples capacity to work which constituted the Irish welfare 
system akin “to a non-categorised minimum income scheme” (2009: 94).  
Fourthly, the report criticised Ireland’s comparatively limited use of sanctions 
internationally (2009: 95). Fifthly, in accordance with the NESC (2005), Ireland’s treatment of 
lone parents receiving benefits until their child was aged eighteen or twenty-two-years-old 
was considered “a sharp outlier” (2009: 135). The only other country passively paying lone 
parents was New Zealand (2009: 130). The report was also particularly critical of the CE 
training programme for its voluntary nature (2009: 105), lack of sanctions (2009: 28) and its 
notably low exit rates into employment, at only 30% (2009: 104). In line with FÁS’s (2005) 
assessment, the report maintained that rather than a form of activation “CE still functions for 
many participants as an alternative to regular employment” (2009: 104). 
Consequently, the report recommended, as they had traditionally, for Ireland to 
integrate the placement and benefit functions into one “single service focused on activation” 
(2009: 132). This would: make employment considered as a first option; increase engagement 
                                                          
90 (Interview 21, February 2016) 
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with the unemployed (ibid); and provide sufficient resources for systematic engagement 
(2009: 137). Grubb also proposed changing to “a more coercive approach” but noted that this 
novel approach “currently has few active advocates within the social partnership process” 
(2009: 130). Grubb recommended that the unemployed activation conditions should be 
“greatly intensified” (2009: 129), with payments of welfare benefits conditional on 
participation in activation programmes (2009: 138). In conjunction, significant reforms to 
inactive benefits needed to be “strategically planned and sequenced” (2009: 95). A revision of 
the NEAP process was also proposed (2009: 137). 
Grubb supported reforms to activate lone parents, additionally recommending the 
adoption of the German system where transfer to Jobseeker’s Allowance was conditional on 
the individual’s access to childcare, rather than adequate availability nationally (2009: 90). 
Grubb noted that while there was no out-and-out opposition to the proposals for reforming 
lone parents’ access to benefits there was also “no particular lobby for this tougher approach” 
(2009: 89). 
7.1.3 Crisis Activated Activation: The Takeover of the Troika  
‘Crisis progression’ initially dominated the Irish response as the economic crisis 
became mirrored in social policy. In the absence of funds to support policy development of 
any kind policy “paralysis” (Interview 13, November 2015) ensued. Nonetheless, this phase 
saw the seeds sown for ‘crisis diversity’ as plans were produced for how EU funds would be 
spent. The arrival of the Troika signified a marked shift in Ireland’s approach to activation 
policy. However, contrary to popular belief, it was not the Troika that dictated national welfare 
to work policy91. Instead, the Troika visited Ireland, found out what policy approach the 
government was pursuing, and “in the case of the activation they pretty much liked our plan 
so they just repeated most of it in the loan agreement” (Interview 18, February 2016). Hence, 
the only policy pressure emanating from the EU was “to insist on immediate actions” 
(Interview 17, January 2016).  
On account of the substantial pre-crisis policy thinking on activation, Ireland was 
already aware of the policy reforms required. One interviewee went as far to state that, “I can 
hardly think of anything to which the Troika drew our attention to in the area of welfare to 
work…that we weren’t aware of” (Interview 17, January 2016). The fiscal crisis created a new 
policy focus on austerity which shifted the emphasis from social policy to economic policy 
                                                          
91 As confirmed in a recent paper by Hick (2017).  
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(Interview 16, January 2016). This made activation policy an imperative response as funding 
welfare benefits became constrained when demand was at its height (OECD, 2013: 132). 
Furthermore, this led to welfare recipients on unemployment benefits being viewed as “the 
primary problem with unemployment” (Interview 17, January 2016). Thus, the policy focus 
was on reducing the claimant count, namely the Live Register which was politically significant 
with being reported on monthly during the crisis (Interview 21, February 2016).  
Hence, the simultaneous fiscal and employment crises from the euro crisis created “a 
dynamic where the ‘Grubb report’ inevitably did become well implemented” (Interview 21, 
February 2016). Respectively, Ireland turned the threat of the unemployment crisis into an 
opportunity to implement overdue activation reforms, as the NESC stated “the moment is 
opportune not to ‘waste a crisis’ in this area” (NESC, 2011: 3). Within the MoU, Ireland 
committed to increasing its activation regime namely, reforming unemployment benefit 
(Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2010: 20); “exploiting synergies” between 
social assistance, unemployment benefit and active labour market policies to improve their 
efficiency respectively (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2010: 21); and, to 
reduce “the overlapping of competencies across different departments” (ibid). Additionally, 
the conditionality in relation to taking up employment and training would be increased (ibid).  
Irish activation measures were to be strengthened by a three-pronged policy approach 
namely, the introduction of profiling and a commitment to more engagement with the 
unemployed; “more effective monitoring of jobseekers’ activities”; and, introducing financial 
sanctions for those unemployed who do not comply with these new measures (ibid). 
Nonetheless, as the NESC argued at the time, “these steps would have had to be taken anyway, 
[and] were already in process” (NESC, 2011: 179). The expansion of the activation system was 
targeted primarily at two groups in particular, “the young unemployed generally and lone 
parents who are women for the most part” (Interview 24, April 2016). 
Respectively, the crisis accelerated four pre-crisis activation policies. Firstly, there 
were proposals to reform the welfare benefit system in its treatment towards people of 
working age which strikingly saw Ireland shift to replicating British employment policy 
(Interview 13, November 2015). The Department of Social Protection (DSP), the new title for 
the DSFA, explored the potential of a single working age social assistance payment, analogous 
to Britain’s UC, adopting the NESC’s (2005) pre-crisis proposal for a single baseline payment. 
This new payment was based on Jobseeker’s Allowance (DSP, November 2010: 83), thus 
making an explicit connection between welfare and full-time employment (DSP, November 
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2010: 91). The payment, which included OPFP, comprised of a flexible three-tier activation 
support system, with support increasing through the tiers and each tailored to the 
unemployed with each level differentiated by the individual’s distance from the labour 
market. 
As the NESC (2005; 2006) had purported, claimants were differentiated by their 
barriers to employment and activation needs (DSP, November 2010: 83) and claimants were 
obligated to engage in activation supports (DSP, November 2010: 85). The new profiling 
system determined the level of entry (DSP, November 2010: 89). Secondly, the introduction 
of an age differential in unemployment benefits for the young. There were no significant 
welfare rate changes in the crisis with a notable preservation of all Ireland’s pre-crisis basic 
welfare rates, except those towards the young (Interview 18, February 2016). “One quite 
impactful” and “striking measure” (Interview 17, January 2016) was the introduction of an age 
differential within Jobseeker’s Allowance, as outlined in the McCarthy (2009) and NESC (2009) 
reports. Those new claimants aged between twenty and twenty-one received a reduced 
payment as did those aged between twenty-two and twenty-four (DSP, 2010: 16). Only those 
engaging with activation supports received the full adult payment (ibid). 
   Thirdly, “the change in policy towards lone parents is the prime example” (Interview 
16, January 2016) of policy acceleration. The new Parental Allowance payment was 
incrementally introduced (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011: 51). From April 2011, new lone 
parent claimants would receive this new payment once the child turned fourteen, meanwhile 
pre-existing claimants would be phased onto the new payment over six years (DSP, 2010: 19). 
Fourthly, significant institutional reform ensued as recurrent proposals pre-crisis for a single 
national employment service were finally addressed due to the crisis, as “the reality is it would 
not have changed really, or certainly not at the fast pace without the crisis” (Interview 21, 
February 2016). This policy reform was further justified by the negative experience of young 
jobseekers (NYCI, 2011a). 
FÁS was to be replaced with a new integrated National Employment and Entitlement 
Service (NEES) (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011: 7). In response to Grubb, the DSP 
administered this new service with FÁS only providing training supports. This was a significant 
change considering the historical difficulties to abolish FÁS (see Boyle 2005). Priority was 
afforded to those on the Live Register (DSP, 2011: 14) so “if you are not counted you don’t 
count” (Interview 19, February 2016). Ultimately, echoing T2016, the NEES had “a primary 
focus on the client and a route map starting at the first point of engagement” with the DSP 
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(DSP, 2011: 14). “The single biggest change” (Interview 18, February 2016) was the “active, 
outcome-focused, individual case management” (DSP, 2011: 14) approach. 
In response to Grubb, NEES established a new NEAP process in conjunction with FÁS 
(DSP, 2011: 8), further warranted by the critique of NEAP by McGuiness et al. (2011). This 
comprised of a new coercive system with new sanctions (DSP, 2011: 23) and greater 
monitoring of the unemployed (DSP, 2011: 10; 40). Aligned to the NESC’s (2006) proposals, a 
new social contract of “rights and responsibilities” (DSP, 2011: 24) was created and profiling, 
using the ‘Probability of Exit Score’ (PEX), determined the level of activation support (DSP, 
2011: 21). The activation conditions were also increased on welfare payments.  
Additionally, new policy responses emerged as the government “rapidly created 
programmes” (Interview 19, February 2016). A new training programme, Springboard, and a 
new national internship scheme JobBridge, where participants received a top-up payment for 
participating (Interview 19, February 2016) were created. Contrastingly the Irish, and 
European, response to youth unemployment was slow (ibid). By 2011 there was no policy 
response despite Ireland possessing one of the highest EU youth unemployment rates. The 
only policy proposal was a new Youth Guarantee scheme advocated by the National Youth 
Council of Ireland (NYCI) (2011b: 43). 
Accordingly, the foundations were finally in place for enacting a radical overhaul of 
activation policy as “the crisis provided an opportunity for Irish policy to converge with policy 
practice in the rest of Europe” (Interview 15, December 2015).    
 Phase 2: The Activation of the Irish System (2012-2014) 
7.2.1 The Catalytic Crisis: Implementation, Resistance and Reform  
‘Crisis progression’ was rapidly transformed into a significant period of ‘crisis diversity’ 
as Ireland increased the ‘activation circle’, as the NESC (2005) had proposed, subsequently 
moving the national activation system up the spectrum from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ (Interview 
19, February 2016). Thus, affirming Flinter’s comments in Chapter 5, delivering change was 
much easier in the context of a crisis. Respectively, the pre-crisis focus on training and 
education was radically transformed into Grubb’s ‘work-first’ approach. The collapse of Irish 
social partnership due to the crisis (see Chapter 5) meant many more policy changes were 
enacted than otherwise would have been, particularly in relation to the conditionality of 
welfare benefits (Interview 13, November 2015). The extraordinarily rapid increase in 
unemployment “created a dynamic and a pressure on the system to change” (Interview 21, 
203 
 
February 2016). The EU, and EC in particular, functioned as “a facilitator for the exchange of 
ideas” (Interview 18, February 2016) as Ireland implemented a new activation system within 
three years of entering the Troika agreement. 
The Irish response to unemployment was first and foremost “driven by an effort to 
integrate” the placement and benefit functions (Interview 15, December 2015). This was 
further “accelerated by the crisis” (Interview 16, January 2016) through the government’s new 
flagship activation strategy Pathways to Work (PTW) (2012), which responded to many of 
Grubb’s criticisms and was adopted again from the British model. This was the key policy 
development to create “a sea change in policy terms” (Interview 21, February 2016) within 
Ireland’s approach. In contrast to the historical development of the welfare system, the state 
was now to play an unprecedented role in the lives of its citizens. The Tánaiste (Deputy PM) 
stated at the time that this constituted “one of the biggest reforms in the history of our social 
welfare system” (DSP Press Release, February 2012). This strategy was dependent on the 
creation of NEES92 and the new local ‘one stop shop’ Intreo offices, and aimed to activate those 
long-term unemployed and those who were at high risk of long term unemployment on the 
Live Register with a capacity to work.      
Under PTW, the Irish activation service now profiled welfare claimants on registering 
at Intreo, which would produce a PEX score and lead to creating a personal plan back to 
employment (DSP, 2012: 12). The PEX score facilitated an individual, tailored service as the 
tool by which claimants were differentiated, as the NESC DWS (2005) had proposed. The lower 
the PEX score the more intensive the activation supports. Those claimants with the lowest PEX 
score worked one to one with a case officer. Contrastingly, welfare recipients could no longer 
‘park’ on state benefits with the state increasing its engagement with the unemployed. There 
was a new requirement for any new welfare recipient after 3 months of being unemployed to 
attend a group engagement. Those unemployed after 18 months were referred to a work 
placement or training (DSP, 2012: 4). Hence, this new case management approach meant 
“each job seeker is contacted proactively, we don’t wait for them to contact us we contact 
them” (Interview 18, February 2016).  
There was priority for those on the Live Register in taking up places on activation 
programmes (DSP, 2012: 6) and employment opportunities alike (DSP, 2012: 19). There was 
                                                          
92 Simultaneously there was a significant reform to integrate the Further Education and Training sector 
into one agency, SOLAS and new Local Education and Training Boards which is beyond the remit of this 
thesis to discuss (see Department of Education and Skills, 2012). 
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also increased engagement with employers, drawing on the experience of Germany (Interview 
18, February 2016), to provide an easier transition from welfare to work (DSP, 2012: 9). A new 
coercive activation system was introduced with strengthened financial penalties for those who 
did not engage with the new PTW process (DSP, 2012: 18). There was a commitment to 
introduce the new single working age assistance payment in three years to “simplify the social 
welfare code and minimise any incentive” to remain on benefits (ibid). Ireland discovered very 
quickly that the IMF were “the good boys, the nice people were not who you thought they 
would be” (Interview 23, March 2016), with focusing on the social aspects and the economics 
of activation. This was reflected in the IMF’s emphasis on the importance to “demonstrably 
protect the most vulnerable” (March 2012: 20) when implementing this reform.  
In addressing the issues with inadequate staffing resources for placements, PTW 
included consideration of outsourcing service delivery for employment supports to the long-
term unemployed in what was “quite a different move for the system” (Interview 19, February 
2016). The outsourcing model was based on Britain’s work programme, however it was “very 
significantly different to the UK model” (Interview 18, February 2016) on account of the focus 
on the long-term unemployed, and involving private providers being paid on the basis of their 
performance (DSP, 2012: 21). Both the EU (EC, April 2013: 28) and IMF (April 2013: 26) 
enthusiastically approved of this policy change. In response to the criticisms regarding CE, one-
third of the schemes places were to be readjusted towards short-term activation programmes 
and monitored to ensure participation in the programme led to increased employability of the 
individuals participating (DSP, 2012: 17). The EC consented to Ireland’s new activation strategy 
stating, it “addresses the right priorities” however “swift implementation is now crucial” (EC, 
June 2012: 41). 
Further reforms to welfare benefits were enacted during this phase as the 
government came under pressure from both the EU (EC, June 2012: 39) and IMF (IMF, March 
2012: 20) to reform the welfare system, thus fostering “a good deal of experimentation 
precisely because of the crisis” (Interview 15, December 2015). Budget 2012 reformed the 
basis on which Jobseeker’s Allowance and Jobseekers Benefit was paid. Sundays were now 
included and Jobseekers Benefit was assessed on a five rather than a six working day (DSP, 
Budget 2012a). This had the effect of reducing the amount paid to recipients, thus incentivising 
those on the Live Register combining part-time employment with welfare benefits into full-
time employment.  
205 
 
Reforms to secondary benefits were further accelerated with the “the largest reform 
of housing support in a generation” (Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, 
2013) through the creation of a new Housing Assistance Payment (HAP). This was 
administered by the local authorities. It aimed to replace both Rent Supplement and the Rental 
Accommodation Scheme in an effort to integrate previously disparate housing supports under 
the Department for Housing, Planning and Local Government (ibid). While HAP was being 
developed and rolled out, those on Rent Supplement with a long-term dependence on housing 
support were transferred to the Rental Accommodation Scheme. This permitted those 
individuals in receipt of housing support to undertake full-time employment for the first time 
after Rent Supplement was further cited as providing disincentives to employment (Callan et 
al., 2012; CIB, 2012 and 2013).  
 Despite the pressures for change from continued increases in unemployment levels, 
there was resistance to some policy changes, as one interviewee reflected “the welfare state 
has been more resilient then it felt like during the crisis.” (Interview 13, November 2015). In 
particular, national resistance emerged in relation to the proposals for a new single working 
age payment, which were due to be submitted to the EC by March 2012, despite support from 
the IMF (IMF, March 2012: 20). A parliamentary report by the Joint Committee on Jobs, Social 
Protection and Education (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012) recommended a delay in 
implementing the new payment until activation supports and quality employment was 
available (2012: 28). The committee cited the NEES as underdeveloped and lacking the 
capacity to manage a further increase in their case load (2012: 11). The committee also raised 
concerns over the negative repercussions for those dependent on these payments namely 
lone parents, carers, and those who were disabled (2012: 6). It maintained a new payment 
should have “new structures and not just an amalgamation of payments” (2012: 29).  
 Activation programmes were also reformed by recommendation from the DSP’s 
review of employment supports (November 2012). The ‘passive’ features of the programmes 
were removed to increase the transition from welfare to employment including: shortening 
the duration of participation on certain programmes; a greater role for the DSP in referring 
and monitoring participants; and overlapping programmes were either amalgamated or 
terminated thus reducing expenditure on activation programmes. The IMF praised the report 
(IMF, April 2013) while the EC stated, “it is important that these DSP recommendations are 
acted upon quickly” (EC, April 2013: 28).  
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In response to pre-crisis criticisms from Grubb, FÁS and ESRI regarding CE, there were 
significant reforms to CE with the DSP attaining responsibility for recruitment and participation 
on the programme restricted to one year, extending to a second year was only permitted in 
circumstances where a qualification would be obtained on completion (DSP, November 2012: 
41). There was an emphasis placed on job searching and developing a personal progression 
plan in a timely fashion prior to completing CE. In accordance with proposals by the ESRI (see 
Collins, 2012), the DSP outlined a new structure for CE with two separate streams for 
activation and services supporting the community (DSP, November 2012: 42). This new 
structure was piloted, however other recommended reforms were delayed for further 
discussion to the EC’s disapproval who stated, “a greater sense of urgency in this reform 
process is warranted” with a “more fundamental re-think of some schemes” required (EC, July 
2013: 30).   
Reforms to lone parents OPFP continued at an accelerated pace. Budget 2012 reduced 
the qualifying age limit of a child to twelve-years-old with further reductions on a phased basis 
to limiting qualification to children aged seven-years-old cited (DSP, Budget 2012b). However, 
the Minister for Social Protection at the time, Joan Burton, pledged not to introduce an 
activation requirement on the event of a child turning seven until there was a system of 
“affordable and accessible childcare in place (Irish Examiner, April 2012). The temporary half 
rate payment for those with a weekly income above €425 was terminated (DSP, Budget 
2012b). The income thresholds for means testing OPFP were reduced from €146.50 to €130.00 
for both new and pre-existent lone parents with further decreases earmarked up until 2015 
(ibid). Additionally, lone parents on OPFP were no longer permitted to participate in CE, who 
were previously the largest cohort on the activation scheme, with the government moving to 
a “one person, one payment position” (DSP, Budget 2012c) as the McCarthy report (2009) had 
advocated.   
Resistance arose in relation to the activation of lone parents leading to a reversal on 
their exclusion from JobBridge (TASC, 2012: 16), and significant criticism of the gender-blind 
nature Irish activation policy was taking (NWCI, 2012) as “the crisis crowded out the gender 
issues” (Interview 19, February 2016). The problem was that Ireland’s mixed welfare state was 
leaving women, historically assigned a role to provide care in society, in an ambiguous 
activation position (TASC, 2012: 2). Nevertheless, resistance proved insufficient to stop the 
policy change both for lone parents or the single working age payment as OPFP became 
aligned to Jobseeker’s Allowance, in line with the DSP’s (2010) earlier proposals, through a 
new Jobseekers Transition payment (JST) (2013). Hence, as the opening quote of this chapter 
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stated, during the crisis it was not possible for actors to stop policy change even when they 
disagreed with it. 
JST, originally conceived as Personal Allowance, established a new requirement for 
lone parents with children aged seven to fourteen-years-old to engage with the new activation 
process. JST mirrored Jobseeker’s Allowance in all but one respect whereby lone parents were 
permitted to seek part-time rather than full-time employment. In the event that a lone parent 
did not engage with the activation process financial sanctions would be applied. On children 
turning fourteen-years-old lone parents would then be transferred onto Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, if social assistance was still required, thus requiring the lone parent to be available 
to work full-time.  
In a reversal of the minister’s pledge to delay full implementation of these reforms 
until a Scandinavian model of childcare was in place, from July 2013 to July 2015 the qualifying 
age limit would be reduced to seven, hence after July 2015 those with children aged above 
seven-years-old would no longer receive OPFP (TheJournal.ie, May 2013). Mogstad and 
Pronzato (2012) demonstrated the risks associated with this activation strategy in Norway, the 
model Ireland was following. Respectively, seven years after the first activation proposals 
regarding lone parents, a ‘work-first’ policy regarding lone parents was finally implemented 
within a mere three years of entering the Troika agreement, “we needed to make this reform 
and it was easier to make it in the context of a crisis” (Interview 19, February 2016). 
Lone parents were also activated through a second new payment, the Back to Work 
Family Dividend (BTWFD) announced in Budget 2015 which aimed “to compensate for the loss 
of welfare payments for unemployed parents who are returning to work” (DSP, 2014: 32). This 
payment lasted two years for those lone parents and long-term job seeking who had children 
and successfully secured employment or became self-employed from January 2015, without 
affecting entitlement or the rate of Family Income Supplement (DSP, Budget 2015a) received. 
On the termination of employment and a return to social welfare payments the BTWFD would 
cease to be paid (DSP, 2017). Lone parents in receipt of JST would be ineligible for this new 
payment. 
Further innovative crisis programmes were implemented with the introduction of 
Gateway, work placements under local authorities, Momentum, another new training 
programme, and JobsPlus a new employer subsidy scheme (DSP, 2013: 26). JobPath, the 
outsourcing of service delivery to private providers, was cited for implementation in 2015, it 
was to be “user-centred” (LMC, 2013: 7) and “seamlessly integrated into the Intreo Service” 
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so to retain a ‘one stop shop’ model of delivery (DSP, 2014: 21). A new “Better off in Work” 
statement was introduced for welfare claimants on engagement with Intreo stating the 
financial benefits of being in employment rather than dependent on the state (DSP, 2013: 23). 
Additionally, a new “overarching and appropriately resourced Employer Engagement 
Strategy” (LMC, 2013: 5) was created through the ‘Employers Charter’ as employers became 
a very important part of Ireland’s activation equation (Interview 18, February 2016). This 
committed Ireland’s largest companies to hiring 50% of its staff from the Live Register and 
participating in the upskilling of the unemployed (DSP, 2014: 17).  
 Policy remained notably absent in addressing the youth unemployment crisis. Budget 
2014 entailed further age differentiation to young people’s Jobseeker’s Allowance with new 
claimants aged eighteen to twenty-four years of age receiving a weekly payment of €100 (DSP, 
Budget 2014), previously €144. Those new claimants twenty-five years of age received a 
weekly payment of €144, previously €188, with increases to €188 per week once aged twenty-
six (ibid). Those aged eighteen to twenty-five who participated in the Back to Education 
Allowance Scheme would receive a weekly payment of €160 (ibid). Those below twenty-five 
no longer entitled to Jobseekers Benefit would receive the lower rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(ibid). As a by-product of this targeted activation, combined with the political perception that 
continuing emigration was a lifestyle choice for young people and “not being driven by 
unemployment at home”93 (TheJournal.ie, January 2012), the narrative surrounding the young 
unemployed changed to “the narrative of the scroungers” (Interview 21, February 2016). 
However, political pressure began to mount as young people started to resist welfare cuts 
through a “We’re Not Leaving” campaign (Irish Times, November 2013). 
 Respectively, over the course of the Troika agreement “a key achievement of the 
programme” was to establish an activation system to address unemployment (EC, December 
2013: 10), particularly long-term unemployment, as Europeanization became actively received 
by Ireland. As an interviewee observed, “it is remarkable to see the degree of commitment to 
the EU and EU processes” by Ireland (Interview 7, March 2015). Ultimately, “it is the particular 
Irish variant of the euro crisis” which has changed the Irish welfare state (Interview 15, 
December 2015). 
                                                          
93 University College Cork conducted a study which found more people were emigrating from 
employment then from unemployment (Glynn et al., 2013). 
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7.2.2 An Irish Guarantee for the Young Unemployed 
The acceleration of policy development also occurred at the EU level during the crisis 
with the rapid adoption of the EU’s Youth Guarantee under the Irish Presidency, as Barroso’s 
comments highlight, “it’s not common for Member States to adopt our proposals in six 
months” (EC Press Release, 2014). Despite having largely overlooked youth unemployment 
nationally, the policy was top of Ireland’s agenda as the state took presidency of the European 
Council in 2013 with jobs as a priority and the Youth Guarantee as a key area marked for 
progress (Ireland, 2013). Ireland seized the political opportunity afforded by the presidency 
“to take a lead at a European and international level” (Interview 21, February 2016) as the 
state reversed roles with the EU in leading EU social policy development.  
This was despite two uncharacteristic mismatches between Ireland and the EU. Firstly, 
there was an underlying reluctance in the Irish system to adopt the initiative due to the scale 
of the unemployment problem and young people representing “a relatively limited part of 
that”94 (Interview 15, December 2015). Ultimately, Ireland viewed youth unemployment as “a 
problem that will solve itself” (Interview 21, February 2016). Secondly, while Ireland was 
irrefutably positive and compliant to EU policy, national resistance emerged in adopting the 
EU wide initiative as the EU Youth Guarantee espoused the older pre-crisis model of activation 
policy with a focus on training and education95. Hence, the Youth Guarantee directly conflicted 
with PTW (Interview 21, February 2016). Accordingly, similar to Britain, the EU Youth 
Guarantee became interpreted as supporting “what we had already determined was the 
appropriate practice for Ireland” (Interview 18, February 2016). 
Nevertheless, the EU’s Youth Guarantee was seemingly adopted by Ireland as the EU 
required (EC, July 2013: 30). However, with the state turning to the OECD for an appropriate 
model a ‘work-first’ approach was once again promoted. The OECD recommended an 
“escalator-style approach” (OECD, 2014: 23) from low intensity activation supports to high 
intensive interventions with different phases treating different cohorts of the young 
unemployed at different times. The first phase involved treating those already four months 
                                                          
94 This was one of the big misconceptions in the crisis whereby “contrary to the volume of discussion, 
youth unemployment is not where the large numbers are, accounting for only 13% of those who are 
long-term unemployed and 21% of the overall figure” (Interview 14, November 2015).  
95 “to ensure that within 4 months of leaving school or becoming unemployed, every young European 
gets a good offer for a job, education or training. If there is one main lesson to draw from experiences 
in Member States it is that the better educated and the better trained young people are, the lower 
unemployment is” (EC Press Release, 2013d).  
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unemployed with a low PEX score through inexpensive interventions (OECD, 2014: 22) namely, 
an enhanced PTW with participation on JobBridge and JobPlus (OECD, 2014: 25).  
The implementation of intensive supports from the very outset was seen as 
unnecessarily expensive, particularly in light of the ongoing incremental recovery of the youth 
labour market (OECD, 2014: 23). The second phase would start at different times for different 
PEX scores, with the OECD suggesting a nominal start of nine months after the first phase, for 
those youth remaining unemployed with continued entitlement to benefits dependent on 
participation in the Youth Guarantee (OECD, 2014: 23-24). A third treatment phase would 
eventually be created for those who were long-term unemployed and had additional barriers 
to employment, such as health conditions or addiction (OECD, 2014: 23). It was recommended 
that the Irish Youth Guarantee should be targeted at those receiving unemployment benefits, 
meanwhile those young and unemployed not on benefits would be incrementally 
incorporated into the Guarantee (OECD, 2014: 27). 
Respectively, this provided Ireland with multiple chances of activating young people 
without claimants repeating activation programmes which had been unsuccessful the first 
time around (ibid). The OECD proposed that Ireland invested more into post-programme 
support which it deemed as underdeveloped (OECD, 2014: 32). The OECD recommended that 
young lone parents should be included within a Youth Guarantee but on a voluntary basis and 
with access to all supports under the Guarantee (OECD, 2014: 25). 
The Irish government “tried to cherry-pick” the EU Youth Guarantee (Interview 21, 
February 2016), ultimately implementing a “tailored version” of PTW for young people 
(Interview 18 February 2016). There were significant financial sanctions and a more stringent 
mutual commitment agreement to reflect the “higher level of engagement and commitment” 
expected to the activation process (DSP, January 2014: 20). In return, the DSP committed to 
providing an offer four months after the one-to-one interview (DSP, January 2014: 19). Against 
the OECD’s proposals young lone parents and the disabled were excluded (Interview 20, 
February 2016). 
Further age differentiation was introduced with those under the age of eighteen, 
unemployed and without secondary education provided “a quality ‘second chance’ 
educational/training pathway outside the school system” (DSP, January 2014: 11). Those aged 
nineteen to twenty-four would be provided job search assistance or “a quality offer of training, 
education or work experience” (ibid). Following the OECD model, Ireland would treat those 
with low PEX scores first and after nine months those who had a medium and high PEX score 
211 
 
would be incorporated and provided a quality offer (DSP, January 2014: 11-12). Those under 
twenty-five unemployed for more than a year were prioritised for engagement in 2014 with 
an offer of a work experience programme four months after registering under the Guarantee 
(DSP, January 2014: 21). Hence, the Irish Youth Guarantee’s “priority was to get young people 
off the Live Register” (Interview 20, February 2016). Adopting the OECD’s recommendation 
for post-programme support there would be a further one to one meeting with a case offer 
on completion of an activation programme (DSP, January 2014: 19). 
Respectively, adaptations were made to pre-existing activation programmes, such as 
JobsPlus where the qualifying period for employers was reduced from twelve to four months 
(DSP Press Release, November 2014), and activation places were ring-fenced (DSP, February 
2015a). One new programme was created, Experience Your Europe which assisted young 
people attaining an internship, apprenticeship or employment in another EU state (DSP, 
February 2015c). Hence, while the EU Youth Guarantee failed to create national policy 
specifically to address youth unemployment it successfully placed a focus on the needs of the 
young in Ireland for the first time in the crisis (Interview 22, February 2016). Additionally, the 
EU funded pilot was held in Ballymun an area traditionally possessing a large contingent of 
unemployed with an unemployment rate “four times the national average” (ibid). The EU pilot 
provided Ireland the capacity to “pilot something that was more innovative” than what was 
currently on offer (ibid). As the majority of interviews overwhelmingly concur, “Ireland would 
not have piloted the scheme if we had had to invest in it” (Interview 13, November 2015). 
 Phase 3: The Rise of the ‘Celtic Phoenix’96 and Resurrection of Irish 
Employment (2015-2017) 
‘Crisis stability’ has embedded into the Irish system with minor moments of ‘crisis 
diversity’ as Ireland’s recovery has seen the unemployment level decrease to 8.8% for 
unemployment in general and 19.2% for youth unemployment in December 2015 (CSO, 2016). 
In stark contrast to previous economic crises, “this time around unemployment started to fall 
before economic growth started at all” signifying that, while not all attributable to the new 
activation policy, “activation doesn’t appear to have done any harm” (Interview 18, February 
2016). From the EU level, Ireland was perceived as a “good pupil” for implementing all the 
reforms the Troika had demanded (Interview 7, March 2015). However, while the student was 
good inside the classroom, outside it was a very different story. 
                                                          
96 (The Economist, November 2015) 
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The new activation system, deemed by some to be a “low-road” of activation policy 
(Murphy, 2016), remained in place. However, in the absence of the threat from the fiscal and 
unemployment crisis the present phase has arguably witnessed a retreat on lower rate welfare 
payments and the strict conditionality on welfare benefits introduced during the crisis. There 
has been a striking return to increasing weekly benefit payments in Budget 2017 by €5 
inclusive of Jobseekers Benefit, Jobseeker’s Allowance and OPFP with this increase in payment 
in addition to the reinstated Christmas bonus (DSP, Budget 2017). The bonus was abolished in 
the run up to the crisis and has been reintroduced since Budge 2015 increasing from 25% (DSP, 
Budget 2015b) to 85% by Budget 2017 (DSP, Budget 2017).  
Additionally, the replacement of JobBridge is a case in point. The new national 
internship scheme has a new focus on skills and training, providing a national work experience 
programme as recommended by the Labour Market Council (LMC, 2016). The new programme 
would be based on voluntary participation, provide an equivalent payment to the national 
minimum wage for undertaking the scheme, and a “greater emphasis on skills development 
for interns” (LMC, 2016: 4). Similarly, there has been a loosening of conditionality on lone 
parents since Ireland’s exit from the Troika agreement. 2015 saw the successful completion of 
the OPFP activation reforms with those remaining lone parents on OPFP transferring to 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, JST and Family Income Supplement if they had a child seven-year-old 
or older thus providing “enhanced access” to activation services (DSP, 2015: 39). However, 
following recommendations from a report by the Joint Committee on Social Protection 
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2017), which was supplemented with the evidence from the study 
by Millar and Crosse (2016), Budget 2016 (DSP, Budget 2016) and Budget 2017 (DSP, Budget 
2017) stipulated increases in income disregards for OPFP and JST. Accordingly, “the change 
has been less intense then policy actors intended because there was quite successful 
campaigning” (Interview 13, November 2015). 
The national resistance also continued in regard to the EU’s Youth Guarantee, with 
the rejection of substantial and significant policy lessons produced by the Ballymun Youth 
Guarantee pilot (see Delvin, 2015; DSP, February 2015b; Duggan et al., 2015; Carroll, 2015). 
Consequently, the national rollout of Ireland’s Youth Guarantee continued to adopt an 
enhanced PTW strategy. As such, further adjustments to pre-existing programmes have been 
made through the creation of JobsPlus Youth, a youth stream of the JobsPlus employer 
incentive scheme to encourage employers to hire young unemployed people (DSP Press 
Release, February 2015). Additionally, a new programme First Steps, which is a work 
experience and training programme for young people, was also launched (ibid). The NYCI has 
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been highly vocal in its dissatisfaction with the rollout of a national Youth Guarantee and 
particularly the lack of a partnership approach by the DSP (NYCI, 2016), and was highly vocal 
on the EC’s report which claimed positive results in Ireland from the national Youth Guarantee 
(NYCI Press Release, 2016; also see EC, 2016).  
Nonetheless, structural changes have remained in place as reflected in the continued 
resistance to the EU’s Youth Guarantee with the ‘work-first’ PTW strategy remaining the 
dominant approach to activation policy. Furthermore, the latest update to PTW2016-2020 
reflects the continuation of the new Europeanized, conditional, coercive activation system 
(DSP, 2016: 27-29) which thus appears to be a permanent feature on the Irish welfare to work 
landscape. As reflected in the renaming of the DSP to the Department of Employment and 
Social Protection (Irish Times, September 2017), which demonstrates the permanency and 
commitment to Ireland’s new, integrated activation strategy. Arguably, the MoU was stronger 
in Europeanizing the Irish system than both the EES and OMC (Murphy 2016: 16). Additionally, 
while rate changes to OPFP and JST for lone parents have been reversed the structural shift in 
the gender regime to “a much more mixed woman as-worker-mother-regime” (Interview 13, 
November 2015) has also remained. As an interviewee stated, “in terms of the crisis to date 
we have in a sense and to use a cliché turned it into an opportunity but we can probably only 
do that once.” (Interview 18, February 2016).  
 Conclusion: ‘Crisis Progression’ vs. ‘Crisis Diversity’ 
“The very notion of crisis involves both threat and change. Certainly, you can see that 
in the Irish case” (Interview 15, December 2015). The dual threat from the financial and 
employment collapse created the political will, previously absent, to radically reform the Irish 
activation system, creating a new coercive, conditional and integrated system of employment 
supports. The unemployment crisis was initially confronted by a muted response (‘crisis 
progression’) as the state’s lack of funds inhibited a policy response. EU funds afforded Ireland 
the opportunity to introduce innovative policy at an accelerated pace as EU demands were 
responded to in an archetypal, enthusiastic manner.  
Overdue, pre-crisis thinking was vigorously implemented as the unprecedented 
unemployment crisis was responded to by unprecedented changes to the Irish welfare system 
(‘crisis diversity’), comprising of tough measures “that were not easy for our culture” 
(Interview 17, January 2016). Over the course of the Troika agreement Ireland’s activation 
system was transformed from its ‘outlier’ status, and is today a state who “speaks out even 
more for these rules to be respected” (Interview 7, March 2015). Ultimately, substantiating 
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those findings in the thesis, this demonstrates the presence of a ‘crisis spectrum’ at play as 
Irish activation policy “across the crisis, moved from being ‘crisis progression’ to then ‘crisis 
diversity’” (Interview 19, February 2016). 
In reference to our original three questions: 
• Is ‘crisis diversity’ or ‘crisis progression’ occurring in the crisis response from 
national activation policy? 
• Does the crisis pattern identified within Irish activation policy and its 
interaction with EU social policy mirror that identified previously in Chapter 
5? 
• What has been the impact of the euro crisis on Ireland’s national social policy 
response in activation policy, and what does this tell us about the EU in ‘crisis 
mode’? 
Regarding Question 1:  In relation to the crisis pattern both ‘crisis diversity’ and ‘crisis 
progression’ are occurring within the crisis response from national activation policy. The key 
arguments for ‘crisis progressionists’ are: 
• The euro crisis has spilled over into employment policy creating a 
‘domino’ effect. 
• The euro crisis has spilled over from the EU to the national level, as 
the economic crisis became mirrored in both economic and social 
policy, initially inhibiting a crisis response in social policy and 
subsequently inhibiting the development of a new single working age 
assistance payment. 
In contrast, the key arguments for ‘crisis diversifiers’ are: 
• The euro crisis led to the Troika taking over the Irish state leading to 
significant Europeanization of Irish activation policy as the “Troika and 
OECD overlapped and Europeanisation [was] clearly evident” 
(Murphy, 2016: 11). 
• The euro crisis created the demand for long-standing policy proposals 
of activating lone parents and integrating employment supports as 
“the crisis has provided the opportunity to introduce polices which 
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would have been much more difficult to introduce in a non-crisis 
period” (Interview 24, April 2016). 
• The euro crisis unprecedentedly increased the role of the state in the 
social affairs of its citizens which served to “fasten its journey” 
(Interview 13, November 2015) towards an even more mixed welfare 
market model. 
• The crisis response has been dominated by an economic approach 
when “there’s many ways to solve a problem but at the moment the 
only way we are looking at it is from an economic perspective” 
(Interview 22, February 2016). 
• The threat of financial collapse and high unemployment rate led to 
decreases in welfare payments, without this threat welfare payments 
have steadily begun to increase again in the present recovery phase 
demonstrating how the euro crisis acted as a catalyst for policy 
change. 
For ‘crisis stabilisers’ the key arguments are: 
• Activation policy created in the crisis remains in place in the post-crisis 
period. 
• In a continuation from the historical development of the Irish welfare 
state, the demand for activation policy has emerged from EU 
membership through the Troika and Ireland’s MoU agreement, with 
a notable lack of national demand both pre-crisis and during the crisis 
period. 
• Again, in a continuation from the historical development of the Irish 
welfare state, economic policy has continued to dictate social policy’s 
expansion. 
• A Youth Guarantee was implemented in a previous crisis (Interview 
24, April 2016). 
Regarding Question 2: The pattern of ‘crisis diversity’ identified in Irish activation 
policy does mirror national social policy’s historical development (Chapter 5), and the national 
level within the euro crisis (Chapter 4). The fiscal crisis served to place a constraint on the 
welfare state in addressing Ireland’s unprecedented unemployment crisis, creating an 
existential threat to the state economically, politically and socially. ‘Crisis progression’ 
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emerged as the state lacked the finances to develop a policy response. This lack of finances, 
compounded by its marginalised role in social policy, led to a partnership of convenience, this 
time, with the Troika. Subsequently, ‘crisis progression’ provided the conditions upon which 
Europeanization was necessary, hence the crisis provided an opportunity for Ireland to 
Europeanize its activation policy and converge with EU practices. Thus, as had occurred 
historically, Ireland followed the trajectory of EU social policy, through converging with 
European practices, which was accelerated by the Troika as Ireland followed their demands 
for rapid policy development. The state accepted these demands for a swift response and 
significant policy change as “this change has been on the cards for quite a while” (Interview 
14, November 2015).  
Consequently, Ireland’s ‘passive’ activation system rapidly changed to a highly ‘active’ 
regime as the euro crisis was transformed from a significant threat to an opportunity, as 
Ireland adopted tried and tested models from EU member states and “customised them” 
(Interview 18, February 2016) to address their unemployment crisis. Thus, further 
substantiating Risse et al.’s (2001) contention that adaptation to EU policy occurs in national 
colours and demonstrating the presence of ‘horizontal’ Europeanization. Additionally, the Irish 
case corroborates Kühnhardt’s (2009) conception of EI as a contingent process of oscillation 
between challenge and response (2009: 3) with “courageous responses” required to transform 
a crisis into a new opportunity (2009: 10), as discussed in Chapter 3. Ultimately, ‘crisis diversity’ 
encouraged Europeanization as policy developments expedited the process of 
Europeanization and provided the opportunity for Europeanization which was essential for the 
survival of Ireland, and by implication, the EU.  
Ireland, once again, reversed roles with the EU as the state drove EU social policy 
under its presidency of the European Council, equally fostering accelerated policy 
development at the EU level as the EU’s Youth Guarantee became adopted by member states 
in a matter of months. Hence, the Irish case represents the middle of the spectrum as 
revitalisation was occurring both within the EU and Ireland in concurrence. Subsequently, 
providing further support for the claim that revitalisation is occurring along a spectrum as 
identified in Chapter 6. This also substantiates the presence of ‘bi-directional’ Europeanization 
identified in Chapter 4. 
Regarding Question 3: The euro crisis has very clearly facilitated the Irish crisis 
response within activation policy, as evidenced by the pattern of ‘crisis diversity’. Ireland used 
Europeanization as a defensive strategy to mitigate the destabilising effects of the crisis, 
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implementing overdue reforms to update their activation regime in order to respond and 
address rising unemployment. Irish social policy development was not inhibited, it was 
strikingly and significantly accelerated by the euro crisis as “the innovations in Ireland in the 
welfare sector, they were obvious things to do but they were enabled by the crisis” (Interview 
18, February 2016). Despite the EU system being in crisis, the EU governed Ireland’s economic 
and social policy, placing strict demands and conditions on policy development facilitating the 
establishment of a new activation system. Respectively, in accordance with the British case 
study, against the classical view of crises the Irish case demonstrates that the EU in ‘crisis 
mode’ does not mean the end of the EU. Irish activation policy has demonstrated how a crisis 
can mean a stronger EU, one that member states are even more committed to. Ultimately, 
the euro crisis is both a threat and an opportunity; the determining variable is the response 
from national actors within the state. 
The final chapter will now conclude by comparing the Irish and British case studies, 
drawing concluding observations and ultimately answering those questions this thesis aimed 








Conclusion: The Euro Crisis as a Threat 
and an Opportunity for Social Policy 
 
“The whole nature of crisis is that it can be both…If you have a crisis then that 
challenges the fundamental underpinnings of your system, be it a social system or 
any other system, so on the one hand it is a huge threat. On the other hand, in 
order to deal with such a crisis to the fundamental workings of a system you have 
to introduce change.” (Interview 15, December 2015) 
“I do not think the euro crisis will end the EU, I think it will be somewhere in between, mostly 
‘crisis progression’ with a few aspects of ‘diversity’.” (Interview 12, May 2015) 
 
This thesis has been motivated by the lively debate over the role of crises in the EU, exploring 
the juxtaposed perspectives of those who hold a traditional view of crises, purporting that 
crises are the potential death of the EU, and those who see them as contributing to the 
development of the EU, and possibly a stronger EU. The euro crisis was explored to see 
whether crises really are the death of the EU as many, in the media particularly, claim or 
whether we are in fact seeing a ‘crisis spectrum’ at play.  
The research has made three key contributions to the field of Europeanization theory, 
EU crisis literature and euro crisis literature respectively. Firstly, the thesis has applied 
Europeanization theory and examined the Europeanization process in a time of crisis. 
Europeanization theory emerged in a benign context and has primarily been considered in 
non-crisis times. The euro crisis initiated a movement in Europeanization research to explore 
the effect of a crisis on the Europeanization process (see Saurugger, 2014; Triandafyllidou, 
2014; Christou and Kyris, 2017; González, 2017; Windwehr, 2017). This thesis has contributed 
to this new theoretical discussion, taking Europeanization theory further than it has currently 
been applied by analysing new countries and new policy areas. In particular, the thesis has 
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examined the cases of Britain and Ireland, analysing the response from welfare policy to the 
free movement of EU nationals and within activation policy respectively. 
Secondly, the impact of the euro crisis was explored through the application of a novel 
‘crisis spectrum’ comprising of three crisis logics: ‘crisis progression’, ‘crisis diversity’ and ‘crisis 
stability’. These three novel crisis logics employed Europeanization theory to identify the type 
of crisis pattern occurring, to decipher whether policy was developing because of the euro 
crisis or was being inhibited by the euro crisis. Furthermore, to identify if and what type of 
Europeanization was occurring in the euro crisis. The thesis developed these logics on the 
premise that the EU is flexible and needs to be flexible to survive. Consequently, the thesis has 
provided a new framework with which to examine: the EU system in a crisis; the 
Europeanization process in crisis times; and Europeanization theory in crisis times. This has 
contributed to examining and conceiving the impact of crises on the EU in a way which has not 
been done before. 
Thirdly, the thesis has contributed to widening the euro crisis debate by looking at the 
crisis from a new and different perspective, namely from the perspective of social policy. Social 
policy was the instrument used to explore the impact of the euro crisis on the Europeanization 
process. This is a surrounding policy area which has been overlooked by academics due to the 
scholarly focus on the core crisis area of economic policy, as was demonstrated in Chapter 3. 
While the crisis literature on economic policy is important, the other side of the coin to 
economic policy is social policy. The economic literature is highly significant on account of the 
nature of the crisis, however it has omitted this interconnection and interdependence 
between the two policy areas. Yet, in practice underpinning social policy is monetary policy. 
Accordingly, this research is complimentary to the research already conducted within the 
economic field by providing an analysis of the impact of the euro crisis on the other side of the 
coin. 
Hence, it was equally important to look at the surrounding policy areas both for how 
the euro crisis has impacted on the rest of the EU system and for what it has demonstrated 
with regards to EI and European crises overall. This is a scholarly opportunity that has been 
underdeveloped. Thus, the thesis has examined the euro crisis from a different perspective to 
the majority, with the euro crisis literature having considered the impact of the euro crisis on 
the ESM and national welfare states as a collective. This is where the thesis has filled the gap 
in the current literature, bridging the literature on EU crises and the euro crisis in particular, 
with literature on social policy.  
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There were an array of (European) policy areas that could have been explored. Social 
policy was chosen as the instrument to explore the impact of the euro crisis on the 
Europeanization process due to two key features. Firstly, within crisis countries austerity 
programmes it was social policy which was being adjusted and regulated, acting as an 
important shock absorber in the crisis, as had consistently occurred at times of economic crisis. 
Secondly, in comparison to other policies, the jurisdiction over social policy had been highly 
contentious between member states and the EU. Thus, social policy was deemed an excellent 
litmus paper for testing the impact of crises on European policy responses as well as EU and 
member state policy interactions. Social policy’s treatment within the current crisis was telling 
for how the EU operates in ‘crisis mode’ and for how member states use Europeanization 
and/or de-Europeanization as either an opportunity or a defensive strategy against its 
debilitating effects. This focus on social policy led to two core research questions being posed: 
• What is the impact of crises within the EU on member states’ social policy 
responses?  
• How flexible and adaptable are member states?  
These broad research questions motivated three principal aims by which the impact of EU 
crises would be explored, these were: 
1. To explore if ‘crisis diversity’ is occurring in the euro crisis, demonstrating the presence 
of a ‘crisis spectrum’ which is currently being overlooked; 
2. To explore the role of crises in Europeanization and the resulting impact on national 
social policy; 
3. To explore the role of member states in the current euro crisis and by proxy, their role 
within the EI process. 
Ultimately, underpinned by Europeanization theory, this thesis aimed to identify the specific 
crisis patterns at the European, national and social policy levels as well as within specific areas 
of social policy to decipher whether the euro crisis really was the potential death of the EU. 
 Conclusions: “Crisis Proversity”97 
The dominant view of the euro crisis, particularly during its early stages, was one of a 
traditionalist view of crises with the collapse of the Eurozone leading to the collapse of the EU 
itself. The protagonists of ‘crisis progression’ expected to see events occurring in economic 
                                                          
97 (Interview 9, April 2015) “I would not see them as entirely separate and distinct from one another”. 
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policy mirrored within social policy. As social policy is so expensive the crisis in economic 
policy, in theory, should be undermining social policy. However, the findings from this 
research, by means of the three core aims, have illustrated that crises do not always occur in 
a ‘domino’ effect mechanically spreading to other connected policy areas, despite the 
dominance of this progressionist discourse in the euro crisis debate. Instead, the euro crisis 
created economic pressures which strained social policy, forcing a policy response and 
adjustment to the crisis leading to the development of social policy. Hence, the euro crisis has 
occurred along a ‘crisis spectrum’ with the crisis being both a threat and an opportunity.  
As the research incrementally analysed the EU system closer, ‘crisis diversity’ became 
an increasingly common feature of the euro crisis. Chapter 3 conducted a literature review of 
the European crisis debate on EU crises which countered this appearance of a dominant ‘crisis 
progressionist’ discourse. The chapter demonstrated that there was a growing number of 
‘crisis diversifier’ interpretations as the euro crisis progressed. Chapter 4 proceeded to 
examine the crisis pattern occurring in the initial period of the euro crisis at the European and 
national levels. This chapter contributed to providing support for those ‘crisis diversifiers’ 
identified in the previous chapter, elucidating that ‘crisis progression’ was not the order of the 
day in the euro crisis, despite the domineering media narrative. While the EU level was 
displaying a pattern of ‘crisis progression’, the national level was exhibiting ‘crisis diversity’ 
which was bubbling away underneath the surface of the crisis.  
It was argued that the predominant perception of ‘crisis progression’ was a media 
creation through an EU-centric focused analysis which overlooked national activity. The 
analysis demonstrated a role reversal between member states and the EU by virtue of the two 
disparate crisis patterns. This allowed a ‘crisis cushion’ to form whereby national crisis 
responses were automatically and unconsciously resolving national issues in conjunction with 
the EU. Thus, reinforcing the EU’s structure and ensuring its survival. The states were identified 
as flexibly, in an uncoordinated fashion, prohibiting the perpetuation of ‘crisis progression’ 
through this role reversal.  
Chapter 5 examined the system more closely analysing the crisis pattern within both 
the historical development of EU social policy and national social policy in Britain and Ireland, 
and the crisis period. The chapter further displayed a mixed pattern of ‘crisis progression’ and 
‘crisis diversity’ as pre-crisis moments of ‘crisis diversity’ were recurrently borne out of ‘crisis 
progression’, with crises acting as a catalyst for the development of EU social policy and 
national social policy. The chapter found that, due to the identical crisis patterns, historically 
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Britain and Ireland had flexibly reversed roles with the EU and drove social policy’s 
development at times when EU social policy was stifled. Thus, maintaining the development 
of and concurrently reviving EU and national social policy. Moreover, by exploring the different 
British and Irish social policy responses in the crisis the chapter argued that a uniformed, 
mechanical crisis of ‘crisis progression’ was not able to occur in the absence of a uniformed 
structure at either the EU or national level. 
The thesis finally conducted its closest examination of the EU system through 
exploring the crisis pattern within specific areas of national social policy. Chapter 6 explored 
the crisis response from British welfare policy. This examined how welfare policy mechanisms 
in control of the state were used to manage the welfare entitlement of EU nationals, in the 
context of EU free movement where national immigration policy is invalid and a highly divisive 
national immigration debate. Meanwhile, Chapter 7 analysed Irish activation policy. For 
Britain, the initial threat from ‘crisis progression’ was actively harnessed by national actors for 
their own agendas meanwhile, an uncharacteristically rigid response emerged from the EU 
fostering ‘crisis stability’ within free movement. Thus, creating an area of stability within a core 
EU policy area and containing the euro crisis within the EU structure. This subsequently 
created a significant period of ‘crisis diversity’ in British welfare policy as the 2010 to 2015 
Conservative (led coalition) government utilised the threat of public concern over the social 
impact of the free movement of EU nationals on the welfare state to create innovative national 
social policy.  
Nonetheless, Britain was unable to reverse roles with the EU as it had historically, 
testifying to revitalisation also occurring along a spectrum. The British case demonstrated one 
end of this spectrum. Although Britain attempted to revitalise the EU with no significant effect 
on the state, in actuality the EU’s rejection of Britain’s policy meant changes at the national 
level had no significant effect on the EU. Hence, even in one state and one specific area of 
social policy there were various complex processes and different crisis patterns occurring at 
different times, simultaneously. 
The Irish case contributed to providing clear evidence for a ‘crisis spectrum’ at play 
with the response to the unprecedented unemployment crisis moving up the spectrum from 
‘crisis progression’ to ‘crisis diversity’. The chapter demonstrated how the constraint on the 
welfare state from the fiscal crisis created an existential threat to the state. The events 
predicted by protagonists of ‘crisis progression’ came into realisation as Ireland’s lack of funds 
undermined the development of social policy. Nonetheless, social policy was not undermined 
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for long as the Troika took control of the state and Ireland turned the euro crisis from a 
significant threat into an opportunity to implement overdue reforms to their welfare state. 
This led to the creation of a new ‘active’ activation system to address unemployment. 
Ireland also seized the opportunity, through the EU presidency, to reverse roles with 
the EU and drive the European response to youth unemployment. Hence, the Irish case 
represented the middle of the spectrum as revitalisation occurred concurrently within the EU 
and Ireland. The euro crisis afforded Ireland an opportunity to converge with EU practices 
which it actively embraced, as the Europeanization process and the implementation of pre-
crisis policy proposals were accelerated by the crisis during an extensive period of ‘crisis 
diversity’. Accordingly, it can be seen how both those contrasting crisis perspectives are 
equally overlooking the larger ‘crisis spectrum’ of possibilities for what is happening in the 
euro crisis.  
Ultimately, while there are elements of ‘crisis progression’ in the euro crisis, this is not 
the domineering crisis pattern as many media and political commentators purported. Instead, 
‘crisis diversity’ has featured significantly in the euro crisis, borne out of the threat from ‘crisis 
progression’. Hence, rather than being opposed to one another these two perspectives are in 
tension to one another with a spectrum of possibilities between them. Academics and political 
commentators alike are merely seeing one end of the spectrum, one part of a highly complex 
and interdependent picture of the euro crisis. 
 Implications: National Impact and Response to the Euro Crisis 
 It is acknowledged that this thesis only compared the two cases of Britain and Ireland. 
Hence, to attain a fuller picture of the impact from the euro crisis on social policy responses it 
would be necessary to analyse a greater number of the twenty-seven member states available 
and a greater number of policy areas. Nonetheless, the case studies of Britain and Ireland 
appear to imply a disparate impact from the euro crisis on member states’ social policy 
responses, with different parts of the ‘crisis spectrum’ activated at different times and in 
different ways. 
 Regarding the first research question: What is the impact of crises within the EU on 
member states’ social policy responses? In both cases, the euro crisis facilitated national social 
policy responses. The euro crisis sustained and accelerated Europeanization in Britain and 
Ireland respectively, resulting in significant innovation for national social policy in both 
member states. However, in both the British case and the Irish case the euro crisis initially 
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constrained national social policy’s response to the crisis creating the conditions for the 
economic crisis to translate into a significant social crisis. In Britain, the national social 
response to the political and public concern over the payment of welfare benefits to inactive 
EU nationals was constricted by the EU’s rigid defence of free movement. This in turn created 
a further threat as a national referendum on EU membership was held as a by-product of the 
‘misfit’ between the conceptions of national and EU citizenship in the crisis conditions.  
In Ireland, a simultaneous fiscal and unemployment crisis was experienced as 
“economic misfortune [spilled] over immediately into social policy” (Interview 17, January 
2016) in a ‘domino’ effect. The economic collapse threatened a corresponding social collapse 
as the state was unable to administer welfare benefits as they had typically to facilitate people 
moving from welfare to work on account of the scale of the unemployment crisis and the 
constraint on finances. Nonetheless, ‘crisis progression’ did not overwhelm the system and 
impede national social policy’s development rather, a response was incited from within British 
welfare policy, and similarly from Irish activation policy.  
However, there were disparate impacts from the euro crisis on British and Irish social 
policy responses to Europeanization. In the former, the state attempted to de-Europeanize 
national social policy, moving away from servicing the principle of free movement by 
restricting EU nationals’ entitlements to British welfare benefits to de-incentivise EU nationals 
taking residence in the state. The EU retained this core area of Europeanization despite the 
unprecedented challenges from Britain, hence leading to ‘Brexit’. Contrastingly, the euro crisis 
simultaneously accelerated Europeanization in Ireland as the demand for new activation 
policy created a corresponding opportunity for Ireland to converge with EU activation policy 
practices, under the direction of the Troika and as recommended historically by the OECD. 
Arguably this demonstrates how Eurozone membership enhanced the transformation of the 
domestic arena to the EU system, as economic integration required social integration for 
economic purposes as “all their [EU] focus during the crisis was on economics” (Interview 21, 
February 2016), which in the context of the bailout was inescapable. In contrast, Britain 
outside of the Eurozone had the flexibility to impede the transformation of the national level. 
Hence, as Risse at al. (2001) claimed in regard to Europeanization in non-crisis times in Chapter 
2, adaptation to the EU in the euro crisis occurred in national colours, which in turn advanced 
the development of national social policy.  
Additionally, this incongruent impact from the euro crisis is exemplified by the fact 
that EU free movement did not become an issue in Ireland despite their higher unemployment 
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level, a similar austerity policy, and similarly implementing radical reforms to their welfare 
benefits which resulted in severe cuts for the young in particular. The Irish state was 
overwhelmingly positive towards EU free movement hence the potential negative 
consequences were not considered. Furthermore, the state had a history of emigration and a 
highly international labour market. Hence, it can be seen how the pre-crisis social policy 
relationship between the EU with Britain and Ireland was consistent during the euro crisis. 
Britain’s antagonistic relationship with EU social policy became non-existent as Britain 
disengaged through the rejection of EU free movement from the national social structure, 
followed by EU membership. Ireland retained its enthusiastic relationship as the state 
continued to follow the trajectory of EU social policy. Notably the occurrence of ‘Brexit’ has 
been a significant and lasting change from the euro crisis in Britain’s relationship with the EU 
as the euro crisis enhanced Britain’s Eurosceptic disposition. The implications of ‘Brexit’ are 
discussed within the postscript which follows this chapter. 
Regarding the second research question: How flexible and adaptable are member 
states? Member states are highly flexible and adaptable depending on the policy area and 
national conditions. The case studies exhibit a divergence in the flexibility and adaptability of 
Britain and Ireland in response to the euro crisis. Chapter 4 demonstrated how the EU’s 
flexibility originates from the diverse and autonomous policy activity of member states. The 
national crisis response differed from the EU’s crisis response, with the resolution of national 
issues unconsciously reinforcing the EU’s structure and allowing the system to continue to 
operate and exist. Thus, saving the EU from the euro crisis by means of ‘crisis integration’ 
which was creating a revived EU from the crisis.  
Chapter 5 illustrated how a crisis pattern of ‘crisis progression’ recurrently leading to 
‘crisis diversity’ historically facilitated the member states flexibly reversing roles with the EU 
at times when EU social policy was stifled. This revitalisation of EU social policy facilitated EU 
and national social policy’s progress. Hence, member states have historically facilitated the 
process of Europeanization and the EI process alike providing flexibility and adaptability to the 
EU system in those policy areas that are intended moreover, required to be flexible. The case 
studies demonstrate the limits of this flexibility moreover, how revitalisation of the 
EU/member states does not occur in a uniform manner rather it occurs along a spectrum, 
similar to the euro crisis. 
The British case represents a rigid crisis response in adapting to the EU, showing the 
limits of member states’ flexibility. Paradoxically, by responding in such a rigid fashion Britain 
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assisted in reinforcing the EU structure as EU officials and member states united over Britain’s 
opposition to EU free movement, something the euro crisis itself had failed to do. Once it 
emerged that the EU would not be flexible over free movement rules, even with the impending 
national referendum over EU membership, Britain exited the union rather than responding 
flexibly to the rigidity of free movement and participating in the Europeanization process. 
Hence the British case illustrates the inflexibility of a state when EU policy challenges and 
infringes upon historical national identity, administrative styles and institutional structures. 
Contrastingly, the Irish case represents a flexible crisis response in adapting to the EU 
as both the EU and national levels were concurrently revitalised. This enabled Ireland to adopt 
the much-needed tougher activation measures which ultimately rescued the EU by assisting 
in the financial re-stabilisation of the Eurozone. In turn, the EU level was also revitalised as 
Ireland was successful in flexibly reversing roles with the EU, similarly accelerating EU social 
policy through the rapid adoption of the EU’s Youth Guarantee in response to 
unprecedentedly high EU-wide youth unemployment levels. Consequently, Europeanization 
was both reinforced and reinvigorated in the Irish case through the simultaneous revitalisation 
of EU and national social policy.  
These varying degrees of flexibility again demonstrate the impact of Eurozone 
membership on national crisis responses. Ireland was able to be flexible in response to the 
crisis with being economically integrated and possessing a social system which emulated EU 
social policy. Britain had retained its national economic policy and was thus equally defensive 
over its national social structure creating a more rigid response to crisis conditions. 
Accordingly, Eurozone membership provided Ireland with greater flexibility in responding to 
the crisis hence, providing the state with greater power than if they acted independently. After 
all, it was only with the demand from the EU that a new ‘active’ activation policy was 
implemented, independently this had proven difficult to enact.  
Hence, concurring with the findings in Chapter 4, these diverging responses from Britain 
and Ireland arguably helped to save the EU in the euro crisis namely, Ireland reinforced and 
revitalised the Europeanization process when it was under significant attack at the core from 
Britain. Ultimately this illustrates how revitalisation also occurs along a spectrum with 
revitalisation occurring both ways and on a continuum. Thus, demonstrating the flexibility of 
member states to respond in a number of different ways to a crisis. At one end of the spectrum 
there is revitalisation of member states with no significant effect on the EU (attempted by 
Britain), while at the other end there is revitalisation of the EU with no significant effect on 
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member states (British case). In the middle there is revitalisation of both the EU and member 
states either in concurrence or not at all (Irish case). 
 Implications: EU Impact and Response to the Euro Crisis 
8.3.1 Theoretical Implications: Europeanization in Crisis Times 
Europeanization theory has gone further than traditional EI theory, explaining the 
impact of the euro crisis on EI at the European and national level, analysing the role of national 
institutions during adaptation and examining Britain and Ireland’s individual crisis responses 
to the Europeanization process. The findings from the research overwhelmingly demonstrate 
that the process of Europeanization was not inhibited by the euro crisis, thus providing 
evidence in support of ‘crisis diversifiers’ that not all crises occur in a uniform, mechanical 
fashion signalling the death of the EU. In the euro crisis there was simultaneous convergence 
(Ireland) and divergence (Britain) to EU social policy, as occurs in non-crisis times, illustrating 
the utility of Europeanization theory beyond traditional EI theories and how integration is a 
process rather than an end product.  
This occurred through both ‘bi-directional’ Europeanization, which was found to be 
occurring throughout the different governance and policy levels, and ‘horizontal’ 
Europeanization in the Irish case. Thus, demonstrating the obsolescence of unidirectional 
approaches to examining the process of Europeanization and the impact of Eurozone 
membership, as Ireland was able to ‘download’ and customise activation policies from its 
fellow member states. Moreover, this demonstrates how the Europeanization process does 
not involve the continual presence of EU involvement and why the term ‘EU-ization’ (Bulmer 
and Burch, 2005: 863) was rejected in favour of ‘Europeanization’ from the outset of this 
thesis. 
 Europeanization theory has provided further original insights into the politics of the 
EI process at a time of crisis. The research has shown how the Europeanization process 
becomes politicised during a crisis, as discussed in Chapter 5. Britain saw the process of 
Europeanization become subject to competing discourses, with a fervent Eurosceptic 
discourse in the euro crisis as a result of the economic and political crises, confirming Buller’s 
(2006) explanation for the Europeanization process causing political tension as discussed in 
Chapter 2. An EU-enthusiast such as Ireland similarly saw a politicisation of the EU with the 
euro crisis stimulating a debate over the lack of a debate and discussion over joining the euro. 
This creates the conditions for a debate to be had over EU social policy as the state becomes 
more self-aware of its EU membership as a result of the euro crisis.  
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Ultimately, the euro crisis has fostered a strengthening of Europeanization within EU 
social policy due to both a threat (Britain) and an opportunity (Ireland) leading to acceleration 
and consolidation of the Europeanization process. Hence, the British and Irish case studies 
suggest that Europeanized policy areas are able to be strengthened at crisis times, 
consequently reinforcing the EU politically and operationally at a time of unprecedented 
uncertainty and instability. Respectively, while Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2015) were 
concerned with the euro crisis threatening the advancement of EI, this research has shown 
how the EI process is more robust than is commonly assumed in crisis times. Moreover, this 
threat to the EI process is precisely what is advancing the EI/Europeanization process in crisis 
times, albeit on a nationally tailored and nationally contingent basis. 
8.3.2 Crisis Implications: The EU System in Crisis Times 
The case studies are telling for how the EU operates in a crisis. The findings from the 
research lead this thesis to infer that the EU system did not shut down in the euro crisis, rather 
it continued to operate, arguably in a more enhanced role in comparison to non-crisis times 
with the euro crisis providing a new raison d’être for the EU. In the Irish case the EU was a 
facilitator for policy ideas and development meanwhile, in the British case the EU was an 
arbitrator attempting to prevent a fallout from the debate over the principle of free 
movement. Thus, reflecting the EU’s flexibility in the euro crisis, “the European Union has been 
in a number of different modes in different countries depending on what stage they are at for 
economic turbulence” (Interview 3, December 2014).  
Nonetheless, while this thesis is premised on the EU as a flexible system and one that 
needs to be flexible to survive, in the British case stability was of equal importance to the EU 
system. In particular, stability within core EU policy areas, such as free movement, allowed the 
rest of the system to remain amenable with flexibility in these core areas creating a bigger 
crisis than that already occurring. By implication, the EU is only flexible because of these core 
areas of stability. Moreover, the British case shows how some national actors hold a traditional 
view of EU crises. A sub-cohort of British actors assumed the euro crisis was a time of weakness 
in which to regain back the areas of power it had conceded to the EU in previous years. Thus, 
resolving the Europe question in Britain and reducing the political power of the Eurosceptic 
fractions in the Conservative party once and for all. Conversely, as aforementioned, the euro 
crisis facilitated the strengthening of the EU system through the simultaneous defence of 
Europeanization in Britain and expansion of Europeanization to Ireland. This expansion of 
Europeanization in the euro crisis ascribes to Lefkofridi and Schmitter’s (2015) definition of a 
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‘good’ crisis in Chapter 3 as the crisis raised an opportunity for Ireland to make “their collective 
agreement ‘spill-over’ into previously untreated or ignored areas” (2015: 6).  
Ultimately, the two case studies of Britain and Ireland demonstrate how the euro crisis 
is not merely a story of ‘crisis progression’ with the EU on the brink of disintegration. Instead, 
supporting the growing contingent of academics viewing EU crises and the euro crisis in 
particular within a positive framework, we are in fact seeing a ‘crisis spectrum’ at play with 
both ends of the spectrum, disintegration and a strengthening of the EU, in contention with 
one another at crisis times with the former driving the latter. As an interviewee commented, 
“I would not talk about ‘crisis progression’ and a uniform effect…I do not see a unilateral effect 
which is affecting all areas of EU policy making” (Interview 7, March 2015). The euro crisis 
facilitated the development of national social policy in different ways through different 
processes demonstrating how the location of a crisis on the ‘crisis spectrum’ is contingent 
upon those different dynamics at the time. Arguably, based on these research findings, the 
conceptualisation of crises as a threat to the EU needs to be reconsidered as the processes 
from the impact of the euro crisis are more complex than the traditional view of crises account 
for. 
 Future Research 
 The analysis within this thesis has demonstrated the flexibility in utilising the three 
crisis logics by way of application in two different EU states, with different relationships to the 
EU, and two different areas of social policy. Due to the eclecticism of these logics there are a 
number of further areas of scholarship which merit further study. The first of these areas 
would be to explore further the impact of the euro crisis on other EU member states, 
particularly another crisis country such as Greece to compare against those findings in this 
thesis from Britain and Ireland. It would also be of exploratory value to apply these crisis logics 
to different crises, both those from the past and those that occur in the future, so to identify 
the impact(s) of different crises in comparison to the euro crisis. This would assist in identifying 
whether the euro crisis has been a one-off occurrence or whether there are discernible themes 
and features which are consistent throughout those EU crises that have occurred so far. This 
thesis only looked at the euro crisis in isolation, hence a comparative study between crises is 
of further interest to provide a more holistic picture of how crises impact the EU. The 
postscript which follows this chapter demonstrates the scholarly value in applying these crisis 
logics to the current ‘Brexit’ crisis.  
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 In addition, there would be merit in further examining the impact of a crisis on the 
political culture and context of EU member states. This thesis merely touched upon those 
political debates in the British case, highlighting how the political environment altered due to 
the euro crisis and contributed towards ‘Brexit’, and the contrastingly less politicised 
environment of Ireland rather than being orientated towards this area. In Britain the state is 
disproportionately Eurosceptic in comparison to other member states and particularly in 
comparison to Ireland. As the British case in this thesis demonstrated, the highly politicised 
debate can be easily exploited by actors who have an interest in creating issues over non-
significant or minor policy matters as arguments all lead to an issue of sovereignty. In contrast, 
Ireland is located at the other end of the spectrum with being positively dispositioned towards 
the EU. By implication, an interest group with a particular issue is much more likely to arise, 
such as those who campaigned against the activation of lone parents during the crisis, rather 
than an issue over national sovereignty. Ireland accepted in the euro crisis that their 
sovereignty was temporarily devolved to the EU due to the mismanagement of economic 
policy. Hence, this thesis has indirectly shown the importance of the political context for the 
national crisis response and the interaction of member states with the EU during a crisis. 
 A final area of scholarship which merits further study is to further build upon Alan 
Milward’s seminal work The European Rescue of the Nation State (1992). Milward argued that 
the EU was built to ‘rescue’ the nation states and states perceived integration as the only path 
to national reassertion after the destruction of two world wars. By implication of this thesis 
exploring the impact of the euro crisis on national social policy crisis responses, the research 
found evidence to suggest Britain and Ireland’s disparate policy responses to the euro crisis 
helped to save the EU from disintegration. Furthermore, the thesis demonstrated how 
historically member states had recurrently reversed roles with the EU, revitalising EU social 
policy through national social policy. In turn, the case studies provided evidence 
demonstrating how this revitalisation occurred along a spectrum with member states 
exhibiting differing degrees of flexibility and adaptability. Consequently, it would be of 
particular value to explore whether this role reversal occurred in other policy areas and thus 
whether Milward’s process of revitalisation was a two-way process. An in-depth analysis could 
explore this revitalisation process within different policy areas as well as during both other 
crisis times and non-crisis times. It was not the aim of this thesis to explore Milward’s 
argument moreover, this thesis has only analysed one crisis period and one policy hence the 





‘Brexit’: The Beginning of the End or Only just 
the Beginning? 
 
“This isn’t one more crisis, this could very well be the crisis threatening its very existence.” 
(Francois Hollande, October 201698) 
“There is a lesson in Brexit not just for Britain but, if it wants to succeed, for the EU itself. Our 
continent’s strength has always been its diversity. And there are two ways of dealing with 
different interests. You can respond by trying to hold things together by force…that ends up 
crushing into tiny pieces the very things you want to protect. Or you can respect 
difference…and reform the EU so it deals better with the wonderful diversity of its member 
states.” (Angela Merkel, January 201799) 
 
Since this research was completed Britain has begun the process of leaving the EU after forty-
four years of membership. EU officials remained rigid over not reforming the principle of free 
movement leading David Cameron to renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the EU. Cameron 
then sought public assent of this new relationship in a national referendum held in June 2016, 
which was not granted. Subsequently, Article 50 has been triggered and there are now two 
years of negotiations over a ‘Brexit’ deal and the formation of a new relationship with the EU 
outside of the union. As Chapter 6 has demonstrated, arguably it was David Cameron’s political 
failure that led to Britain leaving the EU. The referendum was merely a rubber stamp for the 
dynamics that had already been set in motion. While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to 
discuss events that have occurred since this research was completed it is worth noting how 
the crisis logics explain ‘Brexit’ and what they expect to happen next. 
 The logic of ‘crisis diversity’ explains the occurrence of the ‘Brexit’ crisis as the result 
of the inflexibility of the EU. In the absence of the EU responding in a flexible manner to 
                                                          
98 (The Telegraph, October 2016) 
99 (The Daily Mail, January 2017) 
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Britain’s concerns over the principle of free movement, Britain has responded flexibly to the 
crisis conceiving a new and better relationship with the EU outside of the union. For ‘crisis 
diversifiers’, these events do not signal the end of the EU or Anglo-EU relations. Instead, it is 
the beginning of a new start for a more fruitful relationship for Britain and the EU alike by 
creating a new direction for the system without breaking the system to the point of collapse. 
Through Britain’s withdrawal the EU’s survival is assured as a ‘crisis cushion’ is formed 
whereby the divisive debates over free movement can occur with Britain within the ‘Brexit’ 
negotiations rather than the debate spreading across the EU among all the member states, 
causing ruptures and deep rooted political divisions within the union. Hence, the crisis over 
free movement is now contained within the ‘Brexit’ crisis and process thereby enabling the 
rest of the EU to carry on operating as normal while the ‘Brexit’ negotiations are ongoing. 
Respectively, what ‘crisis diversifiers’ would expect to happen next is for a new EU system to 
emerge underpinned by new mechanisms and dynamics, a new Anglo-EU relationship to be 
established, and a new system for the United Kingdom to materialise as Scotland takes the 
opportunity from this crisis to potentially attain its independence.  
Contrastingly, ‘crisis progression’ explains the occasion of ‘Brexit’ in more negative 
terms with it being the result of a ‘domino’ effect which is threatening the survival of the EU. 
For ‘crisis progression’ the ‘Brexit’ crisis has emerged due to the economic sovereign debt crisis 
in the Eurozone spilling over into the interconnected policy area of the principle of free 
movement. This has created social concerns over the principle as national crises and lack of 
jobs in numerous countries led to a response in free movement with an increase in EU 
nationals exercising their free movement rights. This crisis, in turn, has spilled over into the 
political issue of British membership to the EU due to free movement being embedded within 
member states’ EU membership. Hence, ‘Brexit’ was the inevitable outcome from the fall out 
over the principle of free movement, which has its origins within the sovereign debt crisis. This 
has arrested EU policy development, thus ultimately signalling the beginning of the end for 
the EU with the first ever member state exiting the union. Respectively, what ‘crisis 
progresionists’ would expect to happen next is for a swath of member states to similarly 
attempt a renegotiation of their relationships with the EU, for referendums to be held over 
their membership, and for a mass “stampede of member states [to go] towards the exit door 
that could see the EU crumble” (The Telegraph, October 2016). They would also expect to see 
a simultaneous “existential threat to the very idea of a United Kingdom” (McEwen, 2016: 22) 
with Wales pressing for independence following in Scotland’s path with the potential for both 
to leave the union and a period of ‘nationalsclerosis’ to ensue.  
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‘Crisis Stability’ explains the manifestation of ‘Brexit’ as the result of the EU defending 
the principle of free movement which, for ‘crisis stabilisers’, was essential for the EU’s survival. 
From the perspective of ‘crisis stability’ the principle of free movement had to be defended.  
Since the principle is a fundamental tenet of the EU structure, a transformation would have 
caused irreversible damage placing into question the rest of the fundamental freedoms which 
underpinned the functioning of the EU system. Hence, ultimately undermining the whole 
structure and operation of the EU system. Additionally, it was viewed as unnecessary and 
undesired by both the EU and other member states. Free movement provided a sphere of 
stability in a context of unprecedented uncertainty over the euro, Eurozone and, 
consequently, the EU itself. For ‘crisis stabilisers’, free movement was the anchor in a storm 
for the EU, keeping it down while other policy areas responded flexibly to the crisis ensuring 
the rigidity and stability of EU free movement. One of these policy areas to react flexibly was 
Britain’s policy stance over EU membership. Respectively, what ‘crisis stability’ would expect 
to see next is the EU system continuing to operate as normal, with the withdrawal of Britain 
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EU 
Europeanization and Crises 
 
Europeanization builds on MLG by accepting that 
there are multiple directions which can be taken 
(those which MLG introduces and discusses), 
however Europeanization focuses on these multiple 
directions, exploring and explaining them, labelling 
accordingly.  
  
Unlike MLG there are not 
endless possibilities and 
the EU is not assumed to 
be involved with every 
option taken, it is 
possible for the EU to be 
absent in the process of 
European Integration. In 
contrast to MLG, 
Europeanization 
emphasises the voluntary 
basis on which MS co-
operate and co-ordinate 






MS MS MS 
Member States turn towards the EU 




• Member states shift towards the EU and away 
from the state; states are no longer able to 
resolve issues at the domestic level 
• The “learning process” is heightened 
• States follow a “Logic of integration” 
• Political “Spill-over” occurs 
EU SUMMITS 
NON-EU MEMBER STATES 
EU 
Other non-EU states see the 
EU’s success. These states do 
not want to be isolated from 
the benefits. This leads to 
geographical “spill-over”.  
Thus, from the perspective 
of neo-functionalism crises 
are integrative, a 
constructive force that 



























States react with 
diverse responses 















































DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
Progress = opportunity 
EU acts as a scapegoat 
for unpopular domestic 
policies to tackle crisis. 
OPTION 2 
DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL 
No overlapping of 
interests/ no alignment. 
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC 
• Interests remain 
separate 
• No progress or 
European integration 



















Multiple options available for actors and/or states to take 
Member states turn to each other rather 
than EU 
Member states turn towards 
EU with lack of progress from 














Actors – low level political 
actors – turn towards each 
other. There is mutual 
dependence which is 
enhanced as negotiations 
heighten across the 
governance levels. 
Transnational associations 
form as a collective 
attempt to manage the 
crisis is created. 
Subsequently boundaries 
become less clear cut.  
European actors, member state actors, international actors and 
supranational actors all interact with one another. 
All three levels of governance – Domestic; European and 
International – co-ordinate and co-operate to manage the crisis. 
Negotiations take place at a high level of politics and with high 
level actors. 
There are multiple pathways 
according to actors’ actions. 
Opportunities and the range of 

















MLG implies deepening but 
does not imply automatic 
deepening like neo-
functionalism. In MLG, 
actors turn towards each 
other, but it does not 
necessarily imply that 
actors will encourage or 
participate in further 
integration. 
 
MLG implies deepening but 
does not imply automatic 
deepening like neo-
functionalism. In MLG, 
actors turn towards each 
other, but it does not 
The EU remains a key 
figure in the process. 
However, European 
Integration will occur 
only when necessary and 
when in the interests of 
the member state(s). 
MLG emphasises 
the multiple 
levels on which 








levels on which 
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